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Abstract 
 
The aim of this thesis is to determine the relationship between the individual and 
the community in Pauline theology, focusing the investigation specifically on these 
motifs in Romans. Previous Pauline scholarship has for most of the twentieth- and 
twenty-first centuries failed to recognize the integral connection between these 
two dimensions of Paul‖s thought, wrongly pitting either the individual or the 
community against the other. This investigation will present a typology of 
individuals in Romans in order to highlight the diversity of ways in which Paul 
thinks of individuals, as well as the necessarily communal location of these 
individuals. 
 Chapter one surveys recent Pauline scholarship on the question of 
individuals and community, noting that the dominant tone of this research is anti-
individual in its fundamental orientation. This chapter concludes with an outline of 
the entire dissertation. 
 Chapter two provides a detailed analysis of the debate that developed 
between Rudolf Bultmann and Ernst Käsemann over the role of the individual in 
Paul‖s letters. This debate set the agenda for the scholarship surveyed in Chapter 
one, and thus warrants a thorough treatment. 
 Chapter three brings the Stoic philosopher Epictetus into the conversation 
in order to provide a contemporary example of a thinker who, like Paul, attempted 
to do justice to both individual and communal/societal themes in his philosophical 
output. While Epictetus‖ way of relating the individual and the community is 
different from Paul‖s, it shows clearly that this is not an anachronistic question in 
antiquity, contrary to the claims of much Pauline scholarship. The comparison 
between Epictetus and Paul illuminates our understanding of Paul‖s theology even 
(perhaps especially) when it shows the different ways in which the two thinkers 
answered the same basic question, that of how to relate individuals and 
community/society. 
 Chapter four is the first half of the typology of individuals in Romans. It 
looks at four different types of individuals as they are found in Romans 2, 3 and 4: 
characteristic, generic, binary and exemplary individuals. Definitions of each type are 
offered as they are discussed. 
ii 
 
 Chapter five presents the second half of the typology of individuals in 
Romans, looking at four other types of individuals in Romans 5, 7, 12 and 16: 
representative, negative exemplary, somatic and particular individuals. While the 
communal nature of Pauline theology is evident in Chapter four, it becomes 
especially clear in Chapter five. 
 Finally, Chapter six summarizes the findings of the entire investigation, 
while also pointing to other Pauline texts that could be used to fill out the typology 
of individuals. Two main conclusions are enumerated. First, that both Paul and 
Epictetus place great emphasis on the individual and the individual‖s place within 
community or society, although Epictetus‖ concern for emotional invulnerability 
(seen in his prioritizing of individual, cognitive action) is in marked tension with 
Paul‖s more foundationally communal way of thinking. Second, filling out the 
second part of the point just mentioned, it is maintained that although Paul‖s 
theology must be understood as retaining a vital place for individuals, these are 
necessarily individuals-within-community, and that the prevalent scholarly antitheses 
between these two categories (on either side of the debate) are fundamentally 
misleading. 
  
iii 
 
Statement of Copyright 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be 
published in any format, including electronic, without the author‖s prior written 
consent. All information derived from this thesis must be acknowledged 
appropriately. 
  
iv 
 
Declaration 
 
This work has been submitted to the University of Durham in accordance with the 
regulations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It is my own work, and none of it 
has been previously submitted to the University of Durham or in any other 
university for a degree. 
  
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... i 
Statement of Copyright ........................................................................................................ iii 
Declaration .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................... v 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ viii 
Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................... x 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 
1. Exit the Individual: Recent Trends in Scholarship on the Individual and the 
Community in Paul‖s Letters ......................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Social-Scientific Anti-Individualism ..................................................................... 3 
1.2 Anti-Individualism in the Wake of the New Perspective on Paul ..................... 5 
1.3 Apocalyptic Anti-Individualism ........................................................................... 10 
1.4 The Return of Anthropology? .............................................................................. 12 
2. The Argument of this Thesis in Outline .................................................................... 15 
Chapter 2: The Debate over the Individual in Rudolf Bultmann and Ernst Käsemann
 ................................................................................................................................................. 18 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 18 
2. Rudolf Bultmann ........................................................................................................... 19 
2.1 The Individual: Exegetical Foundations ............................................................. 20 
2.1.1 Bodily Living: Created Humanity ................................................................. 20 
2.1.2 Fleshly Living: Boastful Humanity ............................................................... 24 
2.2 The Individual: Theological and Hermeneutical Constraints ......................... 27 
2.2.1 Theology is Anthropology ............................................................................. 28 
2.2.2 Faith, Kerygma and Demythologization ..................................................... 30 
2.2.3 Historical Skepticism and Dialectical Theology ......................................... 33 
2.3 The Individual-in-Community ............................................................................. 35 
2.4 Analysis .................................................................................................................... 38 
3. Ernst Käsemann ............................................................................................................ 41 
3.1 Christology .............................................................................................................. 42 
3.1.1 Christ is Lord ................................................................................................... 42 
3.1.2 Christ and Power ............................................................................................. 44 
3.1.3 Christ and Justification .................................................................................. 45 
3.2 Cosmology ............................................................................................................... 46 
3.2.1 The Two Ages................................................................................................... 46 
3.3 Community versus Individual? ............................................................................ 48 
3.3.1 The Community .............................................................................................. 49 
3.3.2 The Individual ................................................................................................. 50 
3.3.3 The Relationship Between the Community and the Individual .............. 52 
3.4 Analysis .................................................................................................................... 54 
3.4.1 Anthropology is not Denied .......................................................................... 54 
3.4.2 Tying the Threads Together: Christology, Cosmology, Ecclesiology and 
Anthropology .................................................................................................. 55 
3.4.3 The Rhetoric of Antithesis ............................................................................. 57 
3.4.4 Käsemann‖s Legacy: The Reception of his Apocalyptic Reading of 
δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ ............................................................................................. 60 
4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 66 
vi 
 
Chapter 3: Individual and Community in the Discourses of Epictetus ......................... 69 
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 69 
2. Individual and Community in Recent Scholarship on Stoicism ............................ 70 
3. Epictetus: Self and Society .......................................................................................... 76 
3.1 Preliminaries ........................................................................................................... 76 
3.1.1 Epictetus in Context ....................................................................................... 76 
3.1.2 The Goal of Epictetus‖ Ethics: Happiness through Progress in Personal 
Virtue ............................................................................................................... 78 
3.2 The Individual in Epictetus‖ Ethics ...................................................................... 82 
3.2.1 The Individual and Moral Progress (Diatr. 1.4 and 3.2) ............................. 82 
3.2.2 Summary: The Individual in Epictetus‖ Ethics ........................................... 95 
3.3 The Community in Epictetus‖ Ethics ................................................................... 98 
3.3.1 Is Self-Preservation Selfish? (Diatr. 1.19) ................................................... 102 
3.3.2 Self-Interest... For the Sake of All (Diatr. 2.22) .......................................... 104 
3.3.3 Body and Members (Diatr. 2.5) .................................................................... 106 
3.3.4 The Self and Duty (Diatr. 2.10) ..................................................................... 109 
3.3.5 The Contingency of the Communal (Diatr. 3.13) ...................................... 110 
4. Conclusion: A Community of Self-Interest? ........................................................... 114 
Chapter 4: Pauline Individuals (1) .................................................................................... 116 
1. Introduction: The Quest for the Pauline Individual .............................................. 116 
2. The Characteristic Individual and the Generic Individual (Romans 2) .............. 119 
2.1 The Characteristic Individual, or the Judging Judge (Romans 2:1-5, 17-25) 120 
2.2 To Each His Own: the Judgment and Justification of the Generic Individual 
(Romans 2:6-16) .......................................................................................................... 123 
2.3 Invisible Cutting and Impotent Commands: Heart Surgery and the Generic 
Individual (Rom 2:25-29) ........................................................................................... 128 
3. The Generic Individual (Romans 3) ......................................................................... 130 
3.1 The Law‖s Condemning Speech: Universal and Particular (Romans 3:9-20)
 ....................................................................................................................................... 130 
3.2 The Generic Individual: Faith and Fame (Romans 3:20-31) ........................... 132 
4. Summary: Characteristic and Generic Individuals in Romans 2-3...................... 135 
5. The Binary Individual (Romans 2-3) ........................................................................ 137 
6. The Exemplary Individual: Abraham our Father or the Ungodly Proselyte? 
(Romans 4) ................................................................................................................... 139 
6.1 Once Again, Where is Boasting? (Romans 4:1-8) ............................................. 142 
6.2 Who is Blessed? And When? (Romans 4:9-12) ................................................. 145 
6.3 Grace and Promise (Romans 4:13-17a) .............................................................. 147 
6.4 Abraham‖s Faith in a Faithful God (Romans 4:17b-25) ................................... 148 
6.5 Summary ............................................................................................................... 151 
7. Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................................... 152 
7.1 Summary ............................................................................................................... 152 
7.2 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 155 
Chapter 5: Pauline Individuals (2) .................................................................................... 157 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 157 
2. The Representative Individual (Romans 5) ............................................................ 158 
2.1 Adam and Christ (Romans 5:12-21) ................................................................... 158 
2.2 Summary ............................................................................................................... 164 
3. The Negative Exemplary Individual (Romans 7) ................................................... 165 
vii 
 
3.1 Paul‖s Vanishing Act: Autobiography and Impersonation in Romans 7:7-25
 ....................................................................................................................................... 165 
3.2 Echoes of Eden in the Law of Moses? ................................................................ 173 
3.3 Summary ............................................................................................................... 177 
4. The Somatic Individual (Romans 12) ....................................................................... 178 
4.1 Summary ............................................................................................................... 182 
5. The Particular Individual (Romans 16) ................................................................... 183 
5.1 Summary ............................................................................................................... 187 
6. Summary and Conclusion ......................................................................................... 187 
6.1 Summary ............................................................................................................... 187 
6.2 Conclusion: The Individual-within-Community ............................................. 188 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 190 
 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 198 
  
viii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Many people have made the completion of this dissertation possible. I could not 
even have dreamed of moving to England and undertaking a three year PhD 
program without the help of my family. To my parents, Steve and Laura Dunson, to 
my grandmother, Grace Fender and to my aunt, Barbara Chamberlain I am 
particularly indebted for the more than generous financial support that has made 
this all possible. The love and support of my family in so many ways is too great to 
adequately acknowledge here. 
 I am also very grateful for the generous financial support I have received 
from the Faculty of Westminster Theological Seminary during my time here, 
specifically for the funds I have received from the Ned B. Stonehouse Memorial 
Fund, the Edwin L. Jones Graduate Fellowship, the James H. Montgomery 
Scholarship, the Weersing Scholarship and the Edward J. Young Memorial Fund. 
 My supervisor, Professor Francis Watson has done much to make me a better 
scholar, but perhaps nothing has been as beneficial to me as the way he has taught 
me to be a careful reader of texts, both ancient and modern. His comments on my 
work as it progressed were always encouraging and deeply insightful. His own 
scholarly work in Pauline studies has had a very large impact on the way I approach 
Pauline theology, and has made me a far better reader of Paul than I ever would 
have been otherwise. I must also acknowledge my teachers at Westminster 
Theological Seminary, who taught me much over my four years there. I especially 
want to thank Richard Gaffin, whose teaching, writings and example have been an 
inestimable influence on me as a biblical interpreter and as a person. Much, if not 
most, of my understanding of Paul‖s letters stems from his influence. Carl and 
Catriona Trueman have been a great source of wisdom, friendship and support to 
me and my wife Martha during our time in the UK. Over the years Thomas Keene 
has also given me much wise advice and been a helpful sounding board for ideas, in 
addition to being a good friend. 
 My colleagues in the office at 37 North Bailey have made my time in Durham 
a true pleasure. I must especially thank my friend David Briones, whose friendship 
and encouragement have meant much to me these last few years. Dave kindly read a 
large portion of my dissertation and gave me much helpful feedback. Matthew 
Crawford, Wesley Hill, Jonathan Linebaugh, Orrey McFarland, Peter Orr and Lionel 
ix 
 
Windsor have not only been friends and stimulating lunchtime conversation 
partners, but have sharpened my thinking about Paul, theology and life in general 
in many ways. Dave, Wes and Jono offered extremely helpful feedback on earlier 
material I wrote that, while not ending up in this dissertation, made it possible for 
me to finally sort out how to make progress at a critical point in the research and 
writing process. A single conversation with Pete enabled me to see how finally to 
put all of the pieces together and finish the dissertation. I will truly miss the 
fellowship of that office. To the older guard of Durham, especially to John Goodrich 
and Ben Blackwell, I also wish to express my appreciation for their friendship and 
sage advice over the years. 
 Finally, I must express my utmost thanks for the love and support of my 
wonderful wife Martha. If it wasn‖t for her this project would have seemed 
pointless, and would not have happened anyway. She has encouraged me countless 
times when I felt like giving up. She has put my work in perspective too many times 
to count, and has been a wonderful travelling companion on our numerous 
“bentures,” which have always helped me recharge when feeling worn out by my 
work. My sons William (Liam) and Elliot have also been a constant source of joy and 
fun. My favorite part of every day for the last three years has been opening the door 
at 17:30 to be greeted by my wife and sons (except when the latter are hiding!). 
Many, many days, when the dissertation seemed to be going badly, the thought of 
this kept my spirits up. As I write these words, our third son, Calum is only three 
days old. I am thus happy to be able to include all three of my precious sons in these 
acknowledgements. 
 Of course I would be most ungrateful if I did not also offer a small token of 
thanks to the God who created me, saved me and who sustains me in all of life. 
 
 
Hamilton, Ontario, Canada 
November 28, 2011 
  
x 
 
Abbreviations 
 
The bibliographic reference style employed, and the abbreviations of ancient 
literature used, are all taken from Patrick H. Alexander, et al. (eds.), The SBL 
Handbook of Style (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1999), with the following 
exceptions, which are not included in the Handbook: 
 
AnPhil   Ancient Philosophy 
CThM   Calwer theologische Monographien 
EurH   Europäische Hochschulschriften 
LS A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (2 vols.; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
LutMon   Lutherische Monatshefte 
Phron   Phronesis 
RMCS   Routledge Monographs in Classical Studies 
RUSCH   Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Much of the history of modern thought and culture is a story of the ways 
people have found to call . . . claims for individual independence into 
question, to transcend mere selves by fusing them with communities, 
nations, classes, or cultures, or to humble them by trumpeting their radical 
dependency on historical processes, cosmic forces, biological drives, 
fundamental ontologies, discursive regimes, or semiotic systems. More than 
any other world culture, the modern West has made the debate about 
individuality and selfhood a central question – perhaps the central question 
– of its collective attempts at self-definition. 
Jerrold Seigel, The Idea of the Self1 
 
1. Exit the Individual: Recent Trends in Scholarship on the Individual and the 
Community in Paul‖s Letters 
A seismic shift has occurred in the interpretation of the Apostle Paul‖s letters over 
the last century. Classically Paul‖s letters have been read as directed, if not 
exclusively, at least primarily at the individual and the individual‖s salvation and 
moral life. A new consensus, however, has been developing among the majority of 
Pauline scholars that understands the apostle as a communal thinker who has little 
concern for the fate of individuals, who by and large does not even have a 
conception of the individual at all. The following study is a diagnosis of the 
dichotomy between the individual and the community as it has developed in 
Pauline scholarship, as well as a proposal for a way beyond this impasse. My thesis is 
simple: the individual and the community belong together in Paul’s theology; there is no 
Pauline individual outside of community, just as there is no community without individuals 
at the heart of its ongoing life. The simplicity of this thesis, however, masks an 
enormous amount of disagreement and contention among scholars. 
The roots of this debate in biblical scholarship lie in many places.2 Two 
scholars in particular, however, William Wrede and Albert Schweitzer, represent 
                                                        
1 Jerrold Seigel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe since the Seventeenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4. 
2 For a survey and analysis of the origins of this development in New Testament studies see 
Stephen Barton, “The Communal Dimension of Earliest Christianity: A Critical Survey of the Field,” 
JTS 43 (1992): 399-427; cf. James G. Samra, Being Conformed to Christ in Community: A Study of Maturity, 
Maturation and the Local Church in the Undisputed Pauline Epistles (LNTS 320; London: T & T Clark, 2006), 
28-32; Gary W. Burnett, Paul and the Salvation of the Individual (BIS; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 1-6. On related 
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the most important early precursors of the turn from the individual in recent 
Pauline theology. Both scholars, in their own ways, strongly disputed that the 
individual was at the center of Pauline thought, primarily by arguing for the 
marginalization of justification by faith in reconstructions of the major emphases of 
Paul‖s thought.3 This protest against the individual initially did not carry the day, 
however, and was largely eclipsed by the work of scholars operating with 
traditional assumptions about the importance of the individual, even as many of 
these scholars were otherwise highly critical of traditional interpretations of the 
New Testament. Rudolf Bultmann, of course, towers over the rest of his 
contemporaries in his single-minded insistence that the individual and the 
individual‖s act of decision are at the heart of Pauline thought. Bultmann‖s 
existentialist approach to New Testament interpretation, although representing the 
mainstream of biblical scholarship at the time, finally came under sustained attack 
from one of his own former students, Ernst Käsemann. Bultmann and Käsemann, 
because they engaged in a long-standing debate on the individual and community 
that sets out the major issues to be looked at in this dissertation, will be examined in 
detail in the next chapter. In this introductory chapter we will examine the 
                                                                                                                                                              
trends in the human sciences more generally see Kevin Vanhoozer, “Human Being, Individual and 
Social,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Doctrine (ed. Colin Gunton; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 158-85. Dale B. Martin, “Paul and the Judaism/Hellenism Dichotomy: ―Toward 
a Social History of the Question‖,” in Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide (ed. Troels Engberg-
Pedersen; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 52, captures these changes in biblical 
scholarship well: “Whereas [identifying individualism with Hellenism] was a saving aspect for 
nineteenth-century Germans, for whom individualism was a valued commodity of both the 
Enlightenment and Romanticism, it was a problem by the middle of the twentieth century, when it 
could be made to symbolize the fractured, atomized, anonymous state of modernity with its loss of 
communities. And whereas individualism in conjunction with universalism represented truth to 
Kantian and Hegelian liberals, the same combination represented for American scholars, nurtured in 
pietism and evangelicalism, the loss of revelation or Christianity‖s claim to special access to truth.” 
3 See e.g., William Wrede, Paulus (2d ed.; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1907), 77: “Paulus hat den 
Einzelnen gar nicht im Sinn; die Frage der persönlichen Heilsgewißheit spielt deshalb bei ihm keine 
Rolle. Er fragt, wie wir sahen, teils ganz allgemein nach der Bedingung für den Eintritt in die Kirche 
und findet sie im Glauben; teils ebenso allgemein nach dem Wege, auf dem die Menschheit 
überhaupt zum Heil gelangt, und hier weist er auf die Gnade, die in der Erlösung offenbar geworden 
ist.” Albert Schweitzer, Die Mystik des Apostels Paulus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1930), 215, concludes 
that—in contrast to a model centered on righteousness by faith (which is “individualistisch und 
unkosmisch”)—at the heart of Paul‖s view of redemption is “ein kollektives, kosmisch bedingtes 
Erlebnis.” Cf. Otto Merk, “Die Persönlichkeit des Paulus in der Religionsgeschichtlichen Schule,” in 
Biographie und Persönlichkeit des Paulus (eds. Eve-Marie Becker and Peter Pilhofer; WUNT 187; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 37. 
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trajectories that have developed subsequent to the debate between Bultmann and 
Käsemann.4 
Three distinct strands of New Testament scholarship stand out in particular 
with regard to the wall of hostility that has been built up between individually- and 
communally-focused readings of Paul. These three can be labeled the social-
scientific approach, readings of the apostle in the wake of the New Perspective on 
Paul, and apocalyptic approaches. Taken together with the earlier work of 
Käsemann they represent a forceful and integrated challenge to classic readings of 
Paul‖s letters that are focused on themes such as individual salvation, individual 
ethics, and the like. 
The purpose of this survey of more recent scholarly approaches is to 
highlight the development of the dichotomy between individual and communal 
approaches to Paul that has largely come to dominate Pauline scholarship in the 
present. It must be stated emphatically from the outset that my purpose is only to 
bring attention to the dichotomy in recent scholarship, not to perpetuate it. A 
broad-brush antithesis between the individual and the community in Paul is manifestly false. 
When Paul writes of the individual, the community is never far from his mind, and 
the same is true the other way round.5 
 
1.1 Social-Scientific Anti-Individualism 
The social-scientific approach to Paul is represented by a diverse group of scholars 
such as Bruce Malina, Jerome Neyrey, and the “Context Group” of New Testament 
researchers. It is  closely related in approach to a renewed interest in biblical 
scholarship on the social dynamics of the ancient world, and Paul‖s churches in 
particular, an interest that has roots in the earlier work of scholars such as Wayne 
Meeks, Abraham Malherbe, and Gerd Theissen.6 With regard to the individual and 
the community Bruce Malina is representative when he says: 
                                                        
4 For an extended treatment of the scholarly trajectories surveyed below see Ben C. Dunson, 
“The Individual and Community in Twentieth and Twenty-first-Century Pauline Scholarship,” CBR 9 
(2010): 68-88. 
5 It should be noted that I am using the word individual to refer to a singular person and am not 
here engaging in the wider modern debate about what constitutes human identity and selfhood. 
6 Some of the most important works that explore the New Testament from a social-scientific 
and/or “social dynamics” perspective are: Jerome H. Neyrey and Eric C. Stewart (eds.), The Social 
World of the New Testament: Insights and Models (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2008); Bruce J. Malina 
and John J. Pilch, Social-Science Commentary on the Letters of Paul (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006); Gerd 
Theissen, Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2004); 
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Instead of individualism, what we find in the first-century Mediterranean world is 
what might be called collectivism. Persons always considered themselves in terms 
of the group(s) in which they experienced themselves as inextricably embedded. . . . 
Such a group-embedded, collectivist personality is one who simply needs another 
continually in order to know who he or she really is.7 
 
Philip Esler concurs:  
 
Nowhere [are the dangers of anachronistic readings of the New Testament] more 
evident than in the predilection of European and US critics to discuss first-century 
texts in terms of individualism when that is a feature of modern Western culture 
largely absent from the period under discussion.8 
 
This approach to the New Testament argues that notions of individuality or 
individual concern in Paul are illegitimate and anachronistic projections of 
twentieth- or twenty-first-century individualism onto communally-focused texts.9 
The ancient world of the writers of the New Testament, in contrast, is comprised of 
                                                                                                                                                              
idem, The Religion of the Earliest Churches: Creating a Symbolic World (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999); idem, 
Social Reality and the Early Christians (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1992); Abraham J. Malherbe, Social Aspects 
of Early Christianity (2d ed.; Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2003); Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban 
Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (2d ed.; New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003); B. 
J. Malina, The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology (3d ed.; Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox, 2001); Philip F. Esler, The First Christians in their Social Worlds: Social Scientific Approaches to 
New Testament Interpretation (London: Routledge, 1994); John H. Elliott, Social Scientific Criticism of the 
New Testament: An Introduction (London: SPCK, 1993); John E. Stambaugh and David L. Balch, The New 
Testament in its Social Environment (LEC; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1986). See Burnett, 
Salvation, 3-6, for a more extensive discussion of this perspective in recent scholarship, including 
numerous additional bibliographical resources. See also David G. Horrell, “Social Scientific 
Interpretation of the New Testament: Retrospect and Prospect,” in Social Scientific Approaches to New 
Testament Interpretation (ed. David G. Horrell; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999), 3-28; Theissen, Social 
Reality, 15, nn. 18-19; D. J. Harrington, “Second Testament Exegesis and the Social Sciences: A 
Bibliography,” BTB 18 (1988): 77-85. 
7 Malina, Insights, 62; cf. B. J. Malina and J. H. Neyrey, “First Century Personality: Dyadic, Not 
Individualistic,” in The Social World of Luke-Acts: Models for Interpretation (ed. J. H. Neyrey; Peabody, MA: 
Hendrickson, 1991), 67-96; see also John L. Meech, Paul in Israel’s Story: Self and Community at the Cross 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 40 (cf. 18, 39-44, 55-56), who, while adopting Malina‖s basic 
model of dyadic personality, qualifies it in a way that takes more account of the importance of the 
individual in Paul: “the self and community are correlates, which is to say that the self and 
community are each mutually the condition of the other.” 
8 Esler, Approaches, 24. 
9 For a dissenting opinion regarding the claim that the modern reader of the New Testament is 
simply an isolated, individualistic, and abstract “self” (who can be easily contrasted with the ancient 
“dyadic” self) see F. Gerald Downing, “Persons in Relation,” in Making Sense in (and of) the First 
Christian Century (JSNTSup 197; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 44-47; cf. 52: “Such social 
production of adults as we have evidenced from the east Mediterranean of late antiquity is as 
interested in producing socially performed and socially reinforced individuality as is (for good or ill) 
the social production of adults in North Atlantic countries today.” Downing describes a set of 
interlocking attitudes found across a wide range of ancient sources that could best be described as 
inculcating a “socially performed and socially reinforced individuality,” and which are in fact quite 
similar to modern attitudes and constructions of “the self”: parental desire to see children develop in 
their emotional capabilities, development of individual expression in children‖s school exercises, and 
the asserting of one‖s own desires in romantic relationships. 
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collectivist societies, societies in which the interests of one‖s community are all-
controlling, and where self-concern is almost wholly absent. It is not surprising, 
then, that issues like individual sin, justification and even ethics, would be of little 
interest to interpreters operating under the influence of social-scientific models. 
While the use of these models does not mean that an interpreter must dismiss the 
individual from Pauline theology, this has been true for most scholars operating in 
this realm of academic endeavor. Esler is more nuanced than many others in his 
recognition that these models “are merely heuristic tools used in what is essentially 
a comparative process”10 and that “Mediterranean anthropology cannot hope to 
provide a set of models which perfectly match the New Testament social world . . . 
.”11 Nonetheless, claims such as his that individualism is “largely absent” from the 
New Testament period remain firmly entrenched in much recent Pauline 
scholarship, both on the academic and on the popular level. 
 
1.2 Anti-Individualism in the Wake of the New Perspective on Paul 
In the twentieth-century, an approach to Paul‖s relationship with Judaism 
developed that by-and-large began to emphasize the continuities, rather than 
conflicts between the apostle and the theology of his fellow Jews. This approach is 
associated with G. F. Moore, C. G. Montefiore, W. D. Davies, Krister Stendahl and E. P. 
Sanders, among others.12 
For example, on the question of individuals and community, W. D. Davies 
argues that: 
 
Paul‖s doctrine of justification by faith was not solely and not primarily orientated 
toward the individual but to the interpretation of the people of God. The justified 
man was ―in Christ,‖ which is a communal concept. And necessarily because it was 
                                                        
10 Esler, Approaches, 23. 
11 Ibid., 24. 
12 Cf. E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (London: SCM 
Press, 1977); W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology (3d ed.; 
London: SPCK, 1970); G. F. Moore, “Christian Writers on Judaism,” HTR 1 (1921): 197-254; C. G. 
Montefiore, Judaism and St. Paul: Two Essays (London: Max Goschen, 1914). On the history of  
twentieth-century scholarship emphasizing Paul‖s Jewish context see Stephen Westerholm, 
Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The ‘Lutheran’ Paul and His Critics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 117-
33; Timo Eskola, Theodicy and Predestination in Pauline Soteriology (WUNT 2.100; Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1998), 15-18; Stephen Neill and Tom Wright, The Interpretation of the New Testament: 1861-1986 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 313-59. 
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eschatological, the doctrine moved towards the salvation of the world, a new 
creation.”13 
 
In other words, Paul‖s focus lies elsewhere than on individuals and their private 
relationship with God. Even justification by faith is primarily a matter of defining 
the boundaries of God‖s true people. In this regard, we see a polarization developing 
between the individual and the community, although Davies does not express 
himself in quite as strongly antithetical terms as many who would come after him. 
As is widely recognized, Krister Stendahl‖s 1963 article “The Apostle Paul and 
the Introspective Conscience of the West” had an immediate and substantial impact 
on the shape of subsequent Pauline scholarship, despite its brevity.14 Douglas Harink 
echoes the sentiment of many over the last half century: 
 
Stendahl managed in one short essay to distinguish the apostle‖s concerns from 
centuries of individualizing, psychologising, and spiritualizing interpretations, with 
the audacious claim that a great deal of Paul‖s theology was about Gentiles and Jews 
rather than about guilt-ridden individuals seeking to escape the punishment of an 
angry God.15 
 
Stendahl‖s essay, Harink continues, “[effectively shifted] attention from the 
typically ―Lutheran‖ or Protestant themes of individual justification, sin, guilt, grace, 
and faith to the more concrete, historical issues of the relationship between Jews 
and Gentiles in Paul‖s mission and churches.”16 As Richard Hays puts it, Stendahl 
                                                        
13 W. D. Davies, “Paul: From the Jewish Point of View,” in Cambridge History of Judaism. Volume 3: 
The Early Roman Period (eds. W. D. Davies, John Sturdy and William Horbury; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 3.716. 
14 Krister Stendahl, “The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West,” HTR 56 
(1963): 199-215; repr. in idem, Paul Among Jews and Gentiles, and Other Essays (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1976), 78-96. On the reception of Stendahl‖s article, see e.g., Mark A. Seifrid, Christ Our 
Righteousness: Paul’s Theology of Justification (NSBT 9; Grand Rapids: InterVarsity, 2001), 14: “Although 
various studies of early Judaism challenged [the idea that in ―coming to faith in Christ Paul found 
relief for his guilty conscience‖], it was a provocative article on Paul which especially caught the 
attention of more recent scholarship, and marked the changing perspective which was to emerge in 
years to come.” Stanley K. Stowers, A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles (New Haven: Yale, 
1994), 6: “The work of many scholars, beginning with the pioneering essay by Krister Stendahl on 
Paul and the West‖s introspective conscience, suggests the need for a persistent questioning of the 
traditional readings of Paul‖s letters on a . . . fundamental level.” Bruce J. Malina, “The Individual and 
the Community – Personality in the Social World of Early Christianity,” BTB 9 (1979): 126: “Nearly two 
decades ago, Krister Stendahl competently argued against the existence of any sort of ―introspective 
conscience‖ in Paul and his writings . . . .” Douglas A. Campbell, The Quest for Paul's Gospel: A Suggested 
Strategy (JSNTSup 274; London: T & T Clark, 2005), 14, insists that Stendahl‖s article set the “critical 
agenda of the New Perspective” on Paul by shifting it away from a focus on “Paul‖s ostensible 
introspective conscience” toward analysis of the place of Gentiles within the covenant people of God. 
15 Douglas Harink, Paul Among the Postliberals: Pauline Theology Beyond Christendom and Modernity 
(Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2003), 14. 
16 Ibid., 15-16. 
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“rendered increasingly doubtful” the idea that “Romans is a treatise on the problem 
of how a person may ―find‖ justification . . . .”17 
Stendahl‖s main problem with the “traditional Western way of reading 
Pauline letters” is that it looks at them as “documents of human consciousness” 
rather than contingent expressions of local concerns in the individual churches 
addressed in Paul‖s letters.18 This in turn has wrongly led to justification by faith 
being regarded as the center of Pauline (and biblical) thought, since it has “been 
hailed as the answer to the problem which faces the ruthlessly honest man in his 
practice of introspection.”19 As a result, almost every aspect of Pauline theology has 
been illegitimately psychologized and distorted in an individualistic direction. 
Rather than focusing on the issue of Jew-Gentile relations “Pauline thought about 
the Law and Justification was applied [in the Western Christian tradition] in a 
consistent and grand style to a more general and timeless human problem.”20 
Stendahl sees Rudolf Bultmann as something of a capstone to this past history of 
exegesis.21 
With this essay Stendahl sought to re-orient the exegetical and theological 
program of Pauline scholarship away from a focus on the individual toward 
exclusively communal and salvation-historical issues. While (as we will see in the 
next chapter) Ernst Käsemann provided a much more detailed and sophisticated 
program of anti-individual Pauline interpretation, Stendahl‖s essay, by memorably 
capturing the changing mood of biblical scholarship, served as something of a 
flashpoint in dramatically redirecting Pauline scholarship away from questions of 
individual concern. 
On the issue of individuals and their relationship to community it is 
noteworthy that E. P. Sanders, despite his criticism of traditional Christian readings 
of Paul, emphasizes that “Rabbinic religion, while personal and individual, was also 
corporate and collective,” that in the Judaism of Paul‖s day and the centuries after 
it, “the pattern of religion which we have been discussing demonstrates how 
                                                        
17 Richard B. Hays, “Abraham as Father of Jews and Gentiles,” in The Conversion of the Imagination: 
Paul as Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 63, and n. 10; cf. idem, “Psalm 
143 as Testimony to the Righteousness of God,” in The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter 
of Israel’s Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 57, and n. 23. 
18 Stendahl, “Introspective Conscience,” 79. 
19 Ibid., 79. 
20 Ibid., 85. 
21 See ibid., 87-88. 
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individual and collective religion were combined.”22 What is more, especially after 
the destruction of the Jewish temple in 70 CE, “the group did not mediate between 
God and individual Israelites: a man‖s piety was personal, his prayers were directly 
to God, his forgiveness was directly from God.”23 Sanders even points to Bultmann in 
support of his claim that “Christianity adopted a very similar mix of group 
membership and individual and personal religion.”24 Nonetheless, few of the 
scholars who have followed Sanders‖ lead in comparing Paul and Judaism have been 
so balanced in their presentation of how either Paul or Judaism relate the individual 
and community. 
Although certainly not a monolithic unity, the New Perspective on Paul has 
taken the insights of scholars such as Davies, Stendahl and Sanders even further in 
anti-individualist directions.25 Richard Hays, for example, absolutizes the approach 
of scholars like Davies when he argues that: “The fundamental problem with which 
Paul is wrestling in Romans is not how a person may find acceptance with God; the 
problem is to work out an understanding of the relationship in Christ between Jews 
and Gentiles.”26 The place of the people of God in the plan of God, not individual 
experience, is central to Paul‖s theology. As with many scholars, Hays does not see 
middle ground as an option: either Paul is concerned to speak of individuals and 
                                                        
22 Sanders, Palestinian Judaism, 237. 
23 Ibid., 238. 
24 Ibid., 238 (although see also idem, Paul [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991], 49); cf. ibid., 
Palestinian Judaism, 547 (emphasis original): “Both Judaism and Paul take full account of the individual and 
the group.” On ibid., 238, Sanders cites Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament (trans. Kendrick 
Grobel; Waco, TX, 2007), 93. Here Bultmann says that in salvation “the individual is incorporated” 
(der Einzelne eingegliedert ist) into “the fellowship of God‖s people” (die Gemeinschaft des Volkes Gottes) 
and that “in Christianity, the individual believer stands within the Congregation [der einzelne Gläubige 
innerhalb der Gemeinde], and the individual congregations are joined together into one Congregation—
the Church” (Bultmann, Theology, 93; idem, Theologie des Neuen Testaments [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1953], 92-93). 
25 I am here using Dunn‖s phrase “New Perspective on Paul” to refer to any approach to Paul that 
is based on the reinterpretations of his theology that came in the wake of the wide-ranging 
reevaluation of Second Temple Judaism carried out during the twentieth-century and culminating in 
E. P. Sanders‖ Paul and Palestinian Judaism. For a survey of the key elements and primary emphases of 
the New Perspective on Paul see James D. G. Dunn, “The New Perspective on Paul,” in The New 
Perspective on Paul (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 1-98, and Stephen Westerholm, “The New 
Perspective at Twenty-Five,” in Justification and Variegated Nomism. Volume 2: The Paradoxes of Paul (eds. 
P. T. O‖Brien, D. A. Carson and M. A. Seifrid; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 1-38; Westerholm, 
Perspectives, 117-49, 178-200. The anti-individualism of the New Perspective on Paul was anticipated 
in numerous works in the 1960s and 1970s; see e.g., Nils A. Dahl, “The Doctrine of Justification: Its 
Social Function and Implications,” in Studies in Paul (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977), 95-120; Stendahl, 
“Introspective Conscience,” 78-96; Markus Barth, “The Social Character of Justification,” JES 5 (1968): 
241-61. 
26 Hays, “Abraham as Father,” 69. See also the survey of recent scholarly positions that 
emphasize the centrality of the issue of Jew-Gentile relations in Romans over against 
“individualistic” concerns in Burnett, Salvation, 96-104. 
9 
 
their personal salvation, or he means in his letters to work out a program of Jew-
Gentile unity in the historical outworking of the divine plan, especially as it has 
come to its climax in the person of Jesus Christ. Writing at a more popular level N. T. 
Wright agrees: “The gospel creates, not a bunch of individual Christians, but a 
community. If you take the old route of putting justification, in its traditional 
meaning, at the centre of your theology, you will always be in danger of sustaining 
some sort of individualism.”27 
Douglas Campbell, another consistently anti-individual post-New 
Perspective interpreter of Paul, contends that the modern failure to rightly 
understand the apostle owes much to Rudolf Bultmann, who “stresses humans‖ will, 
their individuality, and their ethical nature, although not their inherent 
relationality or sociality.”28 This necessarily (and unfortunately) has led the Pauline 
scholarship that followed Bultmann‖s lead to focus its exegetical and theological 
attention almost exclusively on the individual and individual soteriology.29 While 
Campbell shares the desire of Davies, Hays and many others to elevate the issue of 
the definition of covenant boundaries to prominence in Pauline theology, he also 
believes that it is a serious mistake to set the individual on a pedestal of Paul‖s 
central themes because this ignores Paul‖s explication of the foundationally 
relational nature of human existence. Like Hays, Campbell places individual and 
communal approaches to Paul in sharp antithesis: “It just does not seem possible to 
combine the individual and the corporate, the historical and the atemporal, the 
canonically antithetical with the canonically progressive, and so on.”30 
Interestingly, even Troels Engberg-Pedersen, who is perceived by many to 
have revived elements of Bultmann‖s individualistic interpretation, emphasizes that 
the goal of Paul‖s exhortation is community formation, and does so in such a way 
that the individual drops almost completely out of the picture: 
 
I have mentioned already here that [community formation] is where we shall 
eventually end. Otherwise readers might draw the completely erroneous conclusion 
                                                        
27 N. T. Wright, What Saint Paul Really Said: Was Paul of Tarsus the Real Founder of Christianity? 
(Oxford: Lion, 1997), 157. Cf. ibid., 158: “There is no such thing as an ―individual‖ Christian. Paul‖s 
gospel created a community; his doctrine of justification sustained it.” Cf. idem, Paul: Fresh 
Perspectives (London: SPCK, 2005), 120. 
28 Douglas A. Campbell, The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 292. 
29 See ibid., 293-95. 
30 Idem, Quest, 49. 
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from our discussion . . . that Paul‖s Christ faith is only a relationship between an 
individual and ―his‖ or ―her‖ God. Nothing could be more false.31 
 
While Engberg-Pedersen allows for certain elements of individual concern in Paul, 
he is thoroughly in line with New Perspective influenced readings in arguing that 
“experience of Christ . . . as seen in the Christ event lifts the individual . . . out of his 
or her individuality, leaves it behind and carries him or her over to a state of 
communality . . . shared with all those who have undergone the same process.”32 
Engberg-Pedersen sees a vital role for rational self-deliberation in the event of 
conversion, but when it comes to the nature of the ongoing life of faith, the 
individual disappears.33 While Engberg-Pedersen admits that his own focus on self-
understanding in Paul “clearly recalls Bultmann,” he insists that “the way this was 
construed in the ancient ethical tradition and in Paul” (thus also in Engberg-
Pedersen‖s reconstructions of both) “has very little to do with modern 
―individualism‖ as reflected in Bultmann‖s own existentialism.”34 
 
1.3 Apocalyptic Anti-Individualism 
The third thread woven into the anti-individualist tapestry of modern Pauline 
studies is the “apocalyptic” (i.e., theological/cosmological/eschatological/etc.) 
approach which was presented to the world of New Testament scholarship, first by 
Albert Schweitzer, but later much more systematically by Ernst Käsemann.35 After 
Käsemann, an apocalyptic approach was further developed in different ways in the 
works of scholars such as J. Louis Martyn and J. Christiaan Beker, among others.36 
                                                        
31 Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 140. 
32 Ibid., 294. 
33 Cf. Ibid., 128, 137, 147, 152, 154-55. 
34 Ibid., 7. For an analysis of Käsemann‖s reception among scholars influenced by the New 
Perspective on Paul see Paul F. M. Zahl, Die Rechtfertigungslehre Ernst Käsemanns (CThM; Stuttgart: 
Calwer, 1996), 188-98. 
35 See Schweitzer, Mystik, and e.g., Ernst Käsemann, “Zum Thema urchristlicher Apokalyptik,” in 
Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1964). On Schweitzer, 
Käsemann and apocalyptic see R. Barry Matlock, Unveiling the Apocalyptic Paul: Paul’s Interpreters and 
the Rhetoric of Criticism (JSNTSup 127; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 23-71 and 186-246. 
Regarding Matlock‖s charge that Schweitzer “is often now little more than a name attached to the 
notion of an ―apocalyptic‖ approach to Paul” (ibid., 26), I too must plead guilty. In my defence I can 
only say that my interests lie simply in the way interpreters of the so-called apocalyptic Paul have 
appealed to apocalyptic in order to marginalize and dismiss the individual in the apostle‖s thought. 
36 See e.g., J. Louis Martyn, “Apocalyptic Antinomies,” in Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997), 111-24; idem, Galatians: a New Translation with Introduction and 
Commentary (AB 33A; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 97-105; Martinus C. de Boer, “Paul and Jewish 
Apocalyptic Eschatology,” in Apocalyptic and the New Testament: Essays in Honor of J. Louis Martyn (eds. J. 
Marcus and M. L. Soards; Sheffield: JSOT, 1989), 169-90; J. Christiaan Beker, Paul the Apostle: The 
11 
 
Beker crisply articulates the antithesis that lies at the heart of apocalyptic 
approaches, namely the antithesis between individual and cosmos: either Paul is 
fundamentally concerned with “the imminent cosmic triumph of God,” or, as 
Bultmann insists, his chief interest lies in a demythologization of apocalyptic into 
the categories of “existential self-understanding.”37 The individual almost 
completely disappears in the new picture of Pauline thought that emerges among 
apocalyptic interpreters, since what truly matters in their interpretational schemes 
is the epic struggle of good and evil as it works itself out on a worldwide stage. 
Speaking of the apocalyptic battle between the old and new ages in Galatians, 
Martyn argues that Paul “is concerned to offer an interpretation of Jesus‖ death that 
is oriented not toward personal guilt and forgiveness, but rather toward corporate 
enslavement and liberation.”38 Thus, the “root antidote to an individual sin . . . is not 
an individual instance of forgiveness. That antidote lies in . . . in vanquishing the 
enslaving power of Sin (the present evil age) . . .” through the encouragement and 
support of the community, which is where “sin is not only forgiven but also and 
fundamentally overpowered by God‖s mighty victory over Sin.”39 Individual sin, just 
like individual justification, is not Paul‖s concern. An apocalyptic approach, for 
Martyn and others (such as Käsemann), leads directly to a communitarian approach 
to Paul‖s theology that is set in antithesis with so-called individualistic approaches. 
An apocalyptic understanding of Paul such as this is said by many to warrant 
a reevaluation of a host of exegetical and theological foci that classically have been 
understood in primarily individual terms. Speaking of this scholarly reassessment 
David Stubbs boldly argues that “given a reading of Paul in which ―the faithfulness 
                                                                                                                                                              
Triumph of God in Life and Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984); Leander E. Keck, “Paul and 
Apocalyptic Theology,” Int 38 (1984): 229-41. For an analysis of twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
literature on the “apocalyptic Paul” see Matlock, Unveiling; on Apocalypticism and Apocalyptic (as 
theological type, and as genre) in biblical (and extra-biblical) material more broadly than just Paul 
see Adela Yarbro Collins, “Apocalypse Now: The State of Apocalyptic Studies Near the End of the First 
Decade of the Twenty-First Century,” HTR 104 (2011): 447-57; idem, “Apocalypses and 
Apocalypticism: Early Christian,” ABD 1.288-92; John J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination (New York: 
Crossroad, 1984); idem, “Apocalypses and Apocalypticism: Early Jewish Apocalypticism,” ABD 1.282-
88; Paul D. Hanson, “Apocalypses and Apocalypticism: The Genre and Introductory Overview,” ABD 
1.279-82; idem, The Dawn of Apocalyptic (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975). 
37 Beker, Paul, 17. Beker allows for certain minor divergences from Bultmann‖s existentialism 
among critics of apocalyptic interpretation, but sees them all as ultimately resolving into a 
problematically anthropocentric interpretive approach. As will see in the next chapter, Käsemann‖s 
apocalyptic approach begins by setting the individual in antithesis with cosmic concerns, but 
eventually ends by elevating the community over against the individual. 
38 Martyn, Galatians, 101. 
39 Ibid., 97. 
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of Christ‖ is linked with an apocalyptic invasion of Jesus Christ into the world in 
which we participate, traditional Protestant notions of justification, apocalypse, 
election, politics, ethics and the church‖s relationship to culture must be 
renegotiated.”40 
Claims such as this are increasingly common in recent exegetical and 
theological literature, as evidenced, for example, in the way Douglas Harink argues 
for the Käsemannian triumph of “apocalyptic” anti-individualism in recent 
theology: “Paul‖s primary concerns, precisely in the language of justification, are 
cosmic and social more than inner and individual. The approach to justification 
through Paul‖s ―cosmological apocalyptic eschatology‖ . . . demonstrates this.”41 
Harink is a prime example of the way in which the apocalyptic Paul has largely been 
grafted onto the New Perspective, or covenant-inclusion, argument for the primacy 
of community in the apostle‖s letters, with the result that the role of the individual 
has been greatly diminished, if not discounted altogether.42 
  
1.4 The Return of Anthropology? 
Despite the strongly anti-individual tone of much recent Pauline scholarship, some 
scholars have continued to work within a framework that places the individual at 
the heart of Pauline theology.43 Only one work, however, has attempted to address 
the concerns of anti-individualist scholarship on a large scale.44 This book is Gary 
Burnett‖s Paul and the Salvation of the Individual, which argues vigorously for 
returning the individual to the center of Paul‖s theology. 
                                                        
40 David L. Stubbs, “The Shape of Soteriology and the Pistis Christou Debate,” SJT 61 (2008): 157. 
See also the way in which Campbell, Quest, 56-68, relies on “Pauline apocalyptic” to explicate Paul‖s 
understanding of the gospel in an anti-individualist direction. 
41 Harink, Postliberals, 59. So dominant is the Käsemannian approach in many present day circles 
that Harink, writing in 2003, can simply assume that the issue has been settled by the work of 
scholars such as Käsemann and Martyn, thus feeling little need to offer much in the way of 
argumentation in support of his own anti-individualism. 
42 On Harink‖s appropriation of New Perspective anti-individualism see ibid., 25-45. 
43 See e.g., Simon Gathercole, “The Doctrine of Justification in Paul and Beyond: Some Proposals,” 
in Justification in Perspective: Historical Developments and Contemporary Challenges (ed. Bruce L. 
McCormack; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 232, 240; Douglas J. Moo, “Israel and the Law in 
Romans 5-11: Interaction with the New Perspective,” in Justification and Variegated Nomism. Volume 2: 
The Paradoxes of Paul (eds. P. T. O‖Brien, D. A. Carson and M. A. Seifrid; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2004), 188, 216; Westerholm, Perspectives, 440-45; Thomas R. Schreiner, Paul: Apostle of God’s Glory in 
Christ (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001), 193-94. 
44 Although see Nijay K. Gupta, “Which ―Body‖ is a Temple (1 Corinthians 6:19)? Paul Beyond the 
Individual/Communal Divide,” CBQ 72 (2010): 518-36, which attempts to move past the individual-
communal impasse on the question of whether Paul conceives of the individual or the church as the 
spiritual temple described in 1 Cor 6:19. 
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 The chief aim of Burnett‖s book is 
 
to see if Paul was concerned with the individual qua individual, irrespective of 
social or, indeed, historical identity; whether Paul‖s understanding of God‖s work in 
the world was primarily operative at the level of the individual, as opposed to being 
largely concerned with people groups and group identity.45 
 
Burnett is largely reacting against the use of the social-scientific research in Pauline 
studies surveyed above. This scholarship, Burnett contends, illegitimately considers 
a serious focus on the individual to be the imposition of modern and alien 
conceptualities onto the text of Paul‖s letters.46 His book is an attempt at 
“questioning the strong collective emphasis in recent approaches to Romans and in 
indicating that Paul‖s gospel had a primary application to the individual.”47 
 Thus, Burnett‖s book represents a pendulum swing away from the 
communally-centered approaches we have examined above. While Burnett does 
admit that the collective issue of “how Jews and Gentiles relate in the unfolding 
purposes of God in Christ”48 is important in Romans, he insists that this issue must 
not be allowed to shift the focus away from the Pauline “individual qua individual.” 
As he puts it elsewhere: “Paul‖s understanding of the gospel, whilst he was 
concerned with people-groups, had a primary focus on the individual.”49 
 Burnett‖s reaction against exclusively communal interpretations of Pauline 
theology is understandable, but I believe, is ultimately one-sided itself. The reason 
for this lies in the fact that Burnett‖s sole focus is the faith and salvation of the 
individual as an individual. The individual‖s faith and salvation are indeed important 
themes in Romans (contrary to the prevailing opinion of much Pauline scholarship), 
and Burnett is right to highlight them, but insofar as he has attempted to place the 
focus of scholarship back on the “individual . . . irrespective of social identity” he has 
marginalized an equally foundational facet of Pauline theology.50 Burnett‖s attempt 
to rehabilitate the Pauline individual is to be commended, and yet his focus on the 
importance of the individual does not end up giving due attention to the 
corresponding fact that Paul does not think in terms of individuals abstracted from 
                                                        
45 Burnett, Salvation, 10 (emphasis added). 
46 See e.g., ibid., 28-29, 46, 55-57, 67, 84-87, 215-19. 
47 Ibid., 18 (emphasis added); cf. 227-28. 
48 Ibid., 18-19. 
49 Ibid., 209 (emphasis added). 
50 Burnett, Salvation, 10 (emphasis added). 
14 
 
community, even when speaking of themes such as faith and salvation.51 It is also 
the case that in his attempt to highlight the importance of the individual, Burnett‖s 
narrow focus on individual salvation prevents him from doing full justice to the 
many different ways in which Paul conceptualizes the individual. The category of the 
Pauline individual, understood as an individual, encompasses far more than merely 
the individual‖s faith and salvation. 
Furthermore, despite his concession to collectivist interpreters that the 
issue of Jew-Gentile relations is significant for Paul,52 this does not get at the most 
essential facet of Paul‖s communal theology, which is focused on individuals being 
necessarily embedded into the single body of Christ. As I will argue below, there is 
no “individual qua individual” in Paul‖s understanding of the believing life. That is 
to say, there is no sense of the individual being understood as an isolated individual 
in the broader scheme of Paul‖s soteriology and ethics. The Pauline individual, in all 
of its divergent forms, is an individual-in-community.53 Mere acknowledgement of 
the significance of Jew-Gentile relations in Paul‖s theological reasoning is not 
sufficient. His vision for individual life within community is richer than that.54 
 
                                                        
51 On which see further Ben C. Dunson, “Faith in Romans: the Salvation of the Individual or Life 
in Community?” JSNT 34 (2011): 19-46; cf. Robert  Keay, “Review of Gary W. Burnett, Paul and the 
Salvation of the Individual,” JBL 121 (2002): 777. While it is recognized that a dissertation such as 
Burnett‖s is necessarily selective in the texts it chooses to discuss, there is no way to do justice to 
how Paul relates individuals and community in Romans while restricting the discussion (as Burnett 
does) to Romans 1-8. Leaving out the latter half of the letter (esp. chapters 12-16) cannot help but 
skew the discussion in an illegitimately individualistic direction. Even when Burnett mentions these 
chapters he does so only with the place of the individual in mind (see e.g., Burnett, Salvation, 17-18). 
52 See e.g., ibid., 18, 114, 221-23, 229-30. An example: “There can be no question that Paul was a 
radical individualist or that his understanding of salvation was concentrated on the individual in 
such a way that the people of God within the purposes of God became of secondary importance” (ibid., 229 
[emphasis added]). 
53 As will be expanded upon below, there is one theme in Romans where speaking of an 
“individual qua individual” may be appropriate, namely the individual standing before divine 
judgment (see Rom 2:6-16; 14:10-12), although this situation only obtains at the eschaton. Prior to 
that moment, Paul always conceives of the life of faith as one of individuals inextricably embedded 
within community. 
54 A recent doctoral dissertation by Valérie Nicolet Anderson is in a large degree of sympathy 
with Burnett‖s attempt to correct the scholarly bias toward exclusively communal concerns in Paul, 
although she critiques Burnett for operating with an inadequate (Enlightenment) understanding of 
individuality. See Valérie Nicolet Anderson, “Constructing the Self: Thinking With Paul and Michel 
Foucault” (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 2010), 11-20. While I agree with Anderson that Burnett‖s 
definition of the individual in Paul is inadequate (for Burnett there is simply one individual that 
matters, the individual who believes and is saved), I am not certain how appeal to Michel Foucault‖s 
understanding of “the self” (see ibid., 186-310) makes her argument any less anachronistic than 
Burnett‖s supposedly Enlightenment understanding of the individual. 
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2. The Argument of this Thesis in Outline 
The argument in this dissertation unfolds in four steps. First, in chapter two I 
provide a detailed analysis of the debate that developed between Rudolf Bultmann 
and Ernst Käsemann over whether Paul‖s theology was centered on individual 
existence or cosmic and corporate concerns. This debate is important because it is 
the initial impetus that places the question of individuals, community and their 
relationship at the heart of the agenda of modern Pauline scholarship. As we have 
already seen, there is hardly a modern discussion of the importance (or not) of 
individuals in Paul that is carried out without reference to Bultmann, although 
almost always by way of critique or dismissal of his theology and its legacy.55 On the 
other hand, many of Käsemann‖s central emphases (such as cosmology and 
apocalyptic) have been warmly embraced in modern Pauline scholarship, attuned as 
it has become to themes that transcend, and even marginalize, the individual. I will 
argue that the antithesis between the individual and the community that dominates 
Käsemann‖s writings, and which has also come to dominate recent Pauline 
scholarship, is without merit. The individual and the community are two sides of 
the same coin. Even if Bultmann does not relate individuals and community 
completely satisfactorily, his own sensitivity to communal issues in Paul should be 
acknowledged. He has certainly shown that the individual (one specific kind at 
least) is an indispensible component of Pauline thought. 
Next, in chapter three I discuss the individual-community question as it 
appears in the writings (more properly: transcribed lectures) of the Stoic 
philosopher Epictetus. This will enable me to set Paul and Epictetus together in 
conversation, not because either operates from the same set of basic theological or 
philosophical convictions, but because looking at Epictetus can shed fresh light on 
the same questions in Paul‖s letters. While Epictetus and Paul do not relate the 
individual and the community in exactly the same way, our understanding of Paul is 
                                                        
55 See e.g., Richard B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1-4:11 
(2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), xxv-xxvi, who comments that the “spirited debate sparked 
by Ernst Käsemann‖s attacks on the hermeneutical program of [Rudolf Bultmann] defined the issues 
that preoccupied me as a graduate student. . . . Even where Bultmann is not mentioned explicitly [in 
Hays‖ book], he is often the unnamed elephant in the room . . . .” For Hays, one of the two main 
“mistaken hermeneutical decisions” inherent in Bultmann‖s reading of Paul is that “he understood 
the gospel principally as a message about human decision, human self-understanding” (ibid., xxvi; cf. 
5-6; 47-52). We will see below that many criticisms of Bultmann on this point have not paid careful 
enough attention to the way in which he speaks of individuals necessarily being a part of the 
communal life of the church. 
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enriched when it is set in counterpoint with Epictetus‖.56 This is so because even the 
differences between Epictetus and Paul elucidate in important ways the nature of 
the individual and the community in both figures: whereas Epictetus‖ philosophy 
demands a militant guarding of one‖s personal power of choice, and thus is 
pointedly individual in its fundamental orientation (without excluding social 
concerns), Paul is much more concerned to define what it means to be an individual 
in comprehensively (but not exclusively) communal terms. Furthermore, Epictetus‖ 
discourses make it clear that the question of individuals and their relationship with 
community is not a merely modern question that has been imposed 
anachronistically onto ancient texts. While the function of the individual and the 
community in antiquity can be placed on a sliding scale of prominence depending 
on the source, articulating the relationship between the two themes is a pressing 
concern for a large number of ancient thinkers. Below we will see how this is 
worked out in different ways by Epictetus and Paul, with a primary eye toward how 
this helps us navigate a major interpretive problem in modern Pauline scholarship. 
In chapter four I set out the first half of a typology of the individual in 
Romans. In this typology I attempt two things. First, I set out the wide variety of 
ways Paul conceptualizes the individual in Romans 1-4. This is particularly 
important because debates over whether the individual features to any sort of 
significant degree in Paul‖s thought often begin by assuming that the word 
individual means one single thing. Since these interpretations usually understand 
the word individual to imply some sort of modern individualism, they then feel 
warranted in dismissing the entire idea of the individual, almost always doing so 
without argumentation in support of such a move. The rightness of doing so is 
simply taken for granted.57 Such reasoning wrongly assumes that Paul only has a 
                                                        
56 For a similar, recent approach to placing Paul and Epictetus in conversion see John M. G. 
Barclay, “Security and Self-Sufficiency: A Comparison of Paul and Epictetus,” ExAud 24 (2008): 6. A 
conversational model such as this is different in many respects from several recent works comparing 
Paul and Epictetus, which continue (according to a classic history-of-religion approach) to look 
almost exclusively at the question of whether or not Paul was influenced by Stoic teachings (see e.g., 
Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010]; Niko Huttunen, Paul and Epictetus on Law: A Comparison [LNTS 405; London: T & 
T Clark, 2009]). Without dismissing the potential fruitfulness of works such as these, it is hoped that a 
more dialogical model, such as employed below, will be self-evidently worthwhile in the fresh light it 
sheds on a contested issue (individual vs. community) simply by setting two ancient thinkers side by 
side and allowing them to speak to the issue on their own terms, without seeking to make sense of 
either‖s system of thought only in terms of the interests of the other. 
57 As already noted, Burnett could be said to fall into this same error (only in reverse): for him 
there is only one kind of individual worth mentioning, the individual who has faith. 
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single way of conceptualizing the individual. We will see below that Paul constructs 
the individual in numerous ways, and that none of these can be summarily 
dismissed from consideration through vague charges of anachronism. Second, I 
highlight the communal context of the Pauline individuals found in these chapters. 
The communal dimension of the Pauline individual is important in this part of my 
typology, but is only seen in its fullness in chapter five where I deal with Romans 
12-16, the heart of Paul‖s teaching on community in the letter. 
In chapter five I complete the typology of the individual in Romans, this time 
focusing on Romans 5, 7, 12 and 16. Again, a wide variety of constructions of the 
individual are found in this material. However, in this chapter, especially in the 
sections focusing on Romans 12 and 16, the necessarily communal context of the 
Pauline individual becomes especially evident. There simply is no individual in Pauline 
teaching on the believing life that is not at the same time embedded into the ongoing life of 
the believing community, which is the body of Christ. There is no individual qua 
individual. Interpretations that attempt to highlight the importance of the 
individual without at the same time taking account of the individual‖s indispensably 
communal matrix cannot do justice to Paul‖s thinking either on the individual or the 
community. What is more, many other central themes in Paul‖s thought (faith, 
justification, judgment, etc.) will unavoidably be mishandled if the relationship 
between the individual and the community is not properly articulated first. 
Finally, in chapter six I summarize my findings and seek to show their 
significance for understanding Paul‖s way of relating individuals to community. 
In short, this thesis will argue that the individual and the community are 
thoroughly and inextricably integrated in Paul‖s letters. The individual and the 
community imply each other. To downplay or ignore the place of either, or their 
relationship, is to misunderstand a fundamental dynamic at work in Paul‖s system 
of thought.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
The Debate over the Individual in Rudolf Bultmann and Ernst Käsemann 
 
1. Introduction 
Rudolf Bultmann and Ernst Käsemann engaged in a long-running debate over 
whether Paul‖s theology was basically anthropological or cosmological (i.e., focused 
on God‖s work in the world, rather than in individuals) in its orientation.1 Simply 
put, Bultmann insisted on the primacy of the individual while Käsemann argued just 
as forcefully for the centrality of cosmological and communal themes in Paul‖s 
letters. This dispute systematically set the parameters of a scholarly debate that, as 
the survey in the preceding chapter has shown, continues unabated up to the 
present day. Accordingly, this chapter examines the role of the individual and 
cosmos/community in Bultmann‖s and Käsemann‖s writings. Käsemann‖s sustained 
attack on Bultmann‖s anthropological interpretive agenda opened the floodgates for 
communal-exclusive interpreters to follow after him. In what follows we will see 
that both scholars provide a distinctive approach to Paul‖s letters that highlights 
certain important elements to the exclusion of others. Ultimately, I will seek to 
explicate the origins of the antithetical construct in which the individual is pitted 
against the community in Bultmann and Käsemann in order to lay the groundwork 
for my own argument that the individual must be thoroughly integrated within 
community in Paul. 
To anticipate the results of my analysis, I will contend that Käsemann 
constructs a misleading (although highly influential) antithesis between the 
individual and the community in Paul in only partially justified opposition to 
Bultmann. While it is an open question how well Bultmann integrates communal 
elements of Pauline teaching into his own theological presentation of the apostle, 
the pendulum swing in the opposite direction that Käsemann initiates obscures 
matters even further. On the other hand, Bultmann‖s insistence on the importance 
                                                        
1 Paul F. M. Zahl, Grace in Practice: A Theology of Everyday Life (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 17, n. 
3, notes that “there is nothing in English yet concerning Käsemann‖s break with his teacher.” What 
follows is meant to contribute toward remedying this lack, although it is restricted to the issue of the 
relationship between individuals and community in Pauline theology. This is, however, one of the 
central issues (if not the single most important) in Käsemann‖s break with Bultmann. Zahl‖s own 
analysis (in German) of the broader issues involved in Käsemann‖s long-running dispute with 
Bultmann is found in idem, Rechtfertigungslehre, 100-132. 
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of the Pauline individual, while salutary in many respects, is limited mostly to a 
single construction of the individual, and thus inadequately captures the fullness of 
Paul‖s talk of individuals. To illustrate just how solidified an antithetical individual-
communal construct is in Pauline studies I will conclude this chapter with a brief 
treatment of the reception of Käsemann‖s argument for a “theocentric” 
interpretation of δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ in Paul. 
 The most important questions to keep in mind in looking at these two 
scholars on the issue of the individual and the community in Paul are: 1) Not simply 
how, but why they arrive at their conclusions. What exegetical, theological and 
hermeneutical decisions lead each scholar to evaluate these issues differently? 2) 
Can we learn something about how to approach Paul based on the various 
conclusions to this first question? For example, does Bultmann notice aspects of 
Pauline thought that Käsemann misses, and vice versa? Is there a process of 
exegetical selectivity at work in each scholar that, when pinpointed, can be re-
directed toward a more satisfying synthesis with regard to the individual and the 
community? The goal of this chapter is to ask these questions and see if answers can 
be uncovered that are able to move the scholarly debate toward a better 
understanding of Paul‖s thought on this issue. 
 
2. Rudolf Bultmann 
Whether it is explicitly acknowledged or not, as we have already seen in the 
previous chapter, the ghost of Bultmannian “individualism” haunts a wide range of 
theological perspectives up to the present day. Even those most opposed to 
Bultmann on these issues can hardly avoid framing their own work according to the 
terms set by Bultmann‖s theological and exegetical agenda. In light of Bultmann‖s 
influence on the ensuing debate in New Testament scholarship over the individual 
and the community, his understanding of these two elements of Pauline thought 
must be analyzed. The central questions are these: why did Bultmann focus so much 
attention on the individual and the individual act of faith, and did he do so at the 
expense of the communal dimension of Paul‖s thought? In the end, Bultmann‖s 
overall interpretational program may fail to convince, but it provides a set of 
questions for Pauline research, the answers to which, although perhaps differing 
from Bultmann, may—despite the anti-individual protestations of much recent New 
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Testament scholarship—illuminate the meaning of Paul‖s letters in fresh and 
unexpected ways. 
 
2.1 The Individual: Exegetical Foundations 
The most important aspect of Bultmann‖s treatment of the individual in Paul is the 
way in which he focuses his attention on the generic individual. Bultmann is 
interested in statements about individuals as individuals irrespective of any 
differences, whether they be religious, ethnic, cultural or the like. In this way, 
Bultmann is quite different from modern Western individualism with its 
preoccupation with particularity and those aspects of individuality that distinguish 
one person from another. In brief, Bultmann develops a model for understanding 
the generic human being from Paul‖s statements about there being no ultimate 
difference between Jews and Gentiles (such as in Rom 3:27-30; Gal 3:28-29; 6:15; cf. 
Eph 2:11-22; Col 3:11), since in God‖s eyes every single person is placed as an 
individual into one category: that of the boastful and fleshly sinner. 
The following discussion focuses on the exegetical foundations and 
theological and hermeneutical constraints that Bultmann employs to argue for the 
centrality of the individual in Paul and the New Testament more generally. None of 
these points taken in isolation provides the single rationale for Bultmann‖s 
individually-oriented focus. Rather, each indispensably contributes toward the 
formation of an impressive exegetical and theological rationale for existential 
interpretation. 
 
2.1.1 Bodily Living: Created Humanity 
Bultmann‖s understanding of the essence of human existence in Paul is divided into 
two major sections in his Theology of the New Testament: 1) The human prior to the 
revelation of faith and 2) the human under faith.2 The first section treats the nature 
of human existence both in its created state and as that state has been co-opted by 
sin, while the second section deals with the divine remedy for sin in both its 
juridical and transformational aspects. The first subdivision is the focus of our 
initial inquiry since it is where Bultmann most clearly defends his understanding of 
individuality in Paul. 
                                                        
2 Bultmann, Theology, 190-269 and 270-345. 
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For Bultmann, the essence of what it means to be human, and thus to have 
“individuality,” is that a person is “able to make himself the object of his own action 
or to experience himself as the subject to whom something happens.”3 That is to 
say, being human consists of being a free, active agent and a responsive creature. 
For Bultmann the most important anthropological term in Paul is body 
(ς῵μα). Paul‖s use of this word significantly shapes Bultmann‖s description of 
Pauline anthropology and provides a window into Bultmann‖s understanding of the 
quintessence of being human. In fact, ς῵μα is “the most comprehensive term” for 
human existence in Paul.4 Bultmann goes so far as to say that “somatic existence” is 
the “only human existence there is,” that it even continues beyond death.5 The 
body, therefore, is the self, the seat of existential interaction with the world. As 
Bultmann puts it “man does not have a soma; he is soma . . . .”6 
In defense of this notion Bultmann appeals to a wide selection of passages in 
Paul. For example, in 1 Cor 13:3 Paul tells the Corinthian Christians that love is more 
significant than giving one‖s own body up to injury and death. Speaking of one‖s 
body in this way is equivalent to speaking of one‖s “self.” Philippians 1:20 consists of 
Paul telling his readers that he is resolved to honor Christ in his body, even if that 
necessitates death. Here also the body is simply Paul himself.7 Summarizing his 
understanding of the word body in Paul, Bultmann says: “Man, his person as a whole, 
can be denoted by soma.”8 
Included within the concept of the body are the notions of “having a 
relationship to [oneself]” and being able to “disassociate [one‖s inner self] from 
[oneself as an object].”9 That is to say, self-awareness is at the core of what it means 
to be human. Having a body entails the ability to think of oneself as an object. 
                                                        
3 Ibid., 196. In this chapter I normally quote from the standard English translations of both 
Bultmann‖s and Käsemann‖s works, modifying them at points, and adding German in brackets when 
speaking of key concepts (with the German bibliographical reference immediately following the 
English one in the footnotes). I have left generic masculine singular pronouns in place when quoting 
from older English translations, with a few exceptions in places where I have otherwise modified the 
translation. 
4 Ibid., 192. 
5 Ibid., 196; cf. 198. Bultmann denies that Paul‖s basic conception of the body is physical, even 
though he admits that Paul occasionally expresses himself incautiously in such terms, as in 1 
Corinthians 15 (cf. 1 Cor 12:2-4, discussed in ibid., 202). 
6 Ibid., 194; idem, Theologie, 195: “der Mann hat nicht ein ς῵μα, sondern er ist ς῵μα.” 
7 Idem, Theology, 194-95. 
8 Ibid., Theology, 195 (emphasis original); idem, Theologie, 192 (emphasis original): “Durch ς῵μα 
kann der Mensch, die Person als ganze, bezeichnet warden.” 
9 Idem, Theology, 199 (slightly modified); idem, Theologie, 195: “Der Mensch . . . kann . . . sich von 
sich selbst distanzieren . . . .” Cf. Idem, Theology, 202-3, 216. 
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Furthermore, the “inner” self can become entangled in sin and thus not only 
distinguished, but also estranged from one‖s own body.10 In other words, a rift can 
open up between who one is at the deepest level, and one‖s bodily self. This 
understanding of the body is confirmed in Paul's talk of the inner man. For example, 
2 Cor 4:16 describes the inner person (ὁ ἔςψ ἡμ῵ν) as the subject-self, which can be 
distinguished from the outward person (ὁ ἔξψ ἡμψν ἄνθπψπορ), which is, like the 
body, the objective self.11 
Body language in Paul operates broadly to describe a person as a being 
capable of self-interaction. Paul‖s use of the word mind (νοῦρ), on the other hand, 
provides detail to that picture. Νοῦρ captures what it means “to be an ―I‖ that is 
subject of its own willing and doing.”12 While ς῵μα speaks of human existence in 
general, νοῦρ speaks of the “inner person,” the principle of individuality that is able 
to distinguish itself from the ς῵μα and interact with it. For Bultmann, Romans 7 is 
paradigmatic for distinguishing between the self as object and an inner 
consciousness that is distinct from, and possibly even at odds with, the desires and 
actions of the bodily self. Romans 7:23 could not be any clearer on this point: there 
is a “law” at work in the non-Christian Jew that fights against what such a person 
knows in his or her mind (νοῦρ), or inner self.13 Put differently: on a deeper level, 
one holds a set of convictions that may by incongruous with the desires of the 
“bodily self,” since the bodily self can become enslaved to various sinister forces, 
such as sin, flesh and legalism. 
Bultmann‖s treatment of Pauline anthropological terms is used to bolster his 
specifically existential approach to theology. For example, the verb ζάψ (“to live”) is 
understood to indicate the orientation of one‖s life, whether toward good or evil, 
whether toward God or self. On its own, “life” is simply a way of existing that can be 
directed in any number of directions.14 Bultmann contends that ζάψ in Paul is 
always “qualified by an adverb . . . or by an adverbial phrase . . .” in some manner or 
                                                        
10 Ibid., 200-1; idem, Theologie, 197: The “I” or “inner person” of Rom 7:22 is “der Träger des 
eigentlichen Wollens des Menschen.” 
11 Idem, Theology, 203. 
12 Ibid., 211 (slightly modified); idem, Theologie : “ein Ich zu sein, das Subjekt seines Wollens und 
Tuns ist . . . .” 
13 However, understanding the situation this way is only possible from the perspective of 
Christian faith (see idem, Theology, 212). 
14 Ibid., 210. 
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another.15 One can live as a pagan or as a Jew (see Gal 2:14); one can live according to 
the flesh or according to love (see Rom 8:4 and 14:15). The sphere in which one 
“lives” will determine the outcome of one‖s life and actions. 
Similarly, the human conscience (ςτνείδηςιρ) is the element of individuality 
where responsibility is located. The conscience can even become personified and 
testify externally to the individual as in Rom 9:1 and 2 Cor 1:12.16 Like one‖s way of 
life, the conscience guides a person toward authentic existence.17 The point that 
Bultmann continues to drive at throughout his exegesis of Paul‖s anthropological 
language is that being a human means being a rational agent who is constantly 
faced with a decision about how to proceed into the future. This is what Bultmann 
(relying on the terminology of existentialist philosophy) describes as the existential 
dilemma. 
Bultmann summarizes the existential perspective on Paul in this way: 
 
As the investigation of the term soma showed . . . the human [Mensch], according to 
Paul, is a being who has a relationship to itself [ein Verhältnis zu sich selbst], is placed 
at its own disposal, and is responsible for its own existence. But the human‖s 
existence [sein Sein], as the investigation of the terms psyche, pneuma, zoe, nous, and 
kardia showed . . . is never to be found in the present as a fulfilled reality, but always 
lies ahead. In other words, it is always an intention and a quest [Aus-sein-auf]. And in 
it the human may find itself or lose its grip upon itself, gain or lose itself.18 
 
A pervasive theme throughout Bultmann‖s analysis of Paul‖s anthropological 
terminology is the notion that such language has primary reference to how an 
individual lives his or her life with reference to God, and not with reference to other 
people (at least in the first instance). Capturing this emphasis succinctly is 
Bultmann‖s explanation of the word man (ἄνθπψπορ): “In most passages, anthropos 
means man in his creaturely humanity, and that means also man in his relation to 
God.”19 This brief quote captures an important aspect of Bultmann‖s thought: the 
individual is often thought of by Paul in terms of existence as a creature, thus 
                                                        
15 Ibid., 210. 
16 Ibid., 219. 
17 Ibid., 219. 
18 Ibid., 227 (modified); idem, Theologie, 223. While the lexical semantics behind Bultmann‖s 
statements about words related to human nature may be dubious (rightly noted by Anderson, 
“Constructing the Self,” 20-7; cf. Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics 
and Philosophical Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein 
[Exeter: Paternoster, 1980], 280-3), the overall picture of the essence of being human that emerges in 
Bultmann‖s writings is what is important for my purposes. 
19 Bultmann, Theology, 231. 
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highlighting the significance and primacy of the relationship between God and the 
individual. 
 
2.1.2 Fleshly Living: Boastful Humanity 
Having explained the nature of being human in its “unqualified ontological sense” 
[formal ontologischen Sinn], Bultmann moves on to clarify the “qualified ontic sense” 
[ontisch-qualifizierten Sinne] of existence in which individuals find themselves by 
virtue of their being in the world.20 That is to say, on the one hand, Bultmann 
describes a person as that person exists without reference to a specific life 
orientation. Paul‖s talk of the body falls into this ontological, contextually neutral 
sphere. On the other hand, Bultmann notes that Paul never speaks simply of 
individuals living in a vacuum. Instead, he always qualifies created (ontological) 
existence in terms of one‖s actual (ontic) existence under the influence of a wide 
range of forces (the flesh, sin, love, the Spirit, righteousness, etc.).21 While there are 
numerous facets to Bultmann‖s understanding of life under the power of sin (the 
ontic situation prior to conversion), two aspects will now be discussed since they 
provide a framework for understanding the rest: flesh and boasting. 
For Bultmann, a defective attitude toward God is at the root of all sin. Sin is 
refusing to acknowledge God as the creator and oneself as a creature. In Paul, the “. . 
. ultimate sin reveals itself to be the false assumption of receiving life not as the gift 
of the Creator but procuring it by one‖s own power, of living from one‖s self [aus sich 
selbst] rather than from God.”22 This is the sin of the flesh (ςάπξ). 
On a mundane level Bultmann recognizes that flesh in Paul can mean the 
visible element of personhood (human as opposed to animal “physicality”). Flesh 
can also denote human weakness and transitoriness.23 However, Paul is most 
concerned to speak of human flesh as it is co-opted by sinful impulses that direct a 
person away from proper living. This is what is meant in Paul by living “according 
to the flesh” (καπὰ ςάπκα). Such a fleshly life is the result of “trust in one‖s self 
[Selbstvertrauen] as being able to procure life by the use of the earthly and through 
                                                        
20 Ibid., 227 (slightly modified); idem, Theologie, 223. 
21 For the distinction between ontological and ontic existence see idem, Theology, 212, 227-28. 
22 Ibid., 232; idem, Theologie, 229. 
23 Idem, Theology, 233-35. 
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one‖s own strength and accomplishment.”24 Based on passages such as Rom 8:7, 
Bultmann understands fleshly living as life at war with God. 
Bultmann‖s interpretation of ςάπξ could be understood to give prominence 
to the idea of flesh as a power at odds with humanity. However, Bultmann believes 
that the individual “is not, as the New Testament regards him, the victim of a 
strange dichotomy which exposes him to the interference of powers outside 
himself.”25 Instead, once the mythological element of spiritual warfare in Paul‖s 
letters has been properly interpreted (“demythologized”), the individual is seen to 
bear “the sole responsibility for his own feeling, thinking, and willing.”26 That is to 
say, no matter how much Paul‖s language may seem to speak of a cosmic battle 
between God and the devil, the truly significant reference of such language is to the 
power of choice that resides within each individual person.27 Again, we see a partial 
explanation for why Bultmann focuses so much attention on the individual: what 
matters for Paul—and should matter for his modern interpreter—is the existential 
struggle of every human being. 
Life is what God intends for humanity and what people naturally want for 
themselves. The sinister side of each person‖s flesh is the main force at work to 
thwart this pursuit. Sin results when the flesh controls one‖s existence and leads a 
person to seek what is not conducive to the good life. Sin creates a rupture between 
one‖s inner self (who desires life) and one‖s body (objective self). This rupture 
creates a situation where a person “tries to live out of his own strength and thus 
loses his self [sein Selbst]—his ―life‖ [seine ζψή]—and rushes into death.”28 While flesh 
is the dominating force at work in those who turn away from God, boasting is the 
specific attitude that characterizes such people. 
                                                        
24 Ibid., 239; idem, Theologie, 235. 
25 Idem, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate (ed. Hans-
Werner Bartsch; trans. Reginald H. Fuller; London: SPCK, 1972), 6. 
26 Ibid. Briefly, “demythologization” of the biblical writings is a method of interpretation in 
Bultmann. Since Bultmann believes that the entire Bible reflects an ancient and primitive world-
view, he argues that it must be demythologized (that is, interpreted) in order to bring out the “self-
understanding” contained within the texts. According to Bultmann, the self-understanding 
contained within the myth-laden world of the Bible is what really matters, both for Paul and for 
modern theological appropriation of the Bible. See ibid., 17-44, for an outline of Bultmann‖s 
demythologization of key New Testament themes. Cf. Idem, “Is Exegesis Without Presuppositions 
Possible?” in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann (ed. and trans. Shubert M. Ogden; 
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), 292; Thiselton, Two Horizons, 258-63. 
27 Cf. Meech, Self and Community, 129-30. 
28 Bultmann, Theology, 246; idem, Theologie, 241. 
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Bultmann explains the core problem facing humanity in this way: “In the 
self-praise of the law-obedient Jew and the self-praise of the Gnostic proud of his or 
her wisdom, the dominant attitude of humanity comes to light, especially the 
devotion with which they autonomously think themselves to be the true essence of 
humanity, which ultimately ends in self-contradiction.”29 This haughty attitude 
manifests itself in “confidence in the flesh” rather than confidence in Christ (see 
e.g., Phil 3:4-8).30 Furthermore, Bultmann tends to generalize the notion of boasting 
into a critique of all of humanity: 
 
The attitude of sinful self-reliance finds its extreme expression in man‖s ―boasting‖ 
[κατφᾶςθαι dem Menschen]. It is characteristic both of the Jew, who boasts of God 
and the Torah (Rom. 2:17, 23), and of the Greek, who boasts of his wisdom (1 Cor. 
1:19-31). It is also a natural tendency of man [des Menschen] to compare himself with 
others in order to have his ―boast‖ thereby (Gal. 6:4).31 
 
It is not significant whether one is a first-century Jew, a Gnostically-inclined Gentile 
or a twentieth-century German reader of Paul, all are guilty of boasting before 
God.32 Thus, Bultmann‖s insistence that, according to Paul, boasting is the universal 
disposition of sinful humanity serves as another element that feeds into his 
individually oriented New Testament interpretation. This is the basis for Bultmann‖s 
insistence that in light of the gospel everyone is a generic individual and nothing 
else, at least in any ultimately important sense. 
A telling example of Bultmann‖s universalizing tendency is found in his 
explanation of how Paul transcends the contingent situation of Galatians with 
regard to the law: Bultmann reasons that even if “Paul‖s doctrine of the law is 
polemic in character, it is by no means something occasional and secondary, but 
rather contains his central thoughts.”33 Historical contingency cannot be allowed to 
overrule a universal opposition like that between grace and works.34 For Bultmann, 
no matter what the social ramifications of Paul‖s teaching might be, the generalized, 
individual person remains central. 
                                                        
29 Idem, “Neues Testament und Mythologie: Ein theologisches Gespräch,” in Kerygma und Mythos 
(ed. Hans-Werner Bartsch; Hamburg: Herbert Reich-Evangelischer, 1967), 37 (my translation). 
30 Idem, Theology, 243. 
31 Ibid., 242 (slightly modified); idem, Theologie, 239. 
32 Cf. Idem, Theology, 242-43; see also idem, “Paul,” in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf 
Bultmann (ed. and trans. Shubert M. Ogden; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), 135-36. 
33 Ibid., 137. 
34 Cf. Idem, Theology, 283-84. 
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Bultmann‖s exegesis of Romans 7 provides another enlightening example of 
his individualizing treatment of Paul. In Rom 7:14-24 Paul is said to portray the “the 
situation of man under Torah [des Menschen unter dem Gesetz] as it has become clear 
looking backward from the standpoint of Christian faith.”35 The “I” of Romans 7 can 
also be said to be “the Jew” struggling under the law, but only as that struggle has 
been interpreted in light of faith.36 Either way, whether it be the “human under 
Torah” or “the Jew” under the law, Bultmann seeks a generalizable pattern that can 
be applied to the individual human irrespective of time or circumstance.37 
Since the fundamental human problem is centered on the individual and his 
or her boasting, the fundamental solution must be individually oriented as well. 
Hence, the justification of the individual is at the heart of Bultmann‖s theology, and 
faith (the means of justification) is understood as “the absolute contrary of 
―boasting‖.”38 The Gospel shatters boasting and prevents the prideful setting of 
oneself over against others (1 Cor 1:29). Christians are thus forbidden from looking 
down on others (see Gal 6:4; Rom 11:17-18), and instead must boast only in their 
weakness (see 2 Cor 11:30; 12:9; Rom 5:2) and thus in the Lord‖s power (2 Cor 1:9).39 
The justification of the ungodly shows that, while the individual is the primary 
concern in Paul‖s theology of creation and fall, it is also brought to the forefront in 
Paul‖s understanding of redemption. 
 
2.2 The Individual: Theological and Hermeneutical Constraints 
Several theological and hermeneutical convictions further facilitate Bultmann‖s 
existential approach to Paul. However, this is not to say that Bultmann simply 
imposes an individualistic theological a priori onto Paul‖s letters. Indeed, as we have 
already seen, especially throughout his explication of the meaning of Paul‖s 
                                                        
35 Ibid., 247 (slightly modified); idem, Theologie, 243; cf. idem, “Romans 7 and the Anthropology of 
Paul,” in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann (ed. and trans. Shubert M. Ogden; 
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), 147. 
36 Idem, “Paul,” 115. 
37 Which is also the aim of Gary Burnett. See Burnett, Salvation, 10, whose study “seeks to see if 
Paul was concerned with the individual qua individual, irrespective of social or, indeed, historical 
identity; whether Paul‖s understanding of God‖s work in the world was primarily operative at the 
level of the individual, as opposed to being largely concerned with people groups and group 
identity.” 
38 Bultmann, Theology, 281 (emphasis original); cf. idem, “The Christology of the New Testament,” 
in Faith and Understanding (ed. R. W. Funk; trans. Louise Pettibone Smith; London: SCM, 1969), 278-79. 
Cited in David Way, The Lordship of Christ: Ernst Käsemann’s Interpretation of Paul’s Theology (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1991), 177.  
39 Bultmann, Theology, 242. 
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anthropological terms, Bultmann finds an individually-oriented approach to be 
demanded by Paul‖s letters themselves, both in the sense that Paul‖s own focus is 
the individual, and in the sense that the modern interpreter‖s focus should also be 
the individual. 
The reciprocal relationship between exegesis and systematic exposition is 
part of Bultmann‖s use of the hermeneutical spiral: he continually points to the 
importance of the individual in Paul‖s letters and then uses this to structure his 
explication of the totality of Paul‖s thought. His overarching existential perspective, 
however, also enables Bultmann to make sense of the details of Paul‖s letters, 
including the self-understanding present in them. Karl Barth comes to a similar 
conclusion: 
 
I hope I am not wrong when I say that Bultmann‖s primary aim is to present the 
New Testament as the document of a message (kerygma, proclamation, preaching). 
It is that and that alone. This means that the usual lines of demarcation between 
exegesis and systematic theology are entirely abolished.40 
 
That is to say, there is no clear line separating Bultmann‖s exegesis of Paul, his 
overarching theological understanding of the apostle, and his interpretation of 
Pauline thought for the modern person. Because of this, the various exegetical and 
hermeneutical reasons for highlighting the individual in Paul often meld together. 
I will now look at several of the theological and hermeneutical constraints 
that shape Bultmann‖s theology in an existential direction, keeping in mind that 
these cannot be understood in isolation from Bultmann‖s existential exegesis of key 
Pauline texts. 
 
2.2.1 Theology is Anthropology 
Bultmann conceives of Pauline anthropology and theology as closely intertwined.41 
In fact: 
 
Pauline theology is not a speculative system. It deals with God not as He is in 
Himself but only with God as He is significant for man [wie er für den Menschen . . . 
bedeutsam ist], for man‖s responsibility and man‖s salvation. Correspondingly, it does 
not deal with the world and man as they are in themselves, but constantly sees the 
world and man in their relation to God. Every assertion about God is simultaneously 
                                                        
40 Karl Barth, “Rudolf Bultmann—An Attempt to Understand Him,” in Kerygma and Myth: A 
Theological Debate (ed. Hans-Werner Bartsch; trans. Reginald H. Fuller; London: SPCK, 1972), 84-85. 
41 The word “theology” is being used here in the more narrow sense of “teaching pertaining to 
God” as opposed to “teaching pertaining to humanity” (anthropology). 
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an assertion about man and vice versa [Jeder Satz über Gott ist zugleich ein Satz über den 
Menschen und umgekehrt]. For this reason and in this sense Paul‖s theology is, at the 
same time, anthropology [Anthropologie]. . . . every assertion about God speaks of 
what He does with man and what He demands of him [was er am Menschen tut und 
vom Menschen fordert]. And, the other way around, every assertion about man speaks 
of God‖s deed and demand—or about man as he is qualified by the divine deed and 
demand and by his attitude toward them.42 
 
God‖s being cannot be known as it is a se, but only as it is related to individual 
human subjects. Any biblical statement about God is at the same time a statement 
about God in his relationship with humanity, and any statement about humanity is a 
statement about humanity only as it is related to God. Since nothing can be said or 
known about God that is not filtered through the mind of a human agent “it is not 
legitimate to speak about god in general statements, in universal truths which are 
valid without references to the concrete, existential position of the speaker 
[konkrete existentielle Situation des Redenden].”43 To begin from any vantage point 
outside of the mediation of the human actor is not only misguided, but impossible. 
Thus, throughout his writings, Bultmann‖s central concern remains the 
individual, since all knowledge of God is mediated through the divine-individual 
relationship, via the kerygma. To defend such an understanding, Bultmann points 
to such texts as Rom 14:23 and Gal 2:20, which bring to the forefront the 
indispensability of faith for a right ordering of the world, and a right understanding 
                                                        
42 Bultmann, Theology, 190-1; idem, Theologie, 187-88; cf. idem, “Paul,” 127-28; David Fergusson, 
Rudolf Bultmann (London: Continuum, 2000), 83. 
43 Rudolf Bultmann, “What Does it Mean to Speak of God?” in Faith and Understanding (ed. Robert 
W. Funk; trans. Louise Pettibone Smith; London: SCM, 1969), 53; idem, “Welchen Sinn hat es, von Gott 
zu reden?” in Glauben und Verstehen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1933), 26; cf. idem, “Mythology,” 19; 
Nils Alstrup Dahl, “Rudolf Bultmann‖s Theology of the New Testament,” in The Crucified Messiah, and 
Other Essays (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1974), 95: “Insight into the ―historicity of existence‖ has 
decisively clarified the problem of understanding historical documents for him and appears to him 
to be the appropriate ―pre-understanding‖ for the interpretation of the New Testament.” While 
Bultmann‖s interaction with Martin Heidegger cannot be discussed here in detail it is worthwhile to 
note that Bultmann was primarily interested in Heidegger because the two shared the same starting 
point, namely the historicity of existence, an existence that was studied from two different vantage 
points in philosophical and theological analysis (cf. Rudolf Bultmann, “Milestones in Books,” ExpT 70 
[1959]: 125; John Painter, Theology as Hermeneutics: Rudolf Bultmann’s Interpretation of the History of Jesus 
[Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1987], 16-19, 42-43; David Cairns, A Gospel Without Myth: 
Bultmann’s Challenge to the Preacher [London: SCM, 1960], 54-64; John Macquarrie, “Philosophy and 
Theology in Bultmann‖s Thought,” in The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann [ed. Charles W. Kegley; London: 
SCM, 1966], 130-5). Rudolf Bultmann, “The Historicity of Man and Faith,” in Existence and Faith: Shorter 
Writings of Rudolf Bultmann (ed. and trans. Shubert M. Ogden; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961, 
emphasis original), 98, believed that “every theology is dependent for the clarification of its concepts 
upon a pretheological understanding of man that, as a rule, is determined by some philosophical 
tradition.” Thus, Heidegger‖s thought is, from Bultmann‖s vantage point, simply a conceptual tool 
used to clarify the task of theological inquiry (cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 232). 
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of God.44 As we will see below, community is important in Bultmann, but primarily 
as an implication of the divine-human relationship, rather than as constituting a 
primary component of that relationship. 
 
2.2.2 Faith, Kerygma and Demythologization 
Another reason the individual is the focal point of theological enquiry is because 
God can only be known in one specific manner: through faith. Moreover, faith can 
only be created through the preaching of the word (the kerygma), as is evident in 
Rom 10:8-17.45 When the kerygma is grasped through faith, a new theological 
understanding—a posture of hope in the face of an uncertain future—is granted to 
the individual.46 Faith thus constitutes an exegetically-derived, individually-
oriented hermeneutical constraint for Bultmann, in the sense that human 
knowledge of God is dependent on the acceptance of the kerygma by the 
individual.47 If for Paul it is futile to seek knowledge of God apart from faith, it is 
equally futile to seek the ground or locus of Christian experience in the community, 
since it is individuals as individuals who are confronted with the kerygma and must 
submit to it in faith. 
 According to Bultmann, the “preaching of God‖s saving act . . . addresses the 
conscience of the hearer and asks him whether he is willing to understand the 
occurrence that it proclaims as occurring to him himself [an ihm selbst] and thereby 
to understand himself [sich selbst] in its light.”48 Furthermore, “Jesus Christ confronts 
men in the kerygma and nowhere else; just as he confronted Paul himself and forced 
him to the decision [Entscheidung].”49 There is no access to theological knowledge 
apart from faith, and no creation of faith apart from the preached word. 
                                                        
44 Cf. Bultmann, Theology, 324-29. 
45 Cf. Ibid., 318; idem, “Paul,” 139. As Dahl, “Bultmann‖s Theology,” 93-94, puts it: “For Bultmann 
as for Luther the kerygma, or gospel, is the point of orientation and the center of all theology.” 
46 Bultmann, Theology, 320-22. 
47 Although this does not diminish the fact that it is a divine word of address which does not 
have “its origin in human considerations and human intentions; it comes from God” (idem, “The 
Concept of the Word of God in the New Testament,” in Faith and Understanding [ed. Robert W. Funk; 
trans. Louise Pettibone Smith; London: SCM, 1969], 299). 
48 Idem, “Paul,” 139 (slightly modified); idem, “Paulus,” RGG 4:1039; cf. idem, “Concept,” 301. 
49 Idem, “The Significance of the Historical Jesus for the Theology of Paul,” in Faith and 
Understanding (ed. Robert W. Funk; trans. Louise Pettibone Smith; London: SCM, 1969), 241 (emphasis 
original); idem, “Die Bedeutung des geschichtlichen Jesus für die Theologie des Paulus,” in Glauben 
und Verstehen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1933), 208. Cf. idem, Theology, 302; idem, “Paul,” 139. 
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Such a document is a word of address and challenge to each individual 
person. It “is a word which has power, which acts with power,” namely the “power 
and wisdom” of God (cf. 1 Cor 1:14) that shows one‖s sinfulness for what it really is.50 
God, as 2 Cor 5:20-21 indicates, calls for a response to the preached word, and “in 
the summons [of the kerygma], a specific understanding [ein bestimmtes Verstehen] is 
communicated to the obedient hearer [dem gehorchenden Hören].”51 Since faith has to 
do with the transformation of human understanding it is thoroughly centered on 
the individual, even though the word of God also sovereignly constitutes the church 
as “an eschatological fact.”52 The very purpose of the kerygma is to produce a true 
and proper self-understanding in the person who is summoned by it. Therefore, it 
makes no sense for anything other than the thinking and acting individual to be at 
the center of Bultmann‖s understanding of Paul. 
In contrast, Christology, for Käsemann is employed as a theological 
challenge to Bultmann‖s elevation of the kerygma, under the rubric of “decision” 
(Entscheidung), to a controlling framework for interpretation.53 For Käsemann, such 
a move restricts the essence of Pauline theology to a matter simply of existential 
choice, which is “a foundation clearly incapable of doing justice to the reality of any 
history which implies a doctrine of the Fall or of divine preservation.”54 It may be 
that Bultmann‖s choice of expressing his theology of the kerygma in terms of 
decision was infelicitous and opened him up to Käsemann‖s charge of excessive 
individualism. However, given the actual contours of Bultmann‖s discussion of the 
primacy of the living and active word of God in creating and sustaining faith, and of 
Christ‖s sovereign act of confrontation with the individual in preaching, perhaps the 
divine has not been neglected to nearly the degree that Käsemann thinks it has. 
As has already been noted, Bultmann argues that the New Testament, when 
properly demythologized (interpreted) yields a portrayal of humanity split into two 
fundamental categories: the individual before (personal) faith, and the individual 
                                                        
50 Bultmann, “Concept,” 298, 300-1; cf. idem, “Church and Teaching in the New Testament,” in 
Faith and Understanding (ed. R. W. Funk; trans. Louise Pettibone Smith; London: SCM, 1969), 209, 216. 
To defend the notion of the “effective power” of God‖s word Bultmann points to such passages in the 
New Testament as 1 Thess 2:13; 2 Thess 3:1; Col 1:16. 
51 Ibid., 212; idem, “Kirche und Lehre im Neuen Testament,” in Glauben und Verstehen (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1933), 180. 
52 Idem, “Paul,” 139-40. 
53 See e.g., idem, Theology, 316; idem, Theologie, 312. 
54 Cf. Ernst Käsemann, “New Testament Questions of Today,” in New Testament Questions of Today 
(trans. W. J. Montague; London: SCM, 1969), 15. 
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after the coming of (personal) faith.55 It is precisely faith that provides the light that 
illuminates the true meaning of the mythology of the New Testament, which lies in 
the “understanding of human existence” (Existenzverständnis) that can be uncovered 
from the biblical texts.56 
Demythologization is thus built on the premise that generalized truths about 
individual existence can be gleaned from the thoroughly mythological texts of the 
New Testament. Demythologization finds relevant and contemporary meaning in 
events such as Christ‖s cross and resurrection only when “we ask what God is trying 
to say to each one of us through them.”57 Thus, “myth should be interpreted not 
cosmologically [kosmologisch], but anthropologically [anthropologish], or better still, 
existentially [existential].”58 This procedure is legitimated by the fact the “New 
Testament itself invites this kind of criticism,”59 primarily evinced in the fact that 
its own presentation of humanity inconsistently shifts between a cosmic and 
existential explanation of the human condition.60 This comes out clearly when one 
compares the gnostically influenced idea that unbelieving humanity is subject to 
the enslaving power of sin (as in Romans 5-6; 1 Corinthians 15; Galatians 6) with 
statements to the effect that the individual who has faith is free from the 
domination of outside forces (e.g. 1 Cor 6:12; 7:17-24; 10:23-31). The latter examples 
indicate places where “the eschatology of Jewish apocalyptic and of Gnosticism has 
been emancipated from its accompanying mythology, in so far as the age of 
salvation has already dawned for the believer . . . .”61 Once interpreted apart from 
                                                        
55 “Der Mensch vor der Offenbarung der πίςσιρ” and “der Mensch unter der πίςσιρ” (see 
Bultmann, Theologie, 186, 266). 
56 Idem, “Mythology,” 16; idem, “Mythologie,” 26. 
57 Idem, “Mythology,” 35; cf. Hans Hübner, “Existentiale Interpretation der Paulinischen 
―Gerechtigkeit Gottes‖: Zur Kontroverse Rudolf Bultmann-Ernst Käsemann,” NTS 21 (1975): 483: For 
Bultmann “Das ganze Verfahren der Entmythologisierung . . . nur die Kehrseite der existentialen 
Interpretation ist . . . .”  
58 Bultmann, “Mythology,” 10; idem, “Mythologie,” 22. 
59 Idem, “Mythology,” 11. 
60 Ibid., 11-12.Yet, despite this exegetical legitimization, there is also a strong sense in which 
Bultmann brings to the text the conviction that it must be demythologized if its message is to be 
made understandable and believable to the modern person. As Bultmann puts it: “It is impossible to 
use the electric light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical 
discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and miracles. We 
may think we can manage it in our own lives, but to expect others to do so is to make the Christian 
faith unintelligible and unacceptable to the modern world” (ibid., 5). 
61 Ibid., 20. 
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such mythological imagery “the real question is whether it [= understanding of 
existence (Existenzverständnis)] is true.”62 
Therefore, for both exegetical and hermeneutical reasons, Bultmann 
approaches the text of the New Testament expecting to find information that lays 
bare the existential situation of the individual as an individual since he insists that 
the “real purpose of myth is not to give an objective picture of the world [ein 
objektives Weltbild]; instead it points to how humanity understands itself in its 
world.”63 
 
2.2.3 Historical Skepticism and Dialectical Theology 
Bultmann follows his teacher Wilhelm Hermann in transferring Paul‖s teaching on 
justification apart from works into the realm of epistemology.64 For both Hermann 
and Bultmann, basing faith on objective facts is a sinful human striving after false 
security, analogous to Jewish trusting in Torah for justification and Gnostic boasting 
in the security and superiority of human wisdom. Bultmann puts it this way: 
 
Our radical attempt to demythologize the New Testament is in fact a perfect 
parallel to St. Paul‖s and Luther‖s doctrine of justification by faith alone apart from 
the works of the Law. Or rather, it carries this doctrine to its logical conclusion in 
the field of epistemology. Like the doctrine of justification it destroys every false 
security.65 
 
                                                        
62 Ibid., 11 (modified); idem, “Mythologie,” 23. 
63 Ibid., 22 (my translation). Cf. idem, “Christology,” 280; Dahl, “Bultmann‖s Theology,” 94. 
64 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 210-217, 233; cf. Tim Labron, Bultmann Unlocked (London: T & T Clark, 
2011), 33-42; Fergusson, Bultmann, 12, 35; Wilhelm Hermann, The Communion of the Christian with God: 
Described on the Basis of Luther’s Statements (ed. Robert T. Voelkel; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), viii: 
“My opponents on the right count it part of their glory that with them the sum of doctrine is much 
more comprehensive, and embraces at the least all that is reported or taught about Jesus in the New 
Testament. In this assertion, of course, the legal character of their religion is still more sharply 
defined. And the most strange thing in this is that they wish to make a law for all who will become 
Christians the very doctrine of that Apostle who contended so hotly for the recognition of the fact 
that there is no law there that can make alive. They evidently imagine that the sum of doctrine 
constructed in this way by them ceases to be law when it gets the name ―gospel.‖” Cf. ibid., vii-xi, 16-
17, 161-63, 214-16; Daniel L. Deegan, “The Theology of Wilhelm Hermann: A Reassessment,” JR 45 
(1965): 91-95. 
65 Rudolf Bultmann, “Bultmann Replies to His Critics,” in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate 
(ed. Hans-Werner Bartsch; trans. Reginald H. Fuller; London: SPCK, 1972), 210-11; Quoted in 
Thiselton, Two Horizons, 213. 
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Just as Bultmann finds boasting to be the fundamental error attacked by Paul (e.g. in 
Rom 3:27; 1 Cor 1:28-29; etc.), he also sees this error manifesting itself in a demand 
for trust in historically verifiable facts as a foundation for belief in God.66 
Karl Barth‖s dialectic theology, which emphasizes the “radically other” 
nature of God also bolsters Bultmann‖s anti-objectivist stance. Bultmann 
appropriates dialectical theology in its refusal to anchor Christian faith to knowable 
events in the past such as the life, cross and resurrection of Christ. For Barth and 
Bultmann, an “objectivist” approach is thought to make God an object under human 
control rather than the subject who confronts all people and calls for faith.67 As 
exemplified in the factions described by Paul in 1 Corinthians, it is all too human to 
“confuse faith with human knowledge and convictions.”68 Faith is not genuine 
unless it is a radical step into the dark based solely on trust in God.  
Furthermore, historical skepticism leads Bultmann to argue that faith must 
be kept separate from belief in the historicity of past events. Faith must not be tied 
to the results of historical research because the results of such research are 
incapable of forming a foundation for Christian belief. Bultmann‖s historical 
approach seeks to demonstrate that no events (cross, resurrection, etc.) can be 
known in their religious significance simply from a study of history. Such an 
approach, as 1 Cor 1:17-18 indicates, empties the cross of its power and cannot 
accept that “the Christian proclamation is folly (μψπία), and . . . cannot be 
legitimatized to men‖s reason as ―wisdom‖ (ςουία).”69 The nature of God and of his 
rule over the world “is not within the scope of our knowledge, not even after the 
best religious observation of nature and history.”70 All that can be known by an 
individual is “God‖s rule over me.”71 Going even further, Bultmann argues that 
history should simply be ignored when it comes to matters of faith: “It is precisely 
                                                        
66 Cf. Dahl, “Bultmann‖s Theology,” 121: “His rejection of tendencies toward historicizing and 
mythologizing is a matter of his passionate religious concern: the kerygma must be rescued from 
objectivizing thought which puts it at man‖s disposal, thus safeguarding the extra nos.” 
67 An objectivist viewpoint is one that bases faith (and thus knowledge of God) on specific, 
historically verifiable events that have a supposedly clear theological meaning attached to them. Cf. 
Bultmann, Theology, 303; cf. Dahl, “Bultmann‖s Theology,” 117-18. On the influence of Barth‖s 
dialectic on Bultmann‖s anti-objectivism see Rudolf Bultmann, “Karl Barth, The Resurrection of the 
Dead,” in Faith and Understanding (ed. Robert W. Funk; trans. Louise Pettibone Smith; London: SCM, 
1969), 69, 73-75, 94; cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 223-26. 
68 Bultmann, “Barth,” 68. 
69 Ibid., 69. 
70 Ibid., 90. 
71 Ibid. (emphasis original). 
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its immunity from proof which secures the Christian proclamation against the 
charge of being mythological.”72  
Bultmann‖s appropriation of historical skepticism and elements of dialectical 
theology serves as further justification for approaching the New Testament from an 
individually-oriented perspective. Since historically verifiable, objective data 
cannot legitimate Christian belief, the significance of faith for the individual—and 
nothing else—must be the focus of exegetical inquiry and Christian proclamation. 
 
2.3 The Individual-in-Community 
As we have seen, Bultmann focuses throughout his writings on the generic 
individual. However, he does not ignore the social aspects of Pauline thought. In 
fact, contrary to many modern perceptions of Bultmann, the social and communal 
in Paul receives sustained treatment in his work, even if not to the satisfaction of 
the post-Bultmannian, anti-individualist consensus. 
When Bultmann speaks in communal terms, it is almost always with 
reference to love within the church, which is the necessary outcome of the faith of 
every person, not an added extra.73 Writing about the idea of the church (ἐκκληςία) 
in Paul, Bultmann highlights what he takes to be the most important background, 
namely the idea of corporate Israel in the Old Testament. Paul draws a direct line of 
continuity back to Israel and places his churches into the role of a “true Israel.” 
Bultmann puts it this way: 
 
Thus, to a high degree, Paul‖s significance consists in his having given to 
Christianity not the consciousness of being a new ―religion,‖ but rather the 
consciousness of being a ―church‖ in a sense that was unknown in the Hellenistic 
world. Nevertheless, this consciousness of being a church is but a recasting of the 
Jewish inheritance; for in Judaism also the idea of the church as the people of God 
was very much alive.74 
 
In the church, therefore, individuals who have come to a proper self-understanding 
in the act of faith are not simply isolated individuals, but are united by love into 
specific congregations, which in turn form the unified body of all Christians in all 
                                                        
72 Idem, “Mythology,” 44. 
73 Cf. Idem, “Jesus and Paul,” in Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann (ed. and 
trans. Shubert M. Ogden; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1961), 188-90. 
74 Bultmann, “Paul,” 119; cf. idem, “Christology,” 274.  
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places.75 Love creates community and takes individuals outside of themselves into a 
new social world with a new perspective on what is valuable and beneficial.76 
 One of the central affirmations of Bultmann‖s theology of “authentic 
existence” is the notion that “for the believer everything worldly and on hand that 
he encounters turns out to be radically indifferent, inasmuch as nothing can be held 
against him.”77 That is to say, the encounter with Christ in the kerygma frees the 
believer from slavery to fear, boasting and self-security, all of which are hallmarks 
of life apart from faith. Nevertheless, 
 
this indifference . . . immediately disappears before the question of what I have to 
do, before the question of my particular responsibility [jeweiligen Verantwortung] (1 
Cor. 6:12, 8:1 ff., 10:23). Service of Christ realizes itself in actual life as service to the 
neighbor [als Dienst am Nächsten], of whom precisely the man who is free, and only 
he, should and can make himself a genuine servant (1 Cor. 9:19-22, cf. 8:9; Rom 14:13 
ff., 15:1 ff.; Gal 5:13).78 
 
Responsibility toward one‖s neighbor, therefore, is a non-negotiable aspect of the 
Christian‖s freedom. Individuality, for Bultmann, cannot entail individualistic 
isolation and self-serving complacency. 
 Put differently, freedom places the individual into a new realm of existence 
where he or she is “free to enjoy fellowship with others.”79 Bultmann points to the 
other-centered nature of the fruit of the Holy Spirit (cf. Gal 5:22) when he argues 
that freedom makes a person capable of “human togetherness” (das menschliche 
Miteinander) and is of the essence of what it means to be a “new creature.”80 In fact, 
the ethics of the New Testament is primarily communally-focused: 
 
[The New Testament ethical] situation receives its stamp not alone from the 
demands that apply to the individual by himself [dem Individuum für sich], such as 
that of chastity (1 Cor. 6:12ff.), but especially from the obligations that arise from 
human fellowship [dem menschlichen Miteinander]. In this respect ―all things are 
lawful for me‖ is restricted by the limitation (1 Cor. 10:23b): ―but not all things build 
up‖—some things do not contribute to building up fellowship. This limitation is also 
given in positive form: ―let no one seek his own good, but the good of his neighbor‖ 
(1 Cor. 10:24).81 
 
                                                        
75 Bultmann, “Paul,” 120; cf. 140; idem, “Barth,” 79. 
76 Cf. Idem, “Christology,” 275-76. 
77 Idem, “Paul,” 145. 
78 Ibid., 145 (slightly modified; emphasis original); idem, “Paulus,” 1043. 
79 Idem, “Mythology,” 22; cf. idem, Theology, 339-40. 
80 Idem, “Mythologie,” 31 (my translation); cf. idem, “Significance,” 246. 
81 Idem, Theology, 342; idem, Theologie, 338. 
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Human desire for recognition from others is a foundational aspect of the slavery 
that all people are subject to apart from faith. The individual, however, having 
received recognition from God in justification, “is inwardly liberated so that he can 
love, that is, so that he can be genuinely devoted to his fellow-man and to the tasks 
of everyday life in the service of the community.”82 Bultmann can even go so far in 
emphasizing the communal nature of faith working through love as to say that the 
church is not a place where one “has and enjoys his individual relationship to Christ 
[individuelles Christus-Verhältnis]” abstracted from the body of Christ.83 Communion 
with Christ comes only in the context of communion with others through loving 
service. 
Furthermore, Bultmann‖s understanding of the way in which the gospel 
eliminates any ground for human boasting serves to bolster his communal vision. 
While Bultmann argues explicitly for the importance of the elimination of boasting 
for the individual, this elimination also entails a specific social function. All human 
beings stand before God simply as human beings. Since no one has grounds for a 
boast before God, no one has grounds for a boast against others either. Precisely in 
what it says about individuals, the gospel is the great social leveler, obliterating all 
grounds for self-exaltation. 
Another example of Bultmann‖s communally sensitive interpretation is 
found in his discussion of baptism and of Paul‖s “in Christ” language. Disputing 
mystical-individual interpretations of the phrase “in Christ,” Bultmann argues 
instead that it is “primarily an ecclesiological formula [eine ekklesiologische Formel].”84 
Baptism, which joins one to Christ, is about having been brought into the 
community of the church, the location of the proleptic arrival of God‖s new 
creation.85 New creation is vitally important for Paul since the gospel “message has 
for its theme not the fate of individuals [individueller Lebensschicksale] but 
eschatological salvation [das eschatologische Heil].”86 Thus, new creation (and, 
concomitantly, the Christian life itself) is communally oriented, although Bultmann 
                                                        
82 Idem, “Christ the End of the Law,” in Essays Philosophical and Theological (trans. James C. G. 
Greig; London: SCM, 1955), 60; cf. idem, Theology, 332: “A paradoxical servitude! For the ―slave of 
Christ‖ is, at the same time, ―a freedman of Christ‖ (1 Cor. 7:22). It will presently appear that this 
servitude is also a ―serving of one another‖ (Gal. 5:13) and can demand that one make himself ―a slave 
to all‖ (1 Cor. 9:19).” Cf. Ibid., 342-43. 
83 Ibid., 310 (modified); idem, Theologie, 306. Contra Anderson, “Constructing the Self,” 26. 
84 Bultmann, Theology, 311 (emphasis original); idem, Theologie, 307. 
85 Idem, Theology, 311. 
86 Ibid., 324 (slightly modified); idem, Theologie, 319. 
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never loses sight of the individual ramifications of such themes in Paul, such as “die 
Individualisierung der πίςσιρ.”87 
 In sum, the one body and community of Christ is not simply “an association 
that constitutes itself nor a crowd of pneumatic individuals.” It is an “eschatological 
fact.”88 The church is a group of believers who have been “taken out of ―this world‖” 
and who serve as “the continuation of the Christ-event.”89 The Church is the only 
location where the kerygma is proclaimed, and thus serves as the only place where 
Christ is present and salvation enjoyed.90 Throughout his writings Bultmann insists 
that God deals with individuals in the gospel, but only in connection with the 
participation of the individual in the life of the community. The rhetorically-loaded 
reaction to Bultmann‖s individualism in subsequent scholarship has not paid careful 
enough attention to his attentiveness to communal concerns in Paul, even if it is 
admitted that Bultmann could have done more to articulate the concrete 
relationship between the individual and the community.91 
  
2.4 Analysis 
Bultmann contends that Paul does not provide a systematic presentation of his 
anthropological starting point. Nonetheless, such a starting point is the 
presupposition undergirding the entirety of the apostle‖s thought. Just as Jesus did 
in his preaching, Paul begins the theological exposition in his letters from the 
premise that every person is a sinner.92 In Paul, the individual human plight is 
theologically central because every human “has become guilty, stands simply as a 
sinner [als Sünder] before God. Whatever good he may do would naturally not in 
itself be bad, but would be only the act of a sinner, who stands, before God in 
infinite guilt.”93 
                                                        
87 Ibid., 321. 
88 Idem, “Paul,” 140. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., “Paul,” 140; cf. idem, Theology, 303-4: “But it is not only in the proclamation that the cross 
thus becomes present; it also does so in all those who let it become the determining power of their 
lives, those who are united with Christ into one soma.” 
91 This one-sided reaction against Bultmann has been recently restated by Anderson, 
“Constructing the Self,” 26: “Moreover, for Bultmann, it is unnecessary to talk about the self and its 
relationship to the community, let alone to a people, since what matters to him is the individual‖s 
power of decision to lead an authentic life.” Similarly, see Meech, Self and Community, 55. 
92 Cf. Bultmann, “Significance,” 231. 
93 Idem, “End of the Law,” 50 (slightly modified); idem, “Christus des Gesetzes Ende,” in Glauben 
und Verstehen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1952), 44. 
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Furthermore, in light of God‖s awesome transcendence “verschwinden alle 
menschlichen Differenzierungen; vor ihm steht der Jude wie der Grieche 
gleichermaßen als ἄνθπψπορ (Rm 3, 28 f.). Menschliche Größe und menschliche 
Wertungen sind vor Gott nichtig.”94 Just as universal sin creates a common human 
predicament, God‖s “otherness” levels all human distinctions and grounds for 
boasting. All people stand before God simply as individuals, stripped of any 
distinguishing characteristics. Thus, the individual before God is the focus of Paul‖s 
teaching. 
 Yet, Bultmann recognizes that there is an interpersonal dimension to Paul‖s 
theology, although he does not allow this to obscure the primacy of the existential: 
 
However much Paul‖s view of the history of salvation is oriented toward mankind 
[Menschheit], and not the individual [Individuum] . . . it still is true that the situation 
of mankind is also that of the individual [Einzelnen]. He, the sinner who is in death, 
is confronted by the gospel when it reaches him with the decision [Entscheidung] 
whether or not he is willing to understand himself anew and to receive his life from 
the hand of God.95 
 
That is to say, there is no such entity as an abstract humanity (or community) that 
can be defined apart from the actual situation of individual people in the world. 
According to Paul, every individual person has fallen into sin and is confronted in 
the gospel with a call for decision to live for God.96 For this reason exegetical and 
theological inquiry is necessarily directed (at least initially) at the question of the 
generic individual before God. 
 However, far from wholly subsuming the communal life of the church under 
the heading of the individual, Bultmann consistently writes of the responsibility 
and outward-looking nature of the life of faith. While the individual serves as the 
starting point and most prominent feature of Bultmann‖s theology, the extra-
personal life of the community of faith is never lost sight of. Paul‖s kerygma does 
individualize, but it also transforms one‖s self-understanding to include care for the 
community. Recent scholarship has often superficially dismissed Bultmann‖s 
exegetical and theological work for its excessive individualism without recognizing 
his consistent, even if not dominant, focus on community. 
                                                        
94 Idem, Theologie, 227. 
95 Idem, Theology, 269; Idem, Theologie, 267-68. 
96 Cf. Idem, “Christology,” 267-68. 
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 We are now prepared to return to the primary question with which we 
began our discussion of Bultmann. Why is his investigation of Pauline theology 
centered on the individual? The simple answer is that Bultmann is convinced that 
individual existence is central to Paul. In support of this contention Bultmann 
appeals to a wide range of data, including the existential orientation of Paul‖s 
anthropological terms and Paul‖s prohibition of generalized, human boasting. 
Bultmann‖s exegesis of Paul is admittedly selective in this regard, yet Bultmann is 
attuned to elements of Paul‖s thought that subsequent interpreters tend to miss.97 
Nonetheless, a new question emerges when one attempts to understand 
Bultmann‖s treatment of the individual and the community: does he pay adequate 
attention to the way in which Paul integrates these two themes, or do they sit 
awkwardly together, without a clear sense of how they may be presented in their 
unity?98 
Although Bultmann may have left his discussion of the communal life of the 
church relatively abstract, he does not neglect it. It is more the case that Bultmann 
is limited in his expression, than that he overlooks this important facet of Pauline 
teaching. Faith and love form the foundation for a self-giving community. Paul‖s 
preaching destroys human grounds for boasting, and in so doing, places everyone 
into the same existential situation, that of sinners before God. As such, the gospel 
creates community precisely through how it affects individuals. That is to say, 
authentic community is only possible for those individuals who have received a new 
identity in Christ, one that nullifies the identity associated with the old world of sin 
and death. The world of God‖s new creation is built on the premise that one‖s 
identifying characteristics, whether one be a Jew or Gentile, male or female, slave or 
free, cannot distinguish oneself in God‖s sight. A new ethical imperative is born out 
of the divine prohibition on self-exaltation; the end of boasting calls into existence 
God‖s new creation where love, rather than status or personal attainment, is 
supreme. Thus, every individual stands before God in his or her individuality, and at 
                                                        
97 Thiselton, Two Horizons, 283, says much the same thing: “Bultmann‖s use of philosophical 
description enables him to notice important features of the subject-matter of the New Testament, 
but . . . his insights are sometimes selective, partial, and in need of complementation by work at the 
level of painstaking exegesis.” 
98 Even John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann  
(London: SCM, 1955), 224 (cf. 215, 221), a more sympathetic reader of Bultmann than most, complains 
that “however admirable [Bultmann‖s] treatment of individual Christian experience, it fails to make 
the transition to the Christian community.” 
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the same time every individual stands relationally united in a community of love 
with fellow believers. 
 
3. Ernst Käsemann 
Ernst Käsemann represents, and to a substantial degree initiates, the strongly 
negative reaction in Pauline scholarship to Bultmann‖s individually-oriented 
interpretation. Käsemann, writing about his former teacher, addresses the idea of 
the individual in this way: 
 
Unvergessen ist mir Bultmanns Diktum in einer Seminardebatte über den 
neutestamentlichen Begriff “Kosmos”: Menschheit gibt es nicht. Das ist ein 
Abstraktum! Ich hatte zu lernen, daß das total falsch war und viel eher das Wort 
“Individuum” ein Abstraktum bezeichnet.99 
 
Käsemann has thrown down the anti-individual gauntlet: the individual is an 
abstract concept with very little—if any—importance for understanding Paul. 
The community and the individual in Paul are important themes in 
Käsemann‖s writings. He does not, however, neatly compartmentalize the two 
motifs. Thus, their significance must be determined in a less straightforward 
manner than is the case with Bultmann. The reason for this lies in the overarching 
structure of Käsemann‖s theological system: Jesus Christ and his lordship dominates 
throughout, and an eschatological-apocalyptic understanding of salvation is the 
necessary corollary of this construct. The individual, and even the community, 
then, is less significant than the cosmic drama that works itself out in history, and 
culminates in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Additionally, the individual 
is firmly situated within the context of the “world” he or she belongs to (the old age 
of sin and death or the new age of Christ and the Spirit), which for the Christian 
involves participation in the body of Christ (itself a complex theme in Käsemann‖s 
writings). Thus, one must first work through Käsemann‖s reconstruction of Paul‖s 
Christology and eschatology (or “cosmology”) before Käsemann‖s understanding of 
community, and the place of individuals within it, can be grasped. 
 
                                                        
99 Ernst Käsemann, “Was ich als deutscher Theologe in fünfzig Jahren verlernte,” in Kirchliche 
Konflikte (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 241. This quote was brought to my attention by 
my postgraduate colleague Peter Orr. Cf. Zahl, Rechtfertigungslehre, 100-1. 
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3.1 Christology 
3.1.1 Christ is Lord 
Christology serves as a criterion for Sachkritik of any individual portion of Paul‖s 
letters, and is the systematizing principle of Käsemann‖s Pauline interpretation.100 
Käsemann often frames his christological starting point in terms of an explicit 
rejection of the consistent focus on the human subject, and thus on anthropology, 
in Bultmann.101 According to Käsemann, Bultmann‖s preoccupation with the 
individual and “existential decision” led him to neglect significant, and even 
dominant, themes in Paul‖s letters such as Christ‖s universal reign over the whole 
earth, and the cosmic battle between the forces of the old and new ages.102 It is 
Käsemann‖s contention that a proper appreciation of these supra-individual motifs 
is necessary for a correct understanding of Paul. 
For Käsemann, a person is either under the dominion of Christ, or the 
dominion of the hostile powers of the old, fallen age.103 Käsemann describes these 
competing dominions as spheres of “solidarity” (Solidarität),104 which define the 
nature of humanity.105 For exegetical support of this notion, Käsemann often turns 
to Rom 5:12-21 and the discussion of Adam and Christ found there.106 The realm of 
fallen creation is the realm of Adam, and when set in contrast with the realm of new 
creation and Christ, it forms a foundationally important construct in Paul‖s letters. 
                                                        
100 Way, Lordship, 40: In agreement with Barth, “the single most important point for [Käsemann‖s] 
interpretation of Paul is the focus on the centre of the gospel, and the consequent interpretation of 
all other elements in the light of that centre.” For Käsemann, the center of the gospel is the fact that 
Jesus Christ is Lord over all. His prodigious theological output can be seen largely as a working out of 
the implications of this fact in all areas of Pauline interpretation (ibid., 51; cf. 170-3). Richard N. 
Soulen and R. Kendall Soulen, Handbook of Biblical Criticism (3d ed.; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2001), 166, define Sachkritik this way: “The text‖s subject matter must be used as a standard for 
assessing the text, i.e., for judging to what extent the text‖s words and sentences give adequate 
expression to the subject matter . . . . it must be possible to criticize a biblical text from the point of 
view of its own central theological concern.” 
101 Cf. Roy A. Harrisville and Walter Sundberg, The Bible in Modern Cultue: Baruch Spinoza to Brevard 
Childs (2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 252: “Quoting from Bultmann‖s 1957 Gifford Lectures, 
in which his teacher states that with Paul the idea of salvation is oriented to the individual, 
Käsemann replies: ―This sentence clearly shows the stimulus and basis of all Bultmann‖s thought. 
Nowhere is stronger objection to be raised than here.‖” Käsemann‖s quote comes from Ernst 
Käsemann, “Theologie des Neuen Testaments: Vorlesungsnachschrift für den internen 
Studiengebrauch” (Unpublished manuscript, n.d.) 
102 Harrisville and Sundberg, Bible, 252. 
103 Ernst Käsemann, “On Paul‖s Anthropology,” in Perspectives on Paul (trans. Margaret Kohl; 
London: SCM, 1971), 27-28. 
104 Ibid., 22; idem, “Zur paulinischen Anthropologie,” in Paulinische Perspektiven (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1969), 44. 
105 Idem, “Anthropology,” 23-25. 
106 Cf. Hübner, “Existentiale Interpretation,” 469-71. 
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Paul “sees our existence [Existenz] as determined at any given time by the Lord 
whom we are serving. If a transformation of our existence is really effected in 
Baptism and if God‖s Word does posit a new creation, this cannot help but mean a 
change of lordship [Herrschaftswechsel].”107 Lordship, then, and not the individual, 
existential plight of sinners, is of paramount importance for Paul.108 
With regard to Romans 5 Bultmann does not ignore Paul‖s talk of outside 
forces at work on the individual in the world.109 However, he strongly maintains 
that these powers are a subordinate concern for Paul, since what truly defines 
human existence is the internal battle at work in all people, the battle between flesh 
and spirit, the struggle for authentic existence in the face of death.110 Whereas 
Käsemann understands Pauline teaching on themes such as “flesh” to refer to the 
cosmic struggle of the two ages, Bultmann contends that such language refers 
primarily to a battle within the individual, a battle that transcends the contingent 
situation of Paul‖s letters and applies equally to all people throughout history.111 
Much hinges on determining the precise meaning of Paul‖s anthropological terms, 
since an entirely different way of conceptualizing the individual and the community 
will result based on the decisions made. Bultmann‖s consistent emphasis is on the 
generic individual who stands before God precisely as an individual, regardless of 
the influence of inter-personal forces. This is the individual who cannot boast 
before God‖s awesome transcendence and impartiality (cf. Rom 3:27; 1 Cor 1:18-19). 
Käsemann, on the other hand, based on passages in Paul such as Romans 5 and 6, 
unfailingly insists that the powers at work on the individual (such as sin and 
freedom) are “presented so universally and therefore with such mythological 
objectivity that individual existence [Einzelexistenz] threatens to be lost to view.”112 
Both Bultmann and Käsemann recognize the objective picture in Paul with regard to 
                                                        
107 Ernst Käsemann, “The Righteousness of God in Paul,” in New Testament Questions of Today 
(trans. W. J. Montague; London: SCM, 1969), 176; idem, “Gottesgerechtigkeit bei Paulus,” in Exegetische 
Versuche und Besinnungen (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1964), 188. 
108 Cf. Hübner, “Existentiale Interpretation,” 468. 
109 Cf. Bultmann‖s treatment of a proposed Gnostic background to Rom 5:12-21 in Bultmann, 
Theology, 174, 251-53, 347. 
110 Cf. Idem, “Mythology,” 6; Hübner, “Existentiale Interpretation,” 469-71. 
111 This is the consistent emphasis in the large section of Bultmann‖s New Testament Theology 
(Bultmann, Theology, 190-269) devoted to Paul‖s anthropological terms. Cf. Idem, “Mythology,” 6. On 
the unchanging essence of the human situation see idem, “The Problem of Hermeneutics,” in Essays 
Philosophical and Theological (trans. James C.G. Greig; London: SCM, 1955), 234-61. 
112 Ernst Käsemann, Commentary on Romans (trans. G. W. Bromiley; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1980), 159; idem, An die Römer (ΗΝΤ8a; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1973), 150. 
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cosmic forces; Käsemann contends that this is one of Paul‖s chief contributions, 
while Bultmann neutralizes this fact by subordinating it to Paul‖s ostensibly more 
important existential concerns.113 
 
3.1.2 Christ and Power 
When it comes to defining the nature of Christ‖s lordship, Käsemann highlights 
several related themes in Paul. One of the most important is that of power, which is 
partly derived from Käsemann‖s history-of-religion study of Jewish apocalyptic and 
Gnostic sources.114 Käsemann‖s most important contention with regard to power in 
Paul is that the phrase δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ (righteousness of God) is a technical term in 
Jewish apocalyptic, which is picked up by Paul and used to maintain a gift-power 
dialectic.115 That is to say, Paul speaks of δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ primarily to indicate 
“God‖s sovereignty over the world revealing itself eschatologically in Jesus.”116 God‖s 
righteousness is God‖s power at work in Christ‖s saving activity. 
Käsemann admits that the traditional Lutheran and Protestant 
understanding of δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ as “gift” (Gabe) is valid.117 Nonetheless, the 
primary nuance of the phrase is that of God‖s effective salvation-creating power 
(Macht), manifested in Christ.118 Käsemann insists that beginning the investigation 
with the gift aspect of God‖s righteousness will skew the apostle‖s theology in an 
unwarrantedly anthropocentric direction.119 Individuals are only important insofar 
as Christ‖s lordship brings them into its sphere of power so that they act concretely 
in obedience to him. While individuals benefit from coming under the reign of 
Christ‖s lordship, the focus must always be on Christ and his dominion over all of 
creation.120 Käsemann also warns against interpretations of δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ that 
begin with “its specifically juridical application” since such a procedure will 
necessarily over-emphasize the gift nature of divine righteousness, and again lead 
to excessive importance being attached to anthropology.121 
 
                                                        
113 On the latter point see Hübner, “Existentiale Interpretation,” 481. 
114 Way, Lordship, 282. 
115 Ibid., 191. 
116 Käsemann, “Righteousness,” 180. 
117 Ibid., “Righteousness,” 168; idem, “Gottesgerechtigkeit,” 182. Cf. Way, Lordship, 193-94. 
118 Käsemann, “Gottesgerechtigkeit,” 182. 
119 Idem, “Righteousness,” 176, 180-1. 
120 Ibid., 181-82. 
121 Ibid., 172; cf. idem, Romans, 82. 
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3.1.3 Christ and Justification 
Käsemann, like Bultmann, firmly maintains that justification is the center of Pauline 
theology.122 However, he also insists that justification “cannot be located and 
isolated in soteriology, and especially not in anthropology, but is rooted in the 
apostle‖s Christology and his doctrine of God.”123 Justification “is the actuality of 
God‖s right to his creation as this reveals itself as saving power, and this remains the 
basis, force, and truth of justification—a truth which transcends the individual 
[Einzelnen] and is directed toward a new world.”124 Justification is the specific 
doctrine which most clearly displays God‖s universal reign, through Christ the 
“Cosmocrator,” and is Paul‖s application of Christology to humanity and to the 
world.125 Thus, the centrality of justification is firmly anchored to the primacy of 
Christology, rather than to the primacy of the individual.126 
Moreover, justification designates a sinner‖s “transferal to the dominion of 
Christ” from the lordship of the evil powers of the old age and, thus, cannot be 
understood as an anthropological term.127 Because of this, Käsemann does not 
believe that justification and sanctification can be separated in Paul, since the latter 
flows out of the former, and both concepts manifest Christ‖s dominion over his 
subjects.128 As an example, Käsemann‖s exegesis of Rom 12:1-15:13 can be summed 
up as an application of the concept of the justification of the ungodly to the 
concrete life of the community.129 That is to say, because Christ is lord over all, life 
in the churches must reflect his lordship concretely in interpersonal relations. 
Justification means whole-bodied submission to Christ, and reciprocal submission 
among fellow Christians.130 
 
                                                        
122 Way, Lordship, 177, who points to Käsemann, Romans, 111, and idem, “Righteousness,” 174. Cf. 
Idem, Romans, 123. For a discussion of the shift in emphasis in Käsemann‖s later writings which 
moved from highlighting sacramental and Hellenistic religious connections with Paul‖s christological 
thought toward more Jewish apocalyptic themes such as justification, see Way, Lordship, 109-11. 
123 Käsemann, Romans, 123. 
124 Ibid., 93; idem, Römer, 86. 
125 Idem, “Justification and Salvation History in the Epistle to the Romans,” in Perspectives on Paul 
(trans. Margaret Kohl; London: SCM, 1971); Käsemann, Romans, 24. 
126 Ibid., 24; cited by Way, Lordship, 215; cf. Hübner, “Existentiale Interpretation,” 469. 
127 Käsemann, Romans, 172; cited by Way, Lordship, 259. 
128 Way, Lordship, 260-1. 
129 Ibid., 262-63. 
130 Käsemann, “Anthropology,” 18-19, 22; cf. Way, Lordship, 259. 
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3.2 Cosmology 
As was mentioned above, Käsemann‖s interpretation of the phrase δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ 
makes much of Paul‖s adaptation of Jewish apocalyptic motifs. In this section, we 
will examine Käsemann‖s use of such apocalyptic conceptions in more depth, since 
they are a key element in Käsemann‖s prioritizing of what he deems the 
“cosmological” aspect of Paul‖s thought over against concerns with individual 
human beings.131 
In introducing his exposition of Rom 1:18-3:20, Käsemann maintains that this 
“section of the epistle deals with the totality of the cosmos [Totalität des Kosmos] and 
not just with an aggregate of individuals [Anhäufung von Einzelnen]; hence, it deals 
with humanity as such [den Menschen als solchen] and not just with representatives of 
religious groupings.”132 This section of Romans, following directly after the 
statement of the thesis of the letter in Rom 1:16-17, emphasizes the gospel‖s “cosmic 
breadth and depth.”133 Thus, the cosmic and apocalyptic opening of Romans sets the 
stage for the exposition of the eschatological drama that unfolds throughout the 
letter. 
 
3.2.1 The Two Ages 
The doctrine of the two ages lies at the heart of Jewish apocalyptic thought. The old 
age is characterized by sin and death, while the new age is one of life, righteousness, 
blessing and peace. In distinction from Jewish apocalyptic, however, which looks 
forward to the submission of the entire earth in the future when God‖s anointed 
deliver (or deliverers) will usher in the universal dominion of Israel over the 
nations, Paul maintains an “eschatological reserve” based on his theology of the 
cross. Thus, while Paul believes that the powers of the old, evil age have been 
decisively defeated by Christ, this defeat is only manifested in Christian service and 
self-sacrifice, rather than in domination over the structures of power in the world. 
Paul‖s theology of the cross, in distinction from the theology of the Corinthian 
“enthusiasts” with their over-realized, triumphalistic eschatology, is observed in 
the fact that the present time is still one of temptation and trial in anticipation of a 
future day when Christ‖s reign will be completely dominant over all the earth (cf. 1 
                                                        
131 Cf. Way, Lordship, 154: “. . . apocalyptic, not anthropology, determines the main lines of the 
apostle‖s theology.” 
132 Käsemann, Romans, 33; idem, Römer, 30. 
133 Idem, Romans, 35; cf. Hübner, “Existentiale Interpretation,” 468. 
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Cor 15:24-28).134 The self-sacrificial surrender of the believer‖s body to Christ in the 
present time anticipates “the ultimate future of the reality of the Resurrection and 
of the untrammelled reign of Christ.”135 In further contradistinction from Jewish 
apocalyptic, Paul sees the old age overlapping with the present age, rather than 
being wholly surpassed by it. 
 Paul‖s modification of the Jewish view, nonetheless, retains the basic idea of 
the two ages, and this motif is fundamental in Käsemann‖s interpretation of the 
apostle. The world for Paul is one controlled by demonic forces. Thus, the individual 
is only a player (“a piece of the world” [das Stück Welt]) in a cosmic drama of 
competing forces. One cannot think of isolated individuals in the world, but must 
think of individuals as they are situated in this cosmic battle.136 Contradicting 
Bultmann, salvation in Christ is not simply the granting of a new self-
understanding. Instead it is a divine rescue from the powers of evil, and the 
ushering in of a new creation from which evil is banished forever.137 The legitimate 
insight Käsemann sees in Bultmann is that he does not divorce what is true of God 
from how that affects humanity. Bultmann‖s fundamental error, however, lies in his 
neglect of the notion of lordship, as well as the notion of apocalyptic realms of 
power that operate on humans in their concrete life situations. In other words, 
individuals are not simply individuals, but are subject to relations and powers 
outside of themselves and do not have the ability to calmly and rationally 
determine the nature of their own existence.138 Käsemann puts it this way: 
 
The person is not seen primarily as the subject of his history; he is its object and 
projection. He is in the grip of forces which seize his existence and determine his 
will and responsibility at least to the extent that he cannot choose freely but can 
only grasp what is already there.139 
 
For Paul “a human under the lordship of sin cannot be an ―individual‖ [Einzelnen], but 
is, as representative of its world [Repräsentant seiner Welt], enslaved to its powers.”140 
                                                        
134 Ernst Käsemann, “On the Subject of Primitive Christian Apocalyptic,” in New Testament 
Questions of Today (trans. W. J. Montague; London: SCM, 1969), 132-35. 
135 Ibid., 135. 
136 Idem, “Apokalyptik,” 129. 
137 See ibid., “Anthropology,” 26; cited in Way, Lordship, 161-62. On this see also Zahl, 
Rechtfertigungslehre, 123-24. 
138 Käsemann, “Anthropology,” 27. 
139 Idem, Romans, 150; quoted in Way, Lordship, 163. 
140 Idem, “Anthropology,” 31 (modified); idem, “Anthropologie,” 59. 
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True individuality is only a possibility for the believer who has been made new in 
the image of Christ, since true individuality entails freedom, love and service.  
As an example of his defense of such contentions, Käsemann notes that in 
Romans 6 the “old man,” understood as humanity in its falleness, is held under the 
bondage to sin which characterizes the old age. The old man is not the individual 
lost in sin, but corporate humanity as it is alienated from God. In Romans 7 “flesh” is 
a controlling power associated with the old age of sin and death which holds those 
under its sway in bondage, replacing the motif of the old man in Romans 6. As such, 
these motifs highlight the cosmic and corporate aspects of Pauline theology and go 
beyond “the individual sphere” (der Bereich des Individuellen).141 
The new age, in a radical break from the old, is the place of manifold 
blessing. According to Käsemann, the Christian life is a “lived justification.”142 The 
whole world is the sphere of God‖s power. Thus, individual Christians are to live out 
their faithfulness concretely in whatever situation they find themselves.143 New 
creation power must be extended into the world, because Christ‖s lordship demands 
no less than the whole earth. Individual Christians living lives of inner piety hidden 
away from the world are an affront to the rightful claim that God‖s messiah has over 
the world. 
 
3.3 Community versus Individual? 
As we have seen, Käsemann understands Paul‖s thought to bring Christology and 
cosmology into the closest relationship. In Pauline teaching, the themes of Christ‖s 
lordship, and the battle between the two ages, highlight the power and the sphere 
that determine the nature of Christian existence. The role of history‖s chief actor 
has been cast and the stage has been set for his defining performance: the final 
defeat of the forces of evil in the cosmos. What remains to be seen is the outcome 
this defeat has for human beings and their lives in the world. It is here, more than 
anywhere else, that Käsemann‖s understanding of the individual and the 
community, as well as of their relationship, stands out most clearly. 
 
                                                        
141 Idem, Romans, 188; idem, Römer, 178. Cf. Hübner, “Existentiale Interpretation,” 471-72. 
142 Way, Lordship, 25. 
143 Ibid., 24. 
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3.3.1 The Community  
Käsemann believes that body of Christ language in Paul has primary reference to 
the corporate body of the church as a “validation” of Christ‖s heavenly, exalted body 
through concrete acts of personal obedience.144 The primary contention he makes 
with regard to the body of Christ is that it is the means of Christ‖s communication 
with the world, and thus his lordship over the world.145 Thus, “the body of Christ 
motif . . . expresses the cosmic scope of Paul‖s theology: in and through his body 
Christ reaches out for the whole world. Baptism and the Lord‖s supper incorporate 
people into the body of Christ.”146 The theme of the body of Christ is important 
because it “expresses Paul‖s concern for Christ‖s ―universal rule‖ [Weltherrschaft] and 
his rule over the church.”147 Christology always maintains primacy over 
ecclesiology; the church as the “people of God” is secondary in that its existence and 
vitality is wholly derivative of the power and work of the exalted Christ. Paul‖s 
ecclesiology is determined by his “exclusively christological viewpoint”148 in the 
sense that the church has no independent existence as an “eschatological event” (as 
per Bultmann) that could allow it to become a replacement for the exalted Christ 
himself.149 Believers are united with Christ‖s body, but the independent and distinct 
existence (and primacy) of Christ‖s body is firmly guarded.150 It is only through the 
working of the Holy Spirit that the church is made to be Christ‖s presence in the 
world, and this is only “in such a way that it [cannot] become independent of its 
lord.”151 
Furthermore, Christology has primacy over the “people of God” concept, 
which Paul derives mostly from the Old Testament descriptions of Israel. While this 
                                                        
144 Käsemann, “Anthropology,” 18-19.  
145 Way, Lordship, 246-47. 
146 Ibid., 23. 
147 Ibid., 242. 
148 Ernst Käsemann, “The Theological Problem Presented by the Motif of the Body of Christ,” in 
Perspectives on Paul (trans. Margaret Kohl; London: SCM, 1971), 109 (Way‖s translation [Lordship, 242]). 
149 Käsemann, “Theological Problem,” 118; Cf. Harrisville and Sundberg, Bible, 263, 267. 
150 Harrisville and Sundberg, Bible, 262-63. In Käsemann‖s early work, Paul is said to have a 
“realistic” understanding of the body of Christ which is partially derived from Stoic conceptions of 
the humanity-encompassing “world body,” and which is partially derived from mystical conceptions 
of sacramental incorporation. Cf. Käsemann, “Theological Problem,” 106-8. Cf. idem, Leib und Leib 
Christi: Eine Untersuchung zur paulinischen Begrifflichkeit (BHT 9; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1933), 161; 
cited in Way, Lordship, 107. 
151 Cf. Käsemann, “Theological Problem,” 111-13; cited in Way, Lordship, 244. Although 
Käsemann‖s later work shifts toward a “Jewish apocalyptic” history-of-religion background, he 
continues to maintain the dominance of Christology over all other elements of Pauline teaching. Cf. 
Way, Lordship, 109-11. 
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theme is present in Paul, Käsemann subordinates it to Christology because he fears 
that otherwise it will raise the earthly church community into prominence at the 
expense of Christ, and that it is peripheral to Paul‖s interests anyway.152 
In a word, then, the church is vitally connected to Christ, and it receives 
both its existence, and its mission from him. Community, or ecclesiology, is 
important, but only insofar as it derives from Christology, which always remains 
central in Pauline thought. 
 
3.3.2 The Individual 
Only with Käsemann‖s caveat in place that ecclesiology is subordinate to Christology 
can his understanding of the place of the individual in Paul be properly understood. 
This is true because “viewed in their individuality, members of the church mean 
nothing to Paul.”153 Paul is even unconcerned with the church “as a religious group” 
except insofar as “it is the means whereby Christ reveals himself on earth and 
becomes incarnate in the world through his Spirit.”154 If community is an offshoot of 
Christology, then the individual, as a mere means toward the concretization of 
Christ‖s earthly presence, is all the more so. 
In Käsemann‖s article “On the Subject of Primitive Christian Apocalyptic” he 
gives a short history of the development of the traditions which lay behind the 
notion of the church as a community in Paul‖s letters. He begins by noting that the 
earliest (= Palestinian) tradition (that which is related to the time during and 
immediately after Jesus‖ mission, as well as to the founding of the earliest churches) 
lacks any explicit anthropology. Instead, the “individual Christian [der einzelne 
Christ] is what he is simply and solely as a member of the people of God [als Glied des 
Gottesvolkes].”155 Anthropology only enters the picture because of the demand for 
maintaining communal accord, which necessarily takes the form of paraenesis that 
is directed toward individuals. Anthropology “is in no way an independent 
expression of theology but only the parenetic concretion and application of 
ecclesiology.”156 Thus, “the earliest Christian theology cannot adequately be 
                                                        
152 Käsemann, “Theological Problem,” 112; Way, Lordship, 242. Cf. Harrisville and Sundberg, Bible, 
263, 267. 
153 Harrisville and Sundberg, Bible, 263, 262. 
154 Käsemann, “Theological Problem,” 117. 
155 Idem, “Primitive,” 117; idem, “Apokalyptik,” 113. 
156 Idem, “Primitive,” 117. 
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interpreted from an existentialist starting-point [Leitmotiv der Existenz], if decisive 
weight is to be given to its fundamental understanding of itself.”157 
Moving on to the earliest Hellenistic Christian churches (including the 
Corinthian “enthusiasts”) we see a highly-realized eschatology, one that posits the 
present enjoyment of the fullness of eschatological salvation, as well as maintaining 
that Christ‖s reign is already completely established in the world.158 To such 
Christians, 
 
The immediate conclusion to be drawn is that there was no thought of giving up 
cosmology even if anthropology was now coming to the fore [die Anthropologie in den 
Vordergrund rückte]. Of this period it might be said in some sense that anthropology 
is still in the shadow both of Christology and cosmology, and thus the continuity 
with apocalyptic is maintained. The believer who is swept along as a participant in 
the destiny of the Christ is the representative of a new world, and his membership 
in the Church is membership in this divine new world.159 
 
However, since the Hellenistic church recognized that not everything outside of the 
church (the realm of new creation) had yet been placed under Christ‖s dominion, a 
certain anthropological and soteriological emphasis developed. This emphasis was 
firmly based on the christological-cosmological understanding of salvation as new 
creation and deliverance from the old, evil age. This new anthropological 
development was necessitated by the fact that unbelief still existed in the world, 
and that unbelievers needed to be converted, and brought into submission to 
Christ‖s reign. Thus, individual soteriology, and with it a new anthropological 
concern, grew up as a result of the mission of the earliest churches.160 
With the success of the early Gentile mission of the Hellenistic church the 
idea of a “people of God” in continuity with Old Testament Israel waned among new 
converts, or at least could only be used figuratively since “those who received the 
promise no longer coincided exactly with those who received the fulfillment.”161 
Anthropology thus filled the gap that was developing, since it was well suited to the 
transformation of Jewish apocalyptic into “a metaphysical dualism, which itself 
then finds concretion and contemporary force in a doctrine of man. The question of 
                                                        
157 Ibid., 117; idem, “Apokalyptik,” 113. 
158 Idem, “Primitive,” 125-27. Käsemann here notes that this form of Christian proclamation is 
not present in “pure” form anywhere in the NT. Instead it is reflected in various fragments that have 
been incorporated into other documents (such as the pastorals) which may have slightly different 
interests or perspectives. 
159 Ibid., 128; idem, “Apokalyptik,” 122. 
160 Idem, “Primitive,” 128. 
161 Ibid., 129. 
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the reality of the saving event can now be answered in a new way by starting from 
this anthropology.”162 It is no longer simply the two realms of power that are 
central, but the specific way in which this construct affects individuals.163 
Even here, “the two poles of the dialectic are not equal” since anthropology 
is “crystallized cosmology” (konkretisierte Kosmologie).164 Cosmology, at least 
theoretically, remains decisive. In Paul, salvation is not chiefly about making right 
what is wrong on the individual level, but about the defeat of all powers hostile to 
God. To put it differently, “salvation does not primarily mean the end of past 
disaster and the forgiving cancellation of former guilt. It is, according to Rom. 5.9f.; 
8.2, freedom from the power of sin, death and the divine wrath; that is to say, it is 
the possibility of new life.”165 Nonetheless, it is precisely with regard to justification, 
a doctrine that is firmly attached to Christology and apocalyptic in the earliest 
tradition, that the individual-anthropological focus rises to prominence, even in 
Paul‖s letters, but especially in the writings of his followers.166 
 Ultimately Käsemann believes that, compared with the teaching of Jesus and 
the earliest churches, individual anthropology takes on heightened importance in 
Paul. Nonetheless, Christ‖s lordship continues to be all-determinative for 
understanding the place of the individual in the communal life of the church and in 
the unfolding drama of redemption. 
 
3.3.3 The Relationship Between the Community and the Individual 
According to Käsemann, Bultmann‖s understanding of the nature of humanity is too 
individualistic since it does not conceive of humans as relational beings bound by 
their respective realms of existence, whether of the old or new age.167 Bultmann‖s 
understanding of individuality is said to be a particularly abstract and nineteenth-
century understanding of humanity that is not sensitive to external forces and 
                                                        
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid.; cf. 132: “The systematic development of anthropology is indeed without any doubt the 
particular personal contribution of the apostle, which still causes him to stand out from among his 
pupils, for they succeed in preserving only a few pitiful fragments of his terminology and practically 
nothing of his grand design.” 
164 Way, Lordship, 161; Käsemann, “Anthropology,” 29; idem, “Anthropologie,” 56; cf. idem, 
Romans, 52, 82, 159, 296. 
165 Idem, “The Saving Significance of the Death of Jesus in Paul,” in Perspectives on Paul (trans. 
Margaret Kohl; London: SCM, 1971), 44. 
166 Cf. Harrisville and Sundberg, Bible, 261. 
167 Way, Lordship, 48; cf. 155, 159. 
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pressures that act upon humanity (and which Käsemann argues have been 
uncovered by modern sociology, biology, etc.).168 
 Paul‖s “anthropological terms” form an important battleground between 
Käsemann and Bultmann with regard to coming to a proper understanding of the 
relationship between the community and the individual. Significantly, Käsemann 
disputes Bultmann‖s definition of the key anthropological term “body.” Contra 
Bultmann, a “body” is: 
 
related, not to existence in isolation [die isolierbare Existenz], but to the world in 
which forces and persons and things clash violently – a world of love and hate, 
blessing and curse, service and destruction, in which man is largely determined by 
sexuality and death and where nobody, fundamentally speaking, belongs to himself 
alone [niemand je zutiefst allein sich gehört].169 
 
That is to say, bodies are interactive by nature, and cannot be described in merely, 
or even primarily, existential terms. 
 Käsemann‖s exegesis is replete with examples defending his understanding 
of humanity as fundamentally relational.170 In addition to the human body being 
inherently relational, it is also the claimed property of the Lord Jesus Christ. 
Käsemann terms the body a “piece of world.” Everything, including every human 
body, in the world belongs to Christ.171 The Pauline anthropological terms “flesh” 
and “spirit” are likewise oriented toward outside realities (lordships) which 
determine one‖s existence, rather than toward the individual as a self-subsistent 
subject.172 The everyday world that one finds oneself in is the specific realm to 
which Christ directs his lawful demand for obedience.173 The Christian does not have 
the freedom to retreat from the world into the inner sanctity of private devotional 
                                                        
168 Käsemann, “Anthropology,” 10-11, 15-18. 
169 Ibid., 21 (cf. 22-23, 26); idem, “Anthropologie,” 42-43; cf. idem, “Theological Problem,” 114; 
idem, “Anthropology,” 21: “To define this in ontological terms: corporeality is the nature of man in 
his need to participate in creatureliness and in his capacity for communication in the widest sense, 
that is to say, in his relationship to a world with which he is confronted on each several occasion.” 
170 Way, Lordship, 160, summarizes Käsemann‖s use of various relevant passages in Paul this way: 
Käsemann “cites the questions of parents and children (1 Cor. 7: 14), the fate of the dead (1 Thess. 4: 
13ff.), vicarious baptism (1 Cor. 15: 29), union with a prostitute (1 Cor. 6: 15), the nakedness of the 
transitional state (2 Cor. 5: 2 ff.), the handing over of the body of the incestuous man (1 Cor. 5: 5), and 
Paul‖s being caught up in the body (2 Cor. 12: 2). These examples demonstrate the futility of 
narrowing down ―creatureliness‖ to the individual, and of separating the ―authentic person‖ from 
nature, society, history, and creation in general.” 
171 Käsemann, “Theological Problem,” 114-16; cf. Robert Morgan, The Nature of New Testament 
Theology: The Contribution of William Wrede and Adolf Schlatter (SBT 25; London: SCM, 1973), 178, n. 135. 
172 Käsemann, “Primitive,” 136. 
173 Ibid., 135. 
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or churchly life. Such a world-denying posture is a Christ-denying posture.174 The 
individual as a piece of the world is simply the way in which Christ claims all of 
creation for himself. 
Thus we see that neither ecclesiology nor the individual is ultimately central 
in Paul‖s world. These two themes are derivative of Christology. The center of Paul‖s 
teaching “lies in the Christological aspect of his ecclesiology . . . . In a sentence – 
every Christian in his own place, in his particular situation, with his specific 
capacities and weaknesses, may and must be a ―place holder‖ for Christ until 
death.”175 The community is important, but in light of the way in which the 
independent status of Christ‖s own body and lordship in the world dominates Paul‖s 
letters, the church community (and, even more, the individual) is pushed into the 
background. 
 
3.4 Analysis 
3.4.1 Anthropology is not Denied 
It must be noted that Käsemann does not deny the presence of anthropology or 
individuals in Paul‖s letters. Indeed, he affirms this element of Paul‖s thought—even 
if reluctantly—throughout his writings.176 
One way this is seen is in Käsemann‖s granting of a fairly traditional 
Protestant understanding of faith as having reference primarily to individuals. 
While he firmly maintains that faith must always be active in the world, its 
provenance remains that of the individual. Käsemann puts it this way: 
 
Als Annahme des göttlichen Zuspruchs bleibt der Glaube bei Paulus primär eine 
Entscheidung des einzelnen Menschen, deren Gewicht darum nicht aus der 
Anthropologie in die Ekklesiologie verlegt werden sollte. Man glaubt zwar nie 
allein, aber unvertretbar, und die Gemeinde ist die Schar derer, die sich persönlich 
vom Aberglauben abgewandt haben und davon durch nichts und niemanden 
dispensiert werden können.177 
 
Käsemann even sees this as a point of agreement with Bultmann.178 
                                                        
174 Idem, “Theological Problem,” 114 
175 Ibid., 119. 
176 Käsemann explicitly rejects the idea that he has no place for the individual in idem, 
“Erwiderung an Ulrich Asendorf,” LutMon 6 (1967): 595, which is cited by Way, Lordship, 159, n. 79. 
177 Ernst Käsemann, “Der Glaube Abrahams in Römer 4,” in Paulinische Perspektiven (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1969), 147; cf. idem, Römer, 20; Way, Lordship, 214. 
178 Cf. Ernst Käsemann, “The Faith of Abraham in Romans 4,” in Perspectives on Paul (London: SCM, 
1971), 84, n. 11. 
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 Commenting on Rom 3:21-26, Käsemann notes that “whatever else God‖s 
eschatological righteousness may be, at any rate it is a gift that comes to man διὰ 
πίςσεψρ. Faith is basically human receptivity, as actively as it may express itself in 
obedience.”179 However, despite Käsemann‖s clear insistence that faith is something 
that belongs to individuals, he feels compelled to clarify his position in a non-
individualistic direction: 
 
To say that a man only believes as an individual [als Individuum] is simply to say that 
here, as in the case of ministry in the world, he cannot shrug off responsibility 
[Verantwortung]. But I find myself totally unable to assent to the view that Paul‖s 
theology and his philosophy of history are orientated towards the individual [am 
Individuum orientiert sei].180 
 
Käsemann recognizes that humanity is tasked by God with the responsibility of 
responding to the divine summons in the gospel. However, admitting the 
importance of the individual should not be taken as shifting the focus of Paul‖s 
theology away from Christology toward anthropology. In fact, this does little to 
mitigate Käsemann‖s unswervingly anti-individual rhetoric elsewhere, especially 
given that this reluctant concession to anthropological concerns is merely part of 
an argument for the concrete expression of the supra-individual lordship of Christ. 
The individual may exist, but the individual hardly makes much of an impact in 
determining the shape of Käsemann‖s Pauline theology. 
 
3.4.2 Tying the Threads Together: Christology, Cosmology, Ecclesiology and 
Anthropology 
In several places Käsemann notes that Bultmann was right to observe the elevated 
position of anthropology in Paul and John. For example, he agrees that more than 
any other New Testament writer, Paul brings individual paraenesis and individual 
soteriology to the forefront, in distinction from the view dominant in the rest of the 
New Testament that sees an individual “more or less as the representative of a 
group.”181 Commenting on what he understands to be the thesis of Romans (Rom 
1:16-17), Käsemann states: 
                                                        
179 Idem, Romans, 94. Again, Käsemann sees this as a point of agreement with Bultmann. 
180 Idem, “Righteousness,” 176; idem, “Gottesgerechtigkeit,” 188; cf. idem, “Righteousness,” 176, 
n. 5: “As against R. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, 1957, pp. 43ff.” 
181 Idem, “Anthropology,” 2: “. . . even in the community of the body of Christ [the believer] is 
more than a dispensable member of a corporation, for he is the irreplaceable representative of his 
Lord.” 
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The reference to ―every‖ believer shows that the interpretation by early history-of-
religions research, that Paul never has the individual in mind . . . is wrong. 
Universalism and the most radical individuation are here two sides of the same coin 
[Denn Universalismus und äußerste Individuation sind hier Kehrseiten desselben 
Sachverhaltes].182 
 
With regard to justification and judgment Käsemann states that for “the apostle 
doom lies not only over the world but also over the individual whose existence 
heaps God‖s wrath upon itself.”183 Thus “. . . the world and the individual are directly 
related to one another and the signature of cosmology may be perceived in 
anthropology.”184 
However, Käsemann cannot simply leave things at that. While Bultmann 
theoretically affirms an equality, a “vice versa,” of theological and anthropological 
considerations in Paul, he has in fact neglected the theological side of the equation 
by elevating the individual to a place of prominence that is not warranted by the 
text of Paul‖s letters.185 Since Christ is Lord over all the earth, Paul‖s gospel is 
worldwide in scope. Moreover, the gospel mission is presented in Paul in terms of 
the cosmic conflict between God and humanity. Thus, the individual is indispensible 
in Paul, but primarily because the universal compass of the Pauline mission 
demands a concrete individual response. Individuals are important, but only insofar 
as they contribute to the establishment of the universal lordship of Christ in the 
world.186 In a balanced statement, Käsemann, speaking specifically of Rom 5:12-21, 
describes the relationship between the individual and the cosmos this way: 
 
If, in relation to existence, the depth of the salvation event is in view, so is the 
universality of grace with the historical perspective. In each individual God is 
concretely reaching for the world. This would be arbitrary if the whole breadth of 
creation were not at issue. The two approaches alternate and complement one 
another in this epistle . . . . Neither the person in isolation [der isolierbare Mensch] 
nor history abstracted from the individual [die vom Einzelnen abstrahierende 
Geschichte], but the person in his world [der Mensch in seiner Welt] is as the reality of 
creation simultaneously the object and the field of salvation.187 
 
                                                        
182 Ibid., Romans, 22. Cf. Käsemann‖s comments on the individual implications of the “end of the 
law” as understood by Paul in Rom 3:27-31 (ibid., Romans, 103). 
183 Ibid, 57. Käsemann (see e.g., ibid., Romans, 66) can even go so far as to admit the Bultmannian 
concern with “self-judgment” and “self-criticism” in Paul. 
184 Ibid., 52. 
185 Idem, “Anthropology,” 12. 
186 Idem, “Salvation History,” 65. 
187 Idem, Romans, 141 (cf. 87-88); idem, Römer, 131. 
57 
 
While Käsemann does not deny the role of the individual in Paul‖s gospel, he cannot 
allow the individual to be the starting point of theological inquiry. 
In fact, Käsemann appears to presume that, in direct contrast to Bultmann, 
an anti-individualistic starting point is a necessary presupposition of proper 
exegetical results. Käsemann‖s anti-individual rhetoric is therefore necessary as a 
safeguard to ensure that due prominence is given to the christological and 
apocalyptic coloring that he believes so thoroughly permeates Paul‖s thought. 
By way of summary, we can say that Christology brings to the forefront the 
salvation-creating power of God, while cosmology denotes the nature and realm of 
divine deliverance. Ecclesiology highlights the indispensably relational outworking 
of Christ‖s apocalyptic reign, and anthropology indicates the concrete expression of 
this rule in individual existence. All throughout, the Lordship of Christ—not 
anthropology—governs every facet of Christian existence. 
 
3.4.3 The Rhetoric of Antithesis 
We have seen that Käsemann acknowledges the importance of Pauline 
anthropology. Nonetheless, throughout his writings, the rhetoric of cosmology and 
apocalyptic ends up obscuring what he otherwise admits, that the individual has an 
important function in Paul‖s letters. In fact, Käsemann‖s downplaying of the 
individual is a constant motif in his writings. Such a downgrade of individual 
concerns results in exegesis of Paul‖s letters that is skewed in both relatively 
insignificant ways, as well as with reference to foundational issues such as the 
nature of the church and its responsibility in the world. Käsemann‖s overstatement 
of the primacy of Christology and cosmology over anthropology has fundamental 
repercussions for any attempt to articulate the proper relationship between the 
individual and the community in Paul correctly. Some representative examples will 
suffice to make Käsemann‖s penchant for overstating himself clear.188 
In commenting on Rom 3:21-26, Käsemann downplays the notion of 
individual redemption (especially in v. 25) through recourse to the two-age 
construct (which he sees in the latter half of v. 25). He assumes that Paul‖s 
eschatology makes the sacrificial motif of propitiation or expiation irrelevant, or at 
least inconsequential for the individual. While, Käsemann admits that v. 26 has 
                                                        
188 The first three examples are from Käsemann‖s Romans commentary, where such an 
interpretive stance is often evident. These are merely a few examples. 
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reference to individuals, he lets his apocalyptic construct run roughshod over a 
theme (sacrificial redemption) that has individual significance, which is seen in 
Paul‖s statement that Christ‖s blood (as a metonymy for his death) constitutes the 
mercy seat (ἱλαςσήπιον) that avails before God and which affects the justification of 
those who have faith (εἰρ πάνσαρ σοὺρ πιςσεύονσαρ) in Christ.189 Käsemann rejects 
the sacrificial and individual elements of Paul‖s thought at this point because of a 
controlling assumption about the primacy of cosmology over anthropology. 
With regard to the universal scope of Paul‖s presentation of Abraham and 
the promise in Romans 4, Käsemann argues that individuality falls almost 
completely out of the picture. He says of justification in Romans 4: 
 
Justification, as the restitution of creation and as resurrection anticipated in the 
stage of trial (Anfechtung), is the decisive motif of Paul‖s soteriology and theology 
and that these always have to be interpreted in terms of it. It also means that 
justification cannot be located and isolated in soteriology, and especially not in 
anthropology, but is rooted in the apostle‖s Christology and his doctrine of God.190 
 
Käsemann‖s desire, seen in his Romans commentary, to refute a certain kind of 
individualism leads him to overstate himself substantially. Instead of attempting to 
integrate the individual insights developed in his article “The Faith of Abraham in 
Romans 4,”191 where Käsemann speaks of the importance of the faith of individuals, 
we see a rhetoric of sharp antithesis in his Romans commentary between 
soteriology (anthropology) and Christology (theology). As we have already seen, 
this rhetoric permeates Käsemann‖s writings. 
Commenting on Rom 6:16-22, Käsemann says that “in both cases the central 
concern is not the individual but the lordship of Christ, which is objectively erected 
over the individual [über den Einzelnen] and is to be subjectively grasped and 
maintained [subjektiv ergriffen und festgehalten werden will].”192 However, the fact that 
there must be a “subjective grasping” by the individual shows that there is 
absolutely no need to speak of a “central concern” (i.e., lordship) as if giving full 
force to the individual concern in these verses would somehow diminish the 
christological significance of the passage. While not positing an absolute antithesis 
                                                        
189 Idem, Romans, 99-100. See C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to 
the Romans (ICC; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1975), 1.200-1, n. 1, for an excellent analysis of the 
difficulties involved in Käsemann‖s reconstruction of this passage in Romans. 
190 Käsemann, Romans, 123 (slightly modified; Anfechtung is un-italicized and in parentheses, 
rather than brackets, in the English translation); idem, Römer, 115-16. 
191 Idem, “Romans 4,” 83. 
192 Idem, Romans, 182; idem, Römer, 172. 
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between individual and communal concerns, this section (like many in Käsemann) 
significantly diminishes the role of the individual, and its integration into 
community. This is often what happens when exegesis is phrased in terms where 
one alternative is admitted, yet lessened by arguing that the general thrust is “not 
as much” about that alternative (i.e., saying “Paul is concerned with cosmology, and 
not as much with soteriology”). In other words, the force of the grudging admission 
that the individual plays any role whatsoever in the cosmic drama of redemption is 
significantly mitigated by placing cosmological and communal concerns into a 
controlling and systematizing role where little room is left for substantive 
anthropological concerns. 
In a different context, Käsemann discusses Krister Stendahl‖s “salvation 
historical” approach to Paul and justification, stating that 
 
Stendahl and his friends are right in protesting against the individualist 
curtailment [die individualistische Verkürzung] of the Christian message. Here the 
twentieth century must dissociate itself from the nineteenth. The Pauline doctrine 
of justification never took its bearings from the individual, although hardly anyone 
now realizes this. It does not merely talk about the gift of God to the individual. If 
that were so, the cosmic horizons of Rom. 1:18-3:20; 5:12ff.; 8:18ff. and especially 
chs. 9-11, would be incomprehensible. We should then have to shut our eyes to the 
fact that Paul can depict God‖s righteousness as a power which reaches out towards 
our lives in order to make them obedient. Salvation never consists in our being 
given something, however wonderful. Salvation, always, is simply God himself in 
his presence for us.193 
 
However, Käsemann goes on to note (just one page later) that Paul “usually 
expresses [the doctrine of justification] anthropologically because he is concerned 
that it should determine our everyday lives.”194 Käsemann appears to be arguing 
that justification, even in its individual ramifications, must be understood in the 
“cosmic horizons” of God‖s entire redemptive plan. However, instead of integrating 
the individual and the cosmic, we see an overreaction that leads to a false antithesis. 
Without belaboring the point, it must be repeated that Käsemann does not 
deny a place for individual concerns. He does, however, continually relegate the 
individual to the periphery of Paul‖s thought, obscuring and even diminishing 
important elements of Paul‖s theologizing. Those who would argue against such 
moves on exegetical grounds are too easily dismissed as individualistic when the 
                                                        
193 Idem, “Salvation History,” 74; idem, “Rechtfertigung und Heilsgeschichte im Römerbrief,” in 
Paulinische Perspektiven (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1969), 132. 
194 Idem, “Salvation History,” 75 (slightly modified); idem, “Heilsgeschichte,” 133. 
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presence or absence of individual motifs is the very point that needs be determined 
from careful textual analysis. Before offering some final remarks on Käsemann‖s 
theological system, I will now turn to a brief examination of the significant impact 
his anti-individual interpretational approach has had on subsequent scholarship, 
specifically on the question of the righteousness of God in Paul.195 
 
3.4.4 Käsemann‖s Legacy: The Reception of his Apocalyptic Reading of δικαιοςύνη 
θεοῦ 
In his article “The Righteousness of God in Paul,” Käsemann provides a revealing 
statement with regard to the fundamental orientation of his own theology. 
Käsemann is commenting on whether or not δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ should be understood 
primarily as a divine attribute or as a divine gift: 
 
Like Bultmann, and indeed because of his exaggeration of the facts, I, too, am bound 
to make a question of translation into a theological decision. At this point philology 
and the history of ideas prove broken reeds because, if we confine ourselves to the 
insights they provide, both solutions appear acceptable. The whole of the apostle‖s 
theology has now to be subpoenaed in order to reach the correct translation of a 
single word and, conversely, the correct translation of this one word determines, as 
I see it, the whole of the apostle‖s theology.196 
 
Such a statement is illuminating precisely because Käsemann recognizes that lexical 
and historical research into the phrase δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ could lead one in either an 
individually-oriented or a cosmologically-oriented direction.197 Käsemann opts to 
allow his Christological Sachkritik principle (“The whole of the apostle‖s theology 
has to be subpoenaed…”) to determine his handling of the issue. Bultmann, quite 
clearly, selects the individually-oriented option where (based primarily on Phil 3:9) 
                                                        
195 Although Käsemann‖s arguments on this point have been modified substantially by 
subsequent scholarship, the “anti-individualistic” tenor of Käsemann‖s presentation has almost 
always been retained. The standard caveat: as Käsemann already noted, “a complete history of the 
interpretation of δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ in Paul can scarcely be given here since it would embrace many 
volumes.” (Käsemann, Romans, 25); Cf. Cranfield, Romans, 1.92; Douglas A. Campbell, The Rhetoric of 
Righteousness in Romans 3.21-26 (JSNTSup 65; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1992), 138. For a helpful 
survey of research up to 1972 see J. A. Ziesler, The Meaning of Righteousness in Paul: A Linguistic and 
Theological Enquiry (SNTSMS 20; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 1-14. For further 
bibliography see Campbell, Romans 3.21-26, 138, n. 2. See also Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary 
(Hermeneia; Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress, 2007), 141-48, and the bibliographic sources listed in the 
footnotes on those pages. 
196 Idem, “Righteousness,” 173, n. 4 (emphasis added).  
197 Cf. Hübner, “Existentiale Interpretation,” 463. 
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“―God‖s righteousness‖ means the righteousness from God which is conferred upon 
[the believer] as a gift by God‖s free grace alone.”198 
 An apocalyptic, as opposed to a so-called anthropocentric, interpretation of 
δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ was further developed by many of Käsemann‖s students. For 
example, Manfred Brauch describes the position of Christian Müller this way: 
 
As a result of [his] analysis, Müller describes the ―formal structure‖ of dikaiosynē 
theou as the ―eschatological realization of God‖s right in the world‖ (p. 72), for 
―dikaiosynē ek nomou and ek pisteōs (10:5) are not descriptions of the individual, but 
signs for the old and the new people of God, respectively‖ . . . .199 
 
For Müller, the social function of righteousness language in setting up Paul‖s law-
faith contrast invalidates, rather than complements, an understanding of the 
righteousness of God focused on the identity or status of the individual who believes 
that gospel. 
 The apocalyptic reading of δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ eventually began to have a wide 
impact outside the circle of those directly taught by Käsemann. J. C. Beker, for 
example, also operating with an apocalyptic perspective on Paul‖s thought argues 
that  
 
The phrase ―the righteousness of God‖ (dikaiosynē  [tou] theou)—which Paul uses only 
in Rom. 1:17, 3:5, 21, 22, 25, 26, 10:3, and Phil. 3:9—transcends the category of 
acquittal and personal relationship because it points to that order of cosmic peace 
(shalōm) and salvation (sōtēria) that has been proleptically manifested in Christ and 
that discloses itself in our obedience to his lordship (Rom. 6:16-23).200 
 
Beker‖s argument does not necessarily preclude a role for an individual application 
of the language of the righteousness of God. Theoretically the fact that the 
righteousness of God “transcends the category of acquittal and personal 
relationship” does not mean that it obliterates such categories. However, it is telling 
that Beker does not in fact go on to explicate what the role of the individual would 
be for Paul. Like Käsemann, Beker appears to admit that the individual is not wholly 
unimportant, but nullifies such a concession by not actually explaining the place of 
the individual in the apostle‖s thought. The sole nuance that Beker intends to 
                                                        
198 Bultmann, Theology, 285; cf. 279-85; idem, “ΔΙΚΑΟΙΣΥΝΗ ΘΕΟΥ,” JBL 83 (1964): 12-16. See Zahl, 
Rechtfertigungslehre, 125-26, on the interaction between Bultmann and Käsemann on the question of 
the righteousness of God. 
199 Manfred T. Brauch, “Perspectives of ―God‖s Righteousness‖ in Recent German Discussion,” in E. 
P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism (London: SPCK, 1977), 530; cf. C. Müller, Gottes Gerechtigkeit und 
Gottes Volk: Eine Untersuchung zu Römer 9-11 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1964). 
200 Beker, Paul, 264. 
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convey in this section is that the righteousness of God in Paul is cosmic and 
creative, rather than individual and analytic. 
After recounting the nineteenth and twentieth-century development of a 
relational understanding of righteousness, with its focus on God‖s “activity as 
Savior,” Joseph Fitzmyer goes on to state: 
 
What is debatable, however, is whether the gift idea of dikaiosynē theou is suitable 
anywhere in Romans. In his debate with Käsemann, Bultmann insisted on different 
senses of the phrase in different places in Paul‖s letters (subjective gen. in 3:5, 25, 
objective in 1:17; 10:3). Käsemann rightly sought to use one sense, stressing the 
power character of God‖s gift. Pace Cranfield (Romans, 97, 825), it is not ―arbitrary‖ to 
insist that dikaiosynē theou in Romans has only ―one sense.‖ It has rather to be shown 
that it is right to import the objective sense from 2 Corinthians or the prepositional 
expression of Phil 3:9 into the interpretation of Romans.201 
 
For Fitzmyer, the only text in Romans where the potential for understanding 
righteousness as something other than “saving power” is even open to debate is 
Rom 10:3.202 Commenting on δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ in Rom 3:5, Fitzmyer scolds the 
interpreter who would find such individually oriented notions such as God‖s 
“punitive judgment upon sin” in this verse since “to admit that would be to upset all 
the gains of recent decades in the interpretation of Romans.”203 According to 
Fitzmyer (building explicitly on Käsemann), it is a settled issue in scholarship that 
δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ must be understood only in the sense of a divine attribute or 
activity consonant with that attribute. 
 N. T Wright argues similarly: “I regard it as an increasingly firm conclusion 
that Paul‖s other uses of the phrase (all in Romans) treat θεοῦ as referring to a 
δικαιοςύνη that is God‖s own, rather than a δικαιοςύνη that he gives, reckons, 
                                                        
201 Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 33; London: 
Chapman, 1992), 262. Fitzmyer (ibid., 262-63) then lists several important scholars who have adopted 
the Käsemannian perspective, including P. Stuhlmacher, K. Kertlege, S. Lyonnet, C. H. Dodd, and W.-
G. Kümmel, among others. The foundational work that argues for a relational understanding of 
righteousness in the OT and in Paul is Hermann Cremer, Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre im 
Zussamenhange ihrer geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1899). As Campbell, 
Romans 3.21-26, 148-49, notes: “[Hermann Cremer argued that] righteousness denoted fidelity to the 
demands of a relationship, whether with a spouse, neighbor, tribe, nation or God. This fundamental 
insight has been presupposed by all subsequent analyses, although it is developed somewhat 
divergently.” For a thoroughgoing critique of Cremer‖s (and those who have followed it) “relational” 
understanding of righteousness see Charles Lee Irons, “ΔΙΚΑΙΟΣΥΝΗ ΘΕΟΥ: A Lexical Examination of 
the Covenant-Faithfulness Interpretation” (Ph.D. diss., Fuller Theological Seminary, 2011). 
202 Fitzmyer, Romans, 263. 
203 Ibid., 329. Fitzmyer is arguing against John Piper, “The Righteousness of God in Romans 3.1-8,” 
TZ 36 (1980): 15. 
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imparts, or imputes to human beings.”204 Elsewhere Wright argues that “when 
[δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ] occurs in biblical and post-biblical Jewish texts, it always refers to 
God‖s own righteousness, not to the status people have from God; and Jewish 
discussions of ―God‖s righteousness” in this sense show close parallels with Paul‖s 
arguments in Romans.”205 Katherine Grieb summarizes Paul‖s understanding of the 
righteousness of God in a comparable vein to Wright: 
 
Paul seems to have four meanings in mind: (1) God‖s righteousness as the Creator to 
the entire creation; (2) God‖s special covenant relationship with Israel; (3) God as 
the impartial judge who will put things right, especially for the poor and the 
oppressed; and (4) God‖s saving faithfulness that will restore all things to right 
relationship at the end time.206 
 
Operating in the Käsemannian, anti-individualistic trajectory, both Wright and 
Grieb reject an understanding of the righteousness of God in Paul that incorporates 
the idea of righteousness being in any way whatsoever a human identity that is 
granted or based on faith.207 
Similarly, Douglas Campbell states that: 
 
God‖s eschatological saving righteousness functions dynamically, like the O.T. 
―Word of God‖ breaking into a chaotic or rebellious order from above but crucially 
for Paul, here definitively within the Christ-event. The primary relationship 
presupposed by this reading is therefore that between God and the gospel in the 
context of the cosmos, not that between the gospel and the individual.208 
 
Campbell, amplifying Käsemann‖s cosmic construct, places individually-oriented 
applications of the gospel and God‖s righteousness in antithetical relation to the 
cosmic ramifications of the gospel, with the latter winning out completely. Building 
on Campbell‖s reading of δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ, David Southall, in a recent dissertation 
                                                        
204 N. T. Wright, “On Becoming the Righteousness of God: 2 Corinthians 5:21,” in Pauline Theology. 
Volume 2: 1 & 2 Corinthians (ed. David M. Hay; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 200-1; cf. 206: “The 
―righteousness of God‖ in this verse is not a human status in virtue of which the one who has 
―become‖ it stands ―righteous‖ before God, as in Lutheran soteriology. It is the covenantal faithfulness 
of the one true God, now active through the paradoxical Christ-shaped ministry of Paul, reaching out 
with the offer of reconciliation to all who hear his bold preaching.” 
205 Idem, “The Letter to the Romans: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” in The New 
Interpreter’s Bible (Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 403. 
206 A. Katherine Grieb, The Story of Romans: A Narrative Defense of God’s Righteousness (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2002). 
207 On the notion of a new “identity” of righteousness based on faith see Francis Watson, Paul, 
Judaism and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective (rev. and exp. ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 
238. 
208 Douglas A. Campbell, “Romans 1:17- A Crux Interpretum for the πίςσιρ Χπιςσοῦ Debate,” JBL 
113 (1994): 272, quoted in David J. Southall, Rediscovering Righteousness in Romans: Personified dikaiosynē 
within Metaphoric and Narrational Settings (WUNT 2.240; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 289. 
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published on Paul‖s righteousness language, argues that an “anthropocentric view 
[of δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ in Rom 1:17] seems unsatisfactory in the light of an alternative 
reading” that “emphasizes the gospel itself” where “the sense is that ―the 
righteousness of God is being revealed within the gospel.‖”209 Such a reading “links 
well with my cosmic eschatological assertions that δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ is God‖s 
faithfulness and His saving activity.”210 For Southall (as with Campbell and 
Käsemann) cosmology trumps anthropology. 
Commenting on δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ in Rom 1:17 Robert Jewett shows his 
indebtedness to Käsemann: “A crucial contribution was made by Käsemann, who 
emphasized the apocalyptic understanding of the ―righteousness of God,‖ developed 
in response to the individualized, existential interpretation of imputed 
righteousness by his teacher, Rudolf Bultmann.”211 For Jewett, Paul‖s apocalyptic 
context demands a non-individualized reading of his letters. Jewett lumps together 
any reading of justification in Paul that recognizes the change in status or identity 
that is received through faith and then dismisses such understandings as “partisan 
controversies” that are insufficiently cognizant of “the apocalyptic background of 
Paul‖s language or the missional setting of Romans.”212 Building on Käsemann‖s 
rhetoric of antithesis, Jewett states that the “primary scope” of the righteousness of 
God in Paul “is the group, that is, the nation and the world, rather than the 
individual.”213 Jewett goes so far as to say that “the individual believer in the 
modern sense was not in view by Paul, even though the formulation from Habakkuk 
encourages an individualistic construal for the modern hearer.”214 
 Richard Hays takes a similar line with regard to righteousness of God 
language in Paul: “The problem in view here [Rom 3:20-21] is not, as Hans 
Conzelmann thinks, ―the subjective quest for salvation,‖ but still, as in Rom 3:5, the 
issue of God‖s integrity, God‖s justice that persistently overcomes human 
unfaithfulness.”215 Hays understands interpretations of the phrase δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ 
                                                        
209 Ibid., 293, citing Campbell, Romans 3.21-26, 205. 
210 Southall, Rediscovering, 293. 
211 Jewett, Romans, 141; cf. Robert Jewett, “Major Impulses in the Theological Interpretation of 
Romans Since Barth,” Int 34 (1980): 25-27. 
212 Idem, Romans, 141. 
213 Ibid., 143. 
214 Ibid., 145. 
215 Hays, “Psalm 143,” 60. 
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that are not centered solely on God‖s salvation power to entail a reversion to 
pietistic or fundamentalistic questions of “―How can I be saved?‖”216 
 The tendency toward diminishing the role of the individual in relation to 
God‖s righteousness is clear in the examples above. This is not surprising given the 
way most current Pauline scholarship is set firmly against assigning a prominent 
place—if any place at all—to the individual in Paul‖s letters. Such questions are 
simply passé and irrelevant to the modern scholar of Paul‖s thought. 
 This is all quite odd, considering the way in which πίςσιρ functions in all of 
the contexts in which the righteousness of God appears in Romans, and often, as in 
Romans 3, functions as the vehicle for the reception of a new believing identity. As 
Francis Watson puts it: 
 
Käsemann‖s attempt to convert [the righteousness of God] into an apocalyptic 
victory over the world, only tenuously linked with faith, is an exegetical error. . . . 
An interpretation that severs the link between righteousness and faith will be 
plausible only to those who, on the basis of questionable dogmatic commitments, 
cannot accept the faith/justification sequence that Paul‖s language so plainly 
entails.217 
 
Righteousness, whatever else it may entail, is firmly connected with the faith of 
individuals.218 
Rudolf Bultmann, on the other hand, is able to incorporate Käsemann‖s 
insight into δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ, understood as God‖s saving action, without at the 
same time falling into the false dichotomy that plagues interpretations in the 
Käsemannian vein: “Ebenso ist natürlich die Gabe δικ. θεοῦ im Handeln Gottes 
                                                        
216 Ibid., 57; cf. Wright, Fresh Perspectives, 123. This is a question that appears to pre-date the rise 
of Christian fundamentalism by a few years or so. See e.g., Acts 16:30b: κύπιοι, σί με δεῖ ποιεῖν ἴνα 
ςψθ῵; (“Sirs, what must I do in order to be saved?”). 
217 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 238 (emphasis original); cf. 245: “―Faith‖ is marginalized . . 
. on account of [Käsemann‖s] polemic against the ―individualism‖ inherent in ―justification by faith‖ as 
traditionally understood.” 
218 Appealing to the “faith/fulness of Christ” is of no help in evading the force of this argument. 
As Philip F. Esler, Conflict and Identity in Romans: The Social Setting of Paul’s Letter (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2003), 157-58, has shown, even if we grant the legitimacy of a “faith/fulness of Christ” reading of 
πίςσιρ Χπιςσοῦ in some places, Paul often speaks explicitly of faith in Christ [e.g. Rom 9:33; 10:11; Gal 
2:16; 3:26]. More significantly, Jesus is never the subject of the verb πιςσεύψ in Paul, a verb which 
occurs 41 times, nor is he ever described as πιςσόρ, even though Paul uses that epithet 9 times. 
Believing in Christ is an important facet of Paul‖s thought and it exercises a controlling function with 
regard to the righteousness of God. Positing cosmic dimensions of δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ cannot obscure 
this fact either. For more on the individual (but not exclusively so) nature of Pauline faith see 
Dunson, “Faith.” 
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begründet, aber δικ. bezeichnet nicht das Handeln als solches, sondern sein 
Ergebnis.”219 
 
4. Conclusion 
Käsemann describes his problem with Bultmann‖s theological agenda in this way: 
 
By abandoning the question of the meaning of history or, rather, by narrowing it 
down to the question of the meaning of the historical nature of existence [dem Sinn 
der Geschichtlichkeit der Existenz], Bultmann was inevitably bound to maintain that 
Pauline theology takes its bearings from the individual [die paulinische Theologie sie 
am Individuum orientiert]. His presentation of New Testament theology is determined 
by this thesis. Personal relations colour the total picture and allow even Christian 
service to be described within the framework of an individual ethic [im Rahmen einer 
Individualethik]. The fruitfulness of this approach is as indisputable as the 
fascination of its systematic consistency.220 
 
Ironically, Käsemann falls into the exact opposite error, largely due to his attempt 
to distance himself from his teacher on the point of anthropology. 
Yet, Käsemann sees himself as taking a middle position between the 
extremes of Bultmannian existentialism and salvation-historical “idealism”: 
 
I apparently stand between two fronts in refusing either to subordinate the 
apostle‖s doctrine of justification to a pattern of salvation history or to allow it to 
turn into a mere vehicle for the self-understanding of the believer [Vehikel für das 
Selbstverständnis der Glaubenden]. I would recognize both as necessary. What I would 
dispute are the respective emphases which are associated with these aspects.221 
 
It is certainly true that the individually-oriented aspects of Paul‖s letters should not 
be allowed to obscure the cosmic picture that emerges so clearly in texts such as 
Romans 1, 5 and 8. Yet, the question remains: does Käsemann find a way to 
adequately integrate the individual and the community in Paul into a coherent 
whole, or does his rhetorical overstatement and exegetical selectivity prevent him 
from adequately interpreting the diverse strands of the apostle‖s thinking? While 
Käsemann opens up several fresh and important avenues for Pauline research, he 
also leads interpreters down numerous blind alleys, and closes off other lanes that 
could be fruitfully explored from a variety of new perspectives. Care must be 
                                                        
219 Bultmann, “ΔΙΚΑΟΙΣΥΝΗ ΘΕΟΥ,” 14. 
220 Käsemann, “Anthropology,” 10; idem, “Anthropologie,” 24. 
221 Idem, “Salvation History,” 75, n. 27; idem, “Heilsgeschichte,” 135, n. 27. An even more forceful 
argument along these lines is found in Axel von Dobbeler, Glaube als Teilhabe: Historische und 
semantische Grundlagen der paulinischen Theologie und Ekklesiologie des Glaubens (WUNT 2.22; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 5: “Wir setzen uns damit vor allem gegen die intellektualistisch-abstrakte Sicht 
des Glaubens als ein Fürwahrhalten, bzw. ein neues Sich-selbst-Verstehen ab.” 
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exercised so that Käsemann‖s proper concern with eschatological and communal 
features of Pauline thought does not lead to thinking that requires an excluded 
opposite in order to make the case for its own persuasiveness. 
Similar questions can be asked of Bultmann. Has he found a way to show 
how the individual and the community are related in Paul? I have attempted to 
show that Bultmann is much more attentive to the communal dynamics of Paul‖s 
theology than many of his detractors have thought, but one can still ask whether his 
discussion of community is concrete enough. In other words, is Bultmann content to 
leave the discussion at a relatively abstract level? Bultmann does not provide all of 
the answers to the questions we posed at the beginning of this chapter, such as 
whether it is possible to integrate the complex argumentation in Paul‖s letters with 
regard to both its individual and communal implications and repercussions. 
Nonetheless, he, like Käsemann, focuses attention on important Pauline texts, 
which, especially given the anti-individual context of modern scholarship, need to 
be re-explored, even if one arrives at different conclusions. 
For example, we have seen how Bultmann highlights the “generic 
individual” in Paul (such as in Paul‖s critique of “generic boasting” in Rom 3:27 and 
his discussion of the generic ἄνθπψπορ in Rom 2:1-3). Bultmann‖s careful attention 
to this facet of Paul‖s letters is evidence that his “individualistic” interpretation of 
the apostle is not as insensitive to the precise contours of Pauline thought as some 
have suggested. While I believe that Bultmann has neglected other important ways 
of conceptualizing the Pauline individual, his insight into the generic individual 
provides an important focal point for further exegetical exploration.222 
I suggest that in both Bultmann and Käsemann an exegetical selectivity is at 
work that can make sense of certain portions of Paul‖s letters, while obscuring 
others. Yet, the preceding discussion should not be taken to imply that Bultmann‖s 
individualism and Käsemann‖s communalism should—or even can—be brought 
together in a simplistic pseudo-Hegelian synthesis.223 Instead, I have endeavored to 
draw attention to the hermeneutical and exegetical possibilities that are 
highlighted by each scholar‖s selective reading of Paul. Each approach underlines 
                                                        
222 Hans Hübner‖s assesment is surely correct: “Bultmanns Einbringen der existentialen 
Interpretation in der Theologie ist sein großes Verdienst, das nicht hoch genug eingeschätzt werden 
kann,” even if his “Existentiale Interpretation steht aber in der Gefahr, in individualistischer Weise 
mißdeutet zu werden . . .” (“Existentiale Interpretation,” 488). 
223 Cf. Ibid., 463. 
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genuinely important aspects of Paul‖s thought that must be attended to, especially 
in light of the false antitheses that are common in current research.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Individual and Community in the Discourses of Epictetus 
 
1. Introduction 
As the survey in chapter one above has indicated, an increasing number of Pauline 
scholars argue that it is anachronistic to speak of individuals in any important sense 
in Pauline thought. Indeed, doubt has been expressed about the existence in the 
entire first-century world of anything resembling a modern view of the individual. 
The first task of this chapter is to examine this question: is the widespread 
scholarly apprehension about speaking of the individual in the first-century 
warranted? To do so, we will look at the discourses of the Stoic philosopher 
Epictetus in order to determine whether the individual played an important role 
within his system. The second question to be answered in this chapter, however, is 
equally important: how does Epictetus—if indeed he does—relate the individual to 
society as a whole?1 The two questions are intertwined, and as the survey of 
scholarship below will make clear, must be answered together. 
I contend that Epictetus‖s ethical logic is quite pointedly centered on the 
individual; the individual‖s power to choose a life of virtuous tranquility, despite the 
outward circumstances of life, is the primary concern of Epictetus‖ ethical 
paraenesis. The communal and social facets of Epictetus‖ discourses are secondary—
and contingent—expressions of an essentially individually-centered system. 
Although it is not the case that outwardly-focused aspects of Epictetus‖ thought are 
insignificant, his ethical system is—and can only be—founded on the necessity of 
preserving one‖s self, since he ultimately places social concern into the category of 
“things indifferent” to happiness.2 From this sure foundation his ethical teaching 
branches outward toward social responsibility. 
                                                        
1 Although Burnett has rightly pointed to recent scholarship challenging the idea that there was 
no important sense of individuality in the ancient world, his presentation of this issue is clouded 
when he so strongly distances himself from anti-individual understandings of the ancient world by 
almost exclusively emphasizing the individualistic aspects of the ancient world (see e.g., Burnett, 
Salvation, 23-87). My analysis of Epictetus is specifically meant to avoid swinging the pendulum in 
either an individualistic or communalistic direction, since as I will argue below, both the individual 
and society are vitally important in Epictetus‖ thought, as is the case with most thinkers in antiquity. 
2 On this latter point see A. A. Long, Epictetus: a Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 232. 
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The ultimate purpose of this study of Epictetus‖ way of relating individual 
and communal themes is to enable the interpreter of Paul‖s letters to compare and 
contrast Epictetus and Paul. In so doing, both similarities and differences will 
become evident, although the main point of this comparison is to re-open the 
question of the individual and the community in Pauline theology by taking careful 
note of how thoroughly at home such a question is in a near contemporary of Paul‖s, 
no matter how different the foundational philosophical and theological outlooks of 
each thinker might be.3 
 
2. Individual and Community in Recent Scholarship on Stoicism 
In his account of the relationship between Paul and Stoicism, Troels Engberg-
Pedersen places great weight on Stoic teaching on oikeiōsis, a motif that has been 
increasingly seen in recent scholarship as one of the keys to understanding Stoic 
ethics. In brief, oikeiōsis is the notion that when a person has become equipped with 
a detachment from earthly possessions and affections by aligning him or herself 
completely with reason/God, such a person is elevated beyond mere self-
directedness toward selfless care for others.4 While Engberg-Pedersen admits that 
the ethical system of “canonical” Stoicism appears “wholly oriented towards the 
individual and his or her happiness,” he nonetheless insists that Stoic ethics “is just 
as community-oriented as anything to be found in Paul” since it is inescapably 
political in its vision.5 In fact, although a focus on the individual with regard to 
mental “conversion” and cognitive change at the inception of ethical progress is 
appropriate, neither individual transformation nor the inner life of the individual is 
paramount in the ongoing life of moral progress.6 Instead, the aim of one‖s ethical 
                                                        
3 In other words, I am not primarily seeking to note similarities or differences between Epictetus 
and Paul, or to argue for influence one way or the other. Instead, I am placing two roughly 
contemporary writers side-by-side, who both address a similar issue (how to relate the individual to 
the community), with the goal of persuading Pauline interpreters that this was a live issue in 
antiquity and that superficial dismissals of the Pauline individual are illegitimate, despite the 
legitimate desire to avoid anachronism. As we will see in the next two chapters, the Pauline 
individual is a vitally important category in Paul‖s theology and ethics, but it is most emphatically 
not an isolated individual; for Paul the redeemed individual is necessarily an individual-in-
community. 
4 See e.g., Cicero, Fin. 3.16; Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 53-54. Epictetus‖ appropriation 
of Stoic oikeiōsis teaching will be examined in greater detail below. 
5 Ibid., 37; cf. 73-78. However, Engberg-Pedersen admits that Stoicism (in distinction from Paul) 
never created actual communities and that in this regard it remained “more or less ―individualistic‖” 
(ibid., 78). This is quite an admission! 
6 See Ibid., 66-70. 
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development in both systems is a radically community-centered life orientation. 
Engberg-Pedersen‖s proposal is particularly important for my purposes since he 
places Stoicism side-by-side with Paul‖s theology and ethics in order to argue for a 
similarly all-pervasive focus on the community in Paul. For Engberg-Pedersen it is 
either the individual or the community; there is no via media: after conversion “the 
individual [is] nothing but a member of the group,”7 since Christ-faith “lifts the 
individual . . . out of his or her individuality, leaves it behind and carries him or her 
over to a state of communality.”8         
How does Engberg-Pedersen‖s anti-individualist understanding of Stoicism 
compare with the views of other scholars in the field? As is the case in New 
Testament studies, scholars of Stoicism have also recently begun to scrutinize 
whether Stoic ethics should be understood as individualistic or social in its 
fundamental outlook. 
In her book The Roman Stoics Gretchen Reydams-Schils lays out the two 
primary issues involved in this discussion: 1) the fact that “the Stoics have a robust 
notion of self,” indeed, “the strongest sense of selfhood” on offer in the Hellenistic 
ethical tradition;9 2) but also that “individuality is but one aspect of the Roman Stoic 
notion of a human being‖s core” since everyone is embedded into “a network of 
relationships . . . [that] has its specific claims and standards of behavior.”10 With 
regard to the latter point Reydams-Schils argues that 
 
because sociability is part of animal and human nature, appropriation is also 
supposed to embrace care of others. And the Roman Stoic version of ―appropriation‖ 
yields a striking appreciation for relationships with friends, parents, lovers, 
spouses, children, siblings, parents-in-law, and the like.11 
 
Nonetheless, because “oikeiōsis implies a focus on one‖s own needs as dictated by 
one‖s nature, both ancient and contemporary critics of the Stoics have not failed to 
question how this dynamic could be reconciled with life in a community and the 
                                                        
7 Ibid., 294. 
8 Ibid. For a representative sampling of more instances of this understanding of the individual in 
relation to community see ibid., 128, 137, 147, 152, 154-55. This line of argumentation is repeated in 
idem, Cosmology and Self, 176-81, although Engberg-Pedersen does offer a more nuanced description 
of the Pauline “self” in this book (partially in response to criticisms of Paul and the Stoics). 
9 Gretchen Reydams-Schils, The Roman Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005), 17. 
10 Ibid., 17. 
11 Ibid., 53; cf. Nicholas P. White, Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 316-17. 
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needs of others.”12 That is to say, many scholars—and many non-scholarly readers 
ancient and modern—are troubled by the logic of ethical decision making in Stoics 
such as Epictetus because it at least sounds extremely individualistic, possibly even 
antisocial. Reydams-Schils‖ own response to this seeming tension between the 
individual and communal aspects of Stoic ethics seeks to do justice both to its 
“robust notion of the self” and its “distinctive pattern of emphasizing social 
responsibility.”13 
Anthony Long likewise notes the apparent absence of “any necessary link 
with social relationships” in Epictetus‖ focus on “living ―unimpeded and 
undistressed‖.” Long surmises that Epictetus‖ ethical outlook “looks as if it could be 
a policy for a wholly self-absorbed life, keeping clear of anything that might 
jeopardize one‖s individual tranquility” even arguing that “in a certain respect that 
impression is correct.” However, Long immediately adds that this self-concern “so 
far from cutting people off from society,” is actually “the essential condition for 
acting well in every social role” since only those “who are wholly at peace with 
themselves, have the right kind of disposition to care effectively about other people 
as well.”14 In other words, Long maintains that a strong desire to maintain one‖s 
individual well-being is a necessary presupposition for proper communal living in 
Stoic thought. Thus, Long does not see a tension between the primacy of the 
individual and the importance of the community, even though he does feel the need 
                                                        
12 Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 53; cf. Malcolm Schofield, “Social and Political Thought,” in The 
Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (eds. Keimpe Algra, et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 764-65; Brad Inwood, “L‖oikeiôsis Sociale chez Epictète,” in Polyhistor: Studies in the History 
and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy (eds. Keimpe A. Algra, Pieter W. van der Horst and David T. 
Runia; Leiden: Brill, 1996), 243-44; Gisela Striker, “The Role of Oikeiōsis in Stoic Ethics,” in Essays on 
Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 288-89, 295; Nicholas 
P. White, “The Basis of Stoic Ethics,” HSCP 83 (1979): 149-65; Adolf Bonhöffer, Die Ethik des Stoikers 
Epictet. Anhang: Exkurse über einige wichtige Punkte der stoischen Ethik (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1894), 
158-59. 
13 Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 3; see also Richard Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern Insights about 
Individuality, Life, and Death (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 49. Runar M. Thorsteinsson, 
Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism: A Comparative Study of Ancient Morality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 1-70, argues for a similarly robust view of social responsibility in Stoicism, 
but perhaps because the target of his own critique is scholarship that pits Stoic self-centeredness 
completely against Stoic social responsibility, he does not give much attention to the importance of 
the self and self-preservation in the Roman Stoic authors he analyzes. 
14 All quotes in this paragraph are from Long, Epictetus, 114; cf. 116: “. . . his ethics is premised on 
the claim that we have to care first and foremost for our individual selves if we are to be properly 
equipped to do what is incumbent on us in our social roles.”cf. ibid., 198; Martha Nussbaum, The 
Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 
43. 
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to defend Stoicism from the charge of being wholly individualistic.15 John Sellars 
similarly concludes that “it is arguably one of the strengths of the Stoic position” 
that “it is an ethical theory that takes seriously the primitive behaviour of animals 
and human beings, and does not try to pretend that selfish motivations are not at 
the heart of most people‖s actions.”16 The synthesis (seen in Long and Sellars) of a 
primarily self-preservative instinct with a nonetheless important social concern has 
precedent in the seminal work of Adolf Bonhöffer, who in 1894 said of Epictetus: 
 
Hier haben wir klar und deutlich die Synthese der egoistischen und altruistischen 
Motive. . . . Er selbst wenigstens ist überzeugt, dass die Befolgung seiner Lehren 
nicht bloss Dankbarkeit gegen Gott und stetige Freudigkeit, sondern auch Frieden 
und Eintracht im Haus, im Staat und Völkerleben wirken würde (IV, 5, 35). Der 
Grundsatz aber, den Epictet hier ausspricht, dass wer auf sein eigenes wahres Glück 
bedacht ist, auch seine sozialen Pflichten am besten erfüllt, ist unstreitig der 
denkbar höchste, den eine Ethik aufstellen kann.17 
 
Attempting to give a more prominent place to the community in Stoic ethics, 
Martha Nussbaum insists that the individual progressing in virtue never remains 
simply an individual, but must live virtuously in every one of his or her concrete 
social relationships. Like Reydams-Schils and Long, Nussbaum recognizes that 
“Stoic arguments seek the health of the individual human being, to be sure . . .” but 
also that “they never let the pupil forget that pursuing this end is inseparable from 
seeking the good of other human beings.” The reason for this lies in the fact that 
“philosophy‖s mission, as we have seen, is not to one person or two, not to the rich, 
or the well-educated or the prominent, but to the human race as such.” No one can 
“pursue one‖s own fullest good without at the same time caring for and fostering 
the good of others. . . . In short, a life based on narrow self-interest cannot be 
                                                        
15 Cf. Long, Epictetus, 200 (cf. 114-16, 198-200): “There are not two dispositions, a self-interested 
one and an altruistic one, but a single attitude that treats concern for others as integral to concern 
for oneself. . . . Epictetus devotes far more attention to instructing his students in self-improvement 
than he gives to advising them on specific social roles.  As we have already seen, he treats the latter 
as a topic that is secondary to the primary topic of training one‖s desires and aversions. . . . We could 
say that Epictetus places duty to oneself as the top priority. . . . but, while it is one‖s primary function 
to improve oneself, this should not be at the expense of neglecting one‖s social relationships . . . .” 
But note that Long is careful to distinguish Epictetus‖ individualism from modern, “Cartesian” 
individualism (see e.g., A. A. Long, “Stoic Psychology,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy 
[eds. Keimpe Algra, et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 584; cf. Sorabji, Self, 157; 
Gill‖s criticism of Long on this point, then, seems somewhat misplaced [Christopher Gill, The 
Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 371; cf. 372-
91]). 
16 John Sellars, Stoicism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 108. 
17 Bonhöffer, Epictet, 5. 
74 
 
successful, even on its own terms. Since the self is a member of the human 
community, promoting its fullest success includes promoting the ends of others.”18 
However, while recognizing the interplay between individualism and 
communalism, Nussbaum pushes the communal dimension further than Reydams-
Schils or Long when she says that—in modification of the standard approach of 
other philosophical schools—Stoic thought focuses “on communal well-being rather 
than the health of isolated individuals.”19 Stoics “do not, like the others, turn away 
from politics, bringing eudaimonia to individual pupils (or groups of friends) by 
moderating their individual desires, without social change.” Instead, they “set 
themselves the task of producing a just and humane society.”20 Going even further 
Nussbaum says that in Stoicism the person who desires to cultivate virtue needs to 
“be taught that what she is as an individual is a member of a whole, and that this 
whole reaches out to include the entirety of humanity.”21 In a similar fashion to 
Engberg-Pedersen, Nussbaum places the communal dimension of Stoic ethics into a 
place of precedence. For her it is not simply enough to recognize the communal 
aspect of Stoicism. Rather, one‖s understanding of Stoicism will be skewed unless 
one gives due heed to the ultimacy of community, where the individual is simply the 
starting point for moving toward the accomplishment of Stoicism‖s broader social 
vision.22 However, unlike Engberg-Pedersen, Nussbaum is generally more willing to 
admit the presence of individually-centered elements of Stoic ethics that remain in 
place during the process of human advancement in virtue.23 
                                                        
18 All quotes in this paragraph are from Nussbaum, Therapy, 341-42; cf. 342-44. 
19 Ibid., 329 (emphasis added). Cf. Inwood, “L‖oikeiôsis,” 244: Epictetus “insiste catégoriquement 
sur la nature irréductiblement sociale de l‖homme.” 
20 The two preceding quotes are from Nussbaum, Therapy, 319. 
21 Ibid., 344 (emphasis original). 
22 Cf. M. Andrew Holowchak, The Stoics: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Continuum, 2008), 39: 
“To make sense of Stoic naturalism, one has to have some story to tell, and a convincing one, about 
how humans go from beings who are preeminently preoccupied with self-preservation, to beings 
whose rational element predominates and has such regard for other- and cosmic-concern that it may 
even subordinate the self-preservative instinct to a cosmic ideal.” However, this is in tension with 
statements Holowchak makes elsewhere, such as when he says that “overall, there was general 
agreement among the Stoics that the primary human impulse, dictated by nature, was self-
preservation” (Holowchak, Stoics, 36). Holowchak (ibid., 37 [emphasis added]), seems to admit that, 
rather than subordinating “the self-preservative instinct to a cosmic ideal” “self-affection branches 
out into mutual affection and friendship with others, which develops into a sense of patriotism, of 
care for posterity, and even of fit into the cosmos itself. Here Aristotle‖s political animal has become 
cosmic.” This quote is more in line with Long‖s observation (cited above) that the self-preservative 
instinct is “the essential condition for acting well in every social role” (Long, Epictetus, 114). 
23 For example, Nussbaum, Therapy, 344, cites a passage in Epictetus where he encourages the 
virtuous progressor to recognize that “the medical concern she, and the teacher, feel for her 
personal health is at the same time a concern for the world of rational beings, of which she is a 
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The one scholar of ancient philosophy who comes closest to Engberg-
Pedersen‖s dismissal of the importance of the “post-conversion” individual in 
Stoicism is Christopher Gill, who argues that “if we are to engage effectively with 
[ancient concepts of self or personality], we need to counteract the modern 
tendency to conceive self or personality in terms that gives a central role to 
subjectivity and individuality.”24 However, even Gill recognizes that the individual is 
important throughout the process of ethical growth in Stoicism. He simply insists 
that it is a radically different kind of individual (an “objective-participant”) than the 
“modern individual,” which Gill sees as determined to such a large degree by 
questions of subjectivity and inwardness (a “subjective-individualist”).25 
 These views on the relationship between the individual and the community 
in Stoic ethics highlight a widely felt tension among scholars of ancient philosophy, 
namely how to make sense of the centrality of the individual and self-preservation 
while at the same time doing justice to the social-communal aspect of Stoic thought. 
The scholars surveyed above recognize that the communal dimension of Stoic 
ethical reasoning—as vital as it is—does not completely subordinate the individual 
dimension to itself, even if they have different ways of relating the individual and 
community. This runs directly counter to Engberg-Pedersen‖s case for the total 
sublimation of the individual into the community in both Stoicism and Pauline 
thought.26 
                                                                                                                                                              
―principal part‖ (Epict. 2.10.3).” In other words, proper self-concern, rather than being obliterated in 
the quest for cosmic virtue, leads naturally to concern for others. 
24 Christopher Gill, “The Self and Hellenistic-Roman Philosophical Therapy,” in Vom Selbst-
Verständnis in Antike und Neuzeit (eds. Alexander Arweiler and Melanie Möller; Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2008), 359. 
25 On which see idem, Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: the Self in Dialogue (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 9-28. 
26 Some scholars comparing Paul and Epictetus have also noted the individualistic thrust of the 
latter and the problems that arise when one elevates the communal dimensions of his thought to an 
all-controlling position. Cf. Abraham J. Malherbe, “Paul‖s Self-Sufficiency (Philippians 4:11),” in 
Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World (ed. J. T. 
Fitzgerald; NovTSup 82; Leiden: Brill, 1996): 138, on “Stoic introspection”; cf. Stephen J. Chester, 
Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul’s Theology and the Corinthian Church (SNTW; 
London: T & T Clark, 2003), 73, n. 82: who points to the tension involved when Engberg-Pedersen 
argues that “Paul practiced Stoicism as a communitarian project” even though “Engberg-Pedersen 
admits . . . that the Stoicism of Paul‖s era was ―more or less individualistic‖.” In contrast to Engberg-
Pedersen, Chester contends that “none of the leading Stoics of this period, including Epictetus, 
understood their philosophy in communitarian terms. . . . I doubt both that the claim that Paul 
practised Stoicism as a communitarian project can be sustained historically . . . .”; cf. Downing, 
“Persons,” 58-59: “First-century examples of a concern for interiority are richly provided by 
Epictetus . . . This Stoic distinction, with the emphasis on the ―inner‖, on interiority, which Epictetus 
learned from Musonius Rufus, is widely available and deployed.” Downing (ibid., 50-60) points to 
Cicero, Seneca, Philo and even opponents of Stoicism such as Plutarch and the Epicureans, who all 
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It should be said from the outset that if self-concern is defined (as it is by 
Engberg-Pedersen) as selfish concern, then neither Epictetus nor Paul has any desire 
to defend it. Neither figure seeks to elevate selfishness to the level of a virtue, 
ultimate or otherwise. It is my contention that Engberg-Pedersen reads Stoicism 
exactly backwards: for him the individual is radically subordinate to the 
community. This interpretation of Stoicism leads to insurmountable difficulties for 
a reading of Epictetus (and other Stoics for that matter). Instead of pitting the 
individual against the community, I intend to show in this chapter that Epictetus 
never takes individual self-concern out of his sights when laying out the contours of 
the moral life.27 Socially-directed ethics are important, but they are not ultimate. To 
understand Epictetus in this regard, one must reject the equation of care of the self 
and introspective selfishness. The rest of this chapter will therefore show how these 
issues work themselves out in Epictetus‖ writings. 
 
3. Epictetus: Self and Society 
3.1 Preliminaries 
In order to make overall sense of the details of Epictetus‖ system several preliminary 
issues must be addressed. First, we will look at some features of Epictetus‖ 
discourses that need to be understood in order to make better sense of his 
teachings. Second, we will examine the goal of Epictetus‖ ethical system. This is 
necessary because it reveals how Epictetus‖ entire ethical program is directed 
toward personal development and inner peace. 
 
3.1.1 Epictetus in Context 
First, a word about the author. Epictetus did not write his lectures down, and thus 
we are dependent on the transcriptions of his student Arrian.28 While some scholars 
                                                                                                                                                              
share a concern for “interiority” and “―inner self-engagement” in their expositions of the nature of 
moral progress. 
27 Engberg-Pedersen does appear to recognize this occasionally (cf. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and 
the Stoics, 50-1, on Aristotle), although he does not allow it to mitigate the unswervingly anti-
individual tone of his book. 
28 Epictetus was likely born sometime during the decade 50-60 CE in Hierapolis in the 
southwestern region of present-day Turkey. He was at one time a slave of Nero‖s secretary 
Epaphroditus, and was given philosophical training by the great Roman Stoic philosopher Musonius 
Rufus. He began his own teaching in Rome and moved to Nicopolis after the emperor Domitian 
expelled the philosophers from Rome in 95 CE. Epictetus probably died around 135 CE, having lived 
with poor health throughout a remarkably long life, given the time. These biographical details come 
from Long, Epictetus, 10-12; cf. Huttunen, Comparison, 4-6; W. A. Oldfather, “Introduction,” in Epictetus: 
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question whether the content of the extant Epictetan material is authentic, there is 
no reason to doubt that what is recorded is “completely authentic to Epictetus‖ own 
style and language” since the Discourses retain Epictetus‖ “strikingly urgent and 
vivid voice quite distinct from Arrian‖s authorial persona in [Arrian‖s] other works . 
. . .”29 It would be nearly impossible to prove that the material does not go back to 
Epictetus anyway, so it is something of a moot point to challenge Epictetus‖ 
authorship. Working with the existing material gives us access to an enlightening 
philosophical discussion of the individual and the community that is roughly 
contemporary with Paul, no matter how much of a hand Arrian may have had in 
shaping the presentation of Epictetus‖ lectures.30 
Second, a word about the content. The Discourses are expansive treatments 
of a wide range of philosophical topics, with a primary interest in applied ethics, 
though it is important to note that Epictetus only makes sense when understood 
within a unified system of logic and physics as well.31 Arrian‖s Manual, or Enchiridion, 
is a condensation of Epictetus‖ thought into aphoristic slogans which, while often 
memorable, are not as well-developed, and thus will not be analyzed in this 
chapter.32 Instead, the focus here is on the discourses found in books 1-4 of Arrian‖s 
transcriptions of Epictetus‖ lectures.33 A.A. Long notes that it is important to keep 
the audience in mind since the discourses are transcriptions of lectures to students 
who already possess a certain amount of knowledge of Stoicism and philosophy in 
general. Since the lectures are for students, the “hyperbole, irony, and 
repetitiousness that are characteristic of his teaching” can be better appreciated, 
not as a defect in style, but as a consequence of the school-house origins of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, The Manual, and Fragments (LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1925), vii-xii. 
29 Long, Epictetus, 41. See also Thorsteinsson, Ancient Morality, 59, n. 19; Huttunen, Comparison, 4, 
n. 13. 
30 Difficulties are compounded by the fact that all “manuscripts of the discourses have been 
shown to depend on one, Cod. Bodleianus Misc. Graec. 251 s. xi/xii. Text criticism is thus only the 
weighing of suggested emendations to the many flaws in this manuscript” (Peter Oakes, “Epictetus 
[and the New Testament],” VE 23 [1993]: 40; cf. Huttunen, Comparison, 5). On the question of textual 
criticism in general see Oldfather, “Introduction,” xxxii-xxxiii. 
31 Julia Annas, “Ethics in Stoic Philosophy,” Phron 52 (2007): 58-63; cf. 85-87; cf. Reydams-Schils, 
Roman Stoics, 3. The unity of the three branches of Stoic thought is seen clearly in the analogies 
various Stoic writers use to describe it: e.g., an egg, with logic understood as the shell, and physics 
and ethics variously described as the yolk or egg white (Annas, “Ethics,” 62, n. 12). See also 
Holowchak, Stoics, 53. 
32 Long calls the maxims in the Manual “potted doctrines” (Long, Epictetus, 48) which he thinks 
are inferior to the “unique blend of philosophy, pedagogy, satire, exhortation, and uninhibited 
dialogue” (ibid., 9) found in the Discourses. 
33 On the Manual, and reasons for focusing on the Discourses, see ibid., 8-9. 
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lectures.34 Stylistically the Discourses share the elenctic, or questioning, style of 
Epictetus‖ hero Socrates, which is meant to push students to take decisive action to 
improve the goodness of their lives.35 
The challenging and questioning style of the Discourses highlights one of the 
most important themes in Epictetus‖ system: one must put into practice what one 
learns. Philosophical knowledge that is not lived out in real life is useless for 
Epictetus. This is important because it shows the way in which Epictetus‖ 
philosophy was not simply an abstract system to be learned, but had significant 
bearing on how individuals went about their lives, and how they related to others. 
Epictetus puts it this way: “That is why the philosophers admonish us not to be 
satisfied with merely learning, but to add thereto practice also, and then training.”36 
The elevated significance of the individual self in Epictetus is in large part due to his 
insistence that individual people become self-reflective in order to put his teaching 
into practice. Thus, the individual, as an individual, becomes the focal point of 
ethical exhortation, even exhortation that impinges upon the social domain. 
Epictetus‖ “disdain for mere learning is one of his ways of stating the incomparably 
greater importance of training oneself to live well; in the words he uses to inculcate 
that project he is as artful as the rhetoricians from whom he officially distances 
himself.”37 
 
3.1.2 The Goal of Epictetus‖ Ethics: Happiness through Progress in Personal Virtue 
Epictetus‖ ethical system is goal oriented. That is to say, he puts forward an account 
of the ideal life and the conditions for attaining it. In particular, Epictetus argues 
that happiness is the goal of life.38 Truly ethical living is not a disinterested striving 
                                                        
34 Ibid., 4; cf. 43-46. However, Long (ibid., 8-9) also notes that “numerous passages of the 
discourses, in spite of their conversational and colloquial idiom, have a logical structure that lends 
itself to formal analysis.” 
35 Cf. Ibid., 55-61; cf. 16, 68, 73. See also Nussbaum, Therapy, 335-41. 
36 Diatr. 2.9.13: Διὰ σοῦσο παπαγγέλλοτςιν οἱ υιλόςουοι μὴ ἀπκεῖςθαι μόνῳ σῶ μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
μελέσην πποςλαμβάνειν, εἶσα ἄςκηςιν. Cf. Diatr. 1.4.13-17; 3.23.30-32; Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 5. 
37 Long, Epictetus, 13; cf. 19-20, 58; cf. Nussbaum, Therapy, 330. John Sellars calls this feature of 
Epictetus‖ teaching a training in the “art of living” (Sellars, Stoicism, 6-27; cf. 36, 47-49). 
38 Michelle V. Lee, Paul, the Stoics, and the Body of Christ (SNTSMS 137; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 59-60; Long, Epictetus, 113, 193; idem, “Stoic Eudaimonism,” in Stoic Studies 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 179-201; Brad Inwood and Pierluigi Donini, “Stoic 
Ethics,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (eds. Keimpe Algra, et al.; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 684-90; John M. Cooper, “Eudaimonism, the Appeal to Nature, and 
―Moral Duty‖ in Stoicism,” in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty (eds. Stephen 
Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 261-66; Stephen 
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for goodness, but includes within it a desire for reward or blessedness, namely the 
living of a happy life. While the philosophical schools of antiquity—operating within 
Aristotle‖s eudaemonistic system of ethics—debated the means of achieving 
happiness, all were in basic agreement that happiness was indeed worth striving 
for, and that it motivated right living.39 
Within this framework, Epictetus (and Stoicism generally) offers a 
distinctive understanding of the course of action one should take to procure 
happiness, namely the pursuit of virtue (which can be loosely defined as living in 
harmony with nature, which for Epictetus carries the additional overtone of 
conforming oneself to divine providence; cf. Diatr. 1.1.17).40 In this way of thinking, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Engstrom, “Happiness and the Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant,” in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: 
Rethinking Happiness and Duty (eds. Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 102-4; Gisela Striker, “Following Nature: A Study in Stoic Ethics,” in Essays on 
Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 221-22; Nussbaum, 
Therapy, 3-4, 21-22, 41; Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
27, 44, 426; T. H. Irwin, “Stoic and Aristotelian Conceptions of Happiness,” in The Norms of Nature: 
Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (eds. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 208-10; Bonhöffer, Epictet, 4-6. 
39 Cf. Aristotle, Eth. nic. 1095a13-29 [1.4.1-4]. Cf. Michael Gass, “Eudaimonism and Theology in 
Stoic Accounts of Virtue,” JHI 61 (2000): 19-20; David Furley, “Cosmology,” in The Cambridge History of 
Hellenistic Philosophy (eds. Keimpe Algra, et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 448-51; 
Annas, Happiness, 44; Troels Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and 
Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990), 16-35; Bonhöffer, 
Epictet, 12, 163-88. Aristotle offers an understanding of the good that includes within itself the notion 
that happiness is not solely attainable through recourse to a right ordering of one‖s own mind and 
life (see Eth. nic. 1099a30, 1099b7-8 [1.8.15, 17]). For him, numerous external goods, including friends, 
wealth, physical attractiveness, a harmonious family life, etc., are also necessary (cf. Engstrom, 
“Happiness,” 104, 112-13; Irwin, “Happiness,” 206-8). Aristotle‖s view contrasts significantly with 
Epictetus‖ in that life in community for Aristotle is a non-negotiable dimension of the good and 
happy life, whereas it is an important, but entirely contingent dimension for Epictetus, since 
happiness is solely dependent on virtue—an inward state impervious to external circumstances. 
Virtue provides the only sure basis for a life of contentment because it is “indifferent to the 
characteristic temporal shape of a human life” (Annas, Happiness, 429; cf. Sellars, Stoicism, 119; Long, 
Epictetus, 192). 
40 See Lincoln E. Galloway, Freedom in the Gospel: Paul’s Exemplum in 1 Cor 9 in Conversation with the 
Discourses of Epictetus and Philo (CBET 38; Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 76-78. Both Bonhöffer, Epictet, 16, and 
Long, Epictetus, 33, note that Epictetus does not use the term virtue (ἀπεσή) often. Bonhöffer believes 
this is a reaction against “scholastic” traditionalism and points out that Epictetus uses a variety of 
interrelated descriptions of the goal of life (following God, following nature, protecting one‖s 
volition, freedom from external constraint, etc.; Bonhöffer, Epictet, 12). However, Epictetus does 
occasionally use ἀπεσή in the classical sense, as seen in e.g., Diatr. 1.4.3: here virtue is what creates 
happiness/blessedness (εὐδαιμονία), contentment (ἀπάθεια) and serenity (εὔποια). The point 
Bonhöffer and Long both make still stands: this usage is infrequent. Thus, I am using the term virtue 
here loosely as an umbrella term for the set of perspectivally related goals that Epictetus urges his 
students to seek in order to become invincibly happy. This is easier (and significantly less confusing) 
than saying virtue/following God/living according to nature/developing the soul/protecting one‖s 
volition/protecting personal honor and dignity/being self-sufficient/etc. every time I mention the 
goal of life in Epictetus‖ system. 
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virtue and happiness, although they can be distinguished conceptually, are closely 
connected, in that virtue is the precondition and foundation of happiness.41 
A prominent feature of Epictetus‖ thought is the way he ties right living 
directly to care for the self. For example, in a discourse on “how one may preserve 
his proper character upon every occasion” (Π῵ρ ἄν σιρ ςῴζοι σὸ κασὰ ππόςψπον ἐν 
πανσί - Diatr. 1.2) Epictetus argues that this involves a “regard for one‖s proper 
character” (1.2.28) and doing “that which is according to (one‖s) person” (1.2.30); in 
other words, doing that which is virtuous and in line with the nature with which all 
people are endowed by God (1.2.34).42 Every person is faced with two ways of acting 
at any given time, either to act nobly and in accord with nature, or to choose those 
things that are “inappropriate” (σὰ μηδὲν πποςήκονσα - 1.2.32), inappropriate at 
least for those who care about cultivating virtue.43 Doing what is inappropriate leads 
one into slavery; it is a selling of one‖s “power of choice” (πποαίπεςιρ - 1.2.33). Thus, 
although he may not use the term virtue often, Epictetus firmly believes that there 
is a specific way of living that is in harmony with nature, and that will thus lead to 
happiness. The happy life, then, is the virtuous life that is dependent on self-
control, self-focus, and self-concern. The community is important as an implication 
of seeking to live in accordance with virtue and seeking to be appropriately 
integrated into the world, but is not absolutely vital for one‖s own happiness. 
In this chapter I will explain how Epictetus understands virtue to be the 
pathway to happiness, since it is an inward disposition entirely free from exterior 
constraint, whether such constriction arises from the actions of others or from the 
                                                        
41 Malcolm Schofield, “Stoic Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad Inwood; 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 246. Epictetus brings this aspect of Stoic ethics to the 
fore in his discourse entitled “What is the true nature of the good?” (Τίρ οὐςία σοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; Diatr. 2.8) 
where he explains that the only true good consists in a “desire that fails not of achievement, an 
aversion proof against encountering what it would avoid, an appropriate choice, a thoughtful 
purpose, a well-considered assent” (2.8.29). The inescapable intertwining of virtue and happiness in 
Stoic thought stands out here: happiness, in that human flourishing comes about when desire 
attends only to those things within one‖s own power to bring about; virtue, in that such choices are 
wholly appropriate (ὁπμὴν καθήκοτςαν), that is, in harmony with nature. 
42 All English translations of Epictetus are from the Loeb Classical Library (LCL) edition unless 
otherwise noted. 
43 “Inappropriate things” (σὰ μηδὲν πποςήκονσα) is a technical designation in Stoicism for 
actions taken against nature. On appropriate (those things that are in harmony with nature) and 
inappropriate actions in Stoicism see Long, Epictetus, 115-16; David Sedley, “The Stoic-Platonist 
Debate on kathêkonta,” in Topics in Stoic Philosophy (ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 250-56; F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics (2d ed.; London: Bristol Classic, 1989), 45-48; 
Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Discovering the Good: Oikeiōsis and Kathēkonta in Stoic Ethics,” in The 
Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (eds. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 145-46, 178-82. 
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vagaries of historical happenstance. Epictetus is passionate in his defense of 
indifference because he desires to liberate his students from slavery to situations 
over which they have no control.44 Furthermore, happiness (and thus virtue too) is 
something that must be vigorously sought across the whole span of one‖s life. It is 
not “just . . . a thing, however good, that someone might present you with.”45 That is 
to say, the ancient idea going back to Aristotle was one that emphasized the pursuit 
of happiness, rather than a state or emotion of happiness, especially for Epictetus, if 
such an emotional state was thought to be dependent on circumstances outside of 
one‖s own control.46 This quest for happiness through virtue, which entails a 
lifetime of rigorous training of the mind, is part of the process by which those who 
cultivate virtue become integrated into the cosmos. Although potentially difficult 
for modern readers to understand—accustomed as we are to the Kantian decoupling 
of virtue and personal benefit—seeking one‖s own good in Stoicism is harmonious 
with the single-minded pursuit of virtue and communal benefit.47 After all, being 
assimilated into the cosmos, or nature, through seeking what is “one‖s own” 
necessarily entails virtuous and beneficial relations with others, whether they be 
members of one‖s own family, one‖s city, or even the entire world.48 However, the 
self-preservative instinct remains central in Epictetus‖ account of cosmic 
integration (oikeiōsis), which itself forms the basis of Epictetus‖ socio-ethical vision. 
The quest for happiness is a quest with the individual placed firmly at the 
center. Communal concern is important, but it does not do away with the primacy 
of self-preservation and self-concern. Self-preservation for Epictetus is not tainted 
with the selfishness or morbid introspectiveness such as modern readers might 
assume. This is important to remember because it is precisely this point that has led 
Engberg-Pedersen and others to attempt to vindicate Stoic ethics by downplaying 
                                                        
44 Cf. Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 214-16; cf. Sorabji, Self, 183-85. Sorabji (ibid., 192) notes that Epictetus 
prefers his own terms aproaireton (“not subject to will”) or allotrion (“not belonging to us”) to the 
word adiaphora (“indifferent”; although he does use this word as well) in order to emphasize the 
control one has over what is most important in life, namely, one‖s own power of volition. In other 
words, things are indifferent only because one has set one‖s mental and emotional energies on what 
is “up to us.” 
45 Annas, Happiness, 45. 
46 Cf. Ibid., 45-46, 430. 
47 Cf. Cooper, “Eudaimonism,” 275-78. 
48 The distinction between things that are “one‖s own” or “not one‖s own” is vitally important for 
understanding the place of the individual and community in Epictetus, and will thus receive detailed 
treatment below. 
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the importance of self-preservation in Stoic ethical prescriptions. Such a move 
obscures the contours of the relationship between the individual and the 
community in Epictetus‖ thinking where proper social relations are the by-product, 
rather than the primary aim and focus, of the appropriate use of one‖s mental 
faculties in maintaining indifference toward all things external to one‖s one power 
of choice. In fact, every altruistic impulse flows directly out of one‖s self-
preservative instinct (which remains intact throughout life), since honor is one of 
the primary things that one must preserve in order to be virtuous and, thus, well-
disposed toward others. The primary purpose of the analysis below is to give a 
precise account of the relationship between self-preservation and social concern—
thus between the individual and the community—in Epictetus‖ thought through 
close readings of several important passages in his discourses. 
 
3.2 The Individual in Epictetus‖ Ethics 
3.2.1  The Individual and Moral Progress (Diatr. 1.4 and 3.2) 
The distinction between the Sage and the person making progress in virtue is found 
in the earliest Stoic thinking and remains constant throughout the various Stoic 
writers of antiquity. Nonetheless, the Sage model is used differently by different 
Stoics. For example, Long notes that Chrysippus “had become notorious for [his] 
rigidity, paradoxicality, esoteric terminology, and fine (or in critics‖ eyes quibbling) 
distinctions” with regard to doctrines like that of the Stoic Sage.49 According to 
thinkers such as Chrysippus the all-wise and virtuous Sage could appear to be so far 
above the realm of human possibility as to make the quest for virtue seem almost 
futile. The motive behind such thinking was to bring attention to the absolute 
nature of virtue and vice, which could be neither truly good nor evil if they were 
subject to shades of valuation.50 Regardless, Stoicism was sharply criticized in 
antiquity for what looked to many to be a denial of the possibility of acquiring 
wisdom. Furthermore, the thought that virtue was an unattainable phantom, the 
possession of the mythical Sage alone, was even more troubling.51  
                                                        
49 Long, Epictetus, 32. 
50 Cf. Inwood and Donini, “Ethics,” 714-17. On the co-equality of everything virtuous see A. A. 
Long, “Dialectic and the Stoic Sage,” in Stoic Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
98; on the co-equality of all vices or sins, see J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), 81-96. 
51 Cf. Inwood and Donini, “Ethics,” 724-27. 
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Later Stoics also paid homage to this tenet of Stoic dogma, although some—
like Epictetus—were more interested in putting forward an ethical system that 
would benefit the average person who desired to make incremental, yet steady, 
improvement in virtue.52 For this reason, the notion of progress is vitally important 
for understanding Epictetus‖ conception of the good life, as well as how it brings the 
individual and community within its orbit. Epictetus‖ tractate “On Progress” (Diatr. 
1.4: Πεπὶ πποκοπῆρ) provides an illuminating window into this facet of his thought. 
In this section I will examine Diatr. 1.4 along with Diatr. 3.2 since they are closely 
related, and when read together, helpfully elucidate one another.53 
 “On Progress” begins by arguing that the most important thing one who 
desires to make progress (πποκοπή) can learn from philosophers is “that desire is 
for things good and aversion is toward things evil” and that a serene (εὔποτν) and 
calm (ἀπαθέρ) state of mind is the goal of the life well-lived (1.4.1). Contained within 
this short bit of text in the opening of the tractate is—in nuce—the entire Stoic 
philosophy for the undisturbed life as understood and taught by Epictetus. What 
Epictetus intends to convey to his students is the way one can learn to make 
progress in virtue, and thus make headway toward a life of complete peace, without 
the possibility of disturbance caused by anything external to oneself. As will become 
clear in the ensuing analysis, serenity and calm are the states of mind that 
accompany, and essentially constitute, human happiness. The opening lines of “On 
Progress,” then, set out the general topic of the discourse (progress) and proceed to 
elaborate on the proper mental dispositions, which, if followed, will lead to a life of 
happiness, serenity and calm (see 1.4.3). Epictetus explains that these states of mind 
can be obtained if (and only if) one never fails to gain all “objects of desire” (ὀπέξει) 
and never embraces any “objects of aversion” (ἐκκλίςει). Contained within this 
                                                        
52 On the function of the Sage with reference to moral progress in Stoicism in general see Sellars, 
Stoicism, 36-41; cf. R. J. Hankinson, “Stoic Epistemology,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. 
Brad Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 59; with reference to Epictetus see Long, 
Epictetus, 32-34, 37. Inwood and Donini, “Ethics,” 726-31, note that even the earlier Stoics did not 
ultimately deny a place for ordinary people seeking virtue, since they allowed for “degrees of 
nearness to virtue” and a process of moral progress where one sought to be as much like the all-wise 
Sage as possible. Cf. Thorsteinsson, Ancient Morality, 34-35; Lee, Body of Christ, 62; and Brad Inwood, 
“Rules and Reasoning in Stoic Ethics,” in Topics in Stoic Philosophy (ed. Katerina Ierodiakonou; Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1999), 95, on the ways in which the Roman Stoics allowed that all people could 
“comprehend the order of the universe and thus act virtuously.” 
53 Diatr. 3.2: “Concerning the things it is necessary that the progressor be trained in, and that we 
neglect the most important things” (Πεπὶ σίνα ἀςκεῖςθαι δεῖ σὸν πποκόχονσα καὶ ὅσι σ῵ν 
κτπιψσάσψν ἀμελοῦμεν). 
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rather straightforward sounding statement is the essence of Epictetus‖ conception 
of the good life.54 
 The way in which one guarantees the attainment of what is desired is 
through the exclusion, or at least the radical modification, of the very notion of 
desire. That is to say, one must learn to refrain from desiring anything that she is 
not able of her own volition to get for herself. The same holds true for aversion. 
Here one must feel “aversion only toward the things which involve freedom of 
choice” (σὰ πποαιπεσικά). While Oldfather‖s translation of σὰ πποαιπεσικά as “things 
which involve freedom of choice” is not entirely misleading, one must be careful 
not to import complex modern debates about the freedom or determination of the 
will into this word, and that which is closely related to it, namely πποαίπεςιρ.55 In 
this context πποαιπεσικόν (in conjunction with aversion) refers simply to things one 
is able to avoid, since such things consist of inward responses, rather than external 
happenstances (cf. 1.17.22-28, where Epictetus argues that goodness is always 
within one‖s power of choice). The point Epictetus is making here is that the only 
way to guarantee happiness no matter one‖s circumstances is to alter how desire 
and aversion are conceived. One must reformulate what one seeks and what one 
seeks to avoid by creating a new system of valuation based on what is or is not 
within one‖s “freedom of choice,” rather than simply on one‖s unreflective impulses 
toward or away from certain objects or situations. The alternative to such a 
reformulation of one‖s desires is the exceedingly precarious struggle to attempt to 
avoid everything that is outside of one‖s power of choosing (ἀπποαιπέσον), that is, 
those things that one does not always have the ability to avoid, such as the death of 
a loved one, sickness, or material ruin. When a person attempts this, the types of 
things he or she so desperately seeks to avoid will inevitably come about at some 
point and bring such a person to grief because that person‖s happiness is dependent 
on avoiding negative outcomes (1.4.2). In contrast, Epictetus maintains that virtue 
(ἀπεσή) alone “holds out the promise . . . to create happiness [εὐδαιμονία] and calm 
                                                        
54 The instinctive response to Epictetus‖ claim that serenity and calm are tied indissolubly to the 
securing of objects that one desires and avoidance of objects that one is averse to is that such a 
statement runs sharply counter to normal human experience. For most people, it would be assumed, 
often lead lives of frustration—and even despair—precisely because they are unable to get what they 
want and avoid what they do not want. Epictetus, of course, is aware of the counter-intuitive nature 
of his proposal and must continue his explication of the nature of desire and aversion in order to 
show exactly how his proposal for the taming of both mental states is first of all possible, and 
secondly, how such taming is in fact absolutely indispensible for the securing of happiness. 
55 Cf. Sellars, Stoicism, 17; Sorabji, Self, 194-95; Long, Epictetus, 92, 221. 
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[ἀπάθεια] and serenity [εὔποια]” because virtue alone is built upon one‖s correct 
mental evaluation of life‖s circumstances, rather than on the presence or absence of 
the circumstances themselves (1.4.3).56 The goal of progress is the attainment of 
happiness, calm and serenity through virtue (1.4.4-5). 
 Epictetus next asks why it is that, if what he has just said about progress and 
virtue is true, people nonetheless seek “progress” elsewhere. It is again stated that 
the goal (lit. work [ἔπγον]) of virtue is serenity. At this point, Epictetus mockingly 
asks his students whether the person making progress in virtue is the one who has 
mastered the writings of Chrysippus. If so, then that person is truly virtuous. But of 
course Epictetus‖ students should know better than that: since virtue produces one 
thing (serenity), the approach to virtue (progress) cannot produce anything less, 
and simple knowledge of the contents of Chrysippus‖ writings is just that, 
knowledge without the attendant (and indispensible) practice of what is learned 
(1.4.5-9; cf. 1.4.13-17, 20-23). In fact, bare knowledge of philosophical writings 
diverts a potential progressor “from the consciousness of his own shortcomings” 
because it distracts such a person from both “the work of virtue” and the path of 
progress toward that aim (1.4.10). 
 The explanation offered in 1.4.11 for the place where one‖s “work” lies (i.e., 
the actions appropriate to virtuous living) covers the three most important topics in 
Epictetus‖ program of moral progress: 1) “desire and aversion” (ὀπέξει καὶ ἐκκλίςει), 
2) “choice and refusal” (ὁπμαῖρ καὶ ἀυοπμαῖρ), and 3) “giving assent and 
withholding judgment” (πποθέςει καὶ ἐποφῇ).57 The one who is truly making 
progress will, on account of the altered dispositional state described above, be 
completely immune to “encountering what you would avoid.” Any other approach 
to external circumstances leaves one in a perpetual state of “fear and grief” (σπέμψν 
καὶ πενθ῵ν) (1.4.11). These three realms of thought must be addressed further 
because they play a vital role in determining the precise shape of Epictetus‖ ethical 
                                                        
56 Thus, in Diatr. 1.18.11, Epictetus even urges his auditors to refrain from admiring (θατμάζψ) 
their spouses or possessions. The reason: such things can be stolen, leading one to grief. Rightly 
evaluating material things by counting them as nothing (παπὰ μηδέν; 1.18.12), then, inoculates one 
against the pain of their loss. 
57 The last two are my translations. For a clear and brief discussion of the three fields see 
Thorsteinsson, Ancient Morality, 59-60. Oakes, “Epictetus,” 41, helpfully points to the fluidity with 
which Epictetus can use the terminology of these three topics; his classification system is not a rigid 
and technical one. Cf. Sellars, Stoicism, 50-52. 
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schematization, as well as laying out foundationally important ways in which the 
individual plays a part in that system. 
Desire (ὄπεξιρ) and aversion (ἐκκλιςίρ) are the two affective, mental states 
possible for a person confronted with objects in the world. Straightforwardly, desire 
means longing to obtain some object or state of existence, while aversion is the 
state of mind consisting in revulsion toward certain objects or life-states that are 
deemed to be evil or self-damaging. For Epictetus, properly functioning desire 
should be directed at that which one is always able to procure for oneself, while 
aversion must be aimed at those things one has the power to abstain from or 
prevent from happening.58 A properly functioning faculty of desire and aversion 
must be in place in order that (ἵνα) one might be “unerring in achieving one‖s goal” 
(ἀναπόσεuκσορ) and “kept from what one is averse to” (ἀπεπίπσψσορ).59 The problem 
with most people is that they seek to immunize themselves against the possibility of 
encountering things they dislike, which, as Epictetus notes, is a stance doomed to 
failure, because one can never infallibly control what happens in life (1.4.19). 
In 3.2.3 Epictetus elaborates upon the simpler description of the three fields 
of study he has given in 1.4. Here he explains why he calls the field of study 
pertaining to desire and aversion (“the first and most necessary topics” [ππ῵σοι 
σόποι καὶ ἀναγκαιόσασοι] - 1.4.12) the “most important” (κτπιώσασορ), namely 
because it has to do with the passions (σὰ πάθη). The passions become activated 
when one fails to get what one has set one‖s desire on, or falls into that which one 
wishes to avoid.  Succumbing to passion inevitably leads to a host of disastrous 
consequences (listed in 3.2.3), making one insensible to the guidance of wisdom.60 
The fundamental human error, then, is that of setting one‖s affections on 
things that one cannot assuredly secure for oneself. What is needed to cure this 
disease of the soul is a thoroughgoing transformation of what one believes is worthy 
of desire and aversion. The purging of attachment to external objects and 
circumstances can only come about by attending to one‖s volition (πποαίπεςιρ - see 
                                                        
58 Cf. Long, Epictetus, 113: “Is [Epictetus] telling his students that they should not make happiness 
and the virtues of which it consists their single-minded objective? That is out of the question. His 
point is rather that they should defer their natural desire for what is good until they are so secure in 
their understanding of goodness that they have detached any vestige of desirability for external 
things (see 3.12.4; 4.1.77).” 
59 My translations. 
60 On the general Stoic view of passions and keeping them under control see Inwood and Donini, 
“Ethics,” 699-704. 
87 
 
1.4.18), or power of choice, because this power is purely internal and is able—when 
properly trained—to direct one‖s desire and aversion toward those internal states 
that constitute the good life (virtue, piety, duty, etc.).61 Such a convictional 
revolution brings one into line with correct thinking about the nature of human 
flourishing, specifically that serenity through virtue is the ultimate good, and is the 
only way to ensure that one will always obtain the outcome that one desires in life—
being undisturbed by external conditions.62 Thus, desire and aversion by themselves 
are not bad. It is only when what one desires or is averse to is external to one‖s 
inner power of choice that problems arise. 
 Desire and aversion, then, are states of mind, that when transformed can be 
applied to personal growth in virtue, with a resultant increase in a sense of peace 
and well-being. However, simply having new beliefs about what one should or 
should not choose does not explain how one goes about putting such principles into 
practice. Epictetus thus turns to praxis in the second topic of his ethical guidelines, 
that dealing with reasoned choices (ὁπμαῖρ) and refusals (ἀυοπμαῖρ).63 
 This second field of one‖s life task deals specifically with what is appropriate 
(σὸ καθῆκον). Appropriate action is a critical category in Stoic and Epictetan 
teaching, and is bound up with one‖s broader social responsibilities in the world.64  
Essentially, appropriate acts are those that fit the demands of a given situation, in 
the context of seeking to preserve one‖s own life, and which fit harmoniously into 
the overarching balance of the cosmos.65 As such, in classic Stoic teaching they are 
not primarily concerned with communal responsibility, but with self-preservation.66 
                                                        
61 On πποαίπεςιρ see further below. 
62 Diatr. 3.2.1 explicitly links the moderation of desire and aversion with “obtaining what one 
wants” (ἵνα μήσ‖ ὀπεγόμενορ ἀποστγφάνῃ) and “avoiding falling into what one is averse to” (μήσ‖ 
ἐκκλίνψν πεπιπίπσῃ) (my translations). 
63 Long, Epictetus, 115, similarly calls these positive and negative impulses in order to highlight 
the volitional dimension. 
64 It is probably for this reason that Oldfather translates σὸ καθῆκον in 3.2.2 as “duty.” Given its 
fairly precise meaning in relation to the overall Stoic system of evaluation of good and bad in the 
world, and of how individuals fit into the wider world (thus its relation to oikeiōsis), it is better 
translated as “appropriate thing,” rather than duty. The context of the passage within which the 
word is set (see esp. 3.2.4) points to the important social responsibilities one has toward others, but 
the word itself does not mean duty. On appropriate (those things that are in harmony with nature) 
and inappropriate things in Stoicism see Sedley, “Debate,” 128-33; cf. Sellars, Stoicism, 120-22; Long, 
Epictetus, 115-16, 231-34; Inwood and Donini, “Ethics,” 697-99; Striker, “Following Nature,” 250-56; 
Sandbach, Stoics, 45-48; Engberg-Pedersen, “Discovering,” 145-46, 178-82. 
65 Cf. Sandbach, Stoics, 45-46. 
66 Striker, “Following Nature,” 255: “The decisive factor is not whether an action is altruistic, say, 
or socially useful, but whether it is in accordance with human nature and done from the intention of 
agreeing with universal nature.” Cf. Inwood, “Rules,” 126-27. 
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However, in 3.2.4 Epictetus elaborates on what he takes to be necessary entailments 
of appropriate actions: the maintenance of proper social relations (σὰρ ςφέςιρ), 
“both natural and acquired, as a religious man, as a son, a brother, a father, a 
citizen.”67 Thus, control over the faculty of desiring and being averse to things, 
when put into practice the right way, includes within its remit the maintenance of 
all those duties that every person has, whether to God, family or state. On this point 
Epictetus takes an interesting step in distancing himself from the classic 
characterization of the stony and uncaring Stoic by arguing that one who attends to 
what is appropriate in life need not, nor can be, completely unsympathetic to the 
plight of others.68 As Epictetus puts it in 3.2.4: “It is not necessary for me to be 
unfeeling [ἀπαθῆ] as a statue.”69 
In this way, Epictetus brings outwardly-directed responsibility to the fore in 
a way that was not as prominent or obvious in earlier Stoic writers.70 A truly 
appropriate act is one that involves a person in the harmonious assimilation of all 
worldly things into the perfect balance of nature. Thus, it demands right relations 
with others. While the way in which one is assimilated into social units, and 
ultimately the whole world, is the subject of the discussion on oikeiōsis below, it is 
sufficient at this point to note that flowing from Epictetus‖ focus on individual 
human choice and its moderation is a strong social concern.71 Epictetus senses no 
tension here. In fact, strict control of one‖s own emotional life (the first—and most 
important—ethical topic in his system) is the prerequisite for making appropriate, 
and socially beneficial, decisions.72  
In sum, the field of study pertaining to choice and refusal is all about putting 
into practice one‖s modified desires in a way that orders one‖s life appropriately 
                                                        
67 Cf. Diatr. 3.21.1-6. 
68 Cf. Long, Epictetus, 232. 
69 Ench. 16 puts this same idea a bit more crassly when it says that it is acceptable to sympathize 
with a person in distress “so far as words go, and, if occasion offers, even to groan with him;” but 
that one must “be careful not to groan also in the centre of your being.” Cf. Long, Epictetus, 231; 
Oakes, “Epictetus,” 44. 
70 Other Stoics did, however, place appropriate acts into the context of cosmic assimilation (cf. 
Striker, “Following Nature,” 255). Epictetus‖ distinctiveness lies in tying social responsibility more 
closely to the nature of appropriate acts themselves. 
71 Cf. Ibid., “Following Nature,” 250. 
72 Long, Epictetus, 116 (cf. 21-22; 30): Epictetus “is emphatic on the natural self-interestedness of 
human motivations, and he devotes much more explicit thought to care of the self than to what is 
incumbent on human beings as members of a society.” 
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according to nature. It has important communal implications, but receives its 
driving power from within the individual. 
In 1.4.11 Epictetus attaches the right functioning of judgments to his third 
topic of moral development. Getting this aspect of ethical teaching correct is 
necessary to keep a person free from deception (ἀνεξαπάσησορ). The way in which 
one is able to moderate and redirect one‖s desires and aversions (the first ethical 
topic) is through a proper response to every sense impression (υανσαςία) one 
encounters. Sense impressions in Stoicism are “alterations” within one‖s governing 
faculty evoked within a person by objects or perceptions of the world. These 
alterations themselves are not volitional responses to the object that evoked them, 
but are simply the “propositional content” or value that one assigns to the object. 
When one receives an impression one is then faced with the decision to accept the 
initial intellectual content of the impression, or to resist it.73 Epictetus, summarizing 
his entire ethical program, states that “the first and greatest task of the philosopher 
is to test the impressions and discriminate between them” (1.20.7). Control over 
what appears to the senses (σὸ υαινόμενον - i.e., those things that create 
impressions) is “the measure of every man‖s action” (1.28.10). That is to say, mental 
control is the standard by which one‖s own moral character is judged: those who 
have rightly evaluated external impressions are blameless (ἀνέγκλησορ), while 
those who have not will suffer (ζημιόψ) for it.74 
It is thus absolutely vital that one keeps one‖s “preconceptions [ππολήχειρ] 
clear, polished like weapons, and ready at hand” (1.27.6), since these—as certain 
general notions held in common by all people about what is good and evil—serve as 
pointers toward right actions when one is faced with various impressions.75 Such 
innate ideas must be actualized through a process of mental development and 
maturation, as 1.27.6 shows, but they are nonetheless inherent in the human mind 
from birth, even if only in seed form. In 1.27.2-4 Epictetus compares the testing of 
                                                        
73 Tad Brennan, “Stoic Moral Psychology,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (ed. Brad 
Inwood; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 260-3; cf. Michael Frede, “Stoic 
Epistemology,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (eds. Keimpe Algra, et al.; Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 300-11; Long, “Psychology,” 572-80; idem, “Representation and 
the Self in Stoicism,” in Stoic Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 271. 
74 My translations. Diatr. 1.28 is devoted primarily to explicating how impressions arise and how 
they should be responded to. Cf. Diatr. 1.14.7-8, 16-17; André Munzinger, Discerning the Spirits: 
Theological and Ethical Hermeneutics in Paul (SNTSMS 140; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 122-23. 
75 Cf. Diatr. 1.22.1-2; 4.1.44-45; both cited by Long, Epictetus, 81; cf. idem, “Representation,” 280. 
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impressions to an army calling up reinforcements, a process that is necessary no 
matter what one is confronted with, whether it be a momentary difficulty or a 
recurring habit (ἔθορ - 1.27.3). While preconceptions show one that good and evil 
exist and are worth seeking and shunning respectively, the withholding and giving 
of assent to impressions is the means by which one can infallibly obtain the good 
that one innately knows is worth seeking.76 Thus, the good life is found by “turning 
one‖s thoughts upon oneself” (ἐπιςσπέχασε αὐσοὶ ἐυ‖ ἑατσούρ - 3.22.39) in order to 
examine one‖s preconceived ideas (ππολήχειρ) and whether they line up with what 
is truly good, namely to be free from the unwanted influence of external things.77 
For this reason, as Epictetus puts it in 3.22.38, ultimately the good (σὸ ἀγαθόν) is not 
something outside of oneself, but is found “within you” (ἐν ὑμῖν), which is the only 
place one has control over one‖s own happiness. Epictetus strongly exhorts his 
listeners to “develop this” (σοῦσο ἐξεπγάζεςθε) capacity for evaluating impressions 
and in so doing to “seek here your good” (ἐνσαῦθα ζησεῖσε σὸ ἀγαθόν - 3.22.44). 
A more self-focused understanding of how to achieve the good life is hardly 
conceivable. This holds true for every moment of one‖s life, since there is never a 
time when one is not confronted with impressions that must be rationally evaluated 
and acted on. This is but one element in Epictetus‖ philosophy that shows the 
complete falsity of contending that there is no place for the individual in Stoic 
ethics.78 Right living is premised on the notion of rigorous self-regard, not only 
when one becomes gripped by the force of the logical ordering of the world, but 
throughout all of life.79 This primacy of the individual in Epictetus‖ system leads him 
in another place to summarize his understanding of the very meaning of human 
existence with the claim that one‖s “own life is the subject-matter of the art [σέφνη] 
of living” (1.15.2). In a similar fashion Epictetus responds to an inquirer‖s question 
about how to secure reconciliation with an estranged brother by saying that 
“philosophy does not profess to secure for man any external possession” (1.15.2). 
Epictetus clearly places right social relations into the subsidiary role of external 
                                                        
76 Cf. Idem, Epictetus, 82; Oakes, “Epictetus,” 43. 
77 Slightly modified LCL translation. On the process of giving and withholding assent in Stoicism 
in general see Long, “Representation,” 273-75; on the same in Epictetus see idem, “Representation,” 
275-85. 
78 Epictetus is hardly innovative in this regard, even if he is more obsessively single-minded than 
other Stoics in his focus on the self and mental control. 
79 Pace Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 62-70. 
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possessions here.80 In other words, philosophy does not offer any prescription for 
social harmony since this is an “external thing” (σ῵ν ἐκσόρ) in the same category as 
one‖s profession, health or reputation (1.15.3).81 That is not to say that such 
communally focused problems are unimportant, but simply that they lie “outside 
[philosophy‖s] proper subject matter” (ἔξψ . . . σῆρ ἰδίαρ ὕληρ - 1.15.2), since 
philosophy can only guarantee the securing of personal benefit through mental 
training and self-control (1.15.3-4). Highlighting the fact that progress and maturity 
in right living are lifelong endeavors, this same discourse sees Epictetus comparing 
the development of the ability to live virtuously to the time-consuming process of 
plants producing fruit (1.15.7-8). 
Epictetus‖ primary concern with impressions in 1.4 and 3.2 is to show how 
one goes about “testing” such impressions, only accepting those that are in 
harmony with nature and virtuous living.82 In 3.2.5 the governing power of choice in 
each person is tasked with making right evaluative judgments about sense 
impressions. Such a person can learn to resist the impressions that arise from 
unhealthy desires and so be freed from a state of terror resulting from the fear of 
falling into what one is averse to (3.2.8-9). If one has mastered the theory behind the 
first two ethical fields, and has not learned to resist wrong impressions, then such a 
person is just as miserable and morally ignorant as if he or she had no knowledge of 
philosophy whatsoever (cf. 3.2.8-12). The progressor who has mastered this third 
field has risen to the level of certainty (ἀςυάλεια - 3.2.5) in the rightness of his or 
her actions, so that even if asleep or drunk no sense impression can overrule that 
individual‖s power of choice. 
What precisely is involved in testing impressions? To answer this question 
Epictetus turns to Stoic teaching on judgments (δόγμασα - cf. 3.2.13). While 
impressions are the impulses that arise outside of the self and call for a reply, 
judgments are rationally crafted responses to these external stimuli.83 In 3.2.8 
Epictetus gives a negative example of the kind of person who has not learned to 
make proper judgments about external impressions. Here he speaks of the 
                                                        
80 Cf. Diatr. 4.1.111-12; Inwood, “L‖oikeiôsis,” 246-48. 
81 Cf. “Philosophy promises none of these things, but rather, ―In every circumstance I will keep 
the governing principle (ἡγεμονικόν) in a state of accord with nature‖” (1.15.3-4). 
82 However, the third field of ethical study is only for the individual who has mastered the first 
two fields and is making steady progress in right living (cf. Diatr. 1.4.13; 3.2.5). 
83 Cf. Long, Epictetus, 27, 214-17; Frede, “Epistemology,” 313-21; Nussbaum, Therapy, 374-75. On 
how impressions are formed (according to Epictetus and other Stoics), see Sellars, Stoicism, 64-74. 
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impression that arises when a man sees a pretty girl (κοπάςιον καλόν). Those with a 
defective power of judgment give into the impression in lust for the woman‖s form, 
because they have been deceived into thinking that this sort of response is good and 
excellent, or at least unavoidable. On the other hand, one who is able to “keep 
himself from deception” (διαυτλάξαι σὸ ἀνεξαπάσησον - 3.2.7) will miss nothing 
necessary for the good life because he will have a resolutely unchangeable 
(ἀμεσαπσψςία) moral constitution. Only a person like this has attained perfection 
(cf. ἐκπονέψ - 3.2.8). In fact, as Epictetus argues in another place, if one‖s modesty 
(αἰδῆμον), faithfulness (πιςσόν), and intelligence (ςτνεσόν) are preserved through 
the proper testing of impressions, this means that the whole person is thereby 
preserved (1.28.21). Right judgments alone “make the volition (πποάιπεςιρ) good, 
but if they be crooked and awry, they make it evil” (1.29.1-3). Such self-directed 
qualities are not at odds with the human “capacity for social action” (κοινψνικόρ - 
1.28.20), but neither are they subsumed under it. In other words, as Epictetus briefly 
displays in 1.28.19-28, the preservation of oneself and one‖s many personal virtues is 
important above all else, even though such virtue necessarily entails things like 
“respect for the laws of hospitality” (1.28.23). 
In this same connection Epictetus also speaks of volition (πποάιπεςιρ - cf. 
3.2.13), which is a vital concept in his ethical teaching, and thus needs to be 
explained in more detail here.84 Volition is essentially the power of choice within 
the individual. It is not dependent on action, but only upon the willing of an action. 
That is to say, volition for Epictetus is the unhindered capacity to choose, the ability 
to assess external impressions and take a course of mental action, regardless of 
one‖s bodily ability to carry such actions out.85 The concept is so important for 
Epictetus because freedom from slavery to external circumstances is a vain and 
                                                        
84 Long, Epictetus, 211, notes that “Epictetus is the only Stoic according to our record who made 
prohairesis a key term” and that he uses it similarly to how earlier Stoics used the word ἡγεμονικόν 
(the governing faculty of the soul). Cf. Sorabji, Self, 191-95; Robert Dobbin, “Πποαίπεςιρ in Epictetus,” 
AnPhil 11 (1991): 111, 129. As Long, Epictetus, 218, has shown, the LCL translation of πποάιπεςιρ as 
“moral purpose” is a bit confusing. To begin with, one can have a bad or good πποάιπεςιρ. The epithet 
“moral” could obscure this, since it seems to imply that the πποάιπεςιρ is only oriented toward what 
is good or “moral,” or that one‖s πποάιπεςιρ has to do with one‖s responsibility toward others, when 
for Epictetus it is solely concerned “with the achievement of happiness in terms of mental freedom 
and tranquility” (Oakes, “Epictetus,” 47). From now on I will translate πποάιπεςιρ as “volition” in my 
own translations, as well as wherever it is found in the LCL. 
85 Long, Epictetus, 219; cf. Dobbin, “Πποαίπεςιρ,” 120-2, 130, 133; Long, Epictetus, 211: “We should 
take prohairesis to refer to the human mind in just those capacities or dispositions that Epictetus 
constantly maintains to be completely ―up to us‖ and free from external constraint.” 
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illusory hope if one does not have the faculty within oneself of choosing to react 
rightly to all that comes one‖s way in life. Having been a slave himself, Epictetus 
warns his auditors strongly against the dangers of slavery to things outside of one‖s 
choosing, stressing that true freedom is only attainable when one “sleeplessly” 
keeps one‖s “mind undisturbed by passion, pain, fear, or confusion” (4.3.7).86 
This comes out clearly in 3.2.13, where Epictetus chides his students for 
despising their power of volition by setting value on a range of things outside of 
their own control, such as how they are esteemed by others, or how scholarly they 
appear. Even worse, these kinds of wrong evaluations imply that nature itself (and 
thus divine providence) is flawed, since nothing happens apart from what nature 
intends (cf. 1.9.24-26).87 The only possible path to peace of mind is to diligently 
attend to one‖s volition, only setting value on things that are within one‖s power of 
choice (the first ethical topic), and seeing all external things as indifferent to one‖s 
happiness (cf. 3.2.13, 16).88 This is why πποάιπεςιρ is such a foundational aspect of 
human identity for Epictetus: it is the sole element of the human being capable of 
forming correct judgments about external impressions, and thus the only hope for 
those who suffer misfortune in life, because it makes the one who correctly uses it 
impervious to such misfortune; he or she learns to cast out grief (πένθορ) over how 
things turn out in life, and to be free from the attendant pain that comes along with 
such misplaced emotions (1.4.23).89 If one follows this advice, such a person will 
never fear what others can do to him or her since there is no one else who can gain 
control over the things that are under one‖s own control (σ῵ν ἐπ‖ ἐμοί - 1.29.8).90 
Πποαίπεςιρ—employed rightly—is “the essence of the good” (οὐςία σοῦ ἀγαθοῦ - 
                                                        
86 Cf. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self, 112-14; Long, Epictetus, 11. 
87 Cf. Long, Epictetus, 253. 
88 Other Stoics differed on their view of “indifferents,” with some organizing them according to 
those preferred, those dispreferred, and those wholly indifferent. In this way of thinking, virtue is 
still the only true good, although other things that are indifferent in and of themselves can still be 
preferred or avoided, as long as they do not cause a person to place ultimate value on them, or to 
violate one‖s virtue in seeking them. Epictetus, however, places all indifferents into the same 
category of “external things,” the attainment of which cannot serve as the means of becoming happy 
(cf. Sellars, Stoicism, 113). On the differentiation with reference to “indifferents” in other Stoic 
writers see Sorabji, Self, 192; Inwood and Donini, “Ethics,” 691-97; Nussbaum, Therapy, 360-6. 
89 Cf. Diatr. 1.19.16, where Epictetus rebukes his listeners for entertaining “absurd opinions about 
what lies outside the province of the volition (ἀπποαιπέσψν)” by attaching themselves and their 
affections to external things. Stoics place all emotions into the category of judgments. Therefore, the 
“extirpation of the emotions” through the “cognitive therapy” of testing impressions is the key 
ingredient of the Stoic calling (cf. Sellars, Stoicism, 34, 118; Nussbaum, Therapy, 41, 389-90). 
90 Cf. Long, Epictetus, 220: “The crucial claim, then, is that nothing outside our individual selves 
has ultimate authority over what we want or do not want.” Thus, true freedom is “entirely 
psychological and attitudinal” (ibid., 27; cf. Sellars, Stoicism, 17). 
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1.29.1; cf. 1.25.1-2). External things are nothing more than “materials for the 
volition” (ὗλαι σῆ πποαιπέςει), used by God to perfect the volitional seat of human 
identity (1.29.1-3).91 It can even be said that one‖s volition is the person in the deepest 
sense. For this reason, Epictetus constantly distinguishes between the “paltry” 
outward human body (σὸ ςψμάσιον), which is a non-essential element of one‖s 
identity, and the volition, which in and of itself constitutes the core of human 
identity (cf. 3.18.3). Epictetus says this explicitly in 3.1.40: “You are not flesh, nor 
hair, but volition [πποαίπεςιρ].”92 
It is how we respond to our circumstances, Epictetus contends, that shows 
our true nature (3.2.14-15; cf. 1.22.9-10). Thus, he can structure his entire ethical 
system on the premise that “outside the sphere of volition there is nothing either 
good or bad” (3.10.18).93 What you are at the very core of your being, then, is 
determined by the way in which you make use of your power of choice, your 
πποάιπεςιρ.94 Stripped of all extraneous ornaments of uniqueness (health, family, 
city, tradition, etc.), human identity is nothing but individual volition, power of 
choice and mental command.95 As such, it is self-centered to an enormous degree. 
Scholars who move past this aspect of Epictetus‖ teaching to its social dimensions 
are correct to do so, but only if they do so within a framework where cognitive self-
control remains primary.96 
 What then is the essence of moral progress for Epictetus? After laying out his 
three-fold system in 1.4.11-12, Epictetus compares two types of people, those who 
learn, and those who practice what they learn. The former is like an avid collector of 
weights, but who has no muscles to show for it, since the weights sit around 
                                                        
91 Epictetus is so convinced of the ability of his system to bring relief from sorrow and pain that 
he is willing to be deceived into accepting its rightness because he would rather be wrong and 
completely at peace, than right and miserable (1.4.27). Cf. Bonhöffer, Epictet, 6. 
92 Cf. Diatr. 1.1.23: “What is that you say man? Fetter me? My leg you will fetter, but my volition 
(πποάιπεςιρ) not even Zeus himself has power to overcome” (cited by Long, Epictetus, 161). Cf. idem, 
“Representation,” 275-76, 282; Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 25. When in 2.1.1 Epictetus urges his 
audience to “consider who you are,” the definition of human identity that follows begins with the 
statement that “there is no quality more sovereign than volition (πποάιπεςιρ).” In fact, everything 
that distinguishes rational humanity from the animal world can be summed up under the heading of 
volition (2.1.2). Cf. Sellars, Stoicism, 105; Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 15-16; cf. 25-29, 34-45; Long, 
Epictetus, 21, 28-29, 172-75, 207-20; idem, “Psychology,” 574-75, 577; Nussbaum, Therapy, 326. 
93 Cf. Long, Epictetus, 217. 
94 This is why Long (“Psychology,” 584) can say that the Stoic “philosophy of mind is also a 
philosophy of the self.” Cf. Idem, Epictetus, 220. 
95 Cf. Idem, “Psychology,” 584. 
96 Cf. Diatr. 1.26.15: “This, then, is a starting point in philosophy—a perception of the state of 
one‖s own governing principle (ἡγεμονικόν).” Cf. Bonhöffer, Epictet, 156-58. 
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collecting dust, serving as nothing more than a vain ground for boasting. The latter 
cares little for the weights themselves, which are merely a means toward an end, 
since he or she recognizes that knowledge without praxis is useless. In the same 
way, progress in moral living is only for those who are able to master their power of 
volition, who are able to rightly evaluate external impressions, and thus who are 
able to live lives unimpeded by external circumstances. Only such a person as this is 
living in harmony with nature and making progress. You can read all the books in 
the world about mastering your power of choice and still show yourself to be utterly 
incapable of actually doing so (1.4.14-15). Even the writings of the revered Stoic 
Chrysippus, Epictetus urges, are worth reading only because they grant knowledge 
of the truth of what Epictetus has been saying about tranquility and harmony with 
nature through the reordering of one‖s desires (1.4.28-29). 
In 1.4.18 Epictetus asks where progress is to be found. He answers that it lies 
in “withdrawing from external things,” turning one‖s “attention to the question of 
his own volition.” Proper use of one‖s power of volition requires it to be cultivated 
and perfected in order that (ὥςσε) it might be “finally harmonious with nature, 
elevated, free, unhindered, untrammeled, faithful, and honourable.”97 A purified 
volition leads one to desire (ποθέψ) what one can assuredly bring about (virtue, 
etc.), and to avoid (υεύγψ) “things not up to oneself” (σὰ μὴ ἐυ‖ αὑσῶ), namely all 
things external (σ῵ν ἐκσόρ) (1.4.18-19).98 In other words, volition working rightly 
leads one to focus on attaining “that which is up to us” (σὸ ἐυ‖ ἡμῖν). These things 
(desire, aversion, etc.) are exclusively internal.99 
 
3.2.2 Summary: The Individual in Epictetus‖ Ethics 
We are now in a position to isolate the most important features of Epictetus‖ 
prescription for moral progress. First, it is a system focused on the transformation 
of the mind of the individual; second, it demands a lifetime of vigorous training in 
mental fortitude. The power of external things over one‖s affections is so strong, 
that great care must be exercised across one‖s entire life to cultivate one‖s volition, 
and thus one‖s virtue (cf. 1.4.18); the individual‖s mental power of volition never 
                                                        
97 Gk: ὥςσε ςύμυψνον ἀποσελέςαι σῇ υύςει, ὑχηλὴν ἐλετθέπαν ἀκώλτσον ἀνεμπόδιςσον πιςσὴν 
αἰδήμονα. 
98 My translation. 
99 Cf. Dobbin, “Πποαίπεςιρ,” 124. 
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drops out of the picture. Progress is in this way seen to be possible only for those 
individuals who are sufficiently focused inwardly that they keep themselves from 
being caught up in the illegitimate scheme of valuation that the ordinary person 
constantly falls into because of a lack of  proper self-regard. The epitome of 
waywardness for Epictetus is precisely the person who lacks introspection and self-
regard, who fails to be an adequate “interpreter” and “student of himself and his 
works” (1.6.19).100 
In 1.4.29-32, Epictetus ask why, if humans erect shrines and altars to the gods 
who supplied humanity with the knowledge of food cultivation, they should not 
much more praise the God who has granted knowledge of the pathway to the good 
life (σὸ εὖ ζῆν). This benefit—unlike that supplied through earthly produce—is the 
“fruit in a human mind” (καππὸν ἐν ἀνθπψπίνῃ διανοίᾳ) that leads to true peace. 
Thus, for Epictetus, only diligent mental fortitude can lead to indestructible 
happiness through complete indifference (cf. ἀπαθῆ - 1.4.29) to the external realities 
of one‖s life.101 Since the things preventing human flourishing are wrong “beliefs, 
desires, and preferences,” the solution to this state of affairs must be focused on 
fixing these mental states.102 This is what gives Epictetus‖ ethics what Long calls its 
distinctively “existential” flavor.103 The human mind is sick and must receive 
treatment; thus cognitive “medical arguments, like bodily medical treatments, are 
directed at the health of the individual as such, not at communities or at the individual 
as member of a community.”104 As 3.3.1 puts it, the governing center (ἡγεμονικόν) of 
each person is the most important “subject-matter” (ὕλη) with which “the good and 
excellent” human being must attend since it is the human faculty tasked with 
                                                        
100 Long‖s translation (“Representation,” 276). Cf. Sorabji, Self, 178: “Epictetus‖ wish to narrow the 
self down to exclude the body and anything except a rightly directed will requires constant attention 
to how one is doing.” Cf. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self, 108, 138. 
101 Cf. Long, “Psychology,” 580. Oldfather translates ἀπαθῆ here as “tranquility.” However, given 
that throughout this passage Epictetus has used numerous words for serenity, and given the context 
of 1.4.29, which is found in a summation of the content of Epictetus‖ prescription for happiness 
through the virtuous reframing of desire and aversion, it seems better to translate ἀπαθῆ in the 
more common way as “indifference.” Rightly controlling one‖s mind will lead to tranquility, but the 
main point Epictetus is making is stronger than that: right living will lead to utter indifference to 
one‖s external circumstances, thus making one tranquil and serene. 
102 Nussbaum, Therapy, 26; cf. 34, 28, 46. 
103 Long, Epictetus, 34. In this regard Long‖s (Epictetus, 156) description of Epictetus sounds 
positively Bultmannian: “It will have been obvious to every reader that the primary goal of Epictetus‖ 
theology is the light it can shed on human self-understanding and moral orientation.” 
104 Nussbaum, Therapy, 46 (emphasis original). Nussbaum (ibid., 41) is well aware of the social 
dynamics of Stoic teaching, although she, like Long, recognizes that these dynamics are subordinate 
(although still necessary) to those of individual control of the mind and emotions. 
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controlling the impressions (cf. 1.20.11-12). This shows us that the good life is 
achievable by anyone (in any condition whatsoever) who has a sufficient desire to 
control their responses to outward conditions. As such, blessed living is attainable 
solely through mental focus and control. It does not depend on fate, and it certainly 
does not depend on community. Rather, the essence of being a virtuous and happy 
person is self-control, the ruling of one‖s “impressions in accordance with nature” 
(σαῖρ υανσαςίαιρ κασὰ υύςιν - 3.3.2).105 
We have also noted how the ethical life is a process that requires constant 
vigilance and training. The right use of impressions is very much a learned skill, 
which Epictetus describes as a rigorous exercising (γτμνάζψ) of the self (3.8.1). Only 
a daily application of this sort of thorough mental scrutiny will enable one to be so 
impervious to external matters that one can even dismiss the death of a friend‖s 
child as being “outside the sphere of the volition” and thus “not an evil” (3.8.1-2; cf. 
Ench. 3; 26). Epictetus‖ instruction in the three ethical fields described above is 
explicitly marked out as a process of training (ἀςκέψ) that is necessary for those 
who desire to be “good and excellent” (καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν) (3.2.1). Throughout his 
discourses Epictetus employs a variety of colorful metaphors and images to describe 
the life-long quest of moral progress: just as a calf does not become a bull at once, so 
a person must train (φειμαςκέψ) as a soldier does during his time home during the 
winter before rejoining the army in the spring (1.2.32); the “business of life” is like a 
large-scale and lengthy military campaign (3.24.-31-32); just as readers must 
practice reading, and writers must practice writing (2.18.1-4), the “same principle 
holds true in the affairs of the mind (σ῵ν χτφικ῵ν)” (2.18.5); “the man who 
exercises himself against [wrong] external impressions is the true athlete in 
training” (2.18.27) who through “the habit of taking such exercises . . . will see what 
mighty shoulders you develop, what sinews, what vigour” (2.18.26). This is all to say 
that the self does not disappear from view after beginning a life of moral progress.106 
                                                        
105 Cf. Long, Epictetus, 34; Striker, “Following Nature,” 241. Certainly many other factors 
(rationality, ethnicity, nationality, tradition, freedom of the will [or lack thereof], etc.) figure into 
Epictetus‖ and other ancient conceptions of human identity (on this see Long, “Representation,” 283). 
The point I am making is that the good life is achievable by an individual, as an individual, through 
the control of one‖s affections and does not—indeed cannot—be determined (even to a small degree) 
by factors or influences outside of an individual‖s self-governing mental faculty. 
106 Pace Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 37, 294. Although Engberg-Pedersen shows 
elsewhere (e.g., idem, “The Logic of Action in Paul: How does he Differ From the Moral Philosophers 
on Spiritual and Moral Progression and Regression?” in Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman 
Thought [ed. John T. Fitzgerald; RMCS; London: Routledge, 2008], 248, 255-61), that he is clearly aware 
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Rather, the self must undergo a progression in discipline—a “moral education”—
where the individual‖s mind is perpetually tasked with the most important human 
activity of all, the evaluation of external impressions (cf. 2.18.7), which are the only 
things in life under one‖s personal control (cf. 1.12.35).107 
 This is not to say that concern for others is absent even with regard to such a 
thoroughly individually-oriented notion as Epictetus‖ three-fold system for moral 
progress. We have seen that the second ethical locus in particular points to the way 
in which the lifelong practice of guarding one‖s volition contains within it the seeds 
for social responsibility and care. While Epictetus does not flesh out this communal 
concern in this discourse, he still highlights the important connection between care 
for the self and care for others. Yet even here he does this in a way that does not 
detract in the least from the primacy of the individual. It is only individuals acting 
rightly for themselves who can be equipped to live virtuously with others. An 
intensely inward and self-focused concern, rather than being subordinated to the 
social dimension of Epictetus‖ thought, is the very precondition for it.108 
 
3.3 The Community in Epictetus‖ Ethics 
Can the individually-centered facets of Epictetus‖ thought be harmonized with a 
strong social concern? Epictetus believes they can, and in this regard he puts his 
own distinctive twist on previous Stoic teaching on how the individual and the 
community relate to one another. I will first briefly comment on communal themes 
                                                                                                                                                              
that in Stoicism progress in wisdom is a process that must span one‖s entire life, this does not 
adequately shape his description of the individual-communal dynamics of Stoicism or Paul (cf. idem, 
Cosmology and Self, 106, 135, 138; idem, “Self-Sufficiency and Power: Divine and Human Agency in 
Epictetus and Paul,” in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment [eds. John M. G. 
Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole; London: T & T Clark, 2007], 117-39; Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the 
Stoics, 54-55). See e.g., idem, “The Logic of Action in Paul” 260: “My first basic question has been 
whether the understanding of the self-determining self that is encapsulated in [the ethical logic of 
the moral philosophers] was also Paul‖s. The answer has been that it was. . . . Throughout [one‖s 
whole life], Paul presupposes the kind of self-determining self who makes up his or her own mind, 
and who is, as it were, an individual ―understanding in action‖.” I am completely unable to square 
such a statement with Engberg-Pedersen‖s persistent dismissal of the individual, and his argument 
for its total subordination to the community in Stoic and Pauline teaching on the “post-conversion” 
life as found throughout Paul and the Stoics (see e.g., idem, 138-39, 166-69, 231-33). 
107 See esp. Bonhöffer, Epictet, 144-50, and also Munzinger, Discerning, 135-36; Long, 
“Representation,” 281-82. On the necessity for continual progress in moral education in Stoicism 
more broadly than just Epictetus see Inwood and Donini, “Ethics,” 705-13, 724-35. 
108 Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self, 122, rightly insists that for Epictetus a concern for 
others is “derived from the directedness towards God” (emphasis removed). However, this 
“directedness towards God” should not be placed in opposition to directedness toward oneself, as 
Engberg-Pedersen shows (ibid., 116-21). 
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in Stoicism generally, with a view to placing Epictetus‖ own communal ethics in 
context, which will then be discussed in detail. 
Οἰκείψςιρ is the word used by various Stoic authors (and summarizers of 
Stoic teaching) to describe the process that begins at birth whereby an innate self-
preservative instinct in newborns leads them as they grow in virtue and 
understanding to recognize that certain actions and desires are “appropriate” or 
beneficial. Such thinking can be traced back to Chrysippus, who maintains that 
nature has endowed every person with the rational capacity to seek—according to 
his or her earliest longings, or first impulses (σὴν ππώσην ὁπμήν)—what is 
appropriate, namely his or her own self-preservation. In other words, from birth 
nature itself appropriates (οἰκειόψ), or impresses upon the soul, the desire for self-
preservation.109 
However, οἰκείψςιρ only begins with the self-focused endowment nature 
bestows on children at birth. Stoic writers, such as Hierocles, also note how this 
initially self-preservative instinct branches out into social concerns (such as love for 
family) as one becomes trained over time in what is rational and good.110 Such 
feelings are within the range of appropriate dispositions (οἰκείψςιρ),111 although this 
does not diminish the fact that the process of rationally seeking out such things 
flows from an indispensible desire for one‖s own good, from the appropriate 
disposition of benevolence (εὐνοησικόρ) toward oneself (ππὸρ ἑατσό).112 Hierocles 
bases this social concern on an inborn human need for community.113 
                                                        
109 As recorded in Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.85-86 (SVF 3.178; LS 57A); cf. Plutarch‖s hostile 
statement of Chrysippus‖ position in similar terms in Stoic. rep. 1038B (SVF 3.179, 2.724; LS 57E). On 
this see Gill, Structured Self, 129-77; Sellars, Stoicism, 108, 120; Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 56; 
Schofield, “Thought,” 762; Mary Whitlock Blundell, “Parental Nature and Stoic Οἰκείψςιρ,” AnPhil 10 
(1990): 221-42; White, “Basis,” 165-78; S. G. Pembroke, “Oikeiōsis,” in Problems in Stoicism (ed. A. A. 
Long; London: Athlone, 1971), 114-49. Aristotle also develops ideas similar to those of the Stoics on 
the derivation of love for others from the love parents have for their children (see e.g., Eth. nic. 
1161b16-33; cited by Brad Inwood, “Comments on Professor Görgemanns‖ Paper: Two Forms of 
Oikeōisis in Arius and the Stoa,” in On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics: The Work of Arius Didymus [ed. William 
W. Fortenbaugh; RUSCH; New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1983], 198; cf. Blundell, “Οἰκείψςιρ,” 228-
29). 
110 Cf. Striker, “Oikeiōsis,” 286. It is important to note, however, that Stoic accounts of οἰκείψςιρ 
(Cicero‖s excluded, on which see Gill, Structured Self, 132-33; Engberg-Pedersen, Oikeiosis, 64-100) have 
“a strongly normative cast,” that is, they are about “what we should do” rather than what always 
happens in the world (Schofield, “Thought,” 763 [emphasis original]). 
111 LS 2:345: “The feminine noun to be supplied with the adjectives must be οἰκείψςιρ” 
(appropriate disposition). 
112 Hierocles, El. Eth. 9.3-10 (LS 57D). There is a gap in the text with regard to what is the 
“appropriate disposition to oneself” in the second instance of this phrase in this passage. 
Nonetheless, given that the first instance labels this disposition as “benevolence” (εὐνοησικόρ), and 
that it is said that just as (καθάπεπ) “affection” (ςσεπκσικόρ) is the appropriate disposition toward 
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A classic text explaining the process of cosmic appropriation/assimilation is 
found in another fragment of Hierocles‖, which is preserved in Stobaeus‖ Florilegium 
4.671.7-673.11.114 In this passage Hierocles uses the image of a series of concentric 
circles to describe the way in which one is assimilated into varying levels of social 
integration. The first circle is one‖s self or mind, the second is one‖s closest family, 
the third includes one‖s extended family, the fourth is made up of fellow citizens, 
and the fifth is comprised of the entire human race. He recognizes that natural 
affection (εὐνοία - see LS 57G, line 20) will not be as great for those in the circles 
further out, but argues that it is nonetheless necessary for all people to do their best 
to assimilate to everyone in all five rings of social relations. The primacy of the 
individual is apparent in Hierocles, since a person‖s experience of the self “as the 
closest object of his concern”115 is wholly natural, while it takes effort to be 
affectionate toward those in the outer circles. Importantly, however, self-
preservation will simultaneously promote communal well-being since it is the task 
of every virtuous person to “draw the circles together somehow towards the 
centre” by recognizing “that concern for other people is a natural development of 
concern for one‖s self.”116 
Cicero‖s description of Stoic teaching on οἰκείψςιρ is similar to those above, 
although he begins with the natural love parents have for children, rather than the 
concern children naturally have at birth for themselves and their own good.117 From 
this starting point Stoics believe they can “derive the general sociability of the 
human race,” since it proves that humans are naturally affectionate for all other 
humans and thus equipped for civil unions such as the state.118 Although Cicero does 
not deny the self-interested dimension of the process of being assimilated into the 
                                                                                                                                                              
one‖s children so also is a similar disposition toward oneself appropriate, the gap must be supplied 
with some sort of word indicating self-benefit or self-preservation. Based on the place of the only 
letter preserved in the gap (an iota), LS (2:345) suggests either “observation” (σηπησικ῵ρ; cf. LSJ, 
1289) or “care” (κηδεμονικ῵ρ; cf. LSJ, 946) to modify the second instance of “oneself.” 
113 Hierocles, El. Eth. 11.14-18 (LS 57D). 
114 LS 57G. Cf. Lee, Body of Christ, 69; Sellars, Stoicism, 130-33; Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 3; 
Nussbaum, Therapy, 341-44; Annas, Happiness, 267-70. 
115 LS 1:353. 
116 LS 1:353. 
117 Cf. Cicero, Fin. 3.62 (LS 57F). Cf. Holowchak, Stoics, 36-37; Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 55-59; 
Striker, “Oikeiōsis,” 294; Engberg-Pedersen, Oikeiosis, 66-100. Cicero‖s own philosophical 
commitments are somewhat difficult to pin down. This issue is explored at length in John Glucker, 
“Cicero‖s Philosophical Affiliations,” in The Question of ‘Eclecticism’ (eds. J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long; 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 34-69. 
118 Cicero, Fin. 3.63-63 (LS 57F). 
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world, he does elevate the social dynamics of this development to a significant 
degree.119 For him, the natural affection of human for human is so strong that 
everyone prefers the “common advantage” (communem utilitatem) to his or her 
own.120 However, despite this strongly communal cast, Cicero describes the process 
in a way similar to earlier Stoic writers: initial self-concern (or at least a knowledge 
that a parent is concerned about oneself) is the basis for, and branches out into, 
concern for others. The human instinct for self-preservation is nature‖s way of 
guaranteeing a thriving communal impulse; the outer circles of social relations are 
brought within the inner circle, thus becoming integrated into self-concern, rather 
than replacing it.121 
 Epictetus‖ social ethic is broadly in line with previous Stoic teachers: it is 
essentially self-sufficiency branching out into social concern. Nonetheless, his 
distinctive twist is important for what it shows us about the relation of individuals 
and community in his thought. In his teaching, the individual self is primary to a 
much greater degree than in other Stoic thinkers. However, this does not entail that 
the community is unimportant, as it is seen that—when looked at from a cosmic 
perspective—the interests of others become integrally related to one‖s own self-
preservation, thus becoming worth seeking with the care one expends in 
benefitting oneself.122 I now turn to a series of important passages in order to 
                                                        
119 Cf. Cicero, Fin. 3.67 (LS 57F, emphasis original to LS): “But just as the communal nature of a 
theatre is compatible with the correctness of saying that the place each person occupies is his, so in 
the city or world which they share no right is infringed by each man‖s possessing what belongs to 
him.” 
120 Cicero, Fin. 3.64 (LS 57F). 
121 Cf. Schofield, “Thought,” 761. Although important, οἰκείψςιρ is not the only theme of 
communal importance in Stoicism. Another socially-directed motif is that of the body and its 
members, an image used to urge communal cohesion despite individual diversity. Additionally, 
Stoics speak of the universe itself as a body, a doctrine which supports their teaching on how each 
person becomes integrated into the cosmos (cf. Lee, Body of Christ, 46-58, 83-101), as well as becoming 
“world-citizens” in the divine government of the universe (cf. Epictetus, Diatr. 1.9; 2.5.24-26; 2.10.34; 
Holowchak, Stoics, 116, nn. 6-7; Sellars, Stoicism, 130-2; Long, Epictetus, 150, 233-34; Nussbaum, 
Therapy, 322; Malcolm Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991], 24). 
122 Inwood, “Comments,” 193-99 (cf. idem, “L‖oikeiôsis,” 252-54), suggests that there are two types 
of οἰκείψςιρ at work in Stoic ethics, a personal and a social type. He also argues that these two types 
are held together in Stoic sources in an ad hoc fashion, without any real awareness by the Stoics of 
how to hold “an apparently egoistic trait of human nature” together with “the altruistic trait of 
natural social affinity.” For instance, there is a subtle shift in authors such as Hierocles and Cicero 
where they switch from speaking of the natural love of the self (the first type of οἰκείψςιρ) to the 
natural love parents have for their children (the second type of οἰκείψςιρ), the latter alone being the 
basis for the human desire for communal betterment. Inwood‖s argument appears correct with 
regard to the major passages in Stoic authors that touch on οἰκείψςιρ, although I think that Epictetus 
is a significant exception to this rule in that he explicitly ties the social good of others into the 
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determine the way in which Epictetus relates the individual and community 
(society). 
 
3.3.1 Is Self-Preservation Selfish? (Diatr. 1.19) 
In a passage in the context of a treatise on how one should interact with a 
threatening tyrant (1.19), Epictetus sets forth his standard account of how to remain 
totally free from external trouble. As we have already seen, this is done by 
attending solely to one‖s judgments, a procedure which, if done properly, guards 
one against the inner distress that would otherwise come about through the 
physical abuse inflicted by the tyrant. Epictetus grants that his hypothetical tyrant 
is indeed “master of my dead body” (1.19.9), in that outwardly he can use his 
position of power to treat those under him in whatever way he chooses. Yet when 
asked by the tyrant whether this will cause Epictetus to pay attention to his threats, 
Epictetus responds that he only pays attention to himself (1.19.10), to those things 
within the scope of his volition (cf. 1.19.16, 22), since a person‖s physical welfare is 
irrelevant to one‖s quest for inner peace (1.19.1-10). 
Epictetus is well aware that this way of thinking might be misunderstood as 
selfishness, rather than self-control.123 Anticipating the negative response of his 
hearers, Epictetus claims that such a stance “is not mere self-love [υίλατσον]” 
(1.19.11). Epictetus begins by arguing that nature itself has constituted humans such 
that it is not even possible for them to avoid acting in self-interest, just as the sun 
and Zeus do all things for themselves by their very nature.124 Yet, in 1.19.12 Zeus‖ 
abundant generosity in supplying the earth with rain and harvest shows that divine 
self-interest is also beneficial (ὠυέλιμορ) “for the common interest” (εἰρ σὸ κοινόν). 
Otherwise, Zeus would not receive the praise and reverence of the world. In similar 
fashion God has so constituted human nature that there can be no self-preservation 
without a corresponding contribution to the common interest. Thus, as Epictetus 
puts it in 1.19.14, “it is not anti-social for one to do everything for oneself.”125 The 
                                                                                                                                                              
natural desire people have to preserve their own interests. The analysis below will attempt to 
substantiate this point in detail. Even with the standard accounts prior to Epictetus, however, what 
matters for my purposes is that individual and communal well-being are held together, even if the 
rationale for doing so may fail to persuade ancient or modern readers. 
123 Cf. Idem, “L‖oikeiôsis,” 247, 255. 
124 Diatr. 1.19.11: “He does everything for himself” (αὑσοῦ ἕνεκα πάνσα ποιεῖ). Cf. Long, Epictetus, 
197-98. 
125 Gk: οὕσψρ οὐκέσι ἀκοινώνησον γίνεσαι σὸ πάνσα αὑσοῦ ἕνεκα ποιεῖν.  
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only alternative would be to neglect oneself and one‖s own interests, which would 
destroy the very foundation of Epictetus‖ prescriptions for indifference to external 
circumstances, since the principle (ἀπφή) of appropriation (οἰκείψςιρ) whereby a 
person‖s self-interest branches out into social concern would be nullified (1.19.15).126 
That is to say, Epictetus sees in οἰκείψςιρ the grounds for grouping self-concern and 
communal-concern into the same category so that the exact same impulse that 
leads to self-preservation also brings the welfare of others within its scope; the good 
of others becomes vital to one‖s own self-interest (σοῦ ἰδίοτ ςτμυέπονσορ - 
1.19.15).127 
Thus, in 1.19.1-15 we see the same dynamic that was at work in Epictetus‖ 
teaching on moral progress: the most important thing in the world is oneself and 
one‖s power of choice (cf. 1.19.2-3); yet as one is assimilated into the cosmos (the 
process and principle of οἰκείψςιρ), the common good becomes an indispensible 
part of one‖s personal well-being. In this way the individual and mental self-control 
remain primary without in the least doing away with the importance of communal 
concerns.128 The primacy of the individual is the foundational presupposition for all 
other-regarding attitudes.129 
                                                        
126 Long, Epictetus, 197, maintains that Epictetus‖ communal vision is not as dependent on 
οἰκείψςιρ as some of the Stoic thinkers surveyed above. However, it does figure into his thought as 
one aspect of his broader communal vision and contributes significantly to his synthesis of 
individuality and community. Cf. Gill, Structured Self, 380: “In broad terms, I take it that Epictetus sets 
out in plain language a pathway in ethical progress based on the central Stoic idea of development as 
―appropriation‖, as illustrated in Cicero‖s account in Fin. 3.16-22.” In other words, although Epictetus 
doesn‖t use the language of οἰκείψςιρ very often, the conceptuality is present in important ways 
throughout his lectures (cf. Thorsteinsson, Ancient Morality, 61; Gill, Structured Self, 381-85). 
127 Cf. Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self, 115. Long, Epictetus, 188 (emphasis original), argues 
(correctly I think) that Epictetus understands the social instinct of οἰκείψςιρ to be something with 
which all people are “innately equipped” rather than being a process of development (as other Stoics 
seem to indicate). As such, according to Epictetus, everyone is endowed with the capacity for seeking 
the welfare of others from birth (cf. Inwood and Donini, “Ethics,” 680; Inwood, “L‖oikeiôsis,” 245). 
128 Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self, 115, rightly draws attention to the fact that Epictetus‖ 
“principle of non-dependence does not . . . in the least exclude an attitude of real care and love for 
other human beings, that is, of being genuinely ―affectionate‖ towards them.” Engberg-Pedersen also 
recognizes that this other-directed care is set within the context of “a heightened awareness of self 
with freedom of mind and mastery, even in relation to one‖s own body” (ibid., 113; see also 178). 
Freedom thus requires constant attention to the state of one‖s mental life, which (when functioning 
properly) “aligns human beings with God, thereby giving them a freedom of genuine agency” (ibid., 
108, emphasis removed). Again, I find such statements difficult to synthesize with Engberg-
Pedersen‖s subordination of “post-conversion” individuality to community, both in Stoicism and in 
Paul. 
129 Cf. Bonhöffer, Epictet, 5. Although Inwood (“Comments,” 197) is correct in saying that 
Epictetus‖ method of reconciling the necessity of seeking individual and communal good is to tie 
both dispositions to nature‖s prompting (cf. Long, Epictetus, 182-83), it does not follow that Epictetus 
has failed to answer the question of how social οἰκείψςιρ is derived from personal οἰκείψςιρ. 
Epictetus makes this derivation clear in 1.19.15 (slightly modified LCL translation): there is “one and 
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3.3.2 Self-Interest... For the Sake of All (Diatr. 2.22) 
Diatr. 2.22 is a discourse on the nature of friendship that begins with a statement of 
the basis of social life: “whatever a man is interested in he naturally loves” (2.22.1: 
Πεπὶ ἅ σιρ ἐςπούδακεν, υιλεῖ σαῦσα εἰκόσψρ). Epictetus is aware that such a claim 
seems starkly counter-productive in a treatise on friendship. Thus, the discourse 
moves on to an analysis of what constitutes true love. 
First, Epictetus questions his hypothetical interlocutor‖s insistence that it is 
possible to be both foolish and loving: true love must be based on true wisdom 
(2.22.1-14).130 However, a knowledge of good by itself is insufficient for genuine 
friendship. One must come to grasp what the good is as it pertains to oneself. Thus, in 
2.22.15, Epictetus states that self-interest is the driver of all devotion to others: “It is 
a universal truth—be not deceived—that every living thing is to nothing so devoted 
as to his own interest.”131 In fact, nature itself dictates that it is self-interest (σὸ 
αὐσοῦ ςτμυέπον) alone that determines what or whom one will love, raising self-
concern to the functional level of God in motivating ethical behavior (2.22.16).132 
This is entirely in line with what is to be expected based on what we have seen 
above about the primacy of the self and self-regard in Epictetus.  
However, just as in 1.19, here too Epictetus moves effortlessly from speaking 
of this all encompassing human impulse toward self-preservation into a discussion 
of its necessarily social outcome. To do this, he maintains in 2.22.18 that a person 
has two options: either one‖s honor, country, family and friends are placed together 
                                                                                                                                                              
the same principle for all (μία καὶ ἡ αὐσὴ ἀπφή πᾶςιν), namely, that of appropriation (οἰκείψςιρ) to 
their own needs.” Thus, it is not simply that nature endows one with an individually-centered desire 
and a socially-directed outlook, but that the process of cosmic appropriation itself is one of bringing 
both social and individual well-being under the same heading, that of self-preservation. Whatever 
the merits of Epictetus‖ logic, in distinction from Inwood, I believe that Epictetus does make the 
connection between personal and social οἰκείψςιρ explicit. 
130 Cf. Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 80, although I believe my analysis in this chapter will show 
that she is mistaken to say that Epictetus‖ “form of self-control does not entail that we reduce other 
people to the status of (preferred) indifferents” (emphasis original). It is true that Epictetus does not 
place much emphasis on the distinction between preferred and dispreferred indifferents, but not 
true that he refrains from placing other people into the category of things indifferent for happiness, 
even if he usually uses other terminology to do so. 
131 Gk: Καθόλοτ γάπ—μὴ ἐξαπασᾶςθε—Πᾶν ζῶον οὐδενὶ οὕσψρ ᾠκείψσαι ὡρ σῶ ἰδίῳ ςτμυέπονσι. 
Following LSJ, s.v. καθόλοτ 2, I have translated καθόλοτ as “universal truth,” rather than “general 
rule” (as in the LCL edition), in order to bring out the comprehensive scope of the statement, which 
in its context is a categorical assertion of the priority of self-interest in human decision-making. 
132 Diatr. 2.22.16 reads: “For nothing by nature causes one to love so much as one‖s own interest. 
This is one‖s father and brother and relatives and homeland and God” (my translation). Gk: οὐδὲν γὰπ 
οὕσψρ υιλεῖν πέυτκεν ὡρ σὸ αὑσοῦ ςτμυέπον· σοῦσο πασὴπ καὶ ἀδελυὸρ καὶ ςτγγενεῖρ καὶ πασπὶρ καὶ 
θεόρ. 
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with one‖s self-interest (ςτμυέπον), or they are treated as separate goods in 
competition with personal interest. Self-interest, which by its very nature is 
paramount, will always outweigh and overrule social responsibilities if the latter are 
considered as independent of self-interest (cf. 2.22.21). The only sure ground for 
communal responsibility, then, is to integrate love for others within love and care 
of oneself, although in a way that does not impinge upon one‖s personal 
invulnerability from external circumstances.133 Even justice cannot sufficiently 
motivate right relations with others; in the end it too will give way to the self-
preservative instinct. As Epictetus pithily puts it, “For where there is an ―I‖ or a 
―mine,‖ there a creature must incline.” (2.22.19).134 
Volition (πποαίπεςιρ) is the key to the melding of individual and communal 
interests: it is only when the volitional ruling power (κτπιεῦον) is functioning 
rightly that one can “be the friend and son and the father that [one] should be,” 
since only then will the maintenance of proper social relations be enfolded within 
the scope of self-interest (2.22.19-20).135 Epictetus does not believe that guarding the 
volition is simply a good way to preserve and prosper relationships; he believes it is 
the only way. If something outside of one‖s volition is driving a person‖s life (even 
something as exemplary as personal honor; 2.22.21), then there is no hope for the 
faithful maintenance of goodwill toward others (2.22.26-27, cf. 2.2.37). Such merely 
external constraints are worthless because the only infallible regulator of proper 
conduct is the internal power of volition. Put differently, only when “I am where my 
volition is” (2.22.20),136 that is, only when one sets value on that which certainly can 
be obtained through the exercise of mental self-control, is one actually able to love 
others. External things will always fail to provide the necessary impetus for seeking 
                                                        
133 In other words, to change from seeing their welfare as a concern that is “not yours” to one 
that is “yours” (cf. 2.6.24). Cf. Long, Epictetus, 199-200, 236-37; 238: “There is clearly a strong and 
coherent link between Epictetus‖ introverted recommendations and his social prescriptions.” Cf. 
Nussbaum, Therapy, 43. On how inviolability must be maintained throughout this process see Sorabji, 
Self, 194. 
134 My translation. Gk: ὅποτ γὰπ ἂν σὸ “ἐγὼ” καὶ σὸ “ἐμόν,” ἐκεῖ ἀνάγκη ῥέπσειν σὸ ζῶον. 
135 Epictetus is able simply to assert here that one‖s power of choice (volition) will automatically 
lead to right communal relations when one places others into the category of one‖s own interest. As 
we saw above, this assertion makes sense for Epictetus because of his commitment to the notion that 
the governing faculty of the soul always chooses that which is good, or at least what it perceives to 
be good (cf. 2.22.2-3, 36). Thus, loving others is automatic if it is placed on the side of loving oneself—
an impulse that itself requires no prompting in anyone. Cf. Diatr. 4.5.27-37: “For [volition] is God‖s gift 
to each person, free of impediment. These judgments generate love in the household, concord in the 
community, peace among nations, gratitude to God, and complete confidence, since they treat of 
things that are not one‖s own, things of no importance.” Cf. esp. Sorabji, Self, 193; Long, Epictetus, 30. 
136 Gk: ἐκεῖ εἰμι ἐγώ, ὅποτ ἡ πποαίπεςιρ. 
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the communal good: a suitably strong countervailing desire (power, money, sex, 
etc.) inevitably sours even the most seemingly unshakeable love between people. 
This is the lesson of history and of literature (2.22.16-17, 22-26, 32-34), and is backed 
up by Epictetus‖ philosophical system. This is also an inviolable law of nature (cf. 
2.22.16).  
Yet all need not be lost socially speaking. Others do not have to remain 
outside the sphere of volition; if one sees the well-being of others as an extension of 
one‖s own, then the problem of an external thing being considered inherently good 
on its own disappears, since social fidelity merges into self-interest.137 Then—and 
only then—can one confidently claim that true friendship exists, the kind of 
friendship that cannot be subverted, precisely because it is built on self-
preservation, nature‖s unshakeable foundation (2.22.29-30). The person who has 
vigilantly guarded his or her volition will then be genuinely faithful and loving 
toward those who are similarly wise, and tolerant and patient with those who have 
not risen to the same heights of moral and philosophical excellence (2.22.36). 
Although the word οἰκείψςιρ is not employed in this discourse, the basic idea 
is obviously present: self-concern branches out into other-regard.138 Even more 
explicitly than in 1.19, self-interest in 2.22 is the basis and foundation for care of 
family, city, nation and world. It is fundamentally flawed to see the social as doing 
away with the personal and individual; it is wrong to even posit a priority for the 
social, since communal concern is so absolutely connected with, and derivative of, 
self-interest and self-preservation. For Epictetus, an ethic that begins with the 
communal destroys the possibility of real love and friendship because it makes 
these states into external things (cf. σοῖρ ἐκσόρ - 2.22.19), thus turning them—like all 
external things—into capricious slave-masters of the soul. 
 
3.3.3 Body and Members (Diatr. 2.5) 
Epictetus, in line with much philosophical thought of the time, employs the 
metaphor of the body and members as representing social order to further his 
distinctive approach to communal life. In this regard he offers a variant on what he 
says about οἰκείψςιρ, thus leading to a richer understanding of how individuals are 
assimilated into the cosmos. 
                                                        
137 Cf. George B. Kerferd, “The Search for Personal Identity in Stoic Thought,” BJRL 55 (1972): 195. 
138 Cf. Gill, Structured Self, 381-82; Long, Epictetus, 222. 
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 One of the clearest examples of Epictetus‖ use of the body image is in Diatr. 
2.5. The discourse as a whole is an attempt to show how high-mindedness 
(μεγαλουποςύνη) and carefulness (ἐπιμέλεια) are compatible with one another. As 
he sets up the issue in 2.5.1-5, the potential tension between these two states of 
mind lies in the fact that one desires to be high-minded in the sense of being 
steadfast (εὐςσαθέρ), which means being unshakably resolved to treat all external 
things as indifferent (ἀδιάυοπορ) to one‖s peace of mind (ἀσάπαφον), while also 
desiring to maintain a careful spirit (ἐπιμελέρ). By “carefulness” Epictetus means 
essentially an attitude that desires to maintain a firm grasp on one‖s own 
possessions. It is essentially an attitude of fear that one‖s possessions may be lost. 
Epictetus does not condone this type of attitude, but he does use this notion of 
“carefulness” in a transformed way: instead of being careful to keep all of one‖s 
external possessions, one must exercise equally diligent care in treating external 
things as “indifferents.” Epictetus turns the notion of carefulness on its head. The 
use of matters that are indifferent in and of themselves is not itself indifferent.139 
Thus, the wise person will preserve his or her steadfastness of mind by treating 
indifferent things with the same attitude of care that most people foolishly exhibit 
toward their possessions (2.5.6-9).140 From whence can such an attitude arise? Only 
from “within me, in what is mine [ἔςψ ἐν σοῖρ ἐμοῖρ]” (2.5.5). And what is “mine”? 
The power of choice, namely one‖s volition (πποαίπεςιρ - 2.5.4),141 which is the only 
thing that matters for proper living. 
 This foundation for right living, then, is centered on the individual and his 
or her mental control. But as with the previous two discourses we have examined, 
Epictetus does not leave things on this individualistic basis. Individual volitional 
empowerment is the basis for the important social outcome that Epictetus begins 
discussing in 2.5.24. Here he lays out the communal implications of the prescription 
for happiness through indifference (cf. 2.5.26-9) that he has just finished unpacking 
in the first part of the discourse. To do so, Epictetus employs the metaphor of the 
                                                        
139 Bonhöffer, Epictet, 43. 
140 I.e., it is a combination of “the carefulness of a man who is devoted to material things and the 
steadfastness of a man who disregards them,” a difficult but not impossible union (2.5.9). 
141 Diatr. 2.5.10-23 consists of a series of illustrations that illuminate Epictetus‖ point. 
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body, a rhetorical feature that had become commonplace in philosophical-ethical 
teaching by that time.142 
 The specific question Epictetus attempts to answer (in 2.5.24) using the body 
and members imagery is whether certain “externals” can be seen as natural, and 
whether some are unnatural. While certain things may seem beneficial for a 
detached foot in its severed state, the situation is quite different when the foot is 
seen as part of a whole body. It may seem counterintuitive to consider trampling on 
thorns beneficial for the foot considered simply as a foot; but when one sees the foot as 
a part of a whole body, suddenly the damage done by the thorns does not seem so 
terrible, since the foot serves the broader interests of the whole body, which itself 
will not be overly troubled by pain being applied to one of its members. Thus, 
external things (like health or wealth) may seem necessary for one‖s happiness, but 
when one sees oneself as simply a member of the cosmos-body then one will 
recognize that all that is necessary for the good life is to play one‖s part in the 
drama of fate. 
In the last sentence of 2.5.24 Epictetus states that his audience “ought to 
hold some such view of” themselves: they are individual members of a broader 
cosmic whole. This whole is in the first instance the city-state (πόλιρ). Even more 
fundamentally, however, people should recognize that they are parts of a city-state 
that “is made up of gods and men,” and finally of the city state “that is a small copy 
of the whole” (ἥ σί ἐςσι μικπὸν σῆρ ὅληρ μίμημα - 2.5.26; cf. 2.5.13).143 Because every 
person is united into a world-body, nothing happens to one member that does not 
create the same effect in the body as a whole (2.5.27). Thus, the well-being of society 
and self are tightly connected. 
Even here, however, the initially self-preservative desire to remain 
unaffected by the circumstances of life remains the foundation and cognitive 
presupposition for community. The dynamic at work in 2.22 is also at work here: the 
benefit of the many is based on a rational evaluation of the benefit to the individual. 
That is to say (summarizing 2.5.2-29), only when one grasps one‖s place in the 
cosmos, in the body made up of all gods and people, is one enabled to see that his or 
                                                        
142 For the background to this image see Lee, Body of Christ, 29-45, who focuses on how it was 
developed in Stoicism. Cf. Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995), 38-47. 
143 The whole refers to the entire universe, conceived of as a giant city-state of gods and men. Cf. 
Blundell, “Οἰκείψςιρ,” 231-32. 
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her own well-being is part and parcel of the well-being of others. Individual mental 
control and self-regard by no means disappear, as is evident in the continual 
strictures throughout the discourse to maintain a firm control over how one 
evaluates external things. But at the same time, this “individualistic” mindset is 
completely synthesized with a communal one.144 
 
3.3.4 The Self and Duty (Diatr. 2.10) 
One of the most explicit links Epictetus draws between the primacy of the self and 
the importance of social obligations is found in Diatr. 2.10.145 The discourse begins 
with a definition of human identity: we humans are creatures who have “no quality 
more sovereign than volition” (2.10.1),146 thus making us superior to all other living 
beings (2.10.2-3).147 Yet, this individually-centered facet of our identity is not a 
ground for complacent selfishness. Epictetus rules that out with the question and 
answer in 2.10.4: 
 
What then is the profession of a citizen? To treat nothing as a matter of private 
profit, not to plan about anything as though he were a detached unit, but to act like 
the foot or the hand, which if they had the faculty of reason and understood the 
constitution of nature, would never exercise choice or desire in any other way but 
by reference to the whole. 
 
While this quote contains many important statements, the most noteworthy is that 
Epictetus—having just described the core of human identity as the power of choice 
in service of self-preservation—immediately qualifies this understanding by saying 
that such cannot be simply “a matter of private profit” (μηδὲν ἔφειν ἰδίᾳ ςτμυέπον) 
because, as in 2.5, individuals are bound together into a unified organism, a world-
encompassing body. The cognitive dimension is even more explicit here than in 2.5: 
Epictetus assumes that no one with “the faculty of reason” and a right 
“understanding of the constitution of nature” could possibly fail to “exercise choice 
                                                        
144 While I agree with Long that Epictetus is arguing “that we cannot achieve our good unless we 
see ourselves as integral parts of the world in general and of our society in particular,” it does not 
follow that “our identity is . . . irreducibly social” (Long, Epictetus, 201, emphasis added; see the similar 
sentiments in Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 17; Inwood, “L‖oikeiôsis,” 244), as the analysis of Diatr. 3.13 
below will attempt to prove in more detail. 
145 On the great importance Epictetus attaches to social duties see Bonhöffer, Epictet, 86-108. 
146 Gk: οὐδὲν ἔφψν κτπιώσεπον πποαιπέςεψρ. 
147 Assuming one‖s volition is “free from slavery and subjection.” 
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or desire” “by reference to the whole” of humanity.148 If a person knew the future he 
or she could even desire adverse circumstances to come one‖s way because they 
would be seen in light of the “orderly arrangement of the whole” where the 
individual parts themselves are insignificant since the whole is more sovereign 
(κτπιώσεπον) than the parts (2.10.5). However, since no one knows the future, we 
must do our best to seek out what we know to be good (through controlled 
judgments; cf. 2.10.1), aware that this is the pathway to cosmic harmony (2.10.6). 
 In the rest of the discourse Epictetus ranges across three other dimensions of 
human identity, but in distinction from 2.10.1, these are all expressed in terms of 
their outworking in concrete social situations. First, sons must show respect and 
deference to their fathers (2.10.7). Second, siblings must show “deference, 
obedience, kindly speech,” to each other and never lodge a claim against one 
another (2.10.8-9). Third, those sitting on a city council are obligated to mark their 
tenure with “appropriate acts” (σὰ οἰκεῖα ἔπγα - 2.10.10-12) of civic responsibility. 
All of these actions are grounded in “a natural sense of fidelity, a natural sense of 
affection, a natural sense of helpfulness, a natural sense of keeping our hands off 
one another” (2.10.23).149 There is no tension posited between the individual and the 
community. A communal concern is bestowed on all creatures by nature; this is a 
part of who we are by virtue of our common humanity. And yet, all things are 
subordinate to the human power of choice (volition) in those who are wise (cf. 
2.10.1). The second sentence of 2.10.23 provides the bridge between the individual 
and the social: because of the intimate linkage between individual members and the 
one cosmic body, if any of a person‖s social relations are discordant, that person 
suffers injury and loss. That is to say, the cosmic harmony of the universe is such 
that self-interest and communal-interest coincide. Neither the seeking of individual 
well-being, nor the obligations that arise from life in human community, obviate 
the need for self-preservation or community-centeredness. 
 
3.3.5 The Contingency of the Communal (Diatr. 3.13) 
I have just discussed several ways in which Epictetus integrates a communal 
impulse within his thoroughly self-focused ethical system. I have noted how the 
                                                        
148 Cf. Diatr. 1.11 where Epictetus provides an extended argument for the reasonableness of 
familial affection. 
149 Gk: ἔφομεν υύςει σι πιςσόν, υύςει ςσεπκσικόν, υύςει ὠυελησικόν, ἀλλήλψν υύςει ἀνεκσικόν. 
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desire for self-preservation remains the primary impulse of human life throughout 
one‖s progress in moral living. However, I have also attempted to show how for 
Epictetus the desire for self-preservation does not remain on the level of base self-
love. It necessarily branches out into genuine care for others. With any given social 
relation one has certain responsibilities. Yet, these responsibilities are not in 
themselves intrinsically significant. That is to say, preserving one‖s own self, rather 
than caring for others (in and of itself), is what is truly important. As Epictetus puts 
it in numerous places, social relations (like all external things) are simply “materials 
for the volition” (ὗλαι σῆ πποαιπέςει - cf. 1.29.2); they provide a chance for one‖s 
virtue to be developed, for it to be perfected in the resolute determination to live 
one‖s life according to nature. Abstracted from this context, the life of the 
communities in which one lives threatens to become a desired good in its own right, 
which would completely undo Epictetus‖ prescription for the life of happy and 
peaceful indifference. 
 This by itself is clear from what has already been discussed above. However, 
in Diatr. 3.13 Epictetus takes things one step further. Not only is community 
secondary to the individual, it is in fact an entirely contingent component of the good 
life.150 How you live in community matters, because once you are confronted with 
others, your own well-being dictates that you act in a certain (considerate and 
faithful) fashion toward them. Nonetheless, community is not in any way necessary 
for one to live the good life, to find peace and rest in the midst of an uncertain 
future. 
 Diatr. 3.13 is a discourse on what it means to be in a forlorn (ἐπημία) 
condition. Epictetus begins with his thesis, and then follows it up by countering a 
potential misunderstanding: one is forlorn if one is without help (ἀβοηθησόρ) from 
others, rather than if one is simply alone (ὁ μόνορ) in the world. Conversely, the 
presence of others does not guarantee the absence of human deprivation (3.13.1). 
This misunderstanding of what it means to be forlorn reflects the common way that 
people perceive the world: losing someone dear to us creates loss (makes us feel 
ἐπημία), no matter how many people are physically near us. The simple presence of 
others cannot bring happiness (3.13.2). In 3.13.2 Epictetus states that being forlorn—
                                                        
150 Cf. Inwood, “L‖oikeiôsis,” 264. 
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by definition—means that we are without help, apparently assuming that this 
definition was accepted by his hearers. 
However, Epictetus does not stop with a simple assertion of his point. He 
goes on to add a series of proofs to further convince his audience. First, we may say 
that we are alone when we have lost someone very dear to us, even if we are in the 
middle of populous Rome. Epictetus‖ equivocation on the meaning of being alone 
(ἀβοηθησόρ) is put to use to prove to his hearers that being around others does not 
guarantee that we will not also be forlorn (3.13.2). Epictetus‖s second example is 
even more dependent on equivocation: travelers will feel utterly forlorn if they 
come across bandits on the highway. In other words, the presence of others means 
nothing in and of itself with regard to whether one will be happy or forlorn; only 
the right sort of people will bring gladness to one‖s soul (3.13.3). 
 The third proof is the most important for our purposes. Here Epictetus 
contends that if simply being alone makes one forlorn, then at the world 
conflagration (ἐπύπψςιρ) at the end of history Zeus himself would be forlorn since 
he is alone (μόνορ) at that point in time (3.13.4).151 It would be as if he was sitting by 
himself in the heavens mourning the absence of his fellow gods and goddesses with 
great cries of wretchedness. Those who say that being forlorn means being without 
human company rightly recognize there to be among humans a “natural common 
interest, mutual love and joy in living with others” (3.13.5),152 but they fail to place 
this social dynamic in its properly subordinate position. For, as Epictetus continues 
in 3.13.6, those who understand how to live peaceful lives should be “able to be 
content by oneself” (σὸ δύναςθαι αὐσὸν ἑατσῶ ἀπκεῖν)153 and be “able to commune 
with oneself” (δύναςθαι αὐσὸν ἑατσῶ ςτνεῖναι) without any sense of loss at the 
absence of interpersonal interaction. In other words, self-sufficiency—the most 
important human impulse—creates contentment without community. Just as “Zeus 
communes with himself” and “has inner rest” while alone at the world 
conflagration, so should we be able to be happy when we are completely alone 
                                                        
151 For more on the Stoic doctrine of the world conflagration see Furley, “Cosmology,” 434-41; 
Jaap Mansfeld, “Providence and the Destruction of the Universe in Early Stoic Thought,” in Studies in 
Hellenistic Religions (ed. M. J. Vermaseren; Leiden: Brill, 1979), 129-88. 
152 My translation; Gk: υύςει κοινψνικοῦ εἶναι καὶ υιλαλλήλοτ καὶ ἡδέψρ ςτναναςσπέυεςθαι 
ἀνθπώποιρ. 
153 My translation. 
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(3.13.7).154 Although men and women must be able to carry out their earthly social 
obligations, they must do so without in any way needing others (μὴ πποςδεῖςθαι 
ἄλλψν). An eternity spent alone would actually be beneficial since it would provide 
one with the opportunity for giving extended and undivided attention to the things 
that really matter in life such as understanding our place in the world and 
perfecting our mental response to external circumstances (3.13.8). Human 
relationships are all too often distractions from the process of perfecting the self.155 
 How then can one avoid becoming forlorn in life? For Epictetus, the answer 
is complete self-sufficiency (cf. 3.13.5-13). Self-sufficiency means that we are not 
reliant on anything for our well-being, including community. Communal-concern is 
an entirely contingent expression of virtue.156 It is true that we must act rightly in 
whatever communities we find ourselves in, but even this is first of all a matter of 
preserving our own virtue and self-interest.157 We do not need community. We are 
not such social animals at the core of our being that we somehow cease to be fully 
human when not in community. In other words, Epictetus does not see his students 
as “dyadic first-century Mediterranean persons.”158 Humans naturally seek the 
company and well-being of others, but this is not the same thing as saying that 
human identity is inextricably bound up within the relationships of human society. 
                                                        
154 The Greek of 3.13.7 reads: ὡρ ὁ Ζεὺρ αὐσορ ἑατσῶ ςύνεςσιν καὶ ἡςτφάζει ἐυ‖ ἑατσοῦ καὶ ἐννοεῖ 
σὴν διοίκηςιν σὴν ἑατσοῦ οἵα ἐςσὶ καὶ ἐν ἐπινοίαιρ γίνεσαι ππεπούςαιρ ἑατσῶ, οὕσψρ καὶ ἡμᾶρ 
δύναςθαι αὐσοὺρ ἑατσοῖρ λαλεῖν, μὴ πποςδεῖςθαι ἄλλψν, διαγψγῆρ μὴ ἀποπεῖν·: “Just as Zeus 
communes with himself, has inner rest and reflects on his own administration [of the world] and 
whatever else is in his thoughts that is appropriate for him, thus also we should be able to converse 
with ourselves, not needing others, not at a loss with regard to how to pass our time” (my 
translation). 
155 Diatr. 3.13.9-17 goes into detail about the way in which Caesar cannot provide peace and 
happiness in all circumstances and how this is the provenance of true philosophy alone (3.13.18-19). 
156 Cf. Diatr. 3.3.4-5: “The instant the good appears it attracts the soul to itself, while the evil 
repels the soul from itself. A soul will never refuse a clear sense-impression of good, any more than a 
man will refuse the coinage of Caesar. On this concept of the good hangs every impulse to act both of 
man and of God. That is why the good is preferred above every form of kinship.” Cf. Marcus Aurelius, 
Med. 5.20: “In so far as any of them [other human beings] stand in the way of our closest duties, a 
human being then comes to be one of the things that are indifferent to me, no less than the sun, or 
the wind, or a wild beast” (cited by Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 66; cf. 67-69). Reydams-Schils 
(Roman Stoics, 75) notes that even such a strongly worded statement placing community into the 
category of “things indifferent” to happiness is modified in 3.3.8 when Epictetus argues (in line with 
his normal practice when discussing social responsibility) that “if we set [the good] in a correct 
volition, then the preservation of the relationships of life itself becomes a good” (my translation). 
157 Cf. Diatr. 2.4.2-3 where Epictetus insists that personal wrongdoing is first and foremost self-
destructive of one‖s own “fidelity, self-respect, [and] piety,” but also “overthrows” (ἀναιπέψ) 
“neighborly feeling, friendship, [and] the state.” Cf. 3.13.4-8 and 3.24.54-70 on the compatibility of 
self-interest and “affection” for others. Thus, it is true that Epictetus can even call love for a child “a 
good” (3.3.8; thus Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 78), but this is so only because the preservation of 
one‖s own virtue demands that one deal faithfully with family, friends, fellow citizens, etc. 
158 Contra Malina and Neyrey, “Personality.” 
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4. Conclusion: A Community of Self-Interest? 
In this chapter we have seen that Epictetus‖ philosophy is driven by an almost 
obsessive concern with self-preservation. His teaching on how to make moral 
progress in life is centered squarely on the individual and his or her own mental 
responses to external circumstances. To be happy and at rest is to be completely 
indifferent to external things. In this connection, Epictetus defines what constitutes 
one‖s “self” as one‖s volition, or power of choice. One‖s volition must be guarded 
above all else because “no one is dearer to me than myself” (ἐμοὶ παπ‖ ἐμὲ υίλσεπορ 
οὐδείρ). It must also not be allowed to become dependent on others in any way 
(3.4.10). 
Yet we have also seen that Epictetus by no means neglects familial, 
communal or political responsibility. Preserving one‖s virtue demands faithful 
living in community. Right social relations flow out of, although they are 
subordinate to self-preservation (cf. 4.10.12-13), which must be maintained 
throughout one‖s entire life.159 Anything less would destroy the very possibility for 
living in harmony with others, since it would take one‖s focus off of the one place 
where virtue can be found (one‖s volition) and shift it onto external things, which 
are inherently unstable producers of well-being. There is, then, never a point in 
Epictetus‖s system where the individual is swallowed up in community.160 What we 
find instead is a societal concern driven by self-interest. 
                                                        
159 Cf. Inwood, “L‖oikeiôsis,” 255: “Avant de finir je vais explorer ce rapport, en vue de montrer 
pourquoi la réconciliation du souci orienté vers soi-même et du souci orienté vers les autres doit être 
fondé sur la primauté du souci pour soi-même.” 
160 Epictetus is hardly radical in this regard (cf. Long, Epictetus, 114-16, 200; Burnett, Salvation, 30-
90; Inwood and Donini, “Ethics,” 681). Despite their differences of emphasis, numerous thinkers in 
the ancient world articulated a definition of the human person with foundationally individual 
dimensions (although without neglecting a communal perspective). Chrysippus, for example, states 
that the “dearest thing [oikeion] to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness of it” 
(Diogenes Laertius, Vit. phil. 7.85; quoted by Holowchak, Stoics, 36). Seneca also captures this facet of 
Stoic thought well: “Each animal at the same time consults its own safety, seeks what helps it, and 
shrinks from what will harm it. Impulses towards useful objects and revulsion from the opposite are 
according to nature. Without any reflection to prompt the idea and without any advice, whatever 
nature has prescribed is done” (Ep. 121.21; quoted in ibid., 36; cf. Inwood and Donini, “Ethics,” 679-80; 
Seneca, Ep. 124.23 [cited by Downing, “Persons,” 59]; cf. Striker, “Oikeiōsis,” 286-87). Even Aristotle, 
who sees community as indispensible to one‖s happiness (see e.g., Eth. nic. 1099a30, 1099b7-8 [1.8.15, 
17]), crafts a definition of the human person that centers on the thinking self and the quest for 
virtue: “If then the function of man is the active exercise of the soul‖s faculties in conformity with 
rational principle. . . . it follows that the Good of man is the active exercise of his soul‖s faculties in 
conformity with excellence or virtue . . .” (Aristotle, Eth. nic., 1098a7-8, 16-17; cited by Burnett, 
Salvation, 37, nn. 29-30). 
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This investigation of Epictetus has made several things clear. One of the 
most important is that it has shown the falsity of claiming that there was no 
important sense of the individual in Paul‖s world. Equally important, it has also 
revealed how at home the attempt to relate individuals to community would have 
been for someone like Paul.  As we turn to Paul‖s letter to the Romans, having seen 
how Epictetus approaches questions of both the individual and community enables 
us to look with new eyes not only at the presence of the individual in Paul‖s 
thought, but also at how Paul himself relates the individual to community. As we do 
so, the false assumption that the individual and the community are antithetical 
concepts can be set aside. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Pauline Individuals (1) 
 
“There is no self-conscious notion of ―the self‖ in Paul . . . he thinks in terms of 
membership in groups: Jews, Gentiles, Christ followers.”1 
 
“Paul saw clearly that God‖s purposes were worked out, fundamentally, with 
individual selves . . . .”2 
 
1. Introduction: The Quest for the Pauline Individual 
The individual is a problematic and disputed figure in modern Pauline scholarship. 
It is often simply assumed that the word individual represents one single thing that 
can then be safely dismissed as an imposition of modern, Western categories onto 
the text of Paul‖s letters. This assumption is deeply problematic.3 Thus, one of the 
central aims of this chapter is to show that without an adequately nuanced 
                                                        
1 Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self, 142. Cf. Campbell, Quest, 49: “It just does not seem 
possible to combine the individual and the corporate . . . .” In a forthcoming book chapter, Engberg-
Pedersen appears to soften the stark denial of a post-conversion Pauline self found in his earlier 
works quite significantly. See e.g., Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “A Stoic Concept of the Person in Paul? 
From Gal 5:17 to Rom 7:14-25,” in Christian Body, Christian Self: Essays on Early Christian Concepts of 
Personhood (eds. Clare K. Rothschild and J. Trevor Thompson; WUNT; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
forthcoming 2011), emphasis original: “there is a clear sense of a ―self‖ in Paul, and even of a 
―person‖.” 
2 Burnett, Salvation, 229. On the same page that this quote comes from Burnett does qualify 
himself by stating that Paul was not a “radical individualist” and that he did not concentrate “on the 
individual in such a way that the people of God within the purposes of God became of secondary 
importance.” However, as I have already noted in my introductory chapter, Burnett restricts the 
communal dimension of Paul‖s thought almost exclusively to the question of Jew-Gentile unity in 
Christ, neglecting the numerous ways in which the Pauline individual must be understood as 
embedded within the community of which it is a part. 
3 As was just noted, Troels Engberg-Pedersen has recently nuanced his own view of the Pauline 
individual substantially. In so doing he has offered a devastating critique of many modern anti-
individual readings of ancient thought that is very helpful for the purposes of my own argument in 
both this and the following chapter. Engberg-Pedersen, interacting with the classicist Christopher 
Gill, has taken Gill‖s definition of the individual to task for only refuting what Engberg-Pedersen calls 
a “strong” form of individualism. In other words, scholars like Gill have equated the very concept of 
the individual with something “like a modern, ―Sartrean‖ individualism” and in so doing have quite 
rightly shown that such a form of individualism did not exist in the ancient world (“Person in Paul?” 
[emphasis original]). Engberg-Pedersen rightly wonders, however, whether a “weaker” form of 
individualism (a notion of self, a cognitive center of being, etc.) has been thereby proven false as 
well. While I find Engberg-Pedersen‖s discussion extremely helpful, I think that it would be better to 
speak in terms of “modern individualism” and “ancient  individualism” so as to avoid the automatic 
assumption that the kind of individualism to be found in the ancient world is somehow lacking in 
robustness, an impression that could result from labelling such a view of the individual as “weaker.” 
Nonetheless, the point remains: simply proving that there is no modern individual in Paul‖s letters 
says nothing whatsoever about whether the individual is a fruitful category for analyzing Pauline theology. 
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understanding of the individual (or individuals) in Paul‖s thought, the entire debate 
over the individual versus the community is wrongly framed.4 
There is indeed no Pauline individual. Instead, there are many Pauline 
individuals, or rather, many ways of conceptualizing the individual in Paul‖s letters. 
Thus, to make clear the comprehensive significance of the individual for Paul, I have 
presented the first half of a typology of the individual in this chapter. It, along with 
the remainder of the typology in the next chapter, is an attempt to isolate and 
classify some of the most important ways Paul conceptualizes the individual in his 
letters. In presenting the material in this way I hope to give a selective, although 
truly representative, account of the Pauline individual. 
The Pauline individual, however, is not simply an individual. Although there 
are many ways in which Paul integrates individuals into his argument, with each of 
them the communal coloring of his theology is evident, although more prominently 
in some places than others. That is to say, there is no isolated individual in Paul; 
there is no “individual qua individual,” at least as far as Paul‖s view of the redeemed 
individual is concerned.5 Instead, Paul conceives of the individual within a 
communal framework.6 Therefore, at points in this chapter I will attempt to show 
not only how pervasive and central the category of the individual is in Paul‖s 
theology, but also how communal concerns necessarily shape Paul‖s understanding 
of the individual. The communal shaping of the Pauline individual, however, will 
receive a much fuller treatment in chapter five, since that chapter deals with 
Romans 12-16, the most important chapters in Romans for understanding Paul‖s 
theology of individuals-in-community. 
 It will be beneficial at this point to give a skeletal outline of the portion of 
the typology that I will present in this chapter. First, in Romans 2 (specifically 2:1, 
17) we encounter an example of what I will call the characteristic individual, a 
stereotyped figure of sorts, who represents a possible (although faulty) response to 
Paul‖s gospel. In service of developing this individual type Paul also brings the 
                                                        
4 Again, as was mentioned in chapter 1 above, in this dissertation I am attempting to describe the 
function of individuals and community in Paul‖s argument, rather than to enter into modern debates 
about the ontology and psychology of the self. 
5 Pace Burnett, Salvation, 10. 
6 While there is one place where the individual (simply as an individual) is important for Paul‖s 
argument (namely Rom 2:6-16, which will be discussed further below), this is the eschatological 
individuality of the human being before the judgment seat of God. In the time before the eschaton, 
however, when Paul speaks of individuals as the beneficiaries of God‖s redemptive work in Christ, he 
never conceives of them in isolation from their being embedded within the believing community. 
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generic individual into his argumentation (in 2:6-16; see ἕκαςσορ in 2:6). The generic 
individual comes into its own, however, in Romans 3, where Paul speaks of it in 
order to state one of the most foundational truths of his gospel message, namely 
that justification is by faith apart from works, and that this places every human 
being in the exact same position before God. However, despite the prominence 
(even centrality) of the generic human being in his understanding of individuals, 
Paul does not completely do away with another kind of individual, what I will call 
the binary individual (as exemplified in the Jew-Gentile distinction), even though he 
does radically relativize the importance of this oppositional classification. Romans 4 
is dominated by yet another kind of individual: Abraham the exemplary individual, 
whose faith in God sets a pattern for future believers. Types found elsewhere in 
Romans will be addressed in the next chapter. 
It should be noted from the outset that the different types of individuals are 
not airtight categories. Even though several types can be isolated for the purpose of 
analysis and comparison, they often bleed into one another, making a radical 
separation impossible.7 Nonetheless, each kind of individual within the typology I 
will set forth tells us something vitally important about how Paul conceives of 
individuality itself, how he relates individuals to community and how the different 
types of individuals function with regard to other important themes in Romans. 
Furthermore, this typology is textually selective. Although there may be 
more types of individuals in the letter than I have indicated, I contend that the 
typology presented here represents many of the most important ways of 
conceptualizing the individual in Romans.8 Any other individual types that could be 
uncovered would simply add support to my argument that the individual is a 
central category in Paul‖s thought, and that he has a wide variety of ways of 
expressing this fact. The reader will also note that several parts of Romans 
(specifically chapters 1, 6 and 9-11) receive little treatment in this or the next 
chapter. It should be borne in mind, however, that I am offering a typology rather 
than providing an exhaustive, linear exegesis of Romans. It should not be assumed 
that I think these chapters unimportant, but simply that I believe the typology 
                                                        
7 Cf. Max Weber‖s “ideal types” in e.g., Max Weber, “―Objectivity‖ in Social Science,” in The 
Methodology of the Social Sciences (eds. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch; New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1949), 89-99, 110-12. 
8 In the conclusion I will point to other texts that could be used to fill my typology out, although 
without adding new kinds of individuals into the discussion. 
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presented here is sufficient to capture—if not all—at least the most important ways 
Paul thinks of individuals in Romans. The reason for choosing to focus on Romans is 
simple: the major debates pitting individuals versus community in Pauline theology 
by and large arise out of competing readings of this letter. 
As we have seen in looking at the writings of Epictetus, there is no inherent 
tension in the ancient world in positing the importance of the individual as well as 
the importance of the individual‖s social location. Epictetus attaches supreme 
importance to the idea that the individual must be unconstrained by external 
circumstances (including community) in order to be a flourishing human being. In 
this regard he is at a considerable remove from Paul, who insists on the absolute 
necessity of the individual being bound up within community. Nonetheless, 
Epictetus‖ discourses make it clear that it is by no means anachronistic to speak of 
individuals in the first-century, nor of a strong sense of individualism tempered by 
sociality.9 In this regard, he is an excellent conversation partner for Paul, both 
because he addresses an issue of obvious importance to the apostle, and because the 
way in which he handles it (highlighting a kind of necessarily isolated individualism) 
brings the priorities of Pauline theology (with its necessarily communal form of 
individualism) into sharp relief.10 
 
2. The Characteristic Individual and the Generic Individual (Romans 2) 
With each individual in this typology I will provide an initial and tentative 
definition that will be filled out as the exegesis progresses. The characteristic 
individual is a typical individual, a figure who represents a kind of action, or a 
possible response to Paul‖s proclamation. It is a rhetorical tool Paul uses to make 
certain points about his gospel. The generic individual, on the other hand, is an 
                                                        
9 Epictetus largely focuses on what will be termed below the generic individual (the individual 
guarding his or her volition from external compulsion). The generic individual in fact is at the heart 
of his discourses. His unrelenting focus on the generic individual, who can be perfectly happy apart 
from all social interaction, is at odds in a foundational way with Paul‖s understanding of the 
individual, who, as we will see in this and the next chapter, must always be understood as 
communally situated. 
10 Thorsteinsson, Ancient Morality, 177 (cf. 175-89), is right to insist—against some New Testament 
scholars—that “there is no sustainable reason . . . to suspect that the Stoics were only vaguely 
interested in social matters or that their interest was only on the surface.” Yet, this does not change 
the fact that for Epictetus (and other Stoics) social relations are not necessary for one to be virtuous 
and happy. Only insofar as one is already embedded in such relationships does a proper regard for 
others become important; and this is only true because one‖s own self-preservation and honor is at 
stake in how one relates to others. The fact remains, however, that these social relationships are not 
indispensably necessary for Epictetus in the way they are for Paul. 
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individual before the face of God, an individual who is neither a Jew nor a Greek, nor 
anything else, but simply a human being. In other words, the generic individual is 
one whose only distinguishing marker of identity is his or her humanity shared in 
common with every other individual in the world. 
 
2.1 The Characteristic Individual, or the Judging Judge (Romans 2:1-5, 17-25) 
The characteristic individual makes its appearance in Rom 2:1 as Paul comes 
rhetorically face to face with the human being (ἄνθπψπορ), specifically with “every 
human who judges” (πᾶρ ὁ κπίνψν). As is now widely recognized, in 2:1 Paul shifts 
to a type of argumentation that fits the basic contours of the diatribe style.11 As 
such, the individual judge Paul addresses is not a concrete individual,12 but instead 
represents a hypothetical interlocutor. This individual is introduced not because 
Paul necessarily expects to find such a person among his audience in Rome, but in 
order for Paul to make a point about his gospel. 
Besides recognizing the basically diatribal nature of 2:1, recent scholarship 
has focused largely on one facet of the judge‖s identity: whether or not the judge is 
to be identified with the Jewish interlocutor in 2:17.13 Despite the protestations of 
some scholars, there seems to be no way of evading the simple fact that the singular 
“you” (ςύ) of 2:17 cannot refer back to anything other than the singular person who 
judges (2:1: ὦ ἄνθπψπε πᾶρ ὁ κπίνψν) in 2:1-5. No other person is directly addressed 
in the intervening verses. Whereas Rom 2:17 refers to the singular Ἰοτδαῖορ with no 
introduction, and thus to someone the audience is already familiar with, 2:1 not 
only addresses someone in the second person singular, but also provides an 
introductory appellation that is carried over in 2:17.14 
While determining the identity of the judge is important, more important is 
attending to the function of the characteristic individual (ἄνθπψπορ) in this section 
of the text. Whereas in Rom 1:18-32 Paul speaks primarily in terms of a collective 
                                                        
11 See e.g., Jewett, Romans, 193, n. 1; 196, n. 17; Stowers, Rereading, 100-104, 144-49; see also 16-21; 
Stanley E. Porter, “The Argument of Romans 5: Can a Rhetorical Question Make a Difference?” JBL 110 
(1991): 656-61. Although I believe Stowers wrongly splits the diatribal disputant of 2:1 and 2:17 in 
half, the first half becoming a Gentile, the second a Jew. 
12 Rightly Stowers, Rereading, 101-2. 
13 On this debate see Runar M. Thorsteinsson, Paul’s Interlocutor in Romans 2: Function and Identity in 
the Context of Ancient Epistolography (ConBNT 40; Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 2003), 159-231. 
14 Rightly Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 197-99 (see also the other scholars listed on 197, 
n. 11); James D. G. Dunn, Romans 1-8 (WBC 38A; Dallas: Word, 1988), 108; contra Stowers, Rereading, 101-
4. Thorsteinsson (e.g., Paul’s Interlocutor, 199) is correct to see that Rom 2:1 and 2:17 refer to the same 
person, but I believe wrong to take both as referring to the same Gentile interlocutor. 
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humanity engaged in a cooperative revolt against divine rule,15 2:1 shifts to a 
pointedly individual frame of reference. Here, the judge, who characterizes a 
specific, individual disposition, is one who sits in lofty judgment upon the 
unrestrained wickedness of the previously described sinners in 1:18-32. However, 
this judgmental judge is also condemned because he too practices the very things he 
rails against in others (2:1-2).16 As a character type, or “encoded explicit reader” (to 
use Stanley Stowers‖ language), he provides a negative example for Paul‖s actual 
audience to avoid. In other words, the judge is the foil for the type of individual Paul 
seeks to shape (the “encoded implicit reader”) through the implicit exhortations he 
puts forward in this section, including the censure of hypocrisy (2:1-3) and the 
condemnation of the various, typically Gentile vices (2:21-23) that the judge himself 
has fallen into.17 The individual form of address, while not referring to a “real” 
individual, is nonetheless significant because it places Paul‖s whole argument in 
Romans 2 on the plane of individual ethical action. Paul‖s gospel demands a 
response from every individual it confronts, the characteristic individual being one 
of the central types of individuals Paul envisions needing to hear his message. 
In order to understand the parenetic import of the judging judge two 
functions must be attended to. First, the judge serves to begin laying the 
groundwork for Paul‖s claim in 3:19 that every single person (lit. “every mouth” 
[πᾶν ςσόμα]) in the world, whether Jew or Gentile, will be held accountable to God 
for transgressing his law.18 Paul uses the Jewish judge to show, through his 
                                                        
15 However, the common scholarly appeal to the second person plural as if it alone proves that a 
certain passage in the NT is exclusively communal is significantly misleading, on which see Gerald W. 
Peterman, “Plural You: On the Use and Abuse of the Second Person,” BBR 20 (2010): 183-96. Just one 
example from Romans 2 clearly highlights the rightness of Peterman‖s argument: in Rom 2:6 Paul 
argues that God will repay every individual person (ἕκαςσορ) according to his or her works, although 
when he goes on in the next clause (2:7-8) to show how this will be worked out, he shifts to speaking 
in the plural of those individuals who are to be recompensed by God, either positively or negatively. 
He then finally returns to the singular to describe these same people in 2:9. If one wishes to 
emphasize the collective features of a text, this must be based on a variety of contextual features, 
and not simply argued from the presence of second person plural verbs, pronouns, etc. 
16 Cf. Campbell, Deliverance, 548. 
17 On encoded implicit and explicit readers see Stowers, Rereading, 21; cf. Kent L. Yinger, Paul, 
Judaism, and Judgment According to Deeds (SNTSMS 105; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
149. Whether or not one adopts Stowers‖ terminology, his point is valid and helpful: there are three 
kinds of readers of Romans: those who actually received the letter (the empirical readers), those 
addressed explicitly in the text whether or not they are real or rhetorical (encoded explicit readers), 
and those implicitly addressed (the encoded implicit readers; i.e. the ideal readers who respond to 
Paul‖s letter in exactly the way he intends). 
18 While ἐν σῶ νόμῳ may refer only to Jews (which would be in line with Paul‖s normal way of 
speaking of Jews and the “sphere” of the law; cf. e.g., Rom 2:12, 14; 4:14, 16; 1 Cor 9:20; Gal 4:5; 
Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans [NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996], 204-6; Dunn, Romans 
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hypocrisy, that Jews who do not keep God‖s law are just as guilty as the Gentiles, 
who by common Jewish knowledge, are known to be law-breakers (2:2). Contrary to 
this judge‖s supposition, the judgment of God is impartial and will be unveiled 
against all law-breakers (2:3-5).19 
Second, the judge‖s hypocrisy makes it clear that there is no soteriological 
privilege, even for the Jew, in light of the fact that the Jewish judge, just like the 
mass of common humanity, has been caught in overt rebellion against God‖s law. He 
is not more culpable than others,20 but he is not less culpable either.21 For that 
matter, the judge‖s Jewishness is not the point; his hypocrisy is.22 Stowers‖ polemic 
against the way “Romans has been abstracted, generalized, and individualized by 
interpreters” in order to mount “an attack on ―the typical Jew‖” seems to assume 
that an individualizing reading of this passage necessarily entails taking the Jewish 
judge as a representative of Judaism in and of itself. This is not the case at all:23 the 
Jewishness of the judge is brought into the argument precisely in order to show that 
the Jew and the Gentile are all together in the same plight, that those Jews who 
hypocritically condemn Gentiles have no soteriological safe haven, since all law-
breakers will be judged in the same way as the disobedient Gentiles described in 
1:18-32. 
With the flood of research on the Jewishness of Paul in the latter half of the 
twentieth-century objections have increasingly been raised by scholars to the 
notion that Paul rejects his Jewish covenantal heritage in his letters.24 Such 
arguments often rightly point to passages in which Paul speaks highly of the 
covenantal blessings of Judaism such as Rom 3:1-2; 7:12 and 9:4-5 (cf. Rom 1:16; 2:17-
                                                                                                                                                              
1-8, 152), the main point of Rom 3:19 is nonetheless to speak of the universal plight of humanity with 
reference to the law‖s condemnation. 
19 On the eschatological nature of judgment in Rom 2:5, 12-13, 16, see Richard H. Bell, No One Seeks 
for God: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Romans 1.18-3.20 (WUNT 106; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1998), 148. 
20 Rightly Stowers, Rereading, 143-44. It is, however, unnecessary to argue that the interlocutor in 
2:1 is a Gentile in order to show that the Jew is made out by Paul to be a sharer in the common plight 
of humanity (pace ibid., 149; Oda Wischmeyer, “Römer 2.1-24 als Teil der Gerichtsrede des Paulus 
gegen die Menschheit,” NTS 52 [2006]: 365, 372). The fact that the judge of 2:1 condemns the sins of 
1:18-32 while practicing them himself is sufficient to show this. 
21 Rightly Westerholm, Perspectives, 270-1, n. 23. 
22 Pace Ulrich Wilckens, Der Brief an die Römer (EKKNT; Zürich/Neukirchen: Benziger, 1980), 1.121. 
23 Rightly Campbell, Deliverance, 559-60, although for different reasons than mine. 
24 See e.g., mutatis mutandis Dunn, “New Perspective,” 103-5; Wright, Fresh Perspectives, 3-4, 108-
29; Terence L. Donaldson, Paul and the Gentiles: Remapping the Apostle’s Convictional World (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1997), 236-47; Stowers, Rereading, 149-50; William S. Campbell, “Romans III as a Key to the 
Structure and Thought of the Letter,” NovT 23 (1981): 37-40. 
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20, 25; 11:13-16, 28-29; 15:8-12). However, while there are indeed many covenantal 
privileges enumerated in passages such as these, in none of them is there a notion 
of soteriological privilege, of the idea that the covenant somehow grants Israel 
immunity from the impartiality of divine judgment.25 It is precisely this kind of 
privilege that the argument throughout Rom 2:1-3:20 subverts, with 2:1-29 
specifically targeting the judge‖s hypocrisy, which is symptomatic of the fact that, in 
the final analysis, the Jew is simply a human, an individual, ὦ ἄνθπψπε, and as such 
will face judgment on the same terms as the Gentiles of 1:18-32.26 
 
2.2 To Each His Own: the Judgment and Justification of the Generic Individual 
(Romans 2:6-16) 
In order to explain in more detail the outcome of the judge‖s unrepentant hardness 
of heart (2:5) Paul shifts into a nonspecific mode of individual address in 2:6. Here 
we are introduced to the generic individual.27 
It is appropriate that Paul cites a maxim of biblical wisdom (found almost 
verbatim in LXX Ps 61:13 and Prov 24:12) to introduce the generic individual into his 
argument in chapter 2, enumerating as this maxim does a “timeless” or generalized 
insight about the grounds of God‖s judgment of humanity.28 According to this 
principle of divine justice, God will pay back (ἀποδίδψμι) each individual person 
(ἕκαςσορ) according (κασά) to his or her works.29 In light of the fact that judgment 
will be rendered according to human works, and contrary to the covenant 
presumption of the judgmental judge, there are only two classes of people in the 
                                                        
25 Cf. Wilckens, Römer, 1.127. I thus agree with Campbell, Deliverance, 552 (emphasis original), that 
for Paul “once it has been conceded that final, eschatological judgment will be in accordance with 
desert, then by definition no other considerations are relevant.” 
26 Cf. Wischmeyer, “Römer 2.1-24,” 361. 
27 Or re-introduced as far as the flow of the letter is concerned (see Rom 1:16). 
28 Romans 2:6: ὃρ ἀποδώςει ἑκάςσῳ κασὰ σὰ ἔπγα αὐσοῦ; Ps 61:13b LXX (62:13 MT): ςὺ (= κύπιε) 
ἀποδώςειρ ἑκάςσῳ κασὰ σὰ ἔπγα αὐσοῦ; Prov 24:12e: ὃρ ἀποδίδψςιν ἑκάςσῳ κασὰ σὰ ἔπγα αὐσοτ. Cf. 
Peter Spitaler, “An Integrative, Synergistic Reading of Romans 1-3,” BibInt 19 (2011): 45; Yinger, 
Judgment, 157; Ernst Synofzik, Die Gerichts- und Vergeltungsaussagen bei Paulus: eine 
traditionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung (GTA 8; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), 80. For early 
Jewish and Christian appropriation of this kind of language of judgment, which alternates between 
individual and plural recipients, see Roman Heiligenthal, Werke als Zeichen. Untersuchungen zur 
Bedeutung der menschlichen Taten im Frühjudentum, Neuen Testament und Frühchristentum (WUNT 29; 
Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983), 172-75. 
29 Wright, “Romans,” 438, recognizes that “individuals being shown up as sinners . . . is indeed 
one element in Paul‖s argument,” but subordinates this motif to the larger theme of God‖s “setting 
the whole world to rights” through “Jesus the Messiah.” The broader theme that Wright draws 
attention to may indeed have a role to play in Romans (one thinks particularly of Rom 8:18-25 and 
11:11-36), but does not seem especially germane to Paul‖s discussion of individuals and judgment in 
Romans 2. 
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world, but not the two classes the judge expects (i.e., righteous Jews and 
unrighteous Gentiles): those who patiently and righteously pursue eternal life (2:7), 
and those who selfishly disobey the truth (2:8). In speaking of works (ἔπγα) in 2:6 
Paul has no thought of distinctively Jewish practices; these are simply works done 
by humanity, whether good or bad, whether done by Gentiles or Jews. Divine 
impartiality, as manifested in an unbiased reckoning according to the goodness or 
badness of one‖s actions or works, obliterates covenant privilege, at least 
soteriologically speaking. In so doing, divine justice affects a re-categorization of 
humanity, where there is neither Jew nor Gentile, but simply the generic human, or 
ἄνθπψπορ.30 This is what it means for God to show no partiality (πποςψπολημχία).31 
In 2:12-16 Paul elaborates upon the implications of this new classification of 
humanity: one‖s relationship with Torah is irrelevant (2:12); one‖s righteousness 
comes from doing what the law commands rather than simply being within the 
sphere of the law‖s governance (being a mere hearer [ἀκποασήρ] of the law; 2:13).32 
Law-keeping is held out as an equal possibility for both the Jew and the Gentile even 
though “Gentiles . . . do not have the law by nature” (ἔθνη σὰ μὴ νόμον ἔφονσα 
υύςει).33 In 2:16 Paul closes his discussion of the generic individual begun in 2:6 by 
making it explicit that the rendering according to works described throughout this 
section will take place at the eschatological judgment, “on the day when God, 
through Christ Jesus, judges the secrets of all according to my gospel” (2:16). 
What does all of this have to do with the question of individuals and 
community? First, as we have just seen, the relativization of Jewish covenant 
privilege places individuals as individuals before the bar of divine justice. Whereas 
the mention of God‖s wrath being stored up for the characteristic, judging 
individual in 2:1-5 places Jews and Gentiles alike into the category of sinners, Paul‖s 
                                                        
30 Cf. Jonathan A. Linebaugh, “Announcing the Human: Rethinking the Relationship Between 
Wisdom of Solomon 13-15 and Romans 1.18-2.11,” NTS 57 (2011): 220; cf. 233. Linebaugh speaks of the 
“generic individual” in Rom 2:1, but I believe this designation is more appropriate for the kind of 
individual described beginning in Rom 2:6. The specific terminology is not the most important thing: 
what matters is capturing the way in which Paul, in this section of Romans, uses universally 
applicable, individually-centered language to press home his claim that every individual is 
accountable to God on the basis of individual action (cf. Jewett, Romans, 204; Bell, No One Seeks for God, 
141). 
31 The statement οὐ γάπ ἐςσιν πποςψπολημχία παπὰ σῶ θεῶ is explanatory of what precedes it 
(note the γάπ). 
32 Cf. Yinger, Judgment, 149. 
33 I follow Simon Gathercole, “A Law unto Themselves: The Gentiles in Romans 2.14-15 
Revisited,” JSNT 85 (2002): 35-37, in taking υύςει to modify ἔθνη, for among other reasons, that υύςει 
in Paul is everywhere else a marker of identity, rather than action. 
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purpose in shifting in 2:6 to speak of a generic individual is to individualize and 
personalize the nature of the coming assize of God. Before the all-seeing eye of 
divine justice the individual stands before God simply as an individual, unable to 
hide behind the various collectivities and solidarities of the world.34 
Second, the personalizing of God‖s justice seen in 2:6-16 has important 
implications for Paul‖s understanding of justification. If it is true that God will judge 
every single person (ἕκαςσορ - 2:6) simply according to the criterion of works (and 
irrespective of covenant status), then justification too is a matter of pointedly 
individual concern. Paul‖s argument in 2:6-16 revolves around this connection 
between individual judgment and individual justification. It makes no sense to 
suggest that Paul shifts from speaking of the individual in 2:6 to speaking of 
justification in exclusively, or even primarily, communal terms in 2:13. This would 
destroy to logic of Paul‖s argument: justification being granted “to the doers of the 
law” (2:13) means that judgment is rendered according to the works of the individual 
(2:6). In fact, despite the claims of those such as N. T. Wright that “there is no such 
thing as an ―individual‖ Christian” since “Paul‖s gospel created a community” and 
“his doctrine of justification sustained it,”35 it is highly significant that Paul‖s first 
direct mention of justification in the letter speaks simply of the justification of the 
generic, “timeless” individual. The corporate and covenantal ramifications of 
justification become apparent as Paul‖s argument develops (particularly beginning 
in 2:25, and continuing throughout Romans 3), but in Romans 2 Paul can refer to 
judgment and justification in a strongly individualizing manner without any 
reference to community (either its creation or maintenance). 
In sum, the logic of Paul‖s argument in 2:6-16 can be paraphrased like this: 
God will judge every individual according to works, whether good or bad, making no 
distinction between Jews or Gentiles according to covenant status (2:6-12); thus, 
justification is based on obedience to Torah, and will be parcelled out impartially to 
each individual on the eschatological day of divine reckoning (2:13-16).36 While 
                                                        
34 This, then, is the main (perhaps only) place in Romans where Burnett‖s talk of the “individual 
qua individual, irrespective of social or, indeed, historical identity” (Burnett, Salvation, 10) is 
appropriate. Such language, however, is highly problematic if used indiscriminately in speaking of 
Paul‖s thought more broadly. 
35 Wright, Saint Paul, 197; cf. idem, Fresh Perspectives, 120; Engberg-Pedersen, Cosmology and Self, 
142. 
36 Cf. 1 Corinthians 4:5, where Paul warns the Corinthians not to judge others in the church 
“before the time,” that is, before the final judgment (“before the Lord comes”). On that day praise 
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there are communal implications in this section of text, they are almost entirely 
negative in the form of Paul‖s argument to eliminate communal soteriological 
privilege.37 
Importantly, the generic individual in 2:6-16 is more immediately relevant to 
the real individuals that Paul is attempting to reach (and transform) with his letter 
than is the characteristic individual of 2:1-5, 17-25. This is seen in the fact that Rom 
2:1-5 addresses in general terms a problem Paul feels is important enough to deal 
with in the exposition of his gospel, even though the characteristic Jewish judge 
may or may not be assumed to be present in Paul‖s actual audience. In fact, his 
possible presence or absence is largely irrelevant to Paul‖s intention in bringing him 
into his argument; the successful functioning of the hypocritical judge—rhetorically 
speaking—is brought about in and through the characterization of the judge and the 
implicit paraenesis that is meant to be read off of the negative example he provides. 
All of this focuses Paul‖s exhortation firmly on individuals.38 
With the generic individual of 2:6-16, however, Paul has shifted to describe 
the fate that awaits actual individuals, even though he is of course speaking here in 
generalizing terms. The shift to a generic description of individuals and divine 
judgment is intended to bring this out: the impartiality of divine judgment places 
each and every human being on the same soteriological plane. Paul speaks of the 
judgment that awaits every single individual in the world in order to remove the 
last hope of the hypocritical judge to evade the implications of the human plunge 
into sin and depravity described in more universal terms in 1:18-32. In other words, 
there may have seemed to be room to hide in that passage‖s collectively oriented 
descriptions of human depravity, but with 2:6-16 the possibility of hiding beneath 
                                                                                                                                                              
(ἔπαινορ) will be given to “each individual from God” (ἑκάςσῳ ἀπὸ σοῦ θεοῦ). Bell, No One Seeks for 
God, 4-8, cf. 144, importantly argues that divine impartiality is manifested in the single way of 
justification, rather than the single way of justification being derived from an abstract principle of 
divine impartiality (pace Jouette M. Bassler, “Divine Impartiality in Paul‖s Letter to the Romans,” 
NovT 26 [1984]: 43-58). I would only add that the one way of justification flows directly from the fact 
that judgment comes to each individual as an individual, with the result that justification does as 
well, even as it also reshapes the boundaries of the people of God. 
37 Cf. Campbell, Deliverance, 552-53; Synofzik, Gerichts, 80-1. Thus, Donaldson‖s (Gentiles, 161-62) 
contention that Paul‖s understanding of the human predicament “arises not from any basic 
conviction concerning humankind as an undifferentiated whole but from a conviction that the 
community of salvation is to be determined by the boundary marker of faith in Christ” cannot make 
sense of Paul‖s argument in Romans 2. It is precisely such a “basic conviction concerning humankind 
as an undifferentiated whole” that we see at work in Rom 2:6-13: because God will one day judge 
every individual according to works, there is no divine partiality, with the result that before God 
each and every human being is simply human (rightly Wischmeyer, “Römer 2.1-24,” 373-76). 
38 Cf. Yinger, Judgment, 163. 
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the camouflage of covenant solidarity disappears completely.39 Every “einzelne 
Mensch” will stand before God‖s eschatological judgment simply as a 
“verantwortliches Individuum.”40 One‖s present response to God as such an 
individual is determinative of that future verdict.41 
Communally-centered challenges to a position such as the one I have just 
articulated are certainly not lacking. Calvin Roetzel, for example, while admitting 
that Paul “is not unmindful of the individual believer,” strongly contends that 
“Paul‖s emphasis falls on the corporate aspects of judgment.”42 This, then, also 
contributes to Roetzel‖s downplaying of the importance of individual justification in 
Paul, since the problems of individual sin and judgment have largely fallen out of 
the picture. Such a line of reasoning, however, simply cannot do justice to the 
pronounced individual language in Rom 2:6-11, and to its implications for 
justification. Somewhat inexplicably, there are only two sentences in Roetzel‖s 
entire book discussing Rom 2:6-11, and these are found on a page where Roetzel 
reaffirms that “wrathful judgment is corporate” in Paul rather than individual.43 In 
                                                        
39 Mark A. Seifrid, “The Narrative of Scripture and Justification by Faith,” CTQ 72 (2008): 43-44. Cf. 
Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns; 6th ed.; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1933), 63: “Here again the Jew and the Greek, the men of God and the men of the world, are 
assembled together on one line under the threat of judgement.” 
40 Wischmeyer, “Römer 2.1-24,” 375. 
41 This is not to say that Paul ultimately envisions that anyone will be justified by works, which I 
along with many others (see the list of scholars in Spitaler, “Romans 1-3,” 44, n. 20; Chris 
VanLandingham, Judgment and Justification in Early Judaism and the Apostle Paul [Peabody, Mass.: 
Hendrickson, 2006], 215, n. 137; Bell, No One Seeks for God, 134, n. 11) take to be hypothetical, or as Moo 
(Romans, 86) better phrases it, “theoretical.” While many scholars (see e.g., Spitaler, “Romans 1-3,” 
45-48; VanLandingham, Justification, 215-32; Klyne R. Snodgrass, “Justification by Grace - to the Doers: 
An Analysis of the Place of Romans 2 in the Theology of Paul,” NTS 32 [1986]: 72-93) have recently 
balked at the idea that Paul could be describing an unattainable justification by works in Rom 2:6-16, 
this is actually quite similar to Rom 10:5-13, where Paul mentions the possibility of receiving 
righteousness through law-keeping (10:5) only to immediately exclude that possibility in reality 
(Rom 10:6-13; cf. Gal 3:10-14; Phil 3:9; Westerholm, Perspectives, 272, 326-30; Synofzik, Gerichts, 81). 
Those who argue for an actual justification by works (future or not) have not attended sufficiently to 
the way in which Paul closes this possibility off in Rom 3:9-20 (cf. Rom 4:5; and see Otfried Hofius, 
“―Werke des Gesetzes‖: Untersuchungen zu der paulinischen Rede von den ἔπγα νόμοτ,” in Paulus und 
Johannes: Exegetische Studien zur paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie und Literatur [eds. D. Sanger 
and U. Mell; WUNT 198; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006], 290-91; Bell, No One Seeks for God, 162, 250-56; 
see also Wischmeyer, “Römer 2.1-24,” 361; G. P. Carras, “Romans 2, 1-29: A Dialogue on Jewish Ideals,” 
Bib 73 [1992]: 185, on the need to read Rom 2:12-16 in light of all of 1:18-3:20). 
42 Calvin J. Roetzel, Judgement in the Community: A Study of the Relationship between Eschatology and 
Ecclesiology in Paul (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 178 (cf. 79-80, 90, 100-1, 107, 176). 
43 Ibid., 81. 
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light of what has been argued above, Roetzel‖s failure to figure Rom 2:6-11 into his 
overall argument is a problematic omission, to say the least.44 
 
2.3 Invisible Cutting and Impotent Commands: Heart Surgery and the Generic 
Individual (Rom 2:25-29) 
In Rom 2:25-29, Paul again brings together both the characteristic and generic 
individuals. Romans 2:25 consists in Paul‖s rebuke of the Jewish judge in light of the 
judge‖s hypocritical law-breaking described in 2:21-24: circumcision (and thus 
covenant privilege) “is of benefit if you do [ππάςςψ] what the law says,” but not if 
you transgress it.45 In 2:26, Paul shifts back to generic individual address to make the 
exhortative implications of all that has preceded in chapter 2 more explicit: the 
uncircumcised individual (ἡ ἀκποβτςσία) who keeps (υτλάςςψ) the righteous 
stipulations of the law (σὰ δικαιώμασα σοῦ νόμοτ) is the one who is pleasing to God, 
who is considered (λογίζομαι) by God to be one of his people, a truly circumcised 
individual. In 2:28 Paul further critiques the judge‖s hypocrisy—again speaking of a 
generic individual—with an even more markedly individualizing comment: to be a 
Jew truly, that is, to be a member of God‖s people, is not a matter of an outward 
circumcision of the flesh (ἡ ἐν σῶ υανεπῶ ἐν ςαπκὶ πεπισομή - 2:28), but of a 
circumcision of the heart, by the Spirit (πεπισομὴ καπδίαρ ἐν πνεύμασι - 2:29). Only a 
person who has been circumcised in this manner is inwardly a Jew (ὁ ἐν σῶ κπτπσῶ 
Ἰοτδαῖορ) who will receive praise from God (ὁ ἔπαινορ . . . ἐκ σοῦ θεοῦ).46 
The individual implications of the language of Rom 2:28-29 are strongly 
reinforced in 2:29 when Paul indicates that the location of spiritual circumcision is 
the human heart.47 Put simply, there is no collective heart in Paul (or the rest of the 
                                                        
44 Like many other scholars, much of Roetzel‖s argumentation is based on an equation of 
communal language (i.e., second person plurals) with wholly (or nearly so) corporate concerns (see 
e.g., ibid., 84), an equation that has been effectively challenged by Peterman, “Plural You,” 183-96. 
45 Romans 2:25: Πεπισομὴ μὲν γὰπ ὠυελεῖ ἐὰν νόμον ππάςςῃρ· ἐὰν δὲ παπαβάσηρ νόμοτ ᾖρ, ἡ 
πεπισομή ςοτ ἀκποβτςσία γέγονεν. 
46 See Simon Gathercole, Where is Boasting? Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul’s Response in Romans 1-5 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 206-7. Paul also makes use of an inner/outer contrast in a few other 
places in his letters (Rom 7:22-23; 2 Cor 4:16; cf. Eph 3:16), a contrast that focuses on inner renewal 
and the locus of individual moral action as opposed to outward characteristics and physicality. 
47 Romans 2:15 and 2:29 almost certainly both allude to LXX Jer 38:33, and if so, this fact 
highlights the individual focus of Rom 2:29 all the more. In LXX Jer 38:33 (ESV) God‖s promise to 
Israel is that “I will put my laws in their minds, and I will write them on their hearts. And I will be 
their God, and they will be my people” (διδοὺρ δώςψ νόμοτρ μοτ εἰρ σὴν διάνοιαν αὐσ῵ν καὶ ἐπὶ 
καπδίαρ αὐσ῵ν γπάχψ αὐσούρ καὶ ἔςομαι αὐσοῖρ εἰρ θεόν καὶ αὐσοὶ ἔςονσαί μοι εἰρ λαόν). The 
creation of a renewed and cleansed people of God in this passage in Jeremiah, then, is enacted in the 
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New Testament for that matter); καπδία in Paul‖s letters without exception indicates 
an internal and, thus, individual human focus.48 Although John Barclay is correct to 
note that the meaning of heart-circumcision in the Old Testament and in Paul 
centers on the issue of “obedient response to God,”49 this fact should not be taken as 
militating against a focus on interiority in Rom 2:29,50 since Paul explicitly speaks 
here of heart-circumcision as an “inward” (κπτπσόρ) action. Although Paul‖s use of 
κπτπσόρ does not entail an inwardness in a Platonic sense (soul vs. body),51 it does 
entail inwardness in the sense of being directed toward a divine transformation of 
individual volition leading to obedience, in distinction from an outward 
transformation in the sense of a physical change to the body. A focus on the inner 
seat of emotion and ethical action in the human person does not require one to 
import Platonic dualities into Paul‖s anthropology. As Herman Ridderbos puts it: for 
Paul there is no “dualistic man consisting of two ―parts,‖ or of a more or less ―real‖ or 
―essential‖ part of man . . . Rather . . . man does not only ―have‖ an outward and 
inward side, but is as man both ―outward‖ and ―inward,‖ exists both in the one way 
and in the other.”52 Heart-circumcision pertains to the latter of these aspects of 
human existence, and is as such centered on individual, inner, ethical action. 
Paul, then, can define the very essence of what it means to be a member of 
the true covenant community by referring to the inner and personal operation of 
the Spirit on the hearts of individuals. As such, it is misleading to suggest that other 
(admittedly important) issues (e.g., about the scope of the people of God, etc.) 
eliminate—or even subordinate—questions about the place of individuals within 
that people. 
                                                                                                                                                              
deposit of Torah within, and the transcription of Torah on, the hearts of each individual Israelite (cf. 
ἕκαςσορ in LXX Jer 38:34). For further defense of the claim that Rom 2:15 and 2:29 allude to LXX Jer 
38:33 see Gathercole, “Romans 2.14-15,” 41-43. 
48 The heart (καπδία) metaphor is employed with great frequency by Paul (following frequent 
Semitic usage of the same type; see e.g., Deut 28:19; 1 Sam 16:7; Jer 31:33 [LXX 38:33]; Zech 7:10) to 
speak of emotions, desires, agency, etc., which are inner and personal, often as opposed to that 
which is outward and external. See e.g., Rom 2:5, 15; 5:5; 6:17; 8:27; 9:2; 10:1, 6, 8, 9, 10; 16:18; 1 Cor 2:9; 
4:5; 7:37; 14:25; 2 Cor 1:22; 2:4; 3:2, 3, 15; 4:6; 5:12; 6:11; 7:3; 8:16; 9:7; Gal 4:6; Phil 1:7; 4:7; Col 2:2; 3:15, 
16, 22; 4:8; 1 Thess 2:4; 2:17; 3:13; cf. Eph 1:18; 3:17; 4:18; 5:19; 6:5, 22; 2 Thess 2:17; 3:5; 1 Tim 1:5; 2 Tim 
2:22. All of the standard dictionaries make the inner focus of biblical heart language abundantly clear 
(see e.g., F. Baumgärtel, J. Behm, “καπδία,” TDNT 3:605-13). 
49 John M. G. Barclay, “Paul and Philo on Circumcision: Romans 2.25-9 in Social and Cultural 
Context,” NTS 44 (1998): 551-52. 
50 Pace ibid., 554. 
51 Contra Daniel Boyarin, A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1994), 93-95. 
52 Herman Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology (trans. John Richard De Witt; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1975), 115 (cf. 119-20, 227). 
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3. The Generic Individual (Romans 3) 
3.1 The Law‖s Condemning Speech: Universal and Particular (Romans 3:9-20) 
In order to substantiate his claim that both Jews and Greeks are equally under the 
power of sin, Paul strings together a list of biblical citations, taken from the Psalms 
and Isaiah.53 As with the allusion to LXX Ps 61:13 and Prov 24:12 in Rom 2:6, in Rom 
3:10-18 Paul again generalizes the human condition by citing several sapiential 
maxims from OT texts that speak of a generic individual. With this chain of 
scriptural references Paul eliminates any remaining hope in the mind of his 
interlocutor that righteousness can be found simply by inclusion within the 
covenant community: “no one is righteous” (οὐκ ἔςσιν δίκαιορ), “no one 
understands” (οὐκ ἔςσιν ὁ ςτνίψν), “no one seeks God” (οὐκ ἔςσιν ὁ ἐκζησ῵ν σὸν 
θεόν), “all have turned aside together and become worthless” (πάνσερ ἐξέκλιναν 
ἅμα ἠφπεώθηςαν), “no one does what is right” (οὐκ ἔςσιν ὁ ποι῵ν φπηςσόσησα), “not 
a single one” ([οὐκ ἔςσιν] ἕψρ ἑνόρ). 
The reference to the generic individual is unmistakably central in this 
catena: in light of the ubiquity of human sin, every individual stands alone as an 
individual before the bar of divine justice. In 3:10-12 every single phrase is a 
scriptural citation that speaks of individuals and individual action, with the 
exception of 3:12a, which notes that “all [πάνσερ] have turned aside together and 
become worthless.” This one plural form makes it clear that side by side Paul both 
individualizes and universalizes. There is no tension in this move: taken together, 
Paul‖s scripturally-based description of individual, sinful responses to God (in 3:10-
12) gives him warrant to speak of the entirety of humanity in its collective 
“worthlessness” (3:12). The collective human rebellion against God is the aggregate 
of every individual act of revolt, rather than some sort of amorphous 
conglomeration that erases individual volition and personality. There are 
communally significant overtones in this section of Romans, but, as with 2:6-16, 
they are almost entirely negative in that the community here described is simply a 
                                                        
53 Psalms 14:1-3 (13:1 LXX) and 53:1-3 (52:1 LXX) in Rom 3:10-12; Pss 5:9 (5:10 LXX) and 140:3 
(139:4 LXX) in Rom 3:13; Ps 10:7 (9:28 LXX) in Rom 3:14; Isa 59:7-8 in Rom 3:15-17; and Ps 36:1 (35:1 
LXX) in Rom 3:18. 
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community of the unrighteous.54 Similarly, the generic individual is a completely 
negative example of unrighteous rebellion in this section of the letter.  
Furthermore, although Paul speaks in 3:10-12 of the generic individual (or 
more accurately, of a variety of generic individuals), he shifts to speaking in the 
plural in 3:13-18. However, there is no indication that Paul has begun to speak of 
anyone other than the aggregate of generic individuals mentioned in 3:10-12, who 
all together have turned away from God in disobedience and who thus substantiate 
Paul‖s point that Jews and Greeks are equally under sin (3:9). 
In 3:19-20, Paul‖s argument reaches a major point of summary and 
transition.55 Essentially the whole narrative of human sin and hypocrisy 
(encompassing Jews and Gentiles) that Paul began in 1:18 is summarized in 3:19: the 
law, even though given as the covenant charter of Israel, speaks its word of 
command and rebuke to everyone who is under the law, which, as the second half of 
3:19 makes clear, includes “every mouth” (πᾶν ςσόμα) and “the whole world” (πᾶρ ὁ 
κόςμορ). In other words, the law makes the whole world, that is, each and every 
individual in the world, answerable (ὑπόδικορ) to God‖s inscrutable reckoning.56 It is 
for this reason that “all flesh” (πᾶςα ςάπξ) will not be justified by works of the law 
(3:20). While the universality of this statement is important (it indeed includes all of 
humanity within its scope), it is invalid to suggest that this universality swallows 
the individualizing particularity of πᾶν ςσόμα in 3:19. 
In 3:19-20, then, the individualization and universalization of sin in 3:10-18 
comes to a head with the corresponding individualization and universalization of 
guilt and judgment, even as these two verses point ahead to Paul‖s positive 
statement of the path to justification (of the generic individual). 
 
                                                        
54 Although the fact that there is a single and universal community of the unrighteous paves the 
way for Paul‖s talk of a single and universal way of justification, and thus of a single and universal 
(comprising Jew and Gentile) community of the saved later in the letter. 
55 On which, see Wischmeyer, “Römer 2.1-24,” 364. 
56  Jewett, Romans, 258, in commenting on the increasingly popular scholarly argument that Paul 
never speaks of “universal sin,” (see e.g., the scholars listed in Yinger, Judgment, 150, n. 28) rightly 
concludes that Paul does indeed “make precisely this case and he does so effectively” (cf. 
Wischmeyer, “Römer 2.1-24,” 369, 375; Wright, “Romans,” 456-58, 63; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 151-52; and 
esp. Stowers, Rereading, 112; contra Heikki Räisänen, Paul and the Law [WUNT 29; Τübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 1983], 99) even though Jewett does not find Paul‖s logic compelling. 
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3.2 The Generic Individual: Faith and Fame (Romans 3:20-31) 
Having established that God will judge each individual impartially according to 
works (2:6-16), and that all of humanity (each and every individual) is indeed under 
condemnation for sin (3:9), and in this way made answerable to God through the law 
(3:19), Paul programmatically announces the consequences of all of this in 3:20: 
because of the universal condemnation the law pronounces over a guilty world, it is 
therefore (διόσι) the case that no one (lit. “all flesh [πᾶςα ςάπξ] will not . . .”) will be 
justified before God by works of the law, because (γάπ) the law can only declare sin 
to be sin, without being able to provide sin‖s remedy. If works of the law cannot 
justify a person, what can? Answering this question occupies Paul in 3:21-31. 
 In 3:21 Paul emphatically (ντνὶ δέ) contrasts justification by works of the law 
(3:20) with the righteousness of God (δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ) that has appeared apart from 
the law (φψπὶρ νόμοτ). This righteousness, Paul says, comes through the “faith of 
Jesus Christ to all those who believe.”57 Just as there is no partiality 
(πποςψπολημχία - 2:11) on God‖s part, seen in his judgement of every individual on 
the same terms (2:6-16), so also God does not show favor to Jews or Gentiles in 
justification: there is only one way of receiving the δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ and it is διὰ 
πίςσεψρ Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ. 
As is well known, the meaning of both of these phrases is highly contested in 
recent scholarship. These debates have important bearings on the issue of the 
individual in Pauline thought.58 Particularly common in recent decades has been the 
dismissal of the notion that Paul is speaking in 3:22 (as well as Phil 3:9; Gal 2:16; 3:22) 
of individuals believing in Christ and being justified as a result.59 It is not difficult to 
understand why such debates have developed, especially given the compressed 
nature of the references to πίςσιρ in 3:2260 (and the similarly compressed nature of 
the connection between faith and righteousness in 1:16-1761), but even opponents of 
                                                        
57 Gk: δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ διὰ πίςσεψρ Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ, εἰρ πάνσαρ σοὺρ πιςσεύονσαρ. 
58 On debates over δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ see the literature cited throughout Jewett, Romans, 141-48. 
On πίςσεψρ Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ (and variants) see the survey of positions in Debbie Hunn, “Debating the 
Faithfulness of Jesus Christ in Twentieth-Century Scholarship,” in The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, 
Biblical, and Theological Studies (eds. Michael F. Bird and Preston M. Sprinkle; Peabody, Mass.: 
Hendrickson, 2009), 15-31; Matthew C. Easter, “The Pistis Christou Debate: Main Arguments and 
Responses in Summary,” CBR 9 (2010): 33-47. 
59 On these debates see Dunson, “Faith,” 19-23. 
60 Cf. Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 244, who speaks of the “relationship between ―faith‖ 
and ―Jesus [Christ]‖” in 3:21-22 as being “relatively undefined.” 
61 Which Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith (London: T & T Clark International, 2004), 72, 
calls “brief, cryptic Pauline formulations.” 
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an “anthropological” understanding of faith and righteousness in 3:22 must admit 
that the phrase that qualifies διὰ πίςσεψρ Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ, namely εἰρ πάνσαρ σοὺρ 
πιςσεύονσαρ, makes at least minimal reference to individuals who exercise faith and 
thus receive the δικαιοςύνη θεοῦ (whatever this phrase means).62 
 However, the individual is not nearly as reticent in 3:20-31 as is commonly 
suggested in recent scholarship. To begin with, Paul insists in 3:26 that because God 
has dealt with sin through the blood of Christ (3:25), his own righteousness is 
upheld even as he justifies “the one who is from the faith of Jesus” (σὸν ἐκ πίςσεψρ 
Ἰηςοῦ).63 Just as the focus of Paul‖s discourse in the beginning of chapter 3 has been 
the sinful individual (3:10-20; see also 3:4), so now Paul speaks of the converse: the 
justified individual who is justified by faith. No matter what position one takes in 
the pistis Christou debates, σὸν ἐκ πίςσεψρ Ἰηςοῦ refers to the individual who has 
πίςσιρ, although the symmetry of Paul‖s plight (3:9-20) to solution (3:21-28) 
argumentation throughout Romans 3 points quite decidedly against a subjective 
genitive reading of πίςσιρ Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ in Rom 3:22. The pistis Christou debate has 
perhaps led to an overly hasty dismissal of the generic individual from Paul‖s 
argumentation in 3:21-31 because interpreters have not paid sufficient attention to 
how prominent this individual is in the material directly preceding 3:21-31. It makes 
little sense for Paul to argue so extensively for the sinfulness of the generic 
individual, and for the consequent exclusion of justification by works of the law for 
this individual (3:10-20), only to speak in the next breath of the remedy for this 
situation (πίςσιρ) in non-individual terms.64 
                                                        
62 Cf. “The gift of righteousness” (σῆρ δψπεᾶρ σῆρ δικαιοςύνηρ) in Rom 5:17. Many proponents of 
a christological understanding of πίςσιρ Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ (e.g., Hays, Faith of Jesus Christ, 283, 292; cf. 
161; Campbell, “Romans 1:17,” 277, n. 39, although cf. ibid., 274-75, n. 28) recognize this, but many 
also greatly tone down the significance of this fact in order to highlight the supposedly non-
anthropocentric meaning of πίςσιρ Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ. 
63 This is stated directly after Paul has said that righteousness comes to all who believe “because 
there is no difference, all have sinned and lack the glory of God” (οὐ γάπ ἐςσιν διαςσολή, πάνσερ γὰπ 
ἥμαπσον καὶ ὑςσεποῦνσαι σῆρ δόξηρ σοῦ θεοῦ - 3:22d-23, emphasis added), thereby continuing Paul‖s 
pattern of setting the individual and universal dimensions of his gospel side by side, a procedure 
which (rather than inexplicable redundancy) accounts for Paul‖s consistent practice of attaching πᾶρ 
to πίςσιρ and πιςσεύψ (on which see R. Barry Matlock, “The Rhetoric of πίςσιρ in Paul: Galatians 2.16, 
3.22, Romans 3.22, and Philippians 3.9,” JSNT 30 [2007]: 184-87). 
64 Cf. Matlock, “Detheologizing the πίςσιρ Χπιςσοῦ Debate: Cautionary Remarks from a Lexical 
Semantic Perspective,” NovT 42 (2000): 21; idem, “Rhetoric of πίςσιρ,” 184. The individual nature of 
justification and faith in Rom 3:20-22 is evident from the following considerations. First, it is evident 
that the individual should be conceptually included in Paul‖s statement that ἐξ ἔπγψν νόμοτ οὐ 
δικαιψθήςεσαι πᾶςα ςὰπξ (Rom 3:20) when this verse is compared with Gal 2:16a, which uses a nearly 
identical phrase as Rom 3:20, but which substitutes ἄνθπψπορ for the πᾶςα ςάπξ found in Rom 3:20. 
In other words, in Gal 2:16 πᾶςα ςάπξ (2:16f) and ἄνθπψπορ (2:16a), while having universal and 
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It is in Rom 3:21-31, in fact, that we find the most theologically significant 
instantiation of the generic individual in the letter so far: Paul‖s rhetorical question 
in 3:27 (which sums up 3:21-26) makes this clear: “Where then is boasting?” Paul 
states emphatically that boasting has been excluded, not by a “law of works” 
([νόμοτ] σ῵ν ἔπγψν), but by a “law of faith” (νόμοτ πίςσεψρ). The proof? “Because 
[γάπ] we consider a person [ἄνθπψπορ] to be justified by faith apart from works of 
the law” (3:28). Justification by faith excludes all human boasting, and it does so on 
explicitly individual grounds: ὁ ἄνθπψπορ, the generic human, cannot be justified 
by works of the law.65 
In 3:29 Paul poses another rhetorical question, this time asking whether God 
is the God of Jews alone.66  This too Paul emphatically rejects since the oneness of 
God demands that he justify both Jews and Gentiles in the same way (3:30). Despite 
the importance of Jews (and Israel), Gentiles and Greeks in Romans, Paul does not 
                                                                                                                                                              
particular overtones respectively, are seen to be essentially interchangeable (cf. ibid., 199). Πᾶςα 
ςάπξ should be understood in the same way in Rom 3:20, which is exactly identical with Gal 2:16f. 
Second, the individual focus of πίςσιρ in Rom 3:22 can be substantiated by noting how Paul uses 
δικαιοςύνη and δικαιόψ interchangeably in Gal 2:16-21 to refer to individuals being justified. In Gal 
2:16-21 Paul writes three times of the same law-faith contrast that is present in Rom 3:20-22 using 
the verbal form of δικαιόψ, twice with third person singular forms. The occurrence of ἄνθπψπορ 
together with the third person singular of δικαιόψ in Gal 2:16, then, makes it clear that it is an 
individual that is justified by faith. Combined with the conceptual inclusion of ἄνθπψπορ within πᾶςα 
ςάπξ in Gal 2:16 and Rom 3:20, it is seen that Rom 3:20-22—which makes exactly the same point about 
justification apart from works of the law as Gal 2:16-21—should be understood similarly (and 
indispensably) to include the generic individual within its scope. One could argue that δικαιοςύνη 
θεοῦ διὰ πίςσεψρ Ἰηςοτ Χπιςσοῦ (Rom 3:22) is different since it uses the nominal δικ- form 
δικαιοςύνη, rather than the verbal form δικαιόψ, but this also happens in Gal 2:21, which uses the 
nominal form δικαιοςύνη to make the same point about individual justification by faith that Paul 
makes in Gal 2:16-17 using the verbal form δικαιόψ. No matter what else is said about it, justification 
by faith in Paul is the justification of the individual. Galatians 2:16 is worded as follows (with the 
relevant phrases bolded): εἰδόσερ ὅσι οὐ δικαιοῦσαι ἄνθπψπορ ἐξ ἔπγψν νόμοτ ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίςσεψρ 
Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ, καὶ ἡμεῖρ εἰρ Χπιςσὸν Ἰηςοῦν ἐπιςσεύςαμεν, ἵνα δικαιψθ῵μεν ἐκ πίςσεψρ Χπιςσοῦ καὶ 
οὐκ ἐξ ἔπγψν νόμοτ, ὅσι ἐξ ἔπγψν νόμοτ οὐ δικαιψθήςεσαι πᾶςα ςάπξ. Cf. Rom 3:20: διόσι ἐξ ἔπγψν 
νόμοτ οὐ δικαιψθήςεσαι πᾶςα ςὰπξ ἐνώπιον αὐσοῦ, διὰ γὰπ νόμοτ ἐπίγνψςιρ ἁμαπσίαρ. 
65 In Rom 4:2 Paul makes this theoretical exclusion of boasting in works concrete with the 
example of Abraham. As Moo, Romans, 246-47, rightly insists, the basis for boasting cannot be 
restricted to ethnic or religious markers, since any works Abraham could have done were prior to 
the giving of Torah to Israel. 
66 As Simon Gathercole, “Justified by Faith, Justified by His Blood: The Evidence of Romans 3:21-
4:25,” in Justification and Variegated Nomism. Volume 2: The Paradoxes of Paul (eds. P. T. O‖Brien, D. A. 
Carson and M. A. Seifrid; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), 155, notes “Paul often uses ἤ with 
questions to get to the answer he wants to explore.” See e.g., Rom 2:3-4; 6:1-4; 9:20-21; 11:34-35; 14:10; 
all referred to by Gathercole. Thus, Paul‖s question in 3:29, whether God is a God only of the Jews 
does not flow directly from 3:27-28 as a substantiation of his point in those two verses, but rather 
introduces a new question that Paul answers immediately in the same verse, and in 3:30 as well (i.e., 
ἤ is not an explanatory conjunction like γάπ [on which see BDF §§ 446, 452; cf. Daniel B. Wallace, 
Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: an Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
1996), 672-73]; contra James D. G. Dunn, “Paul and Justification by Faith,” in The New Perspective on Paul 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 372-73; idem, Romans 1-8, 188; Wright, “Romans,” 482. 
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refer only to people groups in Rom 3:29-30, but also to the individual Jew (“the 
circumcised one” [πεπισομή]) and non-Jew (“the uncircumcised one” [ἀκποβτςσία]) 
(cf. Rom 2:26-29). Justification by faith, then, has an important role in the 
transformation of group identity in Romans, but it has an expressly individual 
application as well: it is precisely through the justification of the circumcised 
person and the uncircumcised person in the same way (by faith) that God is seen to 
be the God of both Jews and Gentiles. The individual and community are two 
distinct, yet inseparable, realms of divine redemptive action. 
Thus, in 3:27-31 Paul has succinctly restated the two contentions pertaining 
to justification he has developed throughout 2:1-3:26: obedience to the law cannot 
justify any individual (3:27-28; cf. 3:9-26) and Jews have no special soteriological 
privilege when it comes to God‖s eschatological judgment (3:29-30; cf. 2:1-3:8). The 
latter of these contentions is indeed important in Paul‖s argument, but cannot be 
made (as it is by many) to represent the “fundamental problem . . . in Romans,”67 
since, as the discussion above has shown, the sorting out of the nature of the 
relationship between Jews and Gentiles in Christ is largely a by-product (although 
an important one) of the more fundamental reality of the eschatological judgment 
of the individual as neither a Jew nor a Gentile, but simply as ἄνθπψπορ. For Paul, 
neither privilege nor praxis can bring justification; there is only one thing that 
matters: the faithfulness (or not) of the generic ἄνθπψπορ, the individual coram Deo. 
Bultmann‖s exegetical sensitivities are precisely on target here: “Vor Gott 
verschwinden alle menschlichen Differenzierungen; vor ihm steht der Jude wie der 
Grieche gleichermaßen als ἄνθπψπορ (Rm 3, 28 f.). Menschliche Größe und 
menschliche Wertungen sind vor Gott nichtig.”68 
 
4. Summary: Characteristic and Generic Individuals in Romans 2-3 
Romans 2-3 represents an interweaving of two individual types: the characteristic 
individual and the generic individual. The hypocritical judge in 2:1 is a character 
type, a characteristic individual, in service of Paul‖s argument for the abolishment 
of Jewish soteriological privilege (2:1-5, 17-25; 3:1-9). The generic individual (2:6-16, 
26-29; 3:10-20) is brought into this argument in order to show that in light of divine 
justice and impartiality, every individual will face judgement on the basis of actions 
                                                        
67 Hays, “Abraham as Father,” 69. 
68 Bultmann, Theologie, 227. 
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(obeying the law or not) rather than mere possession of the law (cf. ἕκαςσορ in Rom 
14:12). Paul holds out hope for the generic ἄνθπψπορ under the threat of the law‖s 
judgment through finding righteousness in Christ, and being justified on account of 
Christ‖s sacrifice (3:21-26), rather than by means of a law that can only condemn 
(3:20).69 Since God is one, he justifies in one way, thus further relativizing Jewish 
covenantal privilege (3:27-31).70 
In sum, claims for the absence—or even unimportance—of the individual in 
Romans 2-3 must be deemed a failure. Without attending to the ways in which Paul 
uses the characteristic and generic individual “types” in Romans 2-3, his 
argumentation cannot be properly grasped, nor his central theological motifs fully 
apprehended. Most importantly, both the characteristic individual and the generic 
individual make clear that individual action is indispensable to Paul‖s explication of 
the gospel; sin, judgment, faith, justification and salvation are all individual actions. 
No communal themes, however important, should be allowed to obscure this fact. 
Yet there are important communal implications to be seen in Romans 2-3. 
The use to which Paul puts both the characteristic and the generic individual in 
these chapters has highlighted the fact that Paul speaks of sin, faith and justification 
in strongly individual terms because of the way he relates the final judgement to 
present human experience: every individual will stand before God at the final 
judgment simply as an individual. In light of this impartiality of divine justice, the 
only way to enter into the true community of God is through having the verdict of 
God‖s condemnation for sin (Rom 2:6-12; 3:19; etc.) overturned through 
participation in the redemption accomplished by Jesus Christ on the cross (Rom 
3:21-28).71 As Romans 6 will go on to show, redemption in Christ is an incorporation 
into Christ. This incorporation, as we will see in the next chapter when discussing 
                                                        
69 On the vital connection between justification and Christ‖s work of redemption in Rom 3:21-
4:25 see esp. Gathercole, “Romans 3:21-4:25,” 169-83. 
70 Although it is somewhat tangential to my argument, I am in agreement with Gathercole (ibid., 
214-15) that Jewish covenantal presumption should not be understood as excluding Jewish 
confidence in final vindication on the basis of “obedient fulfillment of Torah.” 
71 As already noted Burnett sees Jews and Gentiles entering God‖s single people by faith as the 
only significant agreement to be found with communally-minded interpreters (see e.g., Burnett, 
Salvation, 18, 221-23, 229-30). He is therefore unable to do justice to the comprehensively communal 
dimension of Paul‖s thinking. In so arguing, Burnett takes what is at most an implication (however 
important) of the impartiality of God‖s judgment of humanity to be essentially the only communally 
important facet of Paul‖s thought (rightly Keay, “Review of Burnett,” 779-80). This is just as 
problematic and misleading as arguing that Paul does not have any place for the individual in his 
theology. 
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Romans 12, is also (and necessarily) an incorporation into the corporate body of 
Christ. The individual dynamics of Romans 2-3 must not be understood apart from 
the communal aspects of redemption as these are seen in the rest of Romans. The 
explicit communal dynamic of Romans 2-3, however, is largely a negative one in that 
it is about the tearing down of a once foundational definition of the people of God, 
and the building up of a new one that is centered on faith-initiated participation in 
Christ. 
 
5. The Binary Individual (Romans 2-3) 
The binary individual is a category that captures the remnants of Paul‖s main ways 
of ordering the universe according to an oppositional system of classification 
(Jew/Gentile, male/female, slave/free, etc.). The binary individual, while radically 
relativized by the generic individual, is nonetheless present in a diminished form at 
points in Paul‖s letters. 
As we have just seen, in Romans 2-3 Paul has radically undermined the 
notion that salvific privilege resides within the covenantal boundaries of Israel. In 
these chapters Paul provides his readers with the inverse of Gal 3:28: in judgment 
there is neither Jew nor Greek, for you are all one in damnation (see esp. Rom 2:9). 
And yet, the Jew-Gentile divide, even though it has become “secondary and 
devalued” in relation to Paul‖s anthropological universalism,72 does not completely 
disappear from the letter.73 Already in the letter opening, Paul expresses his desire 
to bear fruit among the Gentiles spread across the Mediterranean basin (1:13-14), 
even though he attaches a kind of temporal priority to the Jew (Ἰοτδαῖορ) over 
against the Greek (Ἕλλην) in the promulgation of the gospel (1:16).74 
Even in the thick of Paul‖s argument for the relativization of covenant 
privilege in chapters 2-3, the Jew-Gentile/Greek divide registers a presence, 
however fleeting; we still see the binary individual, the Jew or the Gentile, serving 
an important function. For example, despite the fact that Paul is arguing against 
                                                        
72 Boyarin, Radical Jew, 24. 
73 Cf. Mark D. Nanos, The Mystery of Romans (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 286 (emphasis original): 
“They are different, Jews and gentiles—yet equal in Christ. The distinction remained, but 
discrimination did not.” 
74 While Paul does indeed attach temporal priority to the gospel going out to “the Jew,” this is a 
more subdued sense of priority than that argued by some (e.g., ibid., 21, 27; James D. G. Dunn, “The 
Formal and Theological Coherence of Romans,” in The Romans Debate [ed. Karl Donfried; Peabody, 
Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991], 249). 
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Jewish privilege in 2:1-24, he nonetheless retains the categories of Jew and Gentile 
(see 2:9-10). This is the case in chapter 3 as well: 3:9 indicates that Jews and Greeks 
are all “under sin,” while in 3:29-30 Paul emphatically denies that God is a god for 
Jews alone. In both of these passages, the binary individual—the Jew or the Gentile—
is relativized without being fully eliminated from Paul‖s thought world. 
However, in Rom 2:25-29, Paul appears to take the basic framework of the 
binary contrast between Jew and Gentile and transmute it into a new key where 
being a Jew is a matter of obedience from the heart, rather than of one‖s physical 
descent or covenantal “badges.”75 The old categories of binary opposition, Jews or 
Gentiles “by nature” (cf. Rom 2:14; Gal 2:15), are not the categories that matter 
when defining membership in God‖s people; rather, faith is (cf. Rom 3:29-30).76 
Despite even this, however, the old binary distinction of Jew and Gentile does 
not completely vanish, as Rom 3:1 makes clear: there is still an advantage in being a 
Jew, even if it is not the advantage Paul‖s debating partner imagined. Furthermore, 
Jewish, or more properly, Israelite identity remains an important classification 
throughout Romans 9-11, where Paul envisages that—despite what he has said 
about the elimination of salvific priority earlier in the letter—God‖s plans for 
“natural” Israel have not come to an end with Christ‖s coming (see esp. Rom 11:25-
32), although Paul still insists that Israel “according to the flesh” will only find 
salvation through faith (11:23).77 
In sum, the binary contrast between Jew and Gentile or Jew and Greek 
remains present in Romans, even if only in a radically modified and diminished 
form. Paul‖s binary individual shows something of the tension in his thinking on 
individuality between the importance of Jew-Gentile particularity on the one hand, 
and the all-controlling anthropological universalization (seen in the generic 
individual) that he saw as having taken place through the death and resurrection of 
Christ on the other hand. It also reiterates the fact that individuals play an 
                                                        
75 Cf. Love L. Sechrest, A Former Jew: Paul and the Dialectics of Race (LNTS 410; London: T & T Clark, 
2009), 153-54. Alan F. Segal, Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 166-69, is exactly right to highlight how for Paul a sense of 
binary opposition between community insiders and outsiders did not disappear when he became a 
believer in Jesus; it was simply transformed into a new set of oppositions, those “in Christ” versus 
those outside of him (cf. John M. G. Barclay, “Paul Among Diaspora Jews: Anomaly or Apostate?” JSNT 
60 [1995]: 110). Even so, Paul still retains something of his old understanding of the Jew-Gentile 
opposition, especially when contrasting Jewish and Gentile codes of morality, on which see Barclay, 
“Anomaly or Apostate?” 107. 
76 Cf. Sechrest, Former Jew, 123. 
77 Pace e.g., Donaldson, Gentiles, 159. On this see Sechrest, Former Jew, 133, 141-45. 
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indispensible role in Paul‖s theology: the individual Jew and the individual Gentile, 
while less important to Paul than the generic individual, have not ceased to exist as 
meaningful figures in the unfolding of God‖s redemptive plan. The same could be 
said of the binary community as well: despite Paul‖s radical downgrading of 
covenant privilege, both Gentiles (understood as a unified whole) and Israel play 
important corporate roles throughout Romans, as seen for example in Rom 1:18-32 
(Gentiles) and Romans 9-11 (Israel). 
 
6. The Exemplary Individual: Abraham our Father or the Ungodly Proselyte? 
(Romans 4) 
The exemplary individual is a model put forth for emulation by Paul‖s audience. 
Unlike the generic individual, the exemplary individual may retain characteristics 
that distinguish him or her from other individuals, as in Abraham‖s case, who is a 
unique historical figure in the unfolding of God‖s plan of redemption. However, this 
uniqueness (historical or otherwise) does not diminish the fact that the exemplar‖s 
chief significance lies in the example it sets for others. 
Abraham is a self-evidently important individual in Romans 4. Yet, his 
significance for Paul‖s unfolding argument in the letter as a whole has come under 
close scrutiny and widespread debate in recent scholarship. By and large three main 
options are put forward in these discussions, one more or less traditional, and the 
other two revisionary.78 The first view, by far the most common in the history of 
interpretation, and exemplified in the modern period by Charles Cranfield, 
contends that Romans 4 highlights “the relevance to all Christians of Abraham‖s 
faith as a paradigm of their own . . . .”79 The second, with some variations, maintains 
that Paul sees Abraham‖s significance to lie in his irreplaceable function as head of 
the covenant community, and that the focus of Romans 4 is on issues of covenantal 
definition rather than individual salvation. Wright, for example, insists that Romans 
                                                        
78 For more extensive surveys see Benjamin Schliesser, Abraham’s Faith in Romans 4: Paul’s Concept 
of Faith in Light of the History of Reception of Genesis 15:6 (WUNT 2.224; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 
222-36; Maria Neubrand, Abraham-Vater von Juden und Nichtjuden. Eine exegetische Studie zu Röm 4 (FB 
85; Würzburg: Echter, 1997), 32-79; Friedrich E. Wieser, Die Abrahamvorstellungen im Neuen Testament 
(EurH 317; Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1987), 35. 
79 Cranfield, Romans, 1.225. Cf. Gathercole, “Romans 3:21-4:25,” 156-68; Watson, Hermeneutics of 
Faith, 217; Thomas R. Schreiner, Romans (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 218-39; Moo, Romans, 
255-57; Thomas H. Tobin, “What Shall We Say That Abraham Found? The Controversy behind 
Romans 4,” HTR 88 (1995): 450; C. K. Barrett, The Epistle to the Romans (2d ed.; BNTC; Peabody, Mass.: 
Hendrickson, 1991), 86; Gunther Klein, “Römer 4 und die Idee der Heilsgeschichte,” EvT  (1963): 157. 
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4 is “a chapter about the scope and nature of Abraham‖s family, rather than a 
chapter about ―justification by faith‖ as a doctrine about how people become 
Christians.”80 Finally, the third view (which is often combined with some form of the 
second) insists that Abraham is in some sense “a representative figure whose 
destiny ―contains‖ the destiny of others,” that he is a “type” of Jesus Christ‖s faithful 
service to God, a service which—culminating on the cross—serves as the basis for 
God‖s salvific action in the world.81 
Despite their differences, all three of these positions, recognizing that in 
Paul‖s mind what was written of Abraham in scripture was not written “for him 
alone” (δι‖ αὐσὸν μόνον), but also “for us” (δι‖ ἡμᾶρ) (Rom 4:23-24), are aware that 
Abraham‖s significance—whether exemplary or representative—is supra-individual, 
that it affects the lives of believers in the present. Some interpreters understand 
this supra-individuality to have an important bearing on what Paul says about the 
generic individual (included in the “us” of 4:24) who shares Abraham‖s πίςσιρ,82 
although many others attempt to silence the voice of this individual, or at least to 
consign it to essential irrelevance. It is my contention that such attempts are 
seriously misguided and that the main importance of Abraham in Romans 4 lies in 
his being an exemplary individual, although I will argue that he cannot be 
exhaustively described as such. 
Romans 4 begins with a syntactically difficult phrase. The major options for 
translating Rom 4:1 are that Paul either asks his Jewish interlocutor what “Abraham 
our forefather according to the flesh has found,”83 or, with Richard Hays and others, 
                                                        
80 Wright, “Romans,” 489. Cf. Joshua W. Jipp, “Rereading the Story of Abraham, Isaac, and ―Us‖ in 
Romans 4,” JSNT 32 (2009): 231-38; Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 260; Hays, “Abraham as 
Father,” 80; Pamela Eisenbaum, “A Remedy for Having Been Born of Woman: Jesus, Gentiles, and 
Genealogy in Romans,” JBL 123 (2004): 687; Neubrand, Abraham, passim; David M. Bossman, “Paul's 
Mediterranean Gospel: Faith, Hope, Love,” BTB 25 (1995): 76-77; Michael Cranford, “Abraham in 
Romans 4: The Father of All Who Believe,” NTS 41 (1995): 83; Jeffrey S. Siker, Disinheriting the Jews: 
Abraham in Early Christian Controversy (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1991), 75; Stowers, 
Rereading, 227; idem, “ἐκ πίςσεψρ and διὰ ση ρ πίςσεψρ in Romans 3:30,” JBL 108 (1989): 667; Campbell, 
“Romans III,” 38; Lloyd Gaston, “Abraham and the Righteousness of God,” HBT 2 (1980): 57; Roetzel, 
Judgement, 99; Christian Dietzfelbinger, Heilsgeschichte bei Paulus? (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1965), 10. 
81 Hays, “Abraham as Father,” 76. Cf. Campbell, Deliverance, 721, 748-49; Jipp, “Rereading,” 228-31. 
82 Even anti-individual interpreters admit this. See e.g., Campbell, Deliverance, 746; Hays, 
“Abraham as Father,” 80. 
83 Among others, see Moo, Romans, 259. An additional (and important) question when 4:1 is read 
in this basic way is whether κασὰ ςάπκα refers simply to physical descent from Abraham, or whether 
it has more negative notions of fallen human reasoning or sinfulness attached to it (as argued by e.g., 
Jewett, Romans, 308; Moo, Romans, 260). There is no reason to attach any negative connotations to the 
phrase in 4:1, since it appears to function (as is often the case in Paul; see e.g., Rom 1:3; 9:3, 5; 1 Cor 
10:18) simply to designate physical descent (rightly Jipp, “Rereading,” 228; cf. Eduard Lohse, Der Brief 
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whether “we have found Abraham to be our forefather according to the flesh.”84 I 
believe the first option is the soundest, but as Gathercole rightly contends: “Even if 
the proposed translation of Hays and Wright is correct, it does not necessarily 
follow that Romans 4 is therefore concerned with the definition of Abraham‖s family 
at the expense of questions of ―soteriology‖.”85 One cannot simply assume, based on 
one‖s translation of Rom 4:1, that the entirety of Romans 4 is about the definition of 
the people of God and nothing else.86 
 Many scholars have noted that Romans 4 is structured around many distinct 
questions or issues. In this regard there is a large degree of unanimity about how 
the chapter should be divided: first, Rom 4:1 introduces the chapter.87 Second, in 
4:2-8 Paul expands on the language of boasting that he introduced in 3:27.88 Third, 
                                                                                                                                                              
an die Römer (KEKNT 4; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 147, n. 5; Cranfield, Romans, 
1.227). 
84 See Hays, “Abraham as Father,” 61-84; Neubrand, Abraham, 184; Theodor Zahn, Der Brief des 
Paulus an die Römer (KNT 6; Leipzig: Deichert, 1910), 212-18. The syntactical difficulty is compounded 
by the various locations of εὑπηκέναι in the manuscript tradition, the main two options being 1) 
directly in front of Ἀβπαάμ, and 2) after Ἀβπαὰμ σὸν πασέπα ἡμ῵ν (see Jewett, Romans, 304). Either 
option still requires one primarily to determine from the context what exactly is being said. 
85 Gathercole, “Romans 3:21-4:25,” 156 (emphasis original). Of the two basic translation options, I 
believe the former should be adopted for the following reasons. First, and most importantly, it makes 
the best sense of the context: there is simply no reason, given what is said in Rom 3:27-31 or 4:2-25, 
why Paul‖s hypothetical objector (or Paul asking a question in rhetorical mode) should ask whether 
anyone has found Abraham to be his or her physical forefather. Jews (and Jewish Christians) would 
have assumed this to be true¸ whereas the thought would never cross the mind of a Gentile believer. 
Questions that would naturally arise include whether descent from Abraham guarantees one a place 
in God‖s justified people, or what Abraham has found regarding justification, works, faith and 
boasting. Both of these questions are in fact answered throughout 4:2-25. Furthermore, as Watson, 
Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 261, n. 8, notes: “If Hays were right, one would expect further 
development of the κασὰ ςάπκα motif in Romans 4.” See also Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 
363, n. 3, who points out the extreme awkwardness of translating “our forefather” (with the article) 
as a predicate noun correlate with Abraham. Hays, “Abraham as Father,” 74, believes that his reading 
is only odd for those committed to the idea that Paul is opposed to “Judaism” in Romans. It is true 
that Paul is not opposed to some sort of abstract conception of Judaism. However it is equally true 
that Paul sets the Mosaic Torah over against faith with regard to justification, which is quite 
different from saying that there is an antithesis between Judaism and grace. Thus, a reading that 
takes Rom 4:1 to be asking what Abraham has found concerning what Paul has said in Rom 3:27-31 
does not require one to adopt an anachronistic understanding of Romans as a “treatise on the 
problem of how a person may ―find‖ justification” (ibid., 63). Jewett‖s (Romans, 307, n. 16) argument 
that “in this attempt to downplay the conflict between Paul and what is ordinarily called ―Judaism,‖ 
Hays skips the abrasive topic of boasting that links 3:27 with 4:2,” and which shapes the entire 
discourse in Romans 4, seems precisely on target. 
86 Pace Wright, “Romans,” 489. 
87 Importantly, understanding 4:1 to be asking what Abraham found concerning what was said in 
3:27-31 allows one to take the verse as an introduction to the whole of chapter 4, without having to 
force the entire contents of the chapter to conform to the single issue of Abraham‖s significance for 
the boundaries of the people of God. 
88 Cf. Campbell, Deliverance, 727-28, 730-2; Jipp, “Rereading,” 222-24; Wilckens, Römer, 1.258; 
Cranfield, Romans, 1.224. All of these scholars (who represent a fairly consistent agreement found 
across the whole range of literature) also point out that each subsection of Romans 4 appears to 
142 
 
Paul transitions in 4:9-12 to a question about whether the blessing of 
justification/forgiveness is restricted to those who are circumcised.89 Forth, 4:13-16a 
(sometimes extended to 17a) addresses the motif of God‖s promised inheritance and 
Abraham‖s reception of it.90 Finally, 4:16/17-25 is usually taken as a discrete unit, 
although according to the two main interpretations it is alternatively understood to 
address, according to Cranfield, “the essential character of Abraham‖s faith,”91 and 
according to Douglas Campbell, the scope of “the illustrious Jewish patriarch‖s 
paternity.”92 Romans 4:23-25 could also be isolated, since this unit applies what has 
been said previously in the chapter to believers in the present, showing the basis of 
redemption to lie in Christ‖s death and resurrection for his people.93 
This brief survey of the structure of the chapter is important because it 
highlights the diversity of themes and issues present there, the diversity of which 
has often been obscured in the debate over whether Romans 4 only portrays 
Abraham as an example of Christian faith or only as a representative figure whose 
significance lies in his role as progenitor of Israel and father of all believers. In other 
words, there are more ways than one to be reductionistic in reading Romans 4. 
Exegesis sensitive to how Paul shifts between several foci in the chapter enriches 
our understanding of Abraham‖s significance as an individual, and of the 
implications of his person for all those individuals who would come after him, 
whether Jews or Gentiles. The following analysis will be divided roughly into the 
section breaks described above. 
 
6.1 Once Again, Where is Boasting? (Romans 4:1-8) 
Whatever is being asked in Rom 4:1, the explanatory γάπ in 4:2 makes it clear that 
the latter verse answers the question posed in the former.94 As has already been 
                                                                                                                                                              
point back directly to a portion of 3:27-31: 4:2-8 (to 3:27); 4:9-12 (to 3:29-30); 4:13-16 (to 3:31). There is 
more controversy over how (if at all) to relate 4:16-25 with anything in 3:27-31. 
89 Cf. Campbell, Deliverance, 728, 733-34; Jipp, “Rereading,” 224-25; Wilckens, Römer, 1.258; 
Cranfield, Romans, 1.224. Romans 4:9 is obviously connected to 4:6-8 in that it probes the implications 
of what those verses state, but it also introduces what follows in 4:10-12. 
90 Campbell, Deliverance, 728-29, 734-35; Jipp, “Rereading,” 225-26; Wilckens, Römer, 1.258. 
Cranfield, Romans, 1.224-25, sees this section ending conceptually in 17a, even though 16-17b are part 
of the same sentence. 
91 Cranfield, Romans, 1.225. 
92 Campbell, Deliverance, 737. 
93 Ibid., 738; Cranfield, Romans, 1.225. Campbell and Cranfield are good representatives of the two 
opposing sides that dominate in the scholarship on Romans 4. 
94 Rightly Cranfield, Romans, 227. 
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noted, many scholars believe that Paul asks two questions in 4:1 and that the nature 
of Paul‖s second question (εὑπηκέναι Ἀβπαὰμ σὸν πποπάσοπα ἡμ῵ν κασὰ ςάπκα;) 
indicates that Romans 4 is almost solely about the boundaries of the Abrahamic 
family, and thus unconcerned with issues of individual faith or salvation. However, 
those who identify 4:1 as a question about the scope or nature of Abraham‖s family 
are forced to ignore the explanatory γάπ in 4:2 and the way that Paul answers his 
own rhetorical question: rather than beginning to speak about Abraham‖s ancestry, 
Paul answers the question of 4:1 directly by returning to the theme of boasting he 
touched on in 3:27. We are told that Abraham could not have been justified by works 
(ἐξ ἔπγψν) because this would have given him a boast (καύφημα) before God. 
However, scripture itself excludes such boasting when it describes the counting 
(λογίζομαι) to Abraham of righteousness as occurring when he trusted (πιςσεύψ) 
God (citing Gen 15:6). 
Theoretically at this point, 4:1 could still be understood to be about the scope 
of Abraham‖s parentage, but only if works, boasting and faith in 4:2-3 all refer 
merely to markers of identity, or wrong attitudes about the restrictive function of 
the law, rather than human actions, specifically actions done in conformity (or not) 
to God‖s revealed will.95 This is plainly impossible in Abraham‖s case, however, since 
no such markers of identity existed that could define him or his seed at the point 
when he believed God and had it counted to him as righteousness. Nor could works 
have been excluded because they signified “the whole mindset of ―covenantal 
nomism‖ – that is, the conviction that status within the covenant (= righteousness) 
is maintained by doing what the law requires (―works of the law‖),”96 since, of course 
the covenant law did not exist, and Abraham could not have been tempted to think 
that his righteousness was constituted through covenant membership, since he was 
justified prior to the initial covenant having being made. Furthermore, circumcision 
was only instituted by God as a mark of the covenant thirteen years after Abraham 
was justified (see Gen 16:16-17:1). While Paul does not mention the time gap in 4:2-3, 
it is foundational for his argument in 4:9-12, which builds directly upon 4:2-8. Thus, 
while Paul does indeed exclude circumcision from the role of marking out the 
                                                        
95 For the first two views see e.g., James D. G. Dunn, “Yet Once More - ―The Works of the Law‖: A 
Response,” in The New Perspective on Paul (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 214-15; Wright, “Romans,” 
490. For the third, see e.g., Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 172. 
96 Dunn, “Works of the Law,” 214. 
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believer‖s identity (4:9-12), the contrast between works and faith in 4:2-3 cannot be 
a dispute about the scope of the covenant community, since the works in view 
cannot have been anything other than simple human actions. 
Further developing the contrast between justification by works versus 
justification by faith, Paul employs a partially-formed accounting metaphor in 4:4-5 
to establish that works merit compensation as a matter of obligation (ὀυείλημα, 
which, as 4:4 indicates, is the total opposite of grace), whereas faith, rather than 
working (an individual working: σῶ μὴ ἐπγαζομένῳ), causes one to be counted 
righteous before God. In 4:6-8 Paul substantiates his exclusion of boasting through a 
scriptural appeal to the example of David: the blessings of God‖s salvation come only 
to those who are counted righteous by God by faith, rather than works, which is 
roughly equivalent to one‖s “lawless deeds” being forgiven and covered over, to 
having one‖s sin not counted against oneself. Romans 4:1-8, as Simon Gathercole 
observes, is not about the criteria for covenant inclusion, but is rather about 
disobedience and grace, since Abraham‖s righteousness and David‖s forgiveness 
come to those who are positively ungodly and sinful (Abraham is ἀςεβήρ [4:5], and 
David is guilty of ἀνομίαι and ἁμαπσίαι [4:7]).97 
As in Rom 2:6-16, Paul brings a generic individual into his argument in 4:4-9 
in order to generalize and universalize the point he is making: the individual who 
works (ὁ ἐπγαζόμενορ) receives pay rather than grace (4:4), the individual who does 
not work, but believes (σῶ μὴ ἐπγαζομένῳ πιςσεύονσι), has righteousness counted to 
her (4:5), the individual (ἄνθπψπορ) who has righteousness counted to him apart 
from works is truly blessed (4:6), and finally, the man (ἀνήπ) is blessed who does not 
have sin counted to him by the Lord (4:8).98 With these uses of the generic 
individual, Rom 4:4-8 has something of the “timeless” feel of Rom 2:6-16, but like 
those verses, also has direct parenetic relevance for the individuals in the actual (or 
at least intended) audience of Paul‖s letter, which is made all the more explicit in 
that Paul‖s entire scriptural exposition in chapter 4 is written “for us” (4:24).99 Paul 
                                                        
97 Gathercole, “Romans 3:21-4:25,” 159. Paul further highlights the generic and universal quality 
of this section of text by speaking simply of “works” rather than “works of the law.” See Tobin, 
“Romans 4,” 445. 
98 Romans 4:7 is the only verse in this section that speaks in plural terms. 
99 The generic quality of the individual in Rom 2:6 (citing LXX Ps 61:13/Prov 24:12) and Rom 4:6-8 
(citing Ps 31:1) appears to be due to both being taken from scriptural citations from wisdom texts 
(namely from Proverbs and the Psalms) that attempt to make “timeless” observations about the 
human condition. 
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is telling the readers of his letter what Abraham (and David) found concerning 
boasting, works and faith, and to do so he speaks in strongly individual terms about 
how righteousness is counted, first to Abraham, but then by analogy to the 
individual in the present who “walks in Abraham‖s footsteps” (4:12). The generic 
individual figures prominently in Paul‖s argument in 4:1-8, as does Abraham the 
exemplary individual, although the latter motif is mostly implicit (though no less 
significant) at this point in the chapter. 
Paul‖s underlying logic seems to run like this: if those pillars of Israelite 
identity, Father Abraham and King David, have no grounds for a boast before God on 
account of their ungodliness and sin, surely no one (i.e., no generic individual) 
would be so foolish as to suppose that he or she could receive the recompense of 
righteousness/justification in return for his or her righteous works.100 Both 
Abraham and David are examples of positively unrighteous individuals justified by 
faith. 
 
6.2 Who is Blessed? And When? (Romans 4:9-12) 
Romans 4:1-8 has established that an individual is blessed (= forgiven = credited with 
righteousness) by faith rather than works. Romans 4:9, then, asks whether this 
blessing is for the circumcision or the uncircumcision. This is the first point in 
Romans 4 in which an explicit concern for the boundaries of the covenant 
community emerges, and it appears as Paul asks whether the individual who is 
righteous by faith must be a Jew, must be circumcised. As 4:9b indicates (γάπ), Paul 
takes this to be the natural question to ask in light of what has just preceded, 
namely the claim that Abraham‖s faith, rather than works, was counted to him as 
righteousness. In other words, if we claim that Abraham was righteous by faith 
(which we do), what does this say about the nature of the community where the 
blessings of salvation are to be found, about who is, and is not, in that community? 
To answer this, Paul reads the Abraham story in Genesis in chronological sequence. 
For him, it is as simple as this: determine if Abraham had righteousness counted to 
                                                        
100 Many exegetes complain about the elevation of the accounting language in 4:4-5 to the level 
of a controlling framework for Pauline interpretation (see e.g., Wright, “Romans,” 491). Whatever 
legitimacy there may be to such complaints, it is nonetheless still the case that as Watson rightly 
argues, Paul “does use this image,” (Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 265, emphasis original) and he does 
so to “speak of two human possibilities, remuneration and gift, that provide contrasting models of 
the divine-human relationship” (ibid., 263). 
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him by faith before or after he was circumcised. Reading Genesis according to its 
narratival order shows that this happened while Abraham was un-circumcised (4:10: 
ἐν ἀκποβτςσίᾳ). Circumcision came after justification and was a sign (ςημεῖον) and 
seal (ςυπαγίρ) of the justification Abraham had already received by faith when he 
was uncircumcised (4:11).101 All of this was for the purpose (εἰρ σὸ εἶναι) of Abraham 
becoming “the father of all those who believe even though they are uncircumcised” 
(4:11a-b) as well as “the father of the circumcision, although to those not merely 
circumcised, but who also follow in the footsteps of the faith our father Abraham 
had while uncircumcised” (4:12). To those who believe, whether circumcised or not, 
they too (like Abraham) will have righteousness counted to them (4:11c). While 
Abraham is certainly not less than an exemplary individual here (the blessing of 
righteousness only comes to those who follow in his footsteps - 4:12), there is more 
going on in 4:9-12 than the exposition of an exemplary paradigm. The nature and 
configuration of the covenant community is being transformed and redescribed. 
Thus, it is true that Abraham in Romans 4 is “a uniting figure in the church 
composed of Jewish and Gentile Christians,”102 and that his own relationship with 
God has critically “important social implications,”103 but it is equally true that this 
“paulinische Heilsgeschichte” only works insofar as Abraham is seen “als Beispiel 
und Urbild.”104 
It is easy to understand the origins of the polemic against Abraham as mere 
example, with the attendant fear that such a view would lead to a wildly 
individualistic reading of Romans 4, but the mimetic pattern—even in 4:9-12—
simply does not work unless “der Glaube Abrahams den christlichen in gewisser 
Weise vorwegnahm, mit diesem letzlich sogar identisch war,”105 especially since his 
reception of righteousness by faith (4:11) leads to a call for direct mimesis in 4:12. 
What is true of the uncircumcised and the circumcised (though not merely so) 
believers is only true of them insofar as they too believe: just as Abraham believed and 
was counted righteous (4:9-10; cf. Gal 3:5-9), so too must everyone else (whether Jew 
or Greek) “in order to have righteousness counted to them” (εἰρ σὸ λογιςθῆναι αὐσοῖρ 
                                                        
101 Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 214-16; Tobin, “Romans 4,” 446. 
102 Campbell, “Romans III,” 35. 
103 Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 261. 
104 Käsemann, “Römer 4,” 152. 
105 Ibid., 140. 
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δικαιοςύνην - emphasis added).106 Whatever else might be said about 4:9-12, 
Abraham as exemplary individual is a key motif in this passage. 
 
6.3 Grace and Promise (Romans 4:13-17a) 
Having established that Abraham was counted righteous before God when he 
believed, rather than when he was circumcised, Paul begins in 4:13 to work out the 
implications of this fact with regard to God‖s promise (ἐπαγγελία) to Abraham, as 
well with regard to the inheritance of that promise. The promise to Abraham and 
his seed did not come through the agency of law (διὰ νόμοτ) but through the 
righteousness that comes from faith (διὰ δικαιοςύνηρ πίςσεψρ - cf. Gal 3:22).107 To 
argue that the law could secure the inheritance nullifies (κενόψ) faith and voids 
(κασαπγέψ) the promise (4:14).108 That is to say (γάπ), as Paul continues, the law 
works (κασεπγάζομαι) wrath and creates transgression (4:15). The law, built as it is 
on a principle of strict remuneration (Rom 4:4; cf. Rom 10:5; Gal 3:10-12) cannot 
secure anything but wrath, death and sin (cf. Rom 7:5-6). This is not a statement 
about Jewish attempts to make circumcision into a meritorious work (regardless of 
whether any such attempts can be uncovered historically), nor is it a disparagement 
of the law. It is rather a simple statement of what the law itself does when it 
encounters human sin and rebellion (cf. Rom 7:8-12). For this reason (διὰ σοῦσο) the 
promise (ἐπαγγελία is understood from what precedes) is by faith (ἐκ πίςσεψρ) in 
order that (ἵνα) it might be according to grace (κασὰ φάπιν) and in order that (εἰρ σὸ 
εἶναι) it might be secure for all of Abraham‖s descendants (his “seed”), not just the 
(generic) individual who is of the law (σῶ ἐκ σοῦ νόμοτ), but also to the (generic) 
individual who shares Abraham‖s faith (σῶ ἐκ πίςσεψρ Ἀβπαάμ).109 Abraham‖s faith 
                                                        
106 Various important manuscript readings of 4:11 (even though probably secondary) pick up this 
explicitly mimetic pattern by inserting either an adjunctive conjunction before αὐσοῖρ (καί; thus 
reading: “in order that it might be counted to them also”) and/or an anaphoric article before 
δικαιοςύνη (σήν; thus reading: “the same righteousness [that was counted to Abraham in 4:9-11]”). 
107 The genitive in δικαιοςύνηρ πίςσεψρ should be taken as a genitive of source (“righteousness 
derived from faith”), setting it in contrast to the agency of law for securing the promised 
inheritance. This is clear in context: Abraham‖s faith is what led to his being counted righteous (4:3, 
9). 
108 That Paul is speaking primarily of Jews with the designation οἱ ἐκ νόμοτ seems likely, but 
there is nonetheless a strong sense that Paul is also referring to the doing of the law here, rather than 
simply to being defined by the law. This comes out in 4:15 which speaks of the law working wrath 
and creating transgressions, both of which make little sense if the law in 4:14 is taken simply as 
marking out Jewish identity. 
109 Ironically, a christological reading of faith in Romans 4 (esp. 4:16) requires Paul to say of 
Abraham exactly what his Jewish contemporaries were saying, which appears to be the exact 
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(πίςσιρ) has already been qualified as his act of believing (πιςσεύψ - Rom 4:3), and so 
it is with those who walk in his footsteps: they too are guaranteed a share in the 
promised inheritance by faith rather than adherence to the law (4:16). In this way 
Abraham is the father of everyone who believes (4:16e-17a). 
Many of the “anti-individualistic” scholars already cited above find a 
presentation of 4:13-17a that focuses on generic individual action or Abraham‖s 
exemplary status to be problematic since it cannot do justice to the salvation-
historical language of inheritance and promise.110 However, the focus in 4:13-16 on 
the scope of those who would receive God‖s promised inheritance does not diminish 
a concern for the believing individual. The promise, even in its universal scope (i.e., 
ὁ κόςμορ), is intended to evoke faith among its recipients (4:18-21), which itself is 
the means through which Abraham (4:22), and those in Paul‖s audience who follow 
Abraham‖s example (4:23-24), have righteousness counted to them. 
 
6.4 Abraham‖s Faith in a Faithful God (Romans 4:17b-25) 
Romans 4:17 begins with a scriptural confirmation of Abraham‖s (redefined) role as 
“father of many nations” and continues with an affirmation of God‖s approbation of 
Abraham in this role.111 In this verse, too, Paul begins a lengthy description of the 
character of Abraham‖s faith: he trusts in the creative and life-giving power of God 
(4:17b), he has a faith that overcomes the earthly obstacles (a “hope against hope”) 
that might thwart God‖s promise (4:18), his faith does not weaken despite the 
decrepit state of his or Sarah‖s bodies (4:19), and his faith does not waver in doubt 
concerning God‖s promise (4:20) because Abraham was “fully convinced that [God] 
was able to do what he promised” (4:21).112  
                                                                                                                                                              
opposite of Paul‖s argumentative strategy throughout Romans 4. That is to say, Abraham is hardly 
being held up as an example of “faithfulness” in this chapter: he is the prototypical ungodly convert 
to true faith who cannot be justified through the due recompense of his works, because he, like 
David, is sinful and needs forgiveness and righteousness to be counted to him. On early Jewish 
depictions of Abraham as the archetypal pious Israelite see e.g., Nancy Calvert-Koyzis, Paul, 
Monotheism and the People of God: The Significance of Abraham Traditions for Early Judaism and Christianity 
(JSNTSup 273; London: T & T Clark International, 2004); Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 220-69. 
110 See e.g., Campbell, Deliverance, 734-35; cf. Jipp, “Rereading,” 225-26. 
111 The syntax of Rom 4:17b is somewhat difficult: among the four main interpretive options I 
think a reading that understands “before” (κασένανσι) as referring to Abraham‖s truly being a father 
“before God” of Gentiles in addition to Jews (i.e., “in God‖s sight Gentiles too are Abraham‖s 
offspring”) is the most contextually sensitive. For this interpretation see Cranfield, Romans, 243-44; 
John Murray, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 145-47. 
112 Isaac‖s birth (and thus Abraham‖s literal parentage) is surely implicit in 4:16-22, but not in the 
way Campbell, Deliverance, 736-39, envisages: Isaac (as the seed) was what was promised to Abraham. 
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Campbell finds this account of Abraham‖s “heroic faith” to be the final nail in 
the coffin of the “anthropocentric” reading of Abraham‖s faith because he sees such 
a description as entailing on the patriarch‖s part “an extraordinarily difficult if not 
superhuman action” which “looks extremely unrealistic as a manageable criterion 
for sinful humanity to exercise.”113 It should be noted, however, that Abraham‖s 
faith is quite specifically centered on the promise. Thus, as Paul describes it, faith is 
not a generic, superhuman power, but rather trust in God‖s provision, trust that God 
would do precisely what he promised when he vowed to make Abraham a father of 
many nations (4:18), despite the strongly adverse circumstances standing in the way 
(4:19). As was the divine intention, the promise itself evoked in Abraham the 
appropriate response of trust, and for this reason was counted to Abraham as 
righteousness (4:22).114 
Although it is difficult on a strictly textual level to evaluate Campbell‖s 
extreme incredulity toward what is said of Abraham‖s faith in 4:17b-21, it can 
nonetheless still be noted that Paul is not actually claiming as much as Campbell 
takes an exemplary view of Abraham‖s faith to be saying: again, it is a matter of 
God‖s promise, and Abraham‖s trust in that very specific promise; the robustness of 
the faith is portrayed as being in direct proportion to the trustworthiness of the 
promise, and even more importantly, to the one who made the promise. This comes 
out in many ways in 4:17b-21: Abraham believed the promise “according to what had 
been said” (κασὰ σὸ εἰπημένον - 4:18, emphasis added), his faith was “in the 
promise” (εἰρ σὴν ἐπαγγελὶαν - 4:20), he was strengthened (passive of ἐνδτναμόψ) 
by means of faith in this promise (4:20), and finally, his faith was a matter of 
conviction that God was able to do what he had promised (4:21), rather than 
constituting a generic quality that led Abraham to accomplish heroic, even 
                                                                                                                                                              
This fact, however, hardly brings into question an exemplary reading of Abraham (in favor of a 
representational one), since Isaac‖s implicit presence does not serve any purpose other than to 
inform the (already scripturally knowledgeable) reader that Abraham‖s belief was directed toward a 
concrete realization of the promise (i.e., it was not a vague faith in God‖s trustworthy nature; cf. 
Gathercole, “Romans 3:21-4:25,” 163). Abraham‖s patronage, however, is not in any way restricted to, 
or focused on, physical genealogy, a point which is made forcefully in Romans 4. It is quite hard to 
see the benefit in emphasizing the centrality of literal biological descent (as does Campbell, 
Deliverance, 395; cf. Stowers, Rereading, 243) in a chapter with a section like 4:9-17a, which 
emphatically separates that which is physical and physically genealogical from that which leads to 
one being counted righteous (faith). If this is a “spiritualizing” (cf. Campbell, Deliverance, 754; 
Stowers, Rereading, 244) of the text, so be it. 
113 Campbell, Deliverance, 735. 
114 See Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 196, 217-18. 
150 
 
inhuman, feats of religious devotion.115 Abraham did not waver “concerning the 
promise of God” (4:20) because he deemed God—rather than his own faith (a strange 
notion indeed)—trustworthy (4:21).116 
Summing up chapter 4, Paul declares that Abraham‖s trusting response to 
God‖s promise is explicitly recounted in Scripture “for us also” who will, like 
Abraham, be counted righteous upon believing in the same God, the God who raised 
Jesus from the dead (4:24). It is certainly true, as has been noted by several scholars 
who attempt to diminish Abraham‖s exemplary role, that chapter 4 is capped off 
with a “christological conclusion” in 4:24-25. However, it does not appear that 
enough weight has been placed by these interpreters on how this christological 
ending describes what God will do for those who follow Abraham‖s example of faith 
and thereby, like Abraham, have righteousness counted to them as well (4:23). It is 
most definitely not the case that in Romans 4, as Stowers contends, “Paul does not 
speak of the believer‖s justification by his or her faith, but of covenants and 
promises that God established in response to the faithfulness of certain individuals” 
like Abraham.117 Rather, Paul (following the narrative of Genesis) sees Abraham‖s 
faith as a response to the divine promise, rather than the other way around. Thus, 
the exemplary view is not (or at least need not be) “individualist, rationalistic, and 
introspective.”118 The promise-response structure of Abraham‖s faith shows this to 
be false: the divine word comes from without, is not dependent on Abraham‖s 
reasoning abilities and does not leave Abraham as an isolated individual, but places 
him at the head of a community of faith that stretches across the centuries to Paul‖s 
own day. 
In 4:17b-25 we have seen yet again that, rather than being “impossible to 
integrate with”119 an exemplary account of Abraham‖s faith, this section of text 
incorporates just such a telling of the significance of Abraham with a corresponding 
focus on him as Father of all who believe. 
 
                                                        
115 Pace Campbell, Deliverance, 735-45. 
116 Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 172. 
117 Stowers, Rereading, 248. 
118 Campbell, Deliverance, 723 
119 Campbell, Deliverance, 735. 
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6.5 Summary 
Despite the concerted effort of many Pauline scholars to argue otherwise, the 
exemplary interpretation of Abraham must be retained. Abraham‖s exemplary role 
is explicit in several places (e.g., 4:12, 23-24) and much of the argumentation of the 
rest of the chapter is dependent upon this construct.120 This does not mean, 
however, that Abraham is nothing more than an example. His actions clearly have 
consequences for the history and composition of God‖s people.121 What this does 
mean, however, is that his extra-individual function must be carefully defined: for 
example, there are no markers in Romans 4 that should lead one to conclude that 
Abraham is a vicarious individual whose actions in and of themselves have 
consequences for those “in Abraham” (to borrow a phrase). Despite the large 
amount of things Paul has to say about the significance of Abraham for the 
individuals and communities of those who come after him, the apostle never 
separates Abraham‖s actions (specifically his faith) from, or has them stand in for, a 
corresponding reproduction of those actions among individuals in the present. 
While Abraham is a unique and unsubstitutable individual (i.e., he cannot be 
replaced with anyone else in the way Paul‖s generic individual can be), he is not a 
representative individual. Romans 4 is not Romans 5 or 6 where explicit markers of 
vicariousness and representation abound (although only with reference to Christ 
and Adam).122 All this being said, many of Campbell‖s protestations against an 
“anthropological” understanding of Abraham‖s faith offer a salutary reminder to 
the exegete not to ignore the important corporate and salvation-historical 
dynamics of the chapter (covenant definition, etc.). Nonetheless, his contention that 
“it ultimately makes little sense to speak of a comprehensive mimetic relationship” 
in Romans 4 is quite wide of the mark.123 Furthermore, contrary to the anti-
                                                        
120 Cf. Karl Olav Sandnes, “Abraham, the Friend of God, in Rom 5,” ZNW 99 (2008): 125. 
121 Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 217, puts it well: “There is therefore a christological component 
in Paul‖s complex appeal to Abraham as exemplar, as well as an ecclesiological and a soteriological 
one. Genesis 15.6 is the fundamental and unsurpassable soteriological statement that Paul finds in 
the Abraham narrative, and its ecclesiological implications come to light as he demonstrates its 
universal normativity.” See also Tobin, “Romans 4,” 450. William S. Campbell, Paul and the Creation of 
Christian Identity (LNTS 322; London: T & T Clark, 2006), 63, goes much too far, however, in insisting 
that in Romans 4 “Abraham is first and foremost father of the Jewish people . . . .” 
122 Pace Stowers, Rereading, 243, Abraham (unlike Jesus in Romans 5-6 and elsewhere) is not 
“essential for Paul precisely as [an] individual who [has] made possible divine benefits inherited by 
whole peoples.” Instead, Abraham responds in faith to what God has done in promising him a seed, and 
with that seed, the inheritance of the world (4:13). 
123 Campbell, Deliverance, 756. 
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individualism of scholars such as Campbell, Abraham‖s own example makes it clear 
just how integral the individual is in Pauline soteriology. Individuals experience 
salvation, not in order to remain mere individuals, but also not through the 
bypassing of their individuality. When individuals are saved, they are incorporated 
into Christ (see Romans 6) and into his corporate body, where they are to serve as 
individual members of the integrated whole (see Rom 12:3-8). 
While Abraham‖s example may not provide us with much more information 
about the nature of Pauline community than Romans 2-3, this should not be 
surprising: Romans 4 is largely a continuation, and concrete instantiation, of what 
has already been said in the two preceding chapters of the letter. Like those 
chapters it is only one step in the progression of Paul‖s argumentation in the letter, 
which has not yet delved deeply into the concrete nature of life in the believing 
community. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusion 
7.1 Summary 
In order to bring together the results of the preceding investigation it will be 
beneficial at this point to summarize the contents of this chapter in a point-by-
point format, indicating along the way further texts in Romans that could have been 
fitted into the typology: 
 
(1) The Characteristic Individual. The characteristic individual is one of the 
central tools Paul deploys (in conjunction with the generic individual) in 
service of his argument for the abolishment of Jewish soteriological 
privilege. The characteristic Jewish judge appears in Rom 2:1-5, 17-25; 3:1-9. 
The other important characteristic individuals in Romans are the weak and 
strong in Rom 14:1-15:7, who as character types allow Paul to present “his 
general moral teaching to Christ-believers . . . in the form of potential, even 
likely, examples.”124 Most fundamentally, the characteristic individual places 
                                                        
124 Thorsteinsson, Ancient Morality, 100 (cf. 91-92, 101-4). However, Thorsteinsson is wrong to 
insist that the presence of these characteristic individuals means that “it is not the individual 
believer himself or herself who benefits from the particular position or ―gift‖ which he or she enjoys 
but the community of believers as a whole, of which the individual is a member.” 
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Paul‖s entire exhortative program firmly (but emphatically not solely) on the 
level of individual action. 
(2) The Generic Individual. The generic individual is more pervasive in Romans 
than any of the other categories in this typology, and yet this type of 
individual, as well as its significance, has been widely dismissed in recent 
scholarship. The analysis in this chapter has centered on the generic 
individual in Romans 2-3, where Paul writes of this individual in order to 
show his readers that there is no soteriological privilege for anyone, Jew or 
Gentile, because each individual will stand before God at the final judgment 
simply as an individual with his or her works and nothing else. In Rom 14:10-
12 Paul similarly brings together the generic individual (ἕκαςσορ) and 
judgment in order to urge his readers to accept one another in love. 
Generic individuals pervade the rest of the letter as well. There is a 
generic sinful individual, the “old human” (ὁ παλαιὸρ ἡμ῵ν ἄνθπψπορ) of 
Rom 6:6, which appears to be a particularly vivid way of describing the pre-
believing stance of individuals who have since been united to Christ in 
baptism (cf. Rom 3:19; 7:7-12). There is also a generic believing individual, as 
became clear in the analysis of Romans 4 above (see esp. 4:16 [σῶ ἐκ πίςσεψρ 
Ἀβπαάμ]; cf. Rom 1:16-17; 3:21-31 [esp. 3:27-28]; 5:1-2; and esp. Rom 10:6-
13125), even though the focus of that discussion was on Abraham the 
exemplary individual. 
Paul often speaks of the benefits of redemption in terms of reception by 
the generic individual, on which see e.g., individual forgiveness (Rom 4:6-8, 
25 [ἄνθπψπορ]), removal of individual condemnation (Rom 8:1-2 [“those in 
Christ Jesus” in 8:1 includes the ςε of 8:2]), the justification of the individual 
(Rom 1:16-17 [Ἰοτδαῖορ . . . Ἕλλην . . . ὁ δίκαιορ]; Rom 2:6-13 [ἕκαςσορ]; Rom 
3:26 [σὸν ἐκ πίςσεψρ Ἰηςοῦ]; Rom 3:27 [ἄνθπψπορ]; Rom 3:30 [πεπισομή . . . 
ἀκποβτςσία]; Rom 10:9-11 [e.g., only singular verbs are used for 
salvation/justification . . . πᾶρ ὁ πιςσεύψν, etc.]) and individual hope in a 
future salvation (Rom 8:24 [σιρ]). Some scholars argue for the basis of these 
benefits of redemption to be located in individual election (pointing esp. to 
                                                        
125 On which see Dunson, “Faith,” 30-34. 
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Rom 9:7-18; cf. Rom 8:29), even though this is widely dismissed in recent 
scholarship.126 
When Paul speaks of spiritual renewal, he also often employs the 
category of the generic individual. We have seen this with the motif of heart 
circumcision in Rom 2:28-29 (cf. obedience from the heart in Rom 6:17), but 
it also appears elsewhere: the individual who has died to sin (ὁ ἀποθανών) 
through union with Christ in his death has been set free from sin (δικαιόψ); 
the individual believer (see Rom 8:2: ςε) is set free from sin and death 
through the Spirit (Rom 8:2-11); etc.127 
Finally, Paul‖s ethical exhortation in Romans has a definite focus on the 
individual, even as it makes it clear that proper ethical living cannot be 
undertaken apart from a properly functioning community of believers. 
Eternal glory awaits the individual who does good (e.g., Rom 2:10: πανσὶ σῶ 
ἐπγαζομένῳ σὸ ἀγαθόν), each individual member of the body is called to love 
and service within the single body (see e.g., Rom 12:3: πανσὶ σῶ ὄνσι ἐν ὑμῖν - 
Rom 13:8: ὁ ἀγαπ῵ν), every individual is called to obey worldly authorities 
(e.g., Rom 13:1: πᾶςα χτφή), and the discrimination called for on issues of 
personal scruple is a matter for individuals to think through (see Rom 14:5: 
ἕκαςσορ). 
This list could be expanded even further, but the point should already be 
clear: despite widespread scholarly assertions to the contrary, the generic 
individual is a central and ever-present category for Paul. In light of the 
impartiality of divine justice and judgment all other formerly significant 
categories and collectivities fall to the ground, leaving the generic human 
coram Deo, although as we will see (especially) in the next chapter, this 
individual is inextricably bound up with life in a new community. 
                                                        
126 Arguing for individual election see e.g., Thomas R. Schreiner, “Corporate and Individual 
Election in Romans 9: A Response to Brian Abasciano,” JETS 49 (2006): 351-71; idem, “Does Romans 9 
Teach Individual Election unto Salvation?” in Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, 
Foreknowledge, and Grace (eds. T. R. Schreiner and B. A. Ware; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 89-106; 
arguing against individual election see e.g., Brian J. Abasciano, Paul’s Use of the Old Testament in Romans 
9:1-9: An Intertextual and Theological Exegesis (LNTS 301; London: T & T Clark, 2006), 185-89, 215-19; 
James D. G. Dunn, Romans 9-16 (WBC 38b; Nashville: Nelson, 1988), 567-68; Cranfield, Romans, 2.479; 
Barth, Romans, 346-47. 
127 Possession of the spirit is described in Rom 8:9 in both communal and individual terms: the 
Spirit dwells “among you” (ἐν ὑμῖν), while an individual (σιρ) must have the Spirit to have Christ. 
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(3) The Binary Individual. Despite Paul‖s radical relativization of the Jew-Gentile 
distinction, as we have seen, he still speaks in terms of that distinction (see 
Rom 1:13-14, 16; 2:14-29; 3:9, 29; 9:24-3; 15:9-12; 16:4; etc.). However, for Paul, 
this binary classification of individuals is something of an anomaly: he still 
employs the Jew-Gentile distinction, although it has almost completely lost 
its meaning as a marker of identity, and has certainly lost its meaning as a 
marker of salvation or the boundaries of the genuine community of God‖s 
people. That being said, retaining elements of one‖s Jewish identity is not 
problematic as long as they are not elevated to levels incompatible with the 
new all-controlling reality of finding one‖s fundamental identity in Jesus 
Christ (see e.g., 1 Cor 7:19). The binary individual (and the binary 
community) appears throughout Romans 9-11, where Paul holds together 
the centrality of salvation through faith in Christ (see Rom 10:6-13) with an 
ongoing place for Israel in God‖s redemptive plan (see esp. Romans 11). 
(4) The Exemplary Individual. In Romans 4, Paul portrays Abraham (and to a 
lesser degree, David) as an exemplary individual whose trust in the divine 
promise sets a pattern that Paul‖s audience is explicitly called to emulate 
(see Rom 4:5-8, 11-12, 16, 23-25). While Abraham is also a historically 
irreplaceable individual within the divine plan whose actions have 
important ramifications for the future of God‖s people, he is not a “vicarious 
individual” whose actions define future peoples irrespective of their 
following in Abraham‖s footsteps of faith. 
 
7.2 Conclusion 
Although the typology of the individual in this chapter awaits completion in the 
next chapter, it should be becoming clear just how often Paul‖s theological vision is 
shaped by the individual. In fact, his argumentation in so many of the places we 
have examined in this chapter simply does not make sense when the category of the 
individual is neglected or dismissed, as seen, for example, in the way in which Paul‖s 
explication of justification depends upon his having already established that there is 
a generic individual who is alternatively sinful (see Rom 3:10-12, 19), judged (see 
Rom 2:6), and finally, believing (see Rom 3:28). 
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I have also noted several ways in which the various individual types must be 
understood as communally shaped, or ways in which they help define the nature of 
community in Pauline thought. For example, although Abraham‖s importance lies 
chiefly in the exemplary pattern he establishes for future believers, his role as 
patriarch and forefather of Israel serves an important function in Romans 4 with 
regard to the shape of the new-creational people of God. Likewise, the interplay of 
the generic and characteristic individuals in Romans 2-3 has much to say about the 
nature of Pauline community, both positively in the centrality attached to faith with 
regard to the formation of that community and negatively in the way it radically 
relativizes the Jew-Gentile distinction. As important as all of these communal 
dimensions are, however, the communal location of the Pauline individual becomes 
much more pronounced as Romans progresses, and thus is especially clear in the 
discussion of the four individual types to be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Pauline Individuals (2) 
 
1. Introduction 
We have seen in the previous chapter that the category of the individual is ever-
present and theologically foundational in the first four chapters of Romans. As we 
move into the rest of the letter this remains true. It is in this latter portion of the 
epistle, however, that the communal location of the Pauline individual becomes 
especially prominent. Thus, the degree to which one must speak of the individual in 
Pauline thought as a communally-engrafted individual emerges throughout the 
material we will examine in this chapter. As I have already noted, Paul‖s argument 
for the indispensability of individuals being situated within community sets him 
apart from Epictetus in an extremely important way. 
Again, a brief outline of the material included in this portion of the typology 
can be beneficially presented at this point. In sharp contrast with Abraham the 
exemplary individual, we see Paul in Romans 5 telling the epoch-spanning story of 
Adam and Jesus Christ, two representative individuals whose actions determine the 
destiny of those whom they represent. In Romans 7, despite strong scholarly 
currents arguing otherwise, we come face to face with Paul the individual, who in 
the depiction of his agony on account of Torah‖s death-dealing power in his life, 
provides a negative counterpart to the positive exemplar Abraham, thus giving us 
the negative exemplary individual. Vitally important for understanding how Paul sees 
the individual incorporated into community is the somatic individual of Romans 12, 
which is a reference to the body-and-members metaphor that Paul employs in 12:3-
8. Finally, in Romans 16 Paul introduces us to a host of particular individuals, both 
among his own friends and companions, as well as among the believers in the 
church or churches in Rome. 
As I noted in the last chapter, there are several portions of Romans that do 
not receive extended treatment in the typology I am presenting. The reason for 
these omissions, again, is simply that I am presenting Paul‖s understanding of the 
individual in the form of a typology, which by its very nature is textually selective, 
rather than providing an exhaustive, linear exegesis of the entire letter of Romans. 
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Nonetheless, I contend that this typology addresses most of the major individual 
types in the letter, even if other individual types may be discernible in portions of 
the text not addressed. 
 
2. The Representative Individual (Romans 5) 
The representative individual, unlike the exemplary individual, is one whose actions 
are significant for others completely apart from their being reproduced in those 
others. Put differently, a representative individual is a vicarious individual, an 
individual who, in some way or another, determines the fate of others. 
 
2.1 Adam and Christ (Romans 5:12-21) 
In Rom 5:12-21 Paul tells a tale of cosmic and universal proportions. It is a story that 
spans the ages and recounts both humanity‖s plunge into sin and death, as well as 
the divine triumph over that state of affairs accomplished through the mission of 
Jesus Christ. In order to map out the precise significance of Christ‖s death for his 
people Paul sets up a contrast between Adam and Christ: one man (5:12: ἑνὸρ 
ἀνθπώποτ), one action (5:15: σοῦ ἑνὸρ παπαπσώμασι - cf. 5:18, 19), death for all; a 
second man (5:17: σοῦ ἑνὸρ Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ), one action (5:18: ἑνὸρ δικαιώμασορ - cf. 
5:19), life for all. The details of this contrast must be attended to with precision in 
order to understand the kind of individuality that is expressed in Paul‖s Adam-
Christ typology. 
 To begin with, Paul, with a protasis (ὥςπεπ) at the head of a stretch of text 
extending all the way to 5:17,1 introduces Adam into his storyline by arguing that it 
was through this one man (δι‖ ἑνὸρ ἀνθπώποτ) that sin entered into the world, and 
that with sin‖s appearance, death came in its trail (5:12a-b). In this way (οὕσψρ) 
death spread (διέπφομαι) to all of humanity “from which it follows that all sinned” 
(ἐυ‖ ᾧ πάνσερ ἥμαπσον - 5:12d). The meaning of this verse, and especially the last 
clause (5:12d), has been widely disputed, in addition to being highly significant 
historically in a variety of theological debates over the nature of sin, death and the 
transmission of both among humans. It is thus necessary to sort out its meaning as 
well as how it contributes to Paul‖s unfolding argument. 
                                                        
1 See Cranfield, Romans, 1.272-73. 
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First of all, this much is clear in the 5:12: sin and death entered into the 
world through (διά) the agency of a single individual, namely Adam, even though 
“Paul‖s focus is not at this point on the corporate significance of Adam‖s act but on 
his role as the instrument through whom sin and death were unleashed in the 
world.”2 Furthermore, ἐυ‖ ᾧ πάνσερ ἥμαπσον seems to explain or qualify the 
immediately preceding clause.3 
Moving to the immediate context, a sense such as “from which it follows” 
seems best.4 Paul goes on in 5:13-14 to explain the meaning of ἐυ‖ ᾧ πάνσερ ἥμαπσον 
(cf. γάπ in 5:13), and his reasoning appears to be this: we know from the narrative of 
Genesis that sin, and through it death, came into the world through Adam (5:12a-b); 
in this way (οὕσψρ) death also spread to all people, “from which it follows” (ἐυ‖ ᾧ) 
that all must have sinned, or else death would not have spread to them (5:12c-d).5 To 
substantiate this Paul states that sin was indeed in the world prior to the giving of 
the law (5:13a; which simply restates 5:12c-d), even though sin is not “charged” to 
one‖s account (ἐλλογέψ) in a legally precise fashion in this pre-Mosaic age (5:13b). 
As Paul puts it in Rom 4:15: “Where there is no law there is no transgression 
(παπάβαςιρ).”6 The presence of sin in the world (as stated in 5:12-13), then, is proved 
by the fact that death reigned (i.e., everyone died) from Adam until Moses even 
though they did not sin in the same way (ἐπὶ σῶ ὁμοιώμασι) Adam did, who 
                                                        
2 Moo, Romans, 321 (emphasis added). 
3 Rightly Cranfield, Romans, 1.275. The Greek of the preceding clause: καὶ οὕσψρ εἰρ πάνσαρ 
ἀνθπώποτρ ὁ θάνασορ διῆλθεν. 
4 Thanks to my postgraduate colleague Lionel Windsor for pointing me in the direction of this 
understanding of ἐυ‖ ᾧ πάνσερ ἥμαπσον. I also owe to him my basic understanding of how 5:13-14 
works as an explanation of 5:12, and is grounded in Paul‖s understanding of the narrative of Genesis. 
See further Matthew Black, Romans (NCB; London: Oliphants, 1973), 88-89, who shows that ἐυ‖ ᾧ can 
be read in the way I am interpreting it, citing Stanislas Lyonnet, “Le sens ἐυ‖ ᾧ en Rom 5, 12 et l‖ 
exégèse des Pères grecs,” Bib 36 (1955): 436-56, as an antecedent of this understanding. 
5 The alternative presented by most modern English translation of ἐυ‖ ᾧ as “because” (see e.g., 
ESV, NASB, NET, NIV, NLT, NRSV, RSV) seems to be ruled out by 5:12a-b which states that death came 
into the world through Adam‖s sin, rather than through the sin of common humanity (cf. Black, 
Romans, 86). It would be odd, then, (although not impossible) for Paul to finish the sentence by saying 
that death came to all people because all sinned. A possible rejoinder would be that Paul only says 
that sin (understood as a power) entered the world through Adam, and that this power did not 
concretely manifest itself in the rest of humanity (πάνσαρ ἀνθπώποτρ) until all sinned (πάνσερ 
ἥμαπσον). However, despite the way Paul at times personifies sin as an enslaving “power” (e.g., in 
Romans 6-7), he does not radically separate sin as a power from sins as corrupt human actions (see 
e.g., Rom 6:12, 19; 7:5, 13, 15, etc.; on this point see esp. Engberg-Pedersen, “Person in Paul?”). 
Therefore, understanding sin in 5:12a as a force at work in the world without any actual 
manifestations in concrete human sinning would not fit the consistent pattern of language about sin 
as deed in Paul‖s letters (pace Käsemann, Römer, 137; rightly Thomas H. Tobin, “The Jewish Context of 
Rom 5:12-14,” SPhilo 13 [2001]: 171-72.). 
6 Not: “Where there is no law there is no sin,” which Rom 2:12 (among other places) clearly 
disallows. 
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committing a legally “chargeable” transgression (παπάβαςιρ) of the divine 
prohibition given him in the garden of Eden, or in the way those after the giving of 
the law did, who like Adam, have sin clearly marked off as transgression by the legal 
prohibitions enshrined in the Mosaic law-code (5:14).7 
Ultimately, the most important thing to keep in mind is that no matter how 
one translates ἐυ‖ ᾧ πάνσερ ἥμαπσον, Paul is still insisting that sin and death have 
come into the world through Adam. Thus, in 5:12 Paul has established a basic 
principle of vicariousness, the details of which he begins parsing out in 5:15, and 
especially in 5:18-19.8 This vicarious relationship is what Paul means to draw 
attention to in calling Adam a “type” (σύπορ) of “the coming one” (σοῦ μέλλονσορ – 
5:14); a pattern of representative action is initiated with Adam that decisively 
shapes how the action of the coming Messiah should be understood.  
 Although Paul has set up the expectation that he will explain in more detail 
how Adam serves as a type of the coming one, in 5:15 he instead seeks to rule out a 
false implication of this typological arrangement: the grace of God is “not like 
[Adam‖s] trespass” (οὐφ ὡρ σὸ παπάπσψμα), because (γάπ), although it is true that 
many (οἱ πολλοί) died on account of the trespass of the one man (σῶ σοῦ ἑνόρ 
παπαπσώμασι), it is all the more (πολλῶ μᾶλλον) true that the grace of God and the 
gift found in the grace of “the one man Jesus Christ” abounded to many. Paul has in 
this verse reconfirmed that Adam‖s (single) transgression is causally responsible for 
the death of many; his single action has vicarious repercussions for an as of yet 
undefined group labelled simply “the many.” Notably—and perhaps shockingly—
absent is any statement of the involvement of “the many” in the transgression that 
leads to their own death. 
 As in 5:15, again in 5:16 Paul, even though he is still arguing typologically, 
continues his argument by highlighting the inequality of sin and gift: the gift, in a 
fundamentally important way, is not like that which comes “through the sin of the 
                                                        
7 Rightly Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 241; John C. Poirier, “Romans 5:13-14 and the 
Universality of Law,” NovT 38 (1996): 353-56; Rudolf Pesch, Römerbrief (3d ed.; NEchtB 6; Würzburg: 
Echter, 1994), 53; N. T. Wright, “Adam, Israel and the Messiah,” in The Climax of the Covenant (London: 
T & T Clark, 1991), 39; cf. Otfried Hofius, “Die Adam-Christus-Antithese und das Gesetz: Erwägungen 
zu Röm 5,12-21,” in Paul and the Mosaic Law (ed. James D. G. Dunn; WUNT 89; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
1996), 186-87, 192-97. 
8 As we will see shortly, the reading of ἐυ‖ ᾧ πάνσερ ἥμαπσον I am proposing, in distinction from 
a view that sees Paul arguing in some sense for an equally ultimate agency of Adam‖s and all of 
humanity‖s sin with regard to the entrance of death into the world, fits more closely with how Paul 
goes on to argue (in 5:15-19) for a direct and causal link between Adam‖s single sin and death, the 
reign of death, judgment and condemnation. Pace e.g., Fitzmyer, Romans, 405-6. 
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one man” (δι᾽ ἑνὸρ ἁμαπσήςανσορ), because (γάπ) the judgment (σὸ κπίμα) resulting 
from this single sin leads to condemnation (κασάκπιμα), while the gift that comes 
“after many sins” (ἐκ πολλ῵ν παπαπσψμάσψν) leads to justification (δικαίψμα).9 
Paul cannot bring himself, even while arguing typologically, to place the gift and 
grace of God on the same level as the transgression and sin of Adam. While Adam‖s 
act of transgression does indeed establish a pattern, it is a pattern that shines a light 
on the triumph of God‖s grace, rather than a pattern of mere equality, with 
transgression and grace on two sides of a ledger, waiting to be shuffled around by 
strokes of the accountant‖s pen.10 What this means in sum is that even though death 
reigned “on account of the trespass of the one” (σῶ σοῦ ἑνὸρ παπαπσώμασι) and 
through “the one man,” it is much more (πολλῶ μᾶλλον) the case that “those who 
have received the abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness will reign in life 
through the one [man] Jesus Christ” (5:17).11 Sin and death have a purely negative 
function; they do nothing but destroy. Yet life and righteousness correspond with 
God‖s creational intention, and are brought in decisively through the redemptive 
transformation accomplished in Christ (see Rom 5:20-21).12 As such they far surpass 
the havoc wreaked by Adam‖s transgression. 
In 5:18 Paul once more restates the causal connection between Adam‖s 
trespass, Christ‖s obedience and the fate of those who come after them: not only 
does Adam‖s act kill (5:15), thus ushering a reign of death into the world (5:17), it is 
also “through the trespass of the one” (δι᾽ ἑνὸρ παπαπσώμασορ) that “all men” 
(πάνσαρ ἀνθπώποτρ) are condemned (εἰρ κασάκπιμα), just as it is “through the 
righteous act of one” (δι᾽ ἑνὸρ δικαιώμασορ) that “all men” (πάνσαρ ἀνθπώποτρ) 
receive the “justification of life” (εἰρ δικαίψςιν ζψῆρ). In explanation (γάπ) of this 
contention Paul in 5:19 states the causal link between Adam‖s and Christ‖s actions 
and the fate of the many in a slightly different form in order to bring out the 
ramifications of the two representational spheres further: just as “through the 
disobedience of the one man” (διὰ σῆρ παπακοῆρ σοῦ ἑνὸρ ἀνθπώποτ) the many (οἱ 
                                                        
9 Cf. Wright, “Romans,” 528; Moo, Romans, 338; Wilckens, Römer, 1.324-25. 
10 Cf. Wright, “Romans,” 528: “It is not . . . that Paul is denying similarity between the gift and the 
trespass; he is denying that there is a balance between them.” See also John Calvin, Romans (Grand 
Rapids: Baker, 2003), 209-10; Hofius, “Adam-Christus-Anthithese,” 168-71; Wright, “Adam,” 37. 
11 Gk: οἱ σὴν πεπιςςείαν σῆρ φάπισορ καὶ σῆρ δψπεᾶρ σῆρ δικαιοςύνηρ λαμβάνονσερ ἐν ζψῇ 
βαςιλεύςοτςιν διὰ σοῦ ἑνὸρ Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ. As in 5:15, the causal connection between Adam‖s 
transgression (σῶ σοῦ ἑνόρ παπαμπσώμασι) and death is restated in 5:17. 
12 See also the connection of life and righteousness, as well as the creational (and new-
creational) context for both, as this is developed at length in Romans 8. 
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πολλοί) were constituted (passive of καθίςσημι) as sinners, so also “through the 
obedience of the one” (διὰ σῆρ ὑπακοῆρ σοῦ ἑνὸρ) man Jesus Christ will the many (οἱ 
πολλοί) be constituted (future passive of καθίςσημι) as righteous.13 
To explain the disparity between grace and transgression, and to round out 
his typology of Adam and Christ, Paul speaks in 5:20 of the law entering into history 
in order to (ἵνα) make transgression abound.14 Although Paul‖s claim would surely 
have appeared to his audience (especially any Jews) to be a scandalous claim about 
God‖s holy law (cf. Rom 7:14), Paul insists that the law‖s transgression increasing 
role is not ultimate: wherever the law causes sin thus to abound, grace super-
abounds. In fact, sin is swallowed up in the superabundance of God‖s gift, as 5:21 
makes clear: even as (ὥςπεπ) “sin reigned in death,” stirred up by the law, grace, in 
its superabundance in and through (lit. “in this way” [οὕσψρ]) sin‖s death-dealing 
rule, will “reign through righteousness, leading to eternal life, through Jesus Christ 
our Lord.”15 Mysteriously, and surely counter-intuitively (hence Rom 6:1), sin is 
nothing more than a subservient knave in the divine economy. Grace has the final 
word. 
In light of the above, what can be said about the type of individuality 
expressed in the Adam-Christ story Paul tells in Romans 5? First, unlike Abraham in 
Romans 4, Adam and Christ are not exemplars, but rather vicariously representative 
individuals.16 Although Abraham‖s significance extends far beyond his own person, 
it does not do so in the way that Adam‖s or Jesus Christ‖s do.17 This is so because, 
while it is true that Abraham, like Adam and Christ, is “unsubstitutable” in his 
                                                        
13 The common English rendering of καθίςσημι as “make” in 5:19 can be slightly misleading. The 
verb should be translated here as “constitute” rather than “make,” if the latter is understood in any 
sort of transformative or creative sense (contra Robin Scroggs, The Last Adam: A Study in Pauline 
Anthropology [Oxford: Blackwell, 1966], 78). This is evident in the way 5:19 directly clarifies 5:18 (cf. 
the γάπ in 5:19): the many being constituted sinners (ἁμαπσψλοί) in 5:19 corresponds with all being 
condemned (εἰρ κασάκπιμα) in 5:18, just as the many being constituted righteous in 5:19 corresponds 
with all receiving justification (εἰρ δικαίψςιν ζψῆρ) in 5:18. In other words, καθίςσημι in 5:18-19 
pertains to negative representative action (Adam‖s disobedience) leading to negative status 
(condemnation) as well as positive representative action (Christ‖s obedience) leading to positive 
status (justification). 
14 The ἵνα should be understood purposively (intended to increase sin), rather than 
epistemologically (showing sin to be sin); rightly e.g., Lohse, Römer, 183; Wright, “Romans,” 530; Moo, 
Romans, 347; pace e.g., Fitzmyer, Romans, 422; Wilckens, Römer, 1.329; Cranfield, Romans, 1.292-93. 
15 Gk: ἡ φάπιρ βαςιλεύςῃ διὰ δικαιοςύνηρ εἰρ ζψὴν αἰώνιον διὰ Ἰηςοῦ Χπιςσοῦ σοῦ κτπίοτ ἡμ῵ν. 
16 Cf. Calvin, Romans, 201; Esler, Conflict and Identity, 201. 
17 Cf. Otto Michel, Der Brief an die Römer (KEKNT 4; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 
186: “So Großes ist von Jesus Cristus ausgesagt worden, daß es berechtigt ist, in ihm den Anfänger 
der neuen Menschheit zu sehen. Er kann also nicht mit einem Menschen innerhalb der israelitischen 
Heilsgeschichte (wie Abraham oder Moses) verglichen werden, sondern kann nur dem Anfänger der 
alten Menschheit gegenübergestellt werden.” 
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individuality, his actions are not in and of themselves epoch shaping. What is true 
for him must be reproduced in others in the present. Appropriation is a non-
negotiable in Romans 4. In Rom 5:12-21 there is not a single reference to 
appropriation in the present, nor a single reference to faith (which is striking given 
the dense concentration of πίςσιρ language in 3:21-5:2).18 There is an account of the 
effects of Adam‖s and Christ‖s actions on groups of people (see e.g., Rom 5:12, 17), 
but no exhortation to follow (or avoid) the example of either. The dominant motif is 
one of representation: one man brings sin and death into the world (5:12-15), and 
his sin is responsible for judgment, condemnation, the reign of death and the 
constitution of humanity as sinners (5:16-19); another man initiates an outpouring 
of grace, justifies transgressors, extends the gift of righteousness and constitutes 
others righteous (5:15-19), he ushers in eternal life to a world crushed by Adam‖s sin 
(5:20-21). With Adam and Christ the correspondence between act and effect is 
absolute. They are both individuals with universal significance, even though the 
typological relationship between the two is asymmetrical, with the emphasis most 
emphatically on the power of God‖s grace as manifested in Jesus Christ. 
 Further corroborating this principle of absolute vicariousness is the 
disappearance of the generic individual from Paul‖s argumentation in 5:12-21. The 
generic individual is ubiquitous and central in Paul‖s argumentation Romans 1-3, 
appears often in Romans 4, and while not explicitly mentioned in 5:1-11, is implicit 
in the continuous (and dominant) language of “us” and what Christ has 
accomplished “for us” (see e.g., ὑπὲπ ἡμ῵ν ἀποθανεῖν in 5:8).19 Without absolutizing 
this (since the “all” and “many” of 5:12-21 cannot be made to exclude individuals), 
the language of Rom 5:12-21 should be taken in a primarily corporate, and even 
cosmic, sense:20 the actions of Adam and Jesus Christ radically effect, and even 
constitute the identities of, “the many” and “all,” while the generic individual 
                                                        
18 Contra Hans Weder, “Gesetz und Sünde: Gedanken zu einem Qualitativen Sprung im Denken 
des Paulus,” NTS 31 (1985): 364, 368. 
19 There is a first person plural pronoun or verb in every single verse in 5:1-11, except 4 and 7, 
both of which continue thoughts from the verse preceding them. There is only one third person 
plural pronoun in 5:12-21 (and no such verbs), and it simply indicates that Jesus Christ is σοῦ κτπίοτ 
ἡμ῵ν (5:21). Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 410. 
20 Rightly Moo, Romans, 315. Thus Käsemann, Römer, 131, is correct to insist that Rom 5:12-21 
clearly evinces the “kosmische Dimension” of Paul‖s doctrine of justification which encompasses “die 
Weite der Schöpfung,” although he is wrong in setting this in (even partial) antithesis to individual 
concerns, as my preceding analysis of Romans 2-4 has shown. The individual and community must be 
understood in a mutually qualifying manner: there is no isolated individual in Paul, nor is there a 
community without individuals. 
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essentially drops out of sight, as is especially clear from the complete lack of 
exhortative and imitative material in this portion of the letter. The dynamic at work 
here is one of representative actions and their aftermath, of contrasting epochs and 
communities and the two men who stand at the head of each. Romans 5:12-21 tells 
the story of the ages of sin and righteousness, of condemnation and justification, of 
death and eternal life. 
  
2.2 Summary 
Representative individuality is the key motif in Rom 5:12-21, as is especially clear in 
the absoluteness of Paul‖s language in 5:15-19: one man‖s sin, all died; one man‖s 
righteous act, all made alive.21 In drawing out the representative and typological 
relationship between Adam and Christ, Paul does not feel the need (as do most 
modern interpreters) to insert a caveat about personal responsibility.22 The central 
point instead is a description of Adam and Christ in completely representative 
terms where the spheres of each are “alternativ, exklusiv und ultimativ.”23 
We thus see in Rom 5:12-21 that individuality cannot be reduced to the 
sphere of individual volition and action, but entails being caught up in the actions of 
one of two representative individuals whose actions have universal significance. 
That is to say, Paul‖s understanding of individuality is communally and corporately 
qualified: the kind of individuality exemplified in Adam and Christ is one that 
determines the destiny of entire groups of people independently of the actions of 
those groups or the individuals who comprise them. The individuals Paul writes to 
are to understand themselves as subject to powers and forces outside of themselves 
even as they must constantly struggle with internal forces (sin, flesh, etc.) and are 
called to participate in a variety of individual actions (faith, hope, etc.).24 Most 
                                                        
21 This principle of absolute representation is significantly stronger than saying, as does Brendan 
Byrne, that Paul understood Adam‖s sin as simply exercising “a fateful influence on many” (Brendan 
Byrne, “―The Type of the One to Come‖ [Rom 5:14]: Fate and Responsibility in Romans 5:12-21,” ABR 36 
[1988]: 29). Rather, we see in Rom 5:12-21 set “in schroffem Dualismus jene beiden Gestalten, welche 
allein Welt in Unheil und Heil inaugurierten” (Käsemann, Römer, 133; cf. 143). 
22 Cf. Hofius, “Adam-Christus-Anthithese,” 184-86. Contra Barrett, Romans, 111; Byrne, “Type,” 29; 
Weder, “Gesetz und Sünde,” 360-1; A. J. M. Wedderburn, “The Theological Structure of Romans V. 
12,” NTS 19 (1972-1973): 349-52; Scroggs, Last Adam, 75, 79. 
23 Käsemann, Römer, 137. Cf. Hofius, “Adam-Christus-Anthithese,” 181; Chrys C. Caragounis, 
“Romans 5.15-16 in the Context of 5.12-21: Contrast or Comparison?” NTS 31 (1985): 146. 
24 See Engberg-Pedersen (“Person in Paul?”) on the necessity of holding “apocalyptical” 
(external) and “cognitive” (internal) aspects of Pauline theology together. 
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importantly, they are to revel in the grace that has come “through the one man” 
(5:15: σοῦ ἑνὸρ ἀνθπώποτ) “Jesus Christ our Lord” (5:21). 
 
3. The Negative Exemplary Individual (Romans 7) 
The negative exemplary individual is simply one who establishes a pattern (whether 
implicit or explicitly stated) for Paul‖s audience to avoid. 
 
3.1 Paul‖s Vanishing Act: Autobiography and Impersonation in Romans 7:7-25 
In Rom 7:5-6 Paul recounts what happens to those “living in the flesh” when they 
come in contact with the law: the sinful passions are aroused, thus bearing fruit for 
death, which ends with human captivity to sin. The natural question to ask in light 
of this is the one Paul poses in 7:7: is the law itself sin (ἁμαπσία)? Paul answers with 
his typically vehement “by no means” (μὴ γένοισο). Rather, the law causes one to 
know (γινώςκψ) sin (7:7). 
In order to explain how this is so Paul shifts into the first person singular in 
7:7: the law does not simply make a generic human, or a generic Jew, aware of sin, it 
makes Paul aware of his sin, yet in such a way as to provide a negative example to 
dissuade Paul‖s audience from turning to the law in order to find deliverance from 
sin. In distinction from the positive example of Abraham‖s faith in God in chapter 4, 
Paul portrays himself in chapter 7 as a negative exemplary individual.25 However, 
the significance of Paul‖s depiction of his struggle with sin and law extends far 
beyond his own experience: combined with what Paul has already written about the 
nature of individuality (particularly in Romans 1-3 and Romans 5), Romans 7—
despite being directed primarily at Paul‖s fellow Jews—paints a picture of a 
universalized humanity, with Paul as a vivid instantiation and example of both 
Adam‖s and Israel‖s deathly encounter with divine command. 
None of this, however, is undisputed in recent scholarship. While the first 
person singular is a dominant feature of this unit of text (being introduced in 7:7, 
                                                        
25 Cf. Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 282, n. 51 (cf. 296): “The focus on the individual ―I‖ 
should not be played down . . . . The individual focus is entirely consistent with the pragmatic aim of 
this chapter, which is to dissuade Roman Christians from the practice of a communally normative 
mode of life.” The reason the alternative “communally normative mode of life” must be shunned is 
because it teaches one to rely on the law in order to find freedom from slavery to sin. Such an 
alternative can be found e.g., in 4 Macc 2:5-6b, on which see Francis Watson, “Constructing an 
Antithesis: Pauline and Other Jewish Perspectives on Divine and Human Agency,” in Divine and Human 
Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment (eds. John M. G. Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole; London: T 
& T Clark, 2007), 108-16. 
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and used consistently until 7:25), since Werner Kümmel‖s influential proposal 
arguing that Paul is merely employing a rhetorical form in Romans, this chapter has 
increasingly been interpreted in non-autobiographical—and ultimately, non-
individual—terms.26 The main attempts to read Romans 7 without reference to 
Paul‖s own autobiography are those that see Paul using a rhetorical device like 
πποςψποποιία (speech-in-character),27 those that see Paul speaking as Adam,28 and 
those that see him speaking as Israel.29 In all of this a good deal of ink has been 
spilled attempting to erase what—on the surface at least—is undeniable in 7:7-25: 
Paul is speaking of himself and no one else. While all of these revisionary readings 
can point to certain features of the text, as Stephen Chester (following Gerd 
Theissen) has argued, there is really only one element—namely the phrase “I once 
was alive apart from the law” (ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζψν φψπὶρ νόμοτ ποσέ) in 7:9—that, 
combined with an alleged incompatibility with Phil 3:4-12, has led interpreters to 
“come up with the idea of considering the ―I‖ fictive.”30 Scholars insist that Paul 
could never have spoken as a Jew of a time in which he lived “apart from law” 
(φψπὶρ νόμοτ),31 and that the wretched struggle between flesh and law that Paul 
                                                        
26 Werner G. Kümmel, Römer 7 und das Bild des Menschen in Neuen Testament (Munich: Kaiser, 1974), 
which was originally published in 1929. Chester, Conversion, 183-84, summarizes the post-Kümmel 
consensus well: “Kümmel influentially argued that the wretched person of 7:14-25 simply cannot be 
the same person as the confident individual who, in Phil. 3:4-6, has so many reasons for confidence in 
the flesh. When Paul uses the first person singular in Rom. 7, he does not mean what he appears to 
say. The ―I‖ of Rom. 7 does not include Paul himself.” See also Hermann Lichtenberger, Das Ich Adams 
und das Ich der Menschheit (WUNT 164; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 72-74; Burnett, Salvation, 174-
87. L. Ann Jervis, “―The Commandment Which is for Life‖ (Romans 7.10): Sin‖s Use of the Obedience of 
Faith,” JSNT 27 (2004): 193-216, is one of the few recent interpreters to argue that Paul describes 
Christian, individual experience in the present. 
27 See e.g., Jewett, Romans, 441-45; Stowers, Rereading, 264-69. I agree with Chester, Conversion, 
184, n. 122, (following Lauri Thurén, Derhetorizing Paul: A Dynamic Perspective on Pauline Theology and the 
Law (WUNT 124; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 118-19) regarding Paul‖s alleged use of 
πποςψποποιία in Romans 7: it is “unlikely that Paul had mastered such a high-level technique, typical 
only of the actor or orator with many years‖ training, and even more unlikely that he would have 
expected his Roman audience to recognize its unsignalled use.” See also the critique of Kümmel‖s 
arguments for a purely rhetorical “I” in Gerd Theissen, Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology (trans. 
John P. Galvin; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1987), 192, n. 17, 200; cf. Douglas J. Moo, “Israel and Paul in 
Romans 7.7-12,” NTS 32 (1986): 128-29. 
28 E.g., Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 282-87; Lichtenberger, Das Ich Adams, 125-86; Otfried 
Hofius, “Der Mensch im Schatten Adams: Römer 7,7-25a,” in Paulusstudien II (WUNT 143; Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 110-21, 134-35; Cranfield, Romans, 1.343-44; Käsemann, Römer, 185-87; Stanislas 
Lyonnet, “L‖histoire du salut selon le chapitre VII de l‖Epître aux Romains,” Bib 43 (1962): 117-51. 
29 E.g., Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 356-80; Frank Thielman, “The Story of Israel and the 
Theology of Romans 5-8,” in Pauline Theology. Volume 3: Romans (eds. David M. Hay and E. Elizabeth 
Johnson; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 190-4; N. T. Wright, “Romans and the Theology of Paul,” in 
Pauline Theology. Volume 3: Romans (eds. David M. Hay and E. Elizabeth Johnson; Minneapolis: Fortress, 
1995), 49-54; Moo, “Romans 7.7-12,” 122-35. 
30 Theissen, Pyschological Aspects, 201, quoted by Chester, Conversion, 185, n. 127. 
31 See e.g., Esler, Conflict and Identity, 231. 
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depicts in Romans 7 could not possibly describe the experience of one who even 
prior to coming to know Jesus Christ saw himself as “blameless” (ἄμεμπσορ) 
“according to the righteousness found in the law” (κασὰ δικαιοςύνην σὴν ἐν νόμῳ 
γενόμενορ - Phil 3:6).32 With autobiography taken out of the picture, the individual 
can easily be dispensed with. 
However, as Chester has argued, Philippians 3 and Romans 7 should be seen 
as recounting Paul‖s past from different vantage points. In Philippians 3 Paul 
describes his former way of life as he experienced it then, as a Jew intent on 
persecuting believers in Christ because of his intense zeal for Jewish law and 
customs (Phil 3:4-6).33 In contrast, in Rom 7:7-13 Paul recounts his past primarily 
from the epistemological vantage point of present Christian experience and 
knowledge (cf. Rom 12:2), which, as Chester details through extensive engagement 
with modern sociological study, is the normal way in which “conversion 
experiences” are recounted across diverse times and cultures.34 In Paul‖s case, while 
his pre-Christian self would never have spoken of the law as death-dealing and sin-
inflaming, from the new perspective of faith in Christ, he insists that the law 
(despite—or perhaps because of—its holiness and righteousness, as per 7:12) does 
these very things (7:13-14; cf. Gal 2:19-20).35 
Furthermore, Paul says in 7:9 that, although he was once alive apart from the 
law, there was a time when sin “came back alive” (ἀναζάψ).36 In 7:11 he clarifies 
(γάπ) what he means by this: Paul‖s “death” came through the deceptive (ἐξαπασάψ) 
agency of the commandment, and the entrance of sin into his life that was provided 
through this commandment. It is not that Paul had no sin prior to sin‖s coming back 
                                                        
32 One of Kümmel‖s main arguments against an autobiographical reading. See Kümmel, Römer 7, 
104-17. 
33 See Chester, Conversion, 183; cf. Gathercole, Boasting, 208. 
34 Chester, Conversion, 184-85; cf. Wright, “Theology of Paul,” 51. 
35 Cf. A. J. M. Wedderburn, “Eine neuere Paulusperspektive?” in Biographie und Persönlichkeit des 
Paulus (eds. Eve-Marie Becker and Peter Pilhofer; WUNT 187; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 50-1; 
Chester, Conversion, 185; Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 243; Moo, “Romans 7.7-12,” 125; 
Käsemann, Römer, 187. 
36 Although ἀναζάψ is often translated simply as “come to life” (e.g., ESV, NASB, NIV), as BDAG, 
s.v. ἀναζάψ 1-2 (cf. LSJ), indicates it is properly translated in every NT usage as “come back to life” or 
“come out of a state of dormancy,” which is more accurately captured in the KJV‖s “sin revived” (cf. 
RSV, NRSV; pace Käsemann, Römer, 187). This adds even more support to seeing Paul in the second 
half of 7:9 as describing his past experience from his present vantage point: only with Christ-
believing hindsight does Paul recognize that the “life” he thought he was enjoying at the time (7:9a) 
was false, since sin was—unknown to Paul—lurking in his heart, waiting for the opportunity 
(provided by the commandment) to reactivate, deceive and kill Paul. The meaning of ἀναζάψ should 
alert the interpreter to the danger of pressing links with Genesis 3 too far: there was of course no sin 
dormant in Adam that could be revived prior to his and Eve‖s initial sinful acts. 
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to life—contradicting Paul‖s categorical denial of such a notion in Rom 3:9-19, and 
especially 3:23—but that there was a time in his life in which he believed himself to 
have had true spiritual life, although in reality sin, using the commandment, was at 
that time deceiving him. It seems clear, as Chester notes, that this refers to Paul‖s 
present understanding of his past experience, for had he known he was being 
deceived, Paul surely would not have allowed himself to be co-opted by sin‖s wicked 
machinations.37 
All of this is to say that it is not necessary to posit a conflict between an 
autobiographical understanding of Romans 7 and how Paul describes his past in Phil 
3:4-6. Given the dominant first-person singular features of Rom 7:7-25 and the 
absence of any explicit cues that Paul intends to be taken as speaking primarily of 
someone other than himself, it is surely more difficult to redact Paul‖s own past out 
of Romans 7 than it is to see this chapter as recounting this history from a different 
vantage point than Philippians 3.38 In neither Romans 7 nor Philippians 3 do we 
have unmediated access to Paul‖s state of mind at the point of his conversion. To 
insist that we can uncover detailed information about Paul‖s state of mind in 
Philippians 3 and then place this in antithesis to a biographical account in Romans 7 
is to attempt to extract far too much information about Paul‖s psyche than 
Philippians 3 provides. Instead, the accounts in Philippians 3 and Romans 7 give us a 
perspectival telling of Paul‖s former life primarily geared toward shaping the 
theology and praxis of his audience in the present. The way in which Paul tells his 
story differs in both accounts, but only insofar as his didactic purposes differ in the 
two passages. The following analysis of Rom 7:7-25 should make the genuinely 
personal, autobiographical and individual nature of this text even clearer. 
 To begin with, the very scriptural prohibition against illegitimate desire 
(Exod 20:17) that Paul cites as he begins to explain the effects of the law on sinful 
humanity is a second person singular (7:7). Scholars, in the attempt to read Paul as 
speaking strictly as Israel, sometimes miss this simple fact; no matter what 
                                                        
37 Chester, Conversion, 186-90. 
38 On the opposite side of the interpretational spectrum, however, Burnett (e.g., Salvation, 197) 
rarely moves beyond the bare fact that Romans 7 has a “personal feel,” or a “highly personal tone,” 
etc. Such statements could of course be very easily assimilated into a purely rhetorical “I.” It is 
necessary not only to provide a more thorough investigation than Burnett offers of the variety of 
textual (and intertextual) features in Rom 7:7-25 that bring to the fore important autobiographical 
dimensions of the text, but also to provide an analysis of what this indicates about Paul‖s conception 
of individuality. 
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relevance Paul‖s speech has in Romans 7 with regard to Israel‖s experience of the 
law, the commandment itself in its Old Testament context was directed at individuals 
within Israel. Thus, even if Paul is speaking as Israel, or as a representative Israelite 
(which is likely), he also speaks as an actual Israelite who is subject to the 
individualized form of the commandment just like his ancestors were.39 If the 
historical experience of this commandment was the occasion for a collective 
rebellion against God, it was only such as each individual found within him- or 
herself a craving for that which the law prohibited. Paul too knows on a deeply 
personal level the pain and “death” attendant upon the counterintuitive cycle of 
proscription, desire and death that marked Israel‖s history (7:8).40 
The overall sense of 7:9-11 is relatively straightforward, despite the scholarly 
debates swirling around the expression ἐγὼ ἔζψν φψπὶρ νόμοτ ποσέ in 7:9: the 
commandment, through an act of deception (7:11), activates latent sin (7:9), which 
results in Paul‖s spiritual death (7:10). As I have already noted, the central difficulty 
in fitting this phrase into a personal and autobiographical reading of Romans 7 is 
that it does not seem to make sense for Paul to say that there was ever a time in 
which he lived without being subject to the law. While it is indeed true that an 
autobiographical reading will fail if it cannot make sense of the fact that Paul as a 
Jew was born within the realm of the law, recent scholarship has been led somewhat 
astray from the outset in assuming that φψπὶρ in 7:9 must mean that the “I” is 
recounting a time in which he or she was alive either before the law was given or 
outside the governing realm of the law.41 However, a more satisfying explanation of 
φψπὶρ νόμοτ is possible that retains its autobiographical focus. 
The most significant thing to note from the outset is that Paul has already 
used the exact phrase φψπὶρ νόμοτ in 7:8c.42 In 7:8c Paul speaks of the fact that sin 
was dead φψπὶρ νόμοτ. Rather than meaning that sin was dead before the law came, 
or independently of the law‖s rule, Paul is indicating that sin is not activated in the 
human heart apart from the work of a law that defines sin as sin, and in so doing, 
                                                        
39 Cf. Theissen, Pyschological Aspects, 200-1. 
40 On which see Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 363-80; cf. Lohse, Römer, 212. 
41 See e.g., Jewett, Romans, 450-1; Moo, Romans, 437; Fitzmyer, Romans, 467; Wilckens, Römer, 2.81-
82; Käsemann, Römer, 186. 
42 Calvin, Romans, 254, says that 7:8c “is a general truth, which he presently applies to his own 
case.” While I have not followed Calvin in every detail of his interpretation, his reading has most 
helped me see that a temporal understanding of φψπὶρ νόμοτ does not make the best sense of the 
phrase in context. 
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provokes the commission of sin.43 This has been Paul‖s point since 7:7: sin is not 
recognized as sin without a commandment to mark it off as sinful (7:7), just as sin 
does not produce its deathly fruit apart from the opportunity (ἀυοπμή) provided by 
the divine commandment (7:8). This is what Paul means (cf. γάπ) in 7:8c when he 
says that sin is dead φψπὶρ νόμοτ, namely that sin is not known as sin, and does not 
work its devastation apart from divine prohibition and command. This is not a 
primarily temporal designation, but rather one of explaining the necessary 
prerequisites for sin to be active in Paul‖s (or anyone‖s) life. 
Therefore, when Paul says in 7:9 that he once lived φψπὶρ νόμοτ, he is 
reflecting on his perception at the time that he had true life, but also noting that 
from his present perspective he realizes that the only reason he thought he had life 
at that time was because he had not yet recognized that the law (combined with sin) 
only kills. When the commandment came (ἔπφομαι) sin revived (ἀναζάψ) (7:9b) and 
Paul died (7:10a). Although Paul speaks of the law coming (ἔπφομαι – 7:9b), which 
could seem to indicate a primarily temporal activity, he makes it clear that this is 
rather to be understood cognitively when he says that this coming should be 
equated with Paul‖s having discovered (passive of εὑπίςκψ) that the 
commandment—despite its promise of life (7:10b; cf. Lev 18:5 in Rom 10:5; Gal 
3:12)—in actuality leads to death (εἰρ θάνασον).44  This whole process Paul 
summarizes as one of sin‖s having deceived (ἐξαπασάψ) him, and having killed him 
through the agency of the commandment (7:11). It is not the case, then, that Paul is 
arguing in 7:9a that the “I” of Romans 7 once lived before the law/commandment 
was given, or independently of its rule, but rather that the “I” (Paul himself) once 
believed himself to be enjoying the life promised in the law, but only because the 
law had not yet destroyed this illusion by activating the dormant sin in his heart. 
Although the phrase ἐγὼ ἔζψν φψπὶρ νόμοτ ποσέ, as many have argued,45 may echo 
                                                        
43 Cf. Romans 3:21, where Paul uses the exact phrase φψπὶρ νόμοτ to show how the righteousness 
of God has been revealed in a source outside of the law (even though the law did testify to it), 
without at all indicating that the law had not yet been given by God. While πόσε in 7:9 points to the 
past, it cannot be thereby assumed (as it is by many) that its use with φψπὶρ νόμοτ indicates that Paul 
is speaking of a time in which the “I” was not governed by law. Such a notion would have to come 
from the broader context, which is in fact against such a reading. 
44 Whether Rom 7:10 is an allusion to Lev 18:5, or simply puts forward “a more general law-life 
concept” (Preston M. Sprinkle, Law and Life: The Interpretation of Leviticus 18:5 in Early Judaism and in Paul 
[WUNT 2.241; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008], 186) is fairly immaterial since the concept is almost 
certainly present. 
45 See e.g., Lichtenberger, Das Ich Adams, 127-34; Cranfield, Romans, 1.351-52. 
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the story of Adam in his primeval “pre-fall” bliss, Paul is the primary speaker in 7:9, 
and the example his past provides is the central point of 7:7-13.46 
When Paul says that “the commandment that leads to life” (ἡ ἐνσολὴ ἡ εἰρ 
ζψήν) “was found by me” (εὑπέθη μοι) to “lead to death” (7:10), he is not simply 
saying that the law made him aware that sin is sin, but that he has come to 
experience in his own life the dreadful effects of the law when combined with human 
sin: the commandment “was found by me” [μοι] to cause death, rather than merely 
revealing this truth in a general sense.47 While εὑπίςκψ can have the sense attached 
to it in the passive simply of something being “proved,”48 it is likely that Paul is 
indicating with this verb the existential nature of his “discovery,” since he is 
explaining throughout 7:8-11 how he came to understand and experience the effect 
the commandment has on sinful humanity. Further pointing to the existential 
dimension of Paul‖s discovery is the fact that covetousness is a purely inward 
disposition, and deception, while involving one in an action against one‖s will, is 
nonetheless cognitive; one is deceived only insofar as one mentally receives and 
acts upon information, even if that information is ultimately misleading. In all of 
this, Paul‖s argumentation is seen to be intensely personal and cognitive in a way 
that is difficult to explain according to a purely rhetorical understanding of the first 
person singular. This could have been spoken in the persona of Adam, but even if 
this is the case, Paul has added his own flourish to the Genesis account by 
attempting to penetrate deeper into the existential and psychological effects of the 
commandment-deception-death sequence than does the straightforwardly 
descriptive narrative of Genesis 3. 
In 7:14, Paul‖s narratival time frame shifts to the present, which adds a 
heightened sense of urgency to the already personal and existential dimensions of 
the battle between the law and sinful flesh described in 7:7-13.49 Throughout 7:13-25 
the war being waged between flesh and sin is portrayed in strongly cognitive 
(particularly “revelational”), inner and individual language.50 Sin is revealed 
(passive of υαίνψ) to be sin through the death it produces (7:13). I do not 
                                                        
46 Contra Käsemann, Römer, 186. 
47 Emphasis added. Cf. Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 243-44. 
48 See BDAG, s.v. εὑπίςκψ 2. 
49 And thus largely marks a turn away from the more “storied” material of 7:7-13, with its 
resonances with Adam and Israel, on which see Theissen, Pyschological Aspects, 184-90. 
50 See ibid., 184. 
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understand (γινώςκψ) the battle going on in myself, which prevents me from doing 
what I want (θέλψ) to do (7:15; cf. θέλψ in 7:16-20).51 Sin dwells “inside of me” (ἐν 
ἐμοί), that is, “in my flesh” (ἐν σῇ ςαπκί μοτ), neither of which designations can be 
abstracted from the individual self and personal volition (7:18). Especially 
significant is Paul‖s statement in 7:22 that the “I” delights in God‖s law “according to 
the inner person” (κασὰ σὸν ἔςψ ἄνθπψπον), a designation that, as is the case with 
the other Pauline uses of ἔςψ ἄνθπψπορ (2 Cor 4:16; Eph 3:16), clearly refers to the 
location of divine renewal and transformation within a Christ-believer.52 Finally, as 
in 7:10, Paul speaks of personally discovering (εὑπίςκψ) the law‖s death-dealing 
nature (7:21), while in 7:23 he writes of seeing (βλέπψ) the law‖s slavery-creating 
power at work “in my body parts” (ἐν σοῖρ μέλεςίν μοτ), which traps Paul in a 
miserable “body of death” (σοῦ ςώμασορ σοῦ θανάσοτ) even while he is still 
biologically alive (7:24). 
As is the case with 7:7-13 it is not possible to abstract the language of 7:14-25 
from the context of inward struggle and mental processes, which points decidedly 
against taking 7:14-25 as referring  exclusively to Israel‖s “hypostatized” experience 
or to a purely fictive rhetorical figure. If there is any doubt that Paul is writing of 
himself as an individual, for the sake of individuals in the present, the way in which 
he articulates in Romans 8 the solution to the plight he has detailed throughout 
Romans 7 should put it to rest: the whole corporate body of believers (σοῖρ ἐν 
Χπιςσῶ Ἰηςοῦ) has had its condemnation taken away in Christ; this means freedom 
for “you” (ςε), the individual, in the present (cf. νῦν in 8:1).53 While the narrative of 
Romans 7 is a story of sin and death that spans the ages, it is also a narrative that 
culminates in the redemption and freedom each individual believer enjoys in Christ 
in the present, even as this is enjoyed only within the corporate context of the body 
of believers.54 
 
                                                        
51 On which see Chester, Conversion, 191. 
52 Whether or not Paul wrote Ephesians, the same perspective on ἔςψ ἄνθπψπορ is present in 2 
Corinthians and Ephesians. 
53 Some mss. substitute με for ςε (A D 1739c. 1881  lat syh sa; Cl), although a few, in an attempt 
to correlate 8:2 with the plural pronouns in the rest of chapter 8 substitute ἡμᾶρ for ςε (Ψ bo; Meth). 
Σε, however, is the best attested reading (ℵ B F G 1506*. 1739* ar b syp; Tert Ambst) as well as being 
the most likely reading to have been changed, since the second person singular feels somewhat out 
of place in the context of the plurals of chapter 8 or the first person singulars throughout chapter 7. 
On Paul‖s reasons for using ςε in 8:2 see C. E. B. Cranfield, “Changes of Person and Number in Paul‖s 
Epistles,” in The Bible and the Christian Life (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1985), 219. 
54 See e.g., Rom 8:9. 
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3.2 Echoes of Eden in the Law of Moses? 
In Romans 7, we see Paul the individual, caught in a desperate struggle with sin for 
mastery of the self. What then about Adam and Israel? Are resonances of Adam or 
Israel present at all in Romans 7, and if so, do they prove that Paul‖s banishment 
from his own life story in Romans 7 is justifiable, or indeed, mandatory? 
To begin with, echoes with Adam‖s story seem to be present, at least with 
regard to 7:7-13. First, Paul refers to a single commandment (ἐνσολή) in 7:8, echoing 
the language of God‖s prohibition (ἐνσέλλομαι) of eating from the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil in Gen 2:16 (and 3:11, 17).55 Just as a single 
commandment proved to be Adam‖s undoing, so too is it Paul‖s.56 Paul‖s writing of a 
single commandment (cf. the definite article) six times in 7:7-13, when in the rest of 
chapter 7 he writes of the law in a more general sense, lends itself toward being 
understood as a reference to the one story of a single commandment‖s transgression 
that would have immediately come to mind for any Jewish reader, namely the story 
of Adam and Eve.57 The presence of an allusion to the first sin in Eden would fit with 
the way Paul has already described Adam‖s sin in Romans 5. In that chapter Paul 
unambiguously describes Adam‖s sin as a trespass (παπάπσψμα - 5:15 [x2], 16, 17, 18, 
20) and a transgression (παπάβαςιρ – 5:14), which are both designations that entail 
the violation of an explicit, individual commandment. This can only mean the single 
prohibition Adam was given in Eden.58 By the time readers gets to Romans 7 they 
will have already been primed to see the reference to a single commandment as 
alluding to Adam‖s story in Genesis 3. 
 Taken on its own, the reference to a single commandment is probably not 
enough to confirm that Paul is intentionally echoing Genesis 3. However, the 
connections continue. Many have pointed to the likely connection between 
deception (ἐξαπασάψ) in Rom 7:11 and Eve‖s claim in Gen 3:13 that the serpent 
                                                        
55 See Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 283. 
56 The commandment cannot be understood as something entirely different from the Mosaic 
law, as the specific commandment (the 10th) that Paul refers to in 7:8-13 is precisely a commandment 
of the law (7:7). My point is not that the mention of the commandment in 7:8-13 is something 
completely separate from the Mosaic law, but rather that Paul has carefully woven both Adam‖s and 
Israel‖s experience of the divine commandment together with Paul‖s own autobiography. Although 
the commandment in 7:7 is explicitly taken from the Mosaic legislation, Paul transitions into a 
description of the commandment in 7:9 that in my estimation intentionally echoes Genesis 3. 
57 Paul is primarily addressing Jews in this section; see 7:1. But cf. Jervis, “Romans 7.10,” 197: “Of 
course, when Paul speaks to matters of immediate relevance to Jewish believers he does not expect 
(or want) his Gentile hearers to stop their ears.” 
58 Pace Moo, “Romans 7.7-12,” 124. 
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deceived (ἀπασάψ) her, causing her to eat of the forbidden fruit.59 Paul was tricked 
into thinking that the law could tame his covetousness (Rom 7:7), just as Eve was 
deceived into thinking that she would become like God if she ate of the fruit of the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Gen 3:5-6).60 Finally, the link between 
transgression and death throughout chapter 7, while also true with regard to the 
Mosaic legislation, is one of the central themes of the narrative in Genesis 2-3.61 
While echoes of the story of Adam‖s transgression in Eden may not be at a 
particularly high “volume,” they do seem to be genuinely present, even though 
Paul‖s own story remains central. 
Do echoes of Adam in Romans 7 mean that scholars who posit an Israel-
centered focus have misunderstood Paul‖s purposes in this chapter? This seems 
unlikely, as many features of the chapter appear to indicate that Paul is also 
speaking, if not as Israel, at least as a representative Israelite.62 To begin with, he 
makes it clear in 7:1 that he is primarily speaking to fellow (believing) Israelites, or 
at least to those who have sufficient knowledge of the law as to be able to make 
sense of what he says. Furthermore, the connection between law and death, as is the 
case with Adam‖s transgression and (promised) death, is one Paul consistently 
makes when referring to the Mosaic law (see e.g., 1 Cor 15:56b; 2 Cor 3:7; etc.).63 
More straightforwardly, Rom 7:7 quotes from the Mosaic law (specifically the 
Decalogue) itself (Exod 20:17); excising or downplaying Israel‖s history would, then, 
on the surface of things seem like an odd procedure. That Paul has Israel in mind is 
also signalled in the abbreviation of the tenth commandment in 7:7 to the simple 
form of “you shall not desire” (οὐκ ἐπιθτμήςειρ), which Paul takes as summarizing 
the entire content of the Mosaic law-code.64 Furthermore, as Francis Watson has 
argued, the pattern of legal prohibition leading to enflamed desire and rebellion fits 
in well with the scriptural narrative of Israel‖s early post-Sinai experience.65 
                                                        
59 On which, see Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 283; Hofius, “Röm 7,7-25a,” 132; Theissen, 
Pyschological Aspects, 206-7; Käsemann, Römer, 186. 
60 Cf. Lohse, Römer, 212. 
61 Cf. Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 284; Theissen, Pyschological Aspects, 209. 
62 On which see Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 374-80; Esler, Conflict and Identity, 237-38; 
Hans-Martin Lübking, Paulus und Israel im Römerbrief: Eine Untersuchung zu Römer 9-11 (EurH 260; 
Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1986), 44-47; Moo, “Romans 7.7-12,” 129. 
63 See Moo, “Romans 7.7-12,” 127. 
64 Cf. Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 360; Moo, “Romans 7.7-12,” 123. 
65 Watson, Hermeneutics of Faith, 363-80; cf. Wright, “Theology of Paul,” 50-1. 
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It is my contention that Echoes of Adam and Israel should be seen as 
cohering in a single story spanning the major periods of Old Testament history 
(creation -> law). The same pattern is evident in both: prohibition creates desire, 
which leads to death.66 Paul himself, who stands as a representative of the condition 
of Israel in the present, although writing from the vantage point of faith in Christ, 
brings biblical history into the present. As I have already noted, all of this fits 
smoothly with the way Paul has already schematized salvation history in Rom 5:12-
21: Adam‖s transgression (παπάβαςιρ), just like all transgressions marked out as such 
(as violations of law), is uniquely legal (and thus “countable” [ἐλλογέψ - 5:13]) in 
nature. Mosaic Torah, of course, is also clearly legal in its demarcation of 
transgressions. Paul the Israelite—subject as he is to legally defined righteousness 
and transgression67—has seen recapitulated in his own life the two most crucial 
encounters with divine commandments in biblical history (Adam and Moses).68 The 
echoes of both reinforce, rather than refute the notion that in Rom 7:7-25 Paul is 
telling his own life story. Paul is describing himself, but he also presents the reader 
with an individual self that is caught up in a drama of sin and death that begins with 
Adam, is amplified and communalized in Israel, and that has been existentially re-
enacted in Paul‖s own past.69 Although Paul is speaking primarily as an individual in 
this chapter, Adam casts his long shadow forward, and in so doing marks the death-
dealing effect of the law out as a universal and primeval human phenomenon.70 It is 
equally important, however, that Paul depicts himself as a representative Israelite 
struggling (and failing, just as his forbears did) to find freedom from the flesh and 
sin through obedience to the law. Whenever sinful humanity comes into contact with 
God’s law, death results. 
                                                        
66 Cf. J. A. Ziesler, “The Role of the Tenth Commandment in Romans 7,” JSNT 33 (1988): 47-49, who 
also notes that the prohibition of illegitimate desire is the only commandment that possibly could 
refer to both the Adamic and the Mosaic situations. Contra Emma Wasserman, “Paul among the 
Philosophers: The Case of Sin in Romans 6–8,” JSNT 30 (2008): 405, who goes so far as to insist that 
“nothing here alludes to God‖s instructions to Adam, the garden, Eve or the serpent.” 
67 On which see Westerholm, Perspectives, 266-71. 
68 Cf. Lichtenberger, Das Ich Adams, 127-29; Hofius, “Röm 7,7-25a,” 119; Theissen, Pyschological 
Aspects, 203-4. 
69 Cf. Chester, Conversion, 187, n. 129; Watson, Paul, Judaism and the Gentiles, 282; idem, Hermeneutics 
of Faith, 360, n. 10; Thielman, “Story of Israel,” 193. 
70 Cf. Hofius, “Röm 7,7-25a,” 119-21. Since Moo, “Romans 7.7-12,” 128, clearly recognizes the 
“basic similarity in the situations of Adam confronted by the Paradise command and Israel 
confronted by the law” and the “conceptual parallels with the Paradise narrative” it is difficult for 
me to see why he downplays the notion of Adamic echoes in Romans 7. 
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The individual in Romans 7, then, is Paul. However, Adam and Israel hover in 
the background. Anti-individual and anti-autobiographical readings of Romans 7 
that posit an exclusively Adamic or Israelite “I” tear asunder what Paul has joined 
together. Rather than simply attempting to amalgamate three things that do not 
belong together,71 the interpretation above posits that this three-way 
juxtaposition—even though the primary story in Romans 7 remains Paul‖s own—
further enhances Paul‖s theology of anthropological universalization, even in a 
context (Romans 7) that does not completely eliminate particularization (i.e., Paul is 
still speaking as an Israelite, even as he continues to relativize the importance of 
that distinction). Ultimately, the experience of Paul the individual reflects the 
histories of Adam and Israel and reveals the presence of a repeating pattern of law, 
illegitimate desire and death in salvation history.72 
When seen in these cosmic terms, Paul‖s own history becomes that of every 
individual in the world, even as it is particularly relevant for a Jewish reader who 
has been born “under the law.” In portraying himself throughout Romans 7 in the 
first person singular (as a negative exemplary individual) Paul‖s “―I‖ models the main 
contention of his argument” in a particularly vivid and individualizing manner:73 
the personal and autobiographical touches are absolutely necessary in order to 
dissuade the Jewish members of his audience from seeking to find freedom from 
slavery to sin under the law, or for those Gentiles who would “overhear” this 
section, to convince them not to turn to the law for freedom in the first place.74 In 
other words, this is no disinterestedly objective treatise on law and sin; it is Paul‖s 
agonized plea to the Roman Christians to turn from the law toward Christ, a plea 
that is all the more dramatic and persuasive because of Paul‖s having himself gone 
through the experiences he describes in Romans 7. 
                                                        
71 Pace Jewett, Romans, 442. 
72 Cf. Oda Wischmeyer, “Paulus als Ich-Erzähler: Ein Beitrag zu seiner Person, seiner Biographie 
und seiner Theologie,” in Biographie und Persönlichkeit des Paulus (eds. Eve-Marie Becker and Peter 
Pilhofer; WUNT 187; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 101-2; Brian Dodd, Paul’s Paradigmatic ‘I’: Personal 
Example as Literary Strategy (JSNTSup 177; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 225-26; Moo, 
Romans, 431. Thus, Fitzmyer, Romans, 465, is correct to argue that Paul speaks in Romans 7 “from a 
historical and corporate point of view” but wrong to contend that “the confrontation of the Ego with 
sin and the law is not considered by Paul on an individual, psychological level.” 
73 As Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 243, puts it: “Paul very clearly chooses this form of 
speaking here because his whole theme is the effect on the individual (an I!) of the law” (emphasis 
original). 
74 Dodd, Paradigmatic ‘I’, 234; cf. Michael Paul Middendorf, The ‘I’ in the Storm: a Study of Romans 7 
(Saint Louis: Concordia Academic Press, 1997), 237-42; Wilckens, Römer, 2.79. 
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3.3 Summary 
In sum, Rom 7:7-21 presents the reader with a picture of the experience of humanity 
with law and sin, and does so primarily through the negative example of Paul‖s own 
past. As an individual, Paul has passed through slavery to sin into the freedom of life 
in Christ (Rom 8:2), and as an individual he provides a negative example to dissuade 
his audience from taking on the “yoke of the law.” Paul‖s implicit plea to turn from 
the law would simply lose its plausibility and force were the “I” of Romans 7 
someone who had not experienced the battle therein described. 
Nonetheless, despite the pointedly individual and autobiographical 
perspective of Romans 7, freedom from the slavery described in this chapter is also 
a thoroughly communal enterprise, as seen for example in Rom 8:9, which speaks of 
the Spirit at work and dwelling “among [plural] you” (ἐν ὑμῖν), although this does 
not make the struggle (or the outcome of this struggle) any less personal and 
individual. The sphere of the Spirit‖s activity is the body of believers as a whole; 
while the Spirit works within the individual (see Rom 8:2), it does not work solely 
within the individual, or within an individual who is not a part of the community of 
believers. As we will see, Paul goes on to articulate the work of the Spirit in terms of 
community formation and edification (Rom 12:1), as well as indicating the 
necessarily communal outworking of the Spirit‖s activity in the peacefulness it 
instils within the church as a whole (see Rom 14:17). The interpersonal and 
corporate dynamics of the Spirit‖s transformative work are extremely important in 
Galatians as well (see esp. Gal 5:22-26). In fact, one could even say with Bultmann 
that the fundamental orientation of Pauline ethics “receives its stamp not alone 
from the demands that apply to the individual by himself . . . but especially from the 
obligations that arise from human fellowship.”75 Paul‖s ethical vision is far more 
centered on how redeemed individuals treat one another than it is with the 
fostering of a kind of private piety that has no necessary connection to the 
development of a peaceful and self-sacrificially loving ethos within the believing 
community. 
 
                                                        
75 Bultmann, Theology, 342 (emphasis added). 
178 
 
4. The Somatic Individual (Romans 12) 
The somatic individual is an individual in the body of Christ. The word somatic is 
meant to capture the necessary connection in Paul‖s thought between the individual 
and the community; there is no individual who is not united to Christ, no member 
cut off from the singular body of the Lord. 
In Romans 12 Paul enters into an extended section of primarily exhortative 
material that continues all the way until Rom 15:13. The opening verse of this long 
stretch of paraenesis provides a supreme example of the way in which Paul holds 
the individual and community together as vitally interconnected dimensions of his 
theological and ethical vision: the bodies of each believer (σὰ ςώμασα ὑμ῵ν) in 
Rome are to be presented as a single, communal “living sacrifice” (θτςίαν ζ῵ςαν) to 
God (12:1);76 here individual and corporate categories meld together.77 From the 
outset of Paul‖s major section of ethical exhortation, then, the individual can only 
be understood insofar as it is found within the community, just as the community 
can only be understood insofar as it is comprised of individual bodies. This will 
become even clearer as Paul elaborates on this principle of unity-within-diversity in 
12:3-8. 
 In 12:2 Paul states that the communal act of sacrificial presentation (12:1) 
entails a resistance to being conformed to the dominant mode of life in the world, 
and is founded upon the renewal of the mind. All of this will enable the Roman 
believers to know how to live according to God‖s will (12:2). The first major ethical 
implication of the renewed mind of the believer is a proper self-estimation, a 
thinking about oneself that is not overly high in its self-opinion, but instead, is 
soundly founded (ςψυπονέψ) on the true state of affairs in the world (12:3). This 
call to transformed thinking is explicitly directed at each individual (πανσὶ σῶ ὄνσι) 
among you (ἐν ὑμῖν), and the basis for this proper thinking is the “measure of faith” 
(μέσπον πίςσεψρ) that is apportioned (μεπίζψ) to each individual (ἕκαςσορ) by God 
(12:3).78 The prominence of cognitively focused exhortations in 12:1-3 points to the 
indispensably personal and individual nature, as well as the inward location (in the 
mind [νοῦρ]), of the moral revolution that is meant to take place among every 
                                                        
76 Cf. Peter Oakes, Reading Romans in Pompeii: Paul’s Letter at Ground Level (London: SPCK, 2009), 99. 
77 Cf. Michael Thompson, Clothed with Christ: The Example and Teaching of Jesus in Romans 12.1-15.13 
(JSNTSup 50; Sheffield: JSOT, 1991), 84. 
78 Cf. Lohse, Römer, 339: “Jeder einzeln Christ wird als Glied der Gemeinschaft angesprochen, der 
er angehört und zu dienen hat.” 
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individual Roman believer: the transformation (μεσαμοπυόψ) that comes with the 
renewal (ἀνακαίνψςιρ) of the mind (12:2b), as the opposite of being conformed 
(ςτςφημασίζψ) to the present age (12:2a), leads to testing (δοκιμάζψ) the will of God 
(12:2c), refraining from thinking too highly (ὑπεπυπονέψ) of oneself (12:3b) and 
thinking (υπονέψ) with sound judgment (ςψυπονέψ - 12:3c).79 
The meaning of the phrase μέσπον πίςσεψρ in 12:3 has proven difficult for 
interpreters to agree on, but I believe it should be understood as an objective 
standard (faith) given to each individual believer to enable him or her to carry out 
the necessary self-evaluation that will lead to humble thinking, which in turn will 
produce the sought after harmony within the body of believers that Paul describes 
in 12:4-8.80 In explaining the function of the μέσπον πίςσεψρ, Paul provides the most 
explicit and extensive elaboration of the interconnectedness of the individual and 
the community in the entire letter. 
In 12:4 Paul, adopting a metaphor common in antiquity, speaks of a single 
body (ἑνὶ ςώμασι) comprised of many individual members (πολλὰ μέλη), each of 
whom, as I have just noted, has already been tasked as an individual (πανσὶ σῶ 
ὄνσι/ἕκαςσορ) with a radical transformation of one‖s thought patterns (12:3).81 Just 
                                                        
79 On the personal and individual nature of this transformation see Jeremy Moiser, “Rethinking 
Romans 12-15,” NTS 36 (1990): 575; Hans Dieter Betz, “Das Problem der Grundlagen der paulinischen 
Ethik,” ZTK 85 (1988): 213; on the inward location of the transformation see Moo, Romans, 753; 
Fitzmyer, Romans, 641. 
80 Two main interpretations of the phrase have been debated in scholarship. The first, which is 
essentially the position I am arguing for, is represented by C. E. B. Cranfield, “μέσπον πίςσεψρ in 
Romans 12.3,” NTS 8 (1962): 345-51. The second, as argued by, among others, Dunn, Romans 9-16, 721-
22, maintains that the genitive πίςσεψρ is a unique gift, a portion of faith given in larger measure to 
some, and smaller measure to others. For the following reasons I believe something like Cranfield‖s 
interpretation must be adopted (see also Peter Stuhlmacher, Der Brief an die Römer [NTD 6; Göttingen 
and Zurich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989], 172). First, this is seen primarily in the fact that 12.4-8 
is not simply an explanation of the clause “as God has apportioned out to each person a measure of 
faith” (ἑκάςσῳ ὡρ ὁ θεὸρ ἐμέπιςεν μέσπον πίςσεψρ) in 12.3e, but rather of the entire verse. That is to 
say, the diversity of functions in the single body enumerated in 12:4-8 is founded, not on a unique 
μέσπον πίςσεψρ for each individual, but rather on the call to sober-mindedness described in the first 
half of 12:3. Furthermore, it is the call to sober-mindedness, and not the diversity of gifts, that is 
based on the μέσπον πίςσεψρ. A distributive understanding of the phrase (something unique given to 
everyone) does not make sense as a foundation for wise thinking: while humble self-judgment could 
be grounded in a diversity of functions and gifts in the one body, 12:3e (“as God has apportioned out to 
each person a measure of faith”)—on the distributive reading of μέσπον πίςσεψρ—only mentions 
diversity, and not diversity-within-unity. A call to humility in light of diversity on the basis simply of 
that diversity defeats the purpose of this whole section of text, which is to reinforce, through appeal 
to the common metaphor in antiquity of the body and members, the notion that difference does not 
entail inferiority. For more extended argumentation in support of the reading I am offering here see 
Dunson, “Faith,” 34-38. 
81 On the body-members metaphor in antiquity see Lee, Body of Christ, 27-58; Runar M. 
Thorsteinsson, “Paul and Roman Stoicism: Romans 12 and Contemporary Stoic Ethics,” JSNT 29 
(2006): 150-2. 
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as each member of a body does not have the same function (ππᾶξιρ) (12:4), so also 
are the many individuals (οἱ πολλοί) in the Roman church “one body in Christ” (ἓν 
ς῵μά . . . ἐν Χπιςσῶ), with all of these individuals being “members of one another” 
(σὸ δὲ καθ᾽εἷρ ἀλλήλψν μέλη) (12:5). Furthermore, each individual member is 
indispensible to the single body because all members have been given different gifts 
(φαπίςμασα . . . διάυοπα) from God (12:6).82 While two of these gifts are described in 
generic terms (prophecy and service in 12:6), gifts given to individuals predominate 
in 12:7-8: individuals are gifted with teaching abilities (ὁ διδάςκψν) (12:7), the gift of 
exhortation (ὁ παπακαλ῵ν), the gift of generosity (ὁ μεσαδιδούρ), the gift of 
leadership (ὁ πποωςσάμενορ), and finally, the gift of mercy (ὁ ἐλε῵ν) (12:8). The 
outworking of God‖s grace in the community does not bypass individuals or make 
them superfluous. Rather, individuals are central to the manifestation of this grace 
in the community; without them the gifts of the Spirit would be empty abstractions. 
While the individual nature of the divine gifts is clear, it is equally clear that 
such gifts cannot be exercised properly outside of the context of the single body, or 
community, of all believers. The very purpose of God having given the various gifts 
is that they be used for the mutual edification of the whole community. As Paul 
explains more extensively in the similar passage in 1 Cor 12:12-31, individual 
members of the body with their unique gifts should not think of themselves as 
worth less because their gifts are not identical with everyone else‖s, but should 
recognize that the body could not survive were everyone to have the exact same 
function (1 Cor 12:18-26). Just as in Rom 12:3-8, Paul makes clear the interweaving of 
the individual and the community in 1 Cor 12:11 and 12:18: in both verses he 
explicitly states that the gifts of the Spirit are given to each individual (ἕκαςσορ) 
within the one body.83 The same is true in Rom 12:3-8: there is one body of Christ 
and it is comprised of individual members with distinctive gifts. 
The principle that emerges in Rom 12:3-8, then, is one of diversity-within-
unity. This principle could also be articulated as the individual-within-community, 
                                                        
82 As Kenneth Berding, “Romans 12.4–8: One Sentence or Two?” NTS 52 (2006): 433-39, has 
persuasively shown, Rom. 12:4-8 should be read as one sentence, rather than two (12:4-6 and 12:7-8). 
Thus, the diversity of gifts (12:6-8) is the precise way in which individuals contribute toward a 
unified body (12:4-5). 
83 See also 1 Cor 12:27, where all of the Corinthian believers (ὑμεῖρ) are the singular body of 
Christ (ς῵μα Χπιςσοῦ), but only insofar as that body is made up of individual members (μέλη ἐκ 
μέποτρ); cf. 1 Cor 12:12: Καθάπεπ γὰπ σὸ ς῵μα ἕν ἐςσιν καὶ μέλη πολλὰ ἔφει, πάνσα δὲ σὰ μέλη σοῦ 
ςώμασορ πολλὰ ὄνσα ἕν ἐςσιν ς῵μα, οὕσψρ καὶ ὁ Χπιςσόρ. 
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the somatic individual. There is no Pauline individual who is not also a somatic, or bodily 
integrated, individual, just as there is no body without individual members. In framing 
things in this way Paul makes clear the indispensability of the individual, but also 
that this individual absolutely cannot be understood as an isolated individual, that 
for Paul the community of believers is the only context in which salvation and 
spiritual transformation can take place. As W. D. Davies puts it “Paul knows nothing 
of solitary salvation; to be ―in Christ‖ is not for him the mystic flight of the alone to 
the alone.”84 However, it is just as false to contend, as does Harink, that Paul‖s 
language of salvation is “cosmic and social more than inner and individual.”85 Any 
interpretation that downplays the significance of the individual even to a small degree 
destroys the very balance that Paul has so artfully constructed between the 
individual and the community in Rom 12:1-8. 
The significance of what Paul says in 12:3-8 is not restricted narrowly to the 
use of the spiritual gifts enumerated in 12:6-8. Instead, As Engberg-Pedersen has 
noted, the principle of diversity-within-unity serves as a “bridge” that introduces 
the large exhortative section of Romans stretching from 12:9-15:13 that is focused 
primarily on love, harmony and peacefulness within the community of believers.86 
That is to say, the diversity of gifts in the single body has been given by God with 
the specific goal in mind of forming a community of love (see Rom 12:9; 13:10; 14:15; 
15:30) and mutual concern (which is dominant in chapters 12-15, but especially in 
the discussion of the weak and the strong in 14:1-15:7).87 Paul captures all of this 
well when he says in 14:7 that “none of us lives for self, nor dies for self,” evoking as 
this does the unity of the individual members within the single body of Christ (12:5; 
cf. the repetition of ἀλλήλψν throughout this section: 12:10, 16; 13:8; 14:13, 19; 15:5, 
7).88 The specific injunction given in 12:6 (“let us . . .”), that every individual is to use 
his or her specific gifts in service to others (12:6), resounds several times 
throughout the closing section of Paul‖s exhortation (see 14:19; 15:1-7): the right 
                                                        
84 Davies, Rabbinic Judaism, 86; As Käsemann, Römer, 280, puts it: “Das Heil wird in der christlichen 
Gemeinde gefunden.” Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 645-47. 
85 Harink, Postliberals, 59, who is following Martyn, Galatians, and John Howard Yoder, The Politics 
of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster (2d ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994) in particular. 
86 Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Paul‖s Stoicizing Politics in Romans 12-13: The Role of 13.1-10 in the 
Argument,” JSNT 29 (2006): 165; cf. Halvor Moxnes, “The Quest for Honor and the Unity of the 
Community in Romans 12 and in the Orations of Dio Chrysostom,” in Paul in His Hellenistic Context (ed. 
Troels Engberg-Pedersen; SNTW; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1994), 217-19, and esp. 223. 
87 Cf. Berding, “Romans 12.4-8,” 436-37; Halvor Moxnes, “Honour and Righteousness in Romans,” 
JSNT 32 (1988): 74. 
88 Cf. Moxnes, “Quest for Honor,” 226. 
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thinking—derived from the μέσπον πίςσεψρ—that comes from rightly recognizing 
unity in diversity in the body must also work itself out in “pursuing what makes for 
peace and for building one another up” (14:19). Just as all believers are one body in 
Christ, so they “with one voice” (ἐν ἑνὶ ςσόμασι) glorify God (15:6), a phrase which, 
like the “living sacrifice” in 12:1, emphasizes the collective nature of Paul‖s 
exhortation without obscuring its individual coloring. 
 
4.1 Summary 
The sound self-evaluation of every member of the body of Christ that results from 
the renewal of the mind leads to a new way of thinking that enables the individual 
members of the single body to see that a diversity of functions within the body of 
Christ is not a problem to be overcome, but a divine gift to be celebrated. It should 
not be a cause of arrogance for individuals who have distinctive gifts, but rather the 
grounds for the elimination of haughty thinking.89 Interpretations of Pauline 
theology that pit the individual against the community destroy the necessary 
balance and integration that Paul seeks to create among his readers on this issue 
and demolish a foundational element of Paul‖s ethical thought, namely that each 
individual believer should look out for the interests of others precisely because 
every individual is a somatic individual, a member of a single body. The properly 
functioning body cannot exist unless each individual member is mentally and 
morally transformed as an individual, just as the individual members will all suffer 
irreparably if they are cut off from the distinctive blessings God has distributed 
throughout the body, since no single individual as an individual has all of the divine 
gifts necessary for the body to be healthy. In the final analysis, a community 
without individuals makes no sense; a body without members is a contradiction in 
terms, but no more so than a healthy individual member severed from the body.90 
It is significant that Paul introduces the largest exhortative section in 
Romans with a statement of a principle of individuals within community: nearly his 
entire (explicit at least) ethical paraenesis in the letter is thus seen to be founded on 
a careful formulation that does justice both to the communal context of individual 
                                                        
89 Cf. Philip F. Esler, “Paul and Stoicism: Romans 12 as a Test Case,” NTS 50 (2004): 116. 
90 Cf. Ernest Best, One Body in Christ: a Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of 
the Apostle Paul (London: SPCK, 1955), 102: “A multiplicity of function is not only always present in a 
body; it is necessary for a body to possess such—or else there would indeed be no real body.” 
183 
 
life and the individual outworking of corporate oneness.91 Paul‖s overarching 
understanding of the believing life, in fact, is shown to be built at its core upon the 
notion of individuals embedded within community. 
 
5. The Particular Individual (Romans 16) 
The particular individual is a category that covers real flesh-and-blood individuals in 
Paul‖s letters. It highlights the importance of each person‖s distinct identity, as well 
as the ways in which every particular individual must be understood in connection 
with the various groups and communities of which he or she is a part, especially the 
connection these individuals necessarily have with individual church gatherings. 
Paul‖s continual exhortations to communal love and mutual honoring 
throughout Romans 12-15 (see e.g., Rom 12:10; 13:8; 14:1, 7) come to a head in Rom 
15:5-7 where Paul prays for God‖s enabling to strengthen the Roman believers 
collectively to align their thoughts among each other according to the principles 
Paul has laid out beginning in 12:1 (see 15:5). The purpose (ἵνα) of this sought for 
harmony of thought is that the whole corporate body of believers “with one accord, 
in one voice” (ὁμοθτμαδὸν ἐν ἑνὶ ςσόμασι) would glorify God (15:6). With this divine 
enabling, those in Rome are to receive one another, just as they have been received 
by Christ (15:7). The sum total of the Roman believers acts as one, because it is one 
body (12:5), one living sacrifice, pleasing to God (12:1). All of this is signalled in Rom 
16:16 with the command that all (whether slave or free, male or female) are to greet 
one another with a “holy kiss,” which in a Roman cultural context was a shocking 
and unprecedented display of communal solidarity and the erasure of prominent 
cultural boundary markers within the primitive Christian churches.92 And yet, as we 
have just seen, this single body is made up of individual members (12:4). The 
significance of this principle of individuality-within-diversity is evident throughout 
Romans, but is worked out in concrete form in chapter 16. 
Reciprocity within the context of “familial” love is the dominant feature of 
this chapter. Phoebe has been a servant (διάκονορ) and benefactor (πποςσάσιρ) of 
                                                        
91 Although it is true that Romans 12-16 should not be radically isolated from the rest of the 
letter as if it is pure exhortation, while the rest of the letter is pure theology (rightly Victor Paul 
Furnish, Theology and Ethics in Paul [3d ed.; NTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009], 98-101), it 
is also true that the vast majority of exhortations occur in these chapters (31 of 42 imperatival forms 
according to Furnish [ibid., 99]). 
92 On which see Jewett, Romans, 973-74; cf. Oakes, Pompeii, 103-4. 
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Paul and many others (16:1-2), just as Gauis currently serves as host (ξένορ) to Paul 
and the other believers in Corinth.93 Prisca, Aquila (16:3-5) and Urbanus (16:9) are 
fellow-workers (ςτνεπγοί) in Paul‖s ministry, while a certain Mary has been hard at 
work in support of the Roman church (16:6), as have been Tryphaena, Tryphosa and 
Persis (16:12). Rufus‖ mother has supported Paul to such as a degree that he says 
that she has been a mother to him (16:13). From the other end, Timothy, who 
directly co-labors with Paul, sends greetings to the Roman believers (16:21). Every 
individual addressed is called to greet (ἀςπάζομαι, which occurs 21 times in Romans 
16) every other individual (or group of individuals) with honor as a concrete 
manifestation of the unity they all have in Christ.94 
Paul‖s greetings have a host of distinctive features that provide a window 
into the importance he attached both to particular individuals in the concrete 
circumstances of life and to the communities in which these individuals were 
necessarily found. To begin with, Paul has two main ways of grouping people 
together. Often, he mentions entire churches, sometimes regional (“the church in 
Cenchrea” [16:1]; “the whole church” in Corinth [16:23]), sometimes contained 
within a single household (16:5), and once he speaks of the totality of the churches 
“among the nations” (16:4). Paul even speaks of “all of the churches in Christ” 
(16:16). Paul also lists important groups who have helped him in his work (“those of 
Aristobulus” [16:10]; “those of Narcissus” [16:11]; “Hermes and the brothers with 
him” [16:14]; “all the saints” [16:15]), as well as smaller groups that have given him 
specific, and indispensable, aid (Prisca and Aquila, who even saved Paul‖s life [16:3-
4]; Andronicus and Junia, who are kinsmen of Paul and have been fellow prisoners 
with him [16:7]). Most of these groupings are related in some important way to 
individual believers, yet at the same time, the fact that Paul speaks so often of 
groups themselves makes clear the importance he attached to individuals being 
integrated into community. It is an unquestioned assumption that every individual 
who has believed in Christ will express that belief within the context of fellowship 
with an ekklesia. 
                                                        
93 On Phoebe as benefactor, and the reciprocity inherent in her relationship with Paul, see Erlend 
D. MacGillivray, “Romans 16:2, πποςσάςιρ/πποςσάσηρ, and the Application of Reciprocal Relationships 
to New Testament Texts,” NovT 53 (2011): 183-99. 
94 Cf. Jewett, Romans, 952. 
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Particularly noteworthy are the small details attached to almost every 
greeting in chapter 16. For example, Paul mentions not only that Epaenetus is his 
“beloved” (ἀγαπησόν μοτ), but also that he is the “firstfruits” (ἀπαπφή) among all 
the converts in Asia. Epaenetus‖ individual conversion, then, is distinctive enough to 
mention, even as Paul‖s use of the word firstfruits—as it does everywhere he uses it 
(see Rom 8:23; 11:16; 1 Cor 15:20, 23; 16:25)—stresses the organic connection 
between Epaenetus and the entire body of believers in Asia. In other words, even as 
Epaenetus‖ conversion singles him out as unique and particular (the firstfruits), this 
can only be understood as it is part of a larger, collective whole (the harvest); the 
individual and the community are so vitally connected that one cannot exist in its 
fullness without the other. When telling the Roman believers to greet Andronicus 
and Junia, Paul mentions that they were converted before he was (οἳ καὶ ππὸ ἐμοῦ 
γέγοναν ἐν Χπιςσῶ [16:7]). Salvation, far from doing away with the importance of 
the individual, as Andronicus‖ and Junia‖s conversions show, is an individual action 
in time and space, even as it is one that brings individuals into community. 
Numerous other particularities are emphasized in Paul‖s greetings, such as when he 
describes someone named Apelles as “approved in Christ” (16:10) and Rufus as 
“elect in the Lord” (16:13), both of which are distinctive among the appellations in 
Romans 16, and which were perhaps meant to encourage two individuals in 
particularly trying circumstances. Paul also groups people according to familial 
relationships, both genetic (Andronicus and Junia [16:7]; Herodion [16:11]; Luke, 
Jason and Sosipater [16:21]) and “fictive” (“Phoebe our sister” [16:1]; Rufus‖ mother = 
Paul‖s “mother” [16:13]).95 The natural family is not unimportant to Paul, but the 
bonds of fellowship in the new community are so strong as to create a new family 
among the Roman believers that transcends the culturally appropriate groupings of 
antiquity. Just as there is no such thing in Paul‖s theology as a member disconnected 
from the body, there can be no such thing as an individual believer outside of the 
new creational family of faith. Faith creates community and binds individuals to it. 
Individuals are not free to choose whether to accept or reject the bonds of this 
familial communion any more than they are free to choose their own natural 
parents. 
                                                        
95 See further Oakes, Pompeii, 107-10, and Wilckens, Römer, 3.131, on the significance of this 
“fictive” familial language for inter-community life in the Roman churches. 
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 Given the role of women in society in Paul‖s day it is also noteworthy how 
much he has to say about the role of women in the furtherance of the gospel. 
Phoebe is called both a “servant [διάκονορ] of the church in Cenchrea” and a 
“benefactor” (πποςσάσιρ) of Paul and many others (16:2). Prisca is listed as a fellow 
gospel associate of Paul‖s, who (along with her husband Aquila) is also mentioned 
several times elsewhere in the New Testament as being active in the mission of the 
earliest churches (Rom 16:3; cf. 1 Cor 16:19; 2 Tim 4:19; Acts 18:2, 18, 26). Paul‖s love 
for Prisca and Aquilla is obvious: not only have they labored with him in the gospel, 
they even placed their own lives in danger to save Paul from an unspecified threat.96 
In addition, Mary did much work with Paul and his associates (16:6), while Junia was 
well known among the apostles for her Christian service (16:7). 
Romans 16, then, is not simply an itemized list of acquaintances; it is Paul‖s 
preaching, in miniature, enacted in real communities, made up of particular 
individuals. Romans 16 shows the reader what it means in concrete practice that 
“no one of us [οὐδεὶρ ἡμ῵ν] lives to oneself [ἑατσῶ], and no one [οὐδεὶρ] of us dies 
to oneself [ἑατσῶ]” (Rom 14:7), and that “each one of us” (ἕκαςσορ ἡμ῵ν) must 
please our neighbors for their good, to build them up (Rom 15:2). This chapter 
makes it clear that in Paul‖s preaching there is no isolated individual, no “individual 
qua individual,”97 in Romans, or in Paul‖s thought in general. Earle Ellis captures the 
dynamic of Romans 16 well: “Given the numerous and varied contributions of Paul‖s 
fellow ministers to his mission, it is clear that they were an essential factor in its 
accomplishment and that even Paul‖s letters were not an individual enterprise.”98 
Paul‖s very gospel itself could not have been proclaimed across the Roman empire 
without a community of believers to support him in his mission. 
Yet it is equally true that no individual is insignificant according to Paul‖s 
thinking, since the single body of Christ has many individual members (12:5: μέλη), 
each with a different function (12:4: ππᾶξιρ). The communities Paul writes to in 
Romans 16 are unintelligible abstractions apart from the particular (and 
indispensible) individuals that make up each of these groups of believers. The 
individuals in this chapter are engaged in essential acts of service for one another, 
                                                        
96 “They risked their necks” (σὸν ἑατσ῵ν σπάφηλον ὑπέθηκαν) for him (16:4). 
97 Burnett, Salvation, 10. 
98 E. Earle Ellis, “Paul and His Co-workers Revisted,” in History and Interpretation in New Testament 
Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 97. 
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and the work of the gospel is only successful as each individual works together 
according to the common mission of the entire ecclesial body. 
 
5.1 Summary 
Someone uninterested in the place of the individual within God‖s salvific scheme 
does not write Romans 16. The detail and warmth with which Paul speaks about so 
many fellow believers (including many he has never met) in their concrete 
individuality puts such a notion to flight. The particular individual in Romans 16, as 
much as any other type in the letter, reveals the centrality of the individual in 
Paul‖s teaching. And yet, while Paul is at pains throughout Romans 16 to emphasize 
the particularity of the numerous individuals whom he urges the Romans to greet 
with affection, he also insists that each individual must be comprehended only as 
they are found “in the Lord” (ἐν κτπίῳ = Jesus Christ; see Rom 15:30; 16:18; etc.), 
which is a communal and collective designation that highlights the unity that exists 
between every believer despite their particularity and individuality (see 16:2, 8, 11, 
12 [twice], 13, 22). In other words, Romans 16 is a real-life manifestation of the “one 
body in Christ” (ἓν ς῵μα . . . ἐν Χπιςσῶ [12:5])—comprised of a multitude of 
individuals (cf. ἕκαςσορ [12:3])—functioning as the singular organism it has been 
fashioned by God to be. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
6.1 Summary 
As with the last chapter it will again be beneficial to summarize the contents of this 
chapter in a point-by-point format: 
 
(1) The Representative Individual. Unlike Abraham and David in Romans 4, Paul 
sets up a contrast between Adam and Jesus Christ in Romans 5 that is truly 
representational: the actions of each define the destinies of the groups (and 
individuals) they represent to an extraordinary degree. This is a corporately 
and communally determined individuality. 
(2) The Negative Exemplary Individual. In Romans 7 Paul tells of his own 
experience (as a typical Israelite) of sin‖s use of God‖s holy law to kill him 
spiritually, despite the law‖s promised goal of life. While there are 
resonances of the story of Adam in Genesis 3, as well as of the biblical story 
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of Israel‖s post-Sinai experience with Torah, the focus remains on Paul 
throughout the chapter. The reason for this is simple: Paul is recounting his 
own experience in order to heighten the vividness and emotional power of 
his appeal to his audience to turn away from the law as a means of finding 
freedom from spiritual slavery. 
(3) The Somatic Individual. The individual in community, or the member within 
the body, is fundamental to Paul‖s theology and ethics. For him, the only 
individual that exists within the sphere of God‖s grace is a somatic 
individual, an individual necessarily embedded within the believing 
community. The logic of Pauline ethics crumbles when the relationship 
between the individual and the community is not properly understood. This 
is a critical point to make both against those who elevate the isolated 
individual to prominence in Paul‖s letters and against those who relegate the 
individual to the periphery of Pauline thought, if they discuss it at all.99 
(4) The Particular Individual. Finally, Paul writes at length of many particular 
individuals in the church at Rome, as well as among his fellow ministry 
companions. While they are indeed one single body in Christ, each individual 
retains his or her distinctive identity, significance and function within that 
larger body, not as isolated individuals, but as individuals fully integrated 
into the single body of Christ. 
 
6.2 Conclusion: The Individual-within-Community 
The typology of the individual in Romans is now complete. Unlike the hints of 
community-mindedness in the previous portion of the typology, Paul‖s 
comprehensively communal theology has become evident in the material analyzed in 
this chapter. We have seen that there is no such thing as an isolated individual in 
Paul‖s thought. Every individual must be a part of the believing community, must be 
a somatic individual. Paul is no individualist, modern or otherwise. Yet, Paul‖s 
theology, even in its most communally-determined expression, never ceases to 
                                                        
99 In order to explicate the precise way in which individuals become incorporated into 
community—the way in which they become somatic individuals—in Paul‖s thought, further work 
would need to be carried out with regard to the christological foundation of Pauline individuals-in-
community. Romans 6, in particular, is one place in Paul‖s letters where such a study could profitably 
begin, given the prominence of the language of incorporation into Christ in that chapter. 
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pertain in foundationally important ways to individuals and individual action 
within the life of the community. 
The part of the typology presented in this chapter has further developed the 
notion that the individual is a complex and multilayered component of Pauline 
theology; this complexity must be carefully attended to in any attempt to describe 
Paul‖s understanding of the individual. In this chapter, I have explained the cosmic 
and corporate aspects of Paul‖s understanding of the individual who is caught up in 
forces outside of his- or herself, in a spiritual battle of the ages (Romans 5). I have 
also analyzed Paul‖s deeply personal expression of spiritual angst and law-induced 
moral impotence in Romans 7, although noting how this expression is situated in an 
allusive retelling of the negative historical experience of God‖s people with Torah, 
and of Adam‖s experience of the original divine prohibition in the garden of Eden. It 
is thus a corporately significant instantiation of individuality in additional to being 
a deeply personal one. We have also seen the theological basis of life in the believing 
community (Romans 12), as well as the concrete realization of this theology in the 
specific circumstances of the lives of the particular individuals that are described in 
detail in Romans 16. 
In all of this three possible interpretational errors have been isolated, 
namely 1) that of seeing the redeemed individual as nothing but an isolated 
individual, and redemption as nothing but a transformation of inner piety, 2) that of 
seeing the individual in abstraction from the cultivation of love and peace within 
the life of the believing community and 3) that of dismissing the importance of the 
individual and individual spiritual enabling within the church‖s continuing life 
together. Put positively, it has become clear that the Pauline individual—a vital and 
complex category in Romans—is necessarily an individual in community.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
1. Paul and Epictetus 
In this study, through the example of Epictetus, I have endeavored to show that an 
integration of individual and communal concerns is by no means foreign to Paul‖s 
own socio-historical and philosophical context. This much is clear in Epictetus: a 
concern for oneself and one‖s mental self-mastery is vitally important and yet must 
also include a concern for the proper maintenance of all of one‖s social relations. 
However, it has also become clear that major differences exist in how Paul and 
Epictetus actually go about relating individual and communal concerns, differences 
that warrant mention at this point as a way of highlighting the specific nuances and 
priorities of Pauline thought. 
For Epictetus, the individual‖s power of choice (volition, or πποάιπεςιρ) is the 
central concern of life. Protecting one‖s volition is paramount in the life well lived. 
The volition must be vigorously guarded so that it does not become in any way 
dependent on external things or circumstances. Otherwise, one becomes a slave to 
fortune, a bond-servant to the whims of fate. Keeping the volition free from 
external domination requires extreme vigilance throughout the duration of one‖s 
life, since at no point in time will one be free from potentially unpleasant 
circumstances. Only when a person militantly guards his or her volition will it be 
possible to be free from the normal uncertainties of life. Furthermore, this process 
of guarding one‖s volition requires a foundational epistemological transformation. 
That is to say, the person who would be free must learn to see the world, and what 
happens in it, in a radically different way. Supreme value must be placed on 
protecting oneself from external circumstances by seeing them as outside of one‖s 
concern. The guarding of one‖s honor and virtue is what matters, not what happens 
in life. Once this revolution of thought has occurred it must be furthered 
throughout life. Only then will a person be truly free, able to rest in utter serenity 
and calm, no matter what happens. 
As such, Epictetus‖ moral philosophy is necessarily and unashamedly 
centered on individual action and personal, rational decision-making. The 
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individual, and the individual‖s self-preservation, is at the core of his thought. This 
is the only way that true emotional invulnerability is possible. While social relations 
are important for Epictetus, these can never impinge upon the more ultimate 
concern with self-preservation. Community for Epictetus is only important insofar 
as one‖s own honor is at stake in the preservation and betterment of social relations. 
One‖s honor, however, can be maintained no matter what other people do. Honor is 
wholly within the realm of one‖s volition; it is not, and indeed cannot be, subject to 
the actions of others, or else it places one in a position of being open to the 
potential harm others could cause to oneself. That is to say, a truly free person 
cannot allow him- or herself to be placed into a position of vulnerability, emotional 
or otherwise. Such vulnerability with regard to others is a catastrophic failure 
according to Epictetus‖ philosophy. Such vulnerability with regard to anything 
external (including community or society) is the very definition of human slavery. 
Paul‖s understanding of individuals and community points in a very different 
direction. For him, individuals experience a fundamental deficiency apart from 
being embedded into community, into the body of Christ. The Epictetan ideal of the 
isolated individual floating in the serenity of self-mastery through mental control is 
far from the picture that emerges in Paul‖s letters. In Romans, as we have seen, the 
individual is absolutely incomplete apart from the wider body of Christ. Individual 
members of the one body need one another, which is the point of Paul‖s body and 
members analogy in Romans 12. Otherwise, they are merely severed appendages 
with no proper function in the world. 
More than this, individuals are told by Paul that love within the community 
is a binding obligation; love is a debt owed by all in the body of Christ (Rom 13:8). As 
such, individuals are in a very important sense not free at all. The individual has 
been freed from bondage to sin (the point of Romans 6:1-8:17) in order to become a 
slave of righteousness (Rom 6:18, 19) and of God (Rom 6:22). Such slavery brings 
with it binding obligations within the community of fellow slaves of God. Whereas 
for Epictetus the actions of others are completely outside the concern of self-
preservation, for Paul the way in which others respond to oneself is of supreme 
importance. As he says in Romans 14:14: “If your brother or sister is grieved because 
of food, you are no longer walking in love.” The Pauline individual is not an 
autonomous agent free to pursue immunity from the possibility of being affected by 
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the fate of others in the community. Although it is true that Epictetus firmly insists 
on the necessity of doing good to those within one‖s social sphere, he parts 
company with Paul over Paul‖s insistence, as expressed, for example, in the body 
and members analogy of 1 Cor 12:26, that “if one member suffers, all suffer 
together.” One‖s own well-being is in a very important sense dependent on the well-
being of every other member of the community. A sentiment like this strikes at the 
heart of Epictetus‖ moral system. For Epictetus other people are ultimately 
“external things” (cf. σοῖρ ἐκσόρ - 2.22.19) that have the potential to interfere with 
the quest for personal mastery and emotional quietude.1 
Another, and related, difference between a Pauline and Epictetan view of the 
individual revolves around the idea of weakness. Moving outside of Romans, it is 
seen that Paul‖s own view of himself and of the ideal life of faith centers on the 
concept of weakness and frailty. Especially in 1 Corinthians weakness defines what 
it means to be a believer in Jesus Christ. God specifically “chose what was weak in 
the world to shame the wise” (1 Cor 1:27) so that God, and not human beings, might 
receive all glory (see 1 Cor 1:29). Paul‖s own proclamation of Christ was “in 
weakness and in fear and much trembling” (1 Cor 2:3), a weakness that provides a 
dramatic “demonstration of the Spirit and of power” (1 Cor 2:4) in the world. 
Epictetus, while also attempting to provide his students with a solid ground on 
which to stand in the midst of adversity, could never countenance the notion that 
fearful weakness is evidence of the powerful work of God within an individual. 
Vulnerability to external circumstances by definition undermines everything 
central to Epictetan and Stoic teaching. 
In sum, it is true that both Paul and Epictetus are concerned with individuals 
and individual action. Both thinkers also attach great importance to how individuals 
are related to others. It is most certainly not the case, however, that Paul and 
Epictetus relate the individual and the community in the same way. Paul, following 
the example he sees laid out in the example of Jesus Christ, teaches of the weakness, 
humility and vulnerability that lies at the very heart of belief in Jesus Christ, which 
                                                        
1 The closest Epictetus comes to Paul‖s teaching on vulnerability towards, and sympathy within, 
the community is found in places such as Ench. 16, where he counsels his students not to “hesitate to 
sympathize with [a suffering friend] so far as words go [μέφπι λόγοτ], and if occasion offers, even to 
groan with him; but be careful not to groan also within [ἔςψθεν]” (LCL translation modified). 
Pretended sympathy for the sake of a distraught loved one? Yes. Vulnerability and participation in 
that very suffering? Absolutely not. 
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is a sentiment that Epictetus could never accept.2 The Epictetan individual, even in 
its relatedness to others, is necessarily an invulnerable individual. The Pauline 
individual-within-community is necessarily a vulnerable individual. 
 
2. Individual and Community in Romans 
The individual is ubiquitous in Romans. The widespread dismissal by modern 
scholars of any significant notion of the Pauline individual represents a flawed 
perspective on the apostle‖s thought. In Paul‖s theology the individual and the 
community are two necessarily (and tightly) integrated concepts. There is no 
individual outside of community, and there is no community that relegates the individual to 
the periphery. Interpretations that obscure this fundamental connectivity of 
individual and community significantly distort Paul‖s articulation of the believing 
life. The purpose of this dissertation has been to explicate the necessary 
relationship between Pauline individuals and community, and in so doing to 
provide resources for a theological understanding of the relation between the 
individual and the community in the broader Pauline corpus.3 
We have seen that Romans displays a wide variety of theologically 
foundational ways of thinking about the individual and individuality. A bare 
concession to the presence of individuals in Pauline thought, however, is not 
sufficient. As I have labored to show, the theology of the entire letter, as well as of 
many particular Pauline themes, cannot be made adequate sense of without duly 
attending to the numerous ways Paul conceptualizes the individual. Each individual 
type, in its own distinctive way, makes clear just how centrally important—even 
indispensible—the category of the individual is in Paul‖s thinking. 
The fundamentally communal context of the Pauline individual(s) has also 
been highlighted. This point cannot be stressed enough, especially in light of those 
who have swung the pendulum too far in the other direction in their attempts to 
reintroduce the category of the individual into discussions of Paul‖s thought. Most 
important in this regard has been the somatic individual of Romans 12; the principle 
                                                        
2 See e.g., Phil 2:1-11. 
3 As was mentioned in the last chapter, to provide a full articulation of Paul‖s theology of 
individuals and community this study would need to be supplemented by further work relating 
Paul‖s Christology and pneumatology to his understanding of individuals in community. Relating the 
motif of Spirit-wrought union with, or participation in, Christ to the present study would be 
particularly useful. 
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of unity-within-diversity, of the “body and members,” reveals as clearly as anything 
in Paul‖s letters the impossibility of either speaking of a community in which 
individuals play little or no role, or of an individual who is not inextricably 
embedded into the ongoing life of the believing community. 
This dissertation has not attempted to say everything that could be said 
about Pauline individuals. In presenting the material in the form of a typology of 
individuals in Romans I have attempted to provide a limited, but truly 
representative, account of the individual in Paul‖s thought. Romans was selected 
both because of its prominence in recent scholarly debates over the place of 
individuals in Paul‖s theology, and because its size and detailed level of theological 
argumentation make it ideal as a test case. The fact that detailed pastoral problems 
do not seem to have driven the letter‖s composition also makes it a good choice, 
since Paul appears to have set out some of his foundational conceptions about 
individuals and community in a more, dare it be said, systematic and unhurried 
manner. This is not to suggest that pastoral concerns do not drive Paul‖s exposition 
in Romans, but simply to state that the way in which Paul articulates his gospel and 
applies it to the diverse range of issues he deems significant for the Roman believers 
is more conducive to the kind of analysis I have provided in the chapters above than 
would be the case in Paul‖s other letters. 
Other significant Pauline texts could also have been discussed, but these 
would simply add detail to the typology presented above. For example, a crucially 
important text for getting at the heart of Paul‖s deeply held convictions about 
individual, spiritual experience is Gal 2:19-20. For those scholars unconvinced—
despite the prominence of the first person singular—that Paul speaks for himself in 
Romans 7, there is no mistaking that he does so in Gal 2:19-20. In a remarkably 
similar sentiment to that expressed in Rom 7:9-11, Paul states in Gal 2:19-20 that 
through the law he died to the law (ἐγὼ γὰπ διὰ νόμοτ νόμῳ ἀπέθανον – Gal 2:19a). 
The purpose (ἵνα) of this death was that he might live to God (θεῶ ζήςψ – Gal 2:19b) 
by faith in Jesus, the son of God (ἐν πίςσει . . . σῇ σοῦ τἱοῦ σοῦ θεοῦ - Gal 2:20d; cf. 
Rom 7:24-8:4). Through this faith Paul has come to see, not simply that Jesus Christ 
is a redeemer, but that he has personally showered his love on Paul as an individual 
and given himself for Paul‖s own justification (σοῦ τἱοῦ σοῦ θεοῦ σοῦ ἀγαπήςανσόρ 
με καὶ παπαδόνσορ ἑατσὸν ὑπὲπ ἐμοῦ - Gal 2:20e). A polemic against the individual 
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simply evaporates when confronted with Gal 2:19-20. Yet, a verse such as this by no 
means overturns Paul‖s firm insistence on the community-centric nature of 
salvation: the redemption that all of the Galatian believers have in Christ (see e.g., 
Gal 1:3; 2:16; 3:13-14) is described in Gal 3:27 as a baptism into Christ (εἰρ Χπιςσόν). 
This baptism eliminates all human markers of status and worth and makes the 
entire body of individual Galatians (πάνσερ ὑμεῖρ) “one in Christ Jesus” (εἷρ . . . ἐν 
Χπιςσῶ Ἰηςοῦ - Gal 3:28).4 As in Romans 12, so also in Galatians 3 there is no 
salvation outside of incorporation into the single body of Christ. Paul knows nothing 
of an isolated individualism. 
Galatians 2:19-20 is simply one example that makes it clear that if scholars 
were able to step back from the exegetical quagmire of Romans 7 they might be able 
to see that there is much more to be said about Paul‖s use of the first person 
singular, and about what it expresses regarding his personal (and others‖) 
experience of Christ‖s redemption.5 One could look to many other texts as well to 
develop the deeply personal and individual nature of Paul‖s understanding of 
redemption in Christ (see e.g., Rom 9:3; 1 Cor 15:10; Gal 1:11-12; 6:17; Phil 3:13-14). 
Pauline uses of second person singulars could also receive a similar treatment. In 
Philemon 5, for example, Paul rejoices in Philemon‖s own faith (σὴν πίςσιν ἣν ἔφειρ) 
“toward the Lord Jesus” (ππὸρ σὸν κύπιον Ἰηςοῦν). Just as Paul shifts to a second 
person singular (ςε) to highlight the intimately personal nature of spiritual life in 
Christ in Rom 8:2, so does he speak of faith to Philemon in strongly experiential and 
individual terms. The individual is an indispensably central category in Pauline 
theology, although it is always the individual-within-community. 
First Corinthians 12 has been touched on in chapter five above, although it is 
worth mentioning again. In 1 Cor 12:12-31 Paul articulates his vision of the 
individual and the community in such a way that both the individual and its 
necessarily communal location predominate in the discussion. In fact, in this text 
Paul brings together his understanding of baptism as incorporation into Christ (cf. 
Gal 3:27-28), and his use of the body and members metaphor (cf. Rom 12:3-8). 
Baptism into Christ creates a single, corporate body (1 Cor 12:13), but this body is 
                                                        
4 On Paul‖s subversion of ancient notions of grace (gift) given according to worth see John M. G. 
Barclay, “Paul, the Gift and the Battle over Gentile Circumcision: Revisiting the Logic of Galatians,” 
ABR 58 (2010): esp. 48-51, 56. 
5 See e.g., Dodd, Paradigmatic ‘I’. 
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not a true body without its individual members (1 Cor 12:12). The body made up of 
all believers is such a unity that if one member suffers or is honored, all suffer or are 
honored together with that individual (1 Cor 12:26). The main point of Paul‖s use of 
the body and members metaphor in 1 Corinthians 12 is to impress upon the 
Corinthians that each individual (ἕκαςσορ – 1 Cor 12:7) among them has been 
personally gifted by the Spirit for the good of the whole body. 
All of these examples, and more, could be used to provide a thicker 
description of the Pauline individual-in-community than has been provided in the 
analysis in the chapters above, although without fundamentally altering the picture 
of the individual we have observed in Romans. The pervasiveness of the 
communally-determined individual in Paul‖s theology will be all the clearer the 
more one engages in similar investigations of his other letters. 
 
The individual and the community form an inextricable unity in Pauline theology. 
Several false assumptions about either the individual or the community have been 
subjected to scrutiny in this dissertation: 
 
(1) That in “Christian communities, the main problem was to keep the Christian 
group, the individual Church, in harmony and unity, in sound state (e.g. 1 
Cor 12; Rom 12,3-21). The individual as such our dyadic personality, is 
expendable.”6 Paul‖s ethical vision did in fact place the life of the community 
at its pinnacle. It did not, however, treat the individual as expendable. 
Instead of a social-scientific model (or any other kind of model) of the 
Pauline individual that emphasizes its necessarily communal-relatedness in 
such a way as to make the individual expendable, we find, as Paul states in 
Rom 12:5, that all believers together are one body in Christ (οἱ πολλοὶ ἓν 
ς῵μά ἐςμεν ἐν Χπιςσῶ), but also—and just as importantly—that they are 
“individually members of one another” (ὁ δὲ καθ᾽εἷρ ἀλλήλψν μέλη).7 
(2) That “there is no such thing as an ―individual‖ Christian” since “Paul‖s gospel 
created a community.”8 Paul‖s gospel indeed created a community; it created 
                                                        
6 Malina, “Personality,” 130. 
7 Cf. First Corinthians 12:27 (NRSV): “Now you are the body of Christ and individually members 
of it” (Gk.: ὑμεῖρ δέ ἐςσε ς῵μα Χπιςσοῦ καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέποτρ). 
8 Wright, Saint Paul, 197. 
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a community of individual Christians baptized into the single body of Christ. 
Furthermore, there is not a single way of conceptualizing the individual in 
Paul‖s letters; a rich variety of ways of defining individuality exist in Pauline 
thought that must all be attended to in order even to begin addressing the 
question of individuals and community. A broad-brush dismissal of “The 
Individual” is simply a category error. 
(3) That the believer‖s “experience of Christ . . . lifts the individual . . . out of his 
or her individuality, leaves it behind and carries him or her over to a state of 
communality.”9 Rather, the believer‖s faith-initiated experience of Christ 
lifts him or her out of a state of individualistic self-absorption, leaves it 
behind and carries the individual as an individual over to a state of 
individuality-within-communality. 
(4) That “Paul was concerned with the individual qua individual, irrespective of 
social or, indeed, historical identity;” that “Paul‖s understanding of God‖s 
work in the world was primarily operative at the level of the individual, as 
opposed to being largely concerned with people groups and group 
identity.”10 There is no individual qua individual in Paul‖s letters. Nor is God‖s 
work in the world in any sense operative at an individual level as opposed to a 
communal one. There is no Pauline individual other than the individual-in-
community, other than the self in vital communion with Jesus Christ and all 
of those who are united to him by faith. 
 
In future, Pauline scholarship should abandon these false assumptions. Paul‖s 
anthropology, soteriology, ecclesiology and ethics (among other things) have for 
too long been obscured by constructs that place either the individual or the 
community over against the other. They belong together.  
                                                        
9 Engberg-Pedersen, Paul and the Stoics, 294. 
10 Burnett, Salvation, 10. 
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